INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

(BEING THE AUTHOR'S THESIS APPROVED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE).

By

JWALA PRASAD, M. A., Ph. D. (Cantab.)

Professor of Philosophy,

Robertson College, Jubbulpore,

and

Head of the Philosophy Department,

Nagpur University.

PUBLISHED BY

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS,

BOOKSELLERS & PUBLISHERS,

Said Mitha Street,

LAHORE.

Published by
Sundar Lal Jain,
Proprietor,
The Punjab Sanskrit
Book Depot, Lahore.

1939

Printed by
Shanti Lal Jain,
Manager, at the Bombs
Sanskrit Press,
Saidmitha, Lahore.

CONTENTS.

Page

Part III.

Epistemology of the Philosophical Sūtras.

List of abbreviations used in this work.

Ait.	Aitareya Upaniṣad.
ASP.	Aristotelian Society Proceedings.
AS.	Artha-śāstra (of Kauṭilya).
Aṣṭa.	Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā.
Bṛhad.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
BSS.	Bombay Sanskrit Series.
CBN.	Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa.
Chānd.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
CS. / C. Saṃhitā.	Caraka-Saṃhitā.
CSS.	Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series.
CSUP.	Constructive Survey of the Upaniṣadic Philosophy.
FD.	Fragments from Diṅnāga.
HIL.	History of Indian Logic.
HIP.	History of Indian Philosophy.
HOS.	Harward Oriental Series.
HPIP.	History of Pre-buddhistic Indian Philosophy.
IIP.	Introduction to Indian Philosophy.
ILA.	Indian Logic and Atomism.
IP.	Indian Philosophy.
JAOS.	Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JASB.	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
JAS. Bomb.	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay.
JBTS.	Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.

JGD. — Jaina Gem Dictionary.
JPTS. — Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
JRAS. — Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
K. — Kārikā.
LS. — Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.
MB. — Mahābhārata.
MDS. — Mānava-dharma-śāstra.
MK. — Mādhyamika-kārikās.
MS. — Mīmāṃsā-sūtras,
MSV. — Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārtika.
Muṇḍ. — Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.
NA. — Nyāyāvatāra.
NB. — Nyāya-bhāṣya.
N. Bindu. — Nyāya-bindu.
NBT. — Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā.
NK. — Nyāya-kandalī.
NS. — Nyāya-sūtras.
NV. — Nyāya-vārtika.
NVT. / NVTT. — Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā.
OJ. — Outlines of Jainism.
OST. — Original Sanskrit Texts (Muir's)
PB. — Praśastapāda-bhāṣya.
PMS. — Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra.
PNT. — Pramāṇa-naya-tattvalokalaṅkāra.
PP. — Prajñā-pāramitās.
P. Pañcikā. — Prakaraṇa-pañcikā.
PPM. — Prabhākara School of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā.
Ram. — Rāmāyaṇa.
RPV. — Religion and Philosophy of the Veda.
SBE. — Sacred Books of the East Series.

SBH.	Sacred Books of the Hindus.
SBJ.	Sacred Books of the Jainas.
SDS.	Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha.
SK.	Sāṃkhya-kārikā.
SKGB.	Sāṃkhya-kārikā-gauḍapāda-bhāṣya.
SPS.	Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtras.
STK.	Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī.
ŚB.	Śabara-bhāṣya.
Śrī. B.	Śrī-bhāṣya.
Śvet.	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.
Taitt.	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka.
TC.	Tattva-cintāmaṇi.
TS.	Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra.
Vaj. cched.	Vajra-cchedikā.
Vāj. Sam.	Vājasaneya-saṃhitā.
VB.	Vidyābhūṣaṇa.
Ved. S.	Vedānta-sūtras.
Viz. SS.	Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.
VM.	Vācaspati Miśra.
VS.	Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.
VSM.	Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī.
YS.	Yoga-sūtras.
ZDMG.	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft.

List of works consulted

N. B. (1) The following list contains the name of only those works to which there are references in this Thesis.

(2) The transliteration of Sanskrit titles as given by the editors has been preserved.

I. Texts and commentaries.

(i) The Vedic and Post-vedic Literature.

1. *Rig-veda-saṃhitā*, the Sacred Hymns of the Brahmans; together with the commentary of Sayaṇacharya. Edited by M. Múller, 6 vols., London 1849-74.

2. *The Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā*, with the commentary of Mahīdhara edited by A. Weber, Berlin (printed), London, 1852.

3. *Atharva-veda-saṃhitā* with the commentary of Sāyaṇācārya, edited by Shankar Pāṇdurang Pandit 4 vols. Bombay, 1895-1898.

4. *The Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* with extracts made from the commentaries of Sāyaṇa, Harisvāmin and Dvivedaganga, edited by A. Weber, Berlin (printed) London, 1855.

5. *The Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, according to the text of the Mādhyandina School. Translated (with introduction) by Julius Eggeling, 5 vols, 1882-1900. (SBE. vols. XI, XXVI, XLI, XLIII, XLIV).

6. *The Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, with introduction, translation, notes, indexes and an appendix containing the portion hitherto unpublished of the *Sāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka*, by A. B. Keith, Oxford, 1909 (*Anecdota Oxoniensia: Aryan Series*, Part IX).

7. *The Taittirīyāraṇyaka of the Black Yajur-veda* with the commentary of Sāyaṇācārya; edited by Rajendralal Mitra, (Bibl. Indica), Calcutta, 1864-72.

8. *Aṣṭaviṃśatyupaniṣadaḥ*, edited by Vasudeva Laxman Shastri Phaṇsikar, Bombay 1904.

(ii) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System.

1. *The Nyāya-sūtras* of Gotama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana and the *Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti* of Viśvanātha, Vidyavilas Press, Benares, 1920.

2. *The Nyāya-sūtras* of Gautama with the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana and the *Vārtika* of Uddyotakara, with notes from the *Nyāya-Vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra and the *Tātparya-pariśuddhi* of Udayanācārya, translated into English by Gaṅgānātha Jhā (Indian Thought, vol. IV, No. 1 to vol. X, No. 4), Allahabad, 1912-20.

3. *The Nyāya-sūtras* of Gotama, translated with a commentary by Mahāmahopādhyāya Satiśa Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa (SBH. vol. viii), Allahabad, 1913.

4. *Die Nyāya-sūtras* Text, Übersetzung, Erläuterung and Glossar von W. Ruben, Leipzig, 1928.

5. *The Nyāya-Vārtika* of Uddyotakara, with the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, (Bibl. Indica) 1887.

6. *The Nyāya-Vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra (Viz. SS.), Benares, 1898.

7. *The Nyāya-mañjarī* of Jayanta (Viz. SS.) Benares, 1895.

8. *The Nyāya-sāra* of Bhāsarvajña, with the *Nyāya-tātparya-dīpikā* by Jayasinha Sūri (Bibl. Indica), 1910.

9. *The Tattva-cintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, with extracts from the commentaries of Mathurānātha

Tarkavāgīśa and of Jayadeva Miśra, vols. I-V (Bibl. Indica) 1888-1901.

10. *The Vaiśesika-darśana,* with the commentaries of *Ś*aṃkara Miśra and Jayanārāyaṇa Tarka-Pañcānana (Bibl. Indica), 1861.

11. *The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* of Kaṇāda with the commentary of *Ś*aṃkara Miśra and extracts from the gloss of Jayanārāyaṇa together with notes from the commentary of Candrakānta, and an introduction; translated by Nanda Lal Sinha (SBH, vol. VI), Allahabad, 1911.

12. *The Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms* of Kaṇāda with comments from the *Upaskāra* of *Ś*aṃkara Miśra and the *Vivṛtti* of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, text and translation by A. E. Gough, Benares, 1873.

13. *The Bhāṣya of Praśastapāda* together with the *Nyāya-Kandalī* of Sridhara, (Viz. SS., vol IV), Benares, 1895.

(iii) The Sāṃkhya System.

1. *The Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, with the Sāṃkhya-tattva-Kaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra; text and translation by G. N. Jhā, Bombay, 1896.

2. *The Sāṃkhya-kārikā* with *the Bhāṣya of Gauḍapāda*; text and translation by Colebrooke and Wilson, Bombay, 1887.

3. *The Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra* with *the Vṛtti of Vijñānabhikṣu* (Bibl. Indica) Calcutta 1854-56.

4. *The Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra,* with *the Vṛtti of Aniruddha,* and *the Bhāṣya of Vijñānabhikṣu,* etc. text of tne Sūtra and translation by Nanda Lal Sinha (SBH, vol. XI), Allahabad, 1915.

(iii) The Yoga System.

1. *The Yoga-sūtras*, with *Rāja-mārtaṇḍa-vṛtti* of Bhoja, text and translation by Rajendralal Mitra (Bibl. India), 1883.

2. *The Yoga-sūtras* with *the Bhāṣya of Vyāsa* and *the Tattva-vaiśāradī* of Vācaspati Miśra, edited by R. S. Bodas (Bombay SS.) 1892.

3. *The Patañjali Yoga-sūtras*, with the commentaries of Vyāsa and the gloss of Vācaspati Miśra, translated by Rama Prasad (SBH. vol IV), Allahabad, 1910.

4. *The Yoga System of Patañjali*—Woods (HOS., vol. xvii)., 1914.

(v) The Pūrva-mīmāṃsā System.

1. *The Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* with *the Śabara-bhāṣya*, 2 vols (Bibl. Indica), Calcutta 1873.

2. *The Mīmāṃsa-śloka-vārtika* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (CSS) Benares, 1898.

3. *The Śloka.vārtika*, translated from the original Sanskrit with extracts from the commentaries of Sucarita Miśra, *the Kāśikā* and *the Nyāya-ratnākara*, by Gaṅgā-nātha Jhā (Bibl. Indica, New Series) Calcutta, 1900.

4. *The Prakaraṇa-pañcikā* of Sālikanātha Miśra (CSS.) Benares, 1904.

(vi) The Vedānta System

1. *Śrī Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* with *Kārikās by Gauḍapāda Āchārya*, with *the Bhāṣya of Śaṃkara Ācārya* and its commentary by Ānandajñāna, also *the Dīpikā* by Śaṃkarānanda (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series) Poona, 1890.

2. *The Brahma-sūtras* with *the Bhāṣya of Śaṃkarācārya* (The works of Śrī Śaṃkarācārya, vols. I-III) Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, 1910.

3. *The Vedānta-sūtras*, with the commentary by Śaṅkarācarya. Translated by G. Thibaut. (SBE. vols. 34, 38), 1890-1896.

4. *The Śrī-Bhāṣya* by Rāmānujacārya, edited with notes in Sanskrit by Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankar, Part I, Text (BSS. No. LXVIII), Bombay, 1914.

5. *The Vedānta-dīpa*, a gloss on Brahmasūtras, by Śrī Bhagavat Rāmānujāchārya, edited by Śrī Ācārya Bhaṭṭanāthasvāmī (Benares. SS.), Benares, 1904.

6. *The Vedānta-sūtras* with *the Śrī-Bhāṣya* of Rāmānujācārya. Translated into English (with introduction and notes) by M. Raṅgācārya and M. B. Varadarāja Aiyangar—Madras, 1899.

7. *The Vedānta-sūtras* with the commentary of Rāmānuja. Translated by George Thibaut (SBE., vol., 48), Oxford, 1904.

8. *The Vedānta siddhānta-muktāvalī* of Prakāśānanda, with English Translation and Notes, by Arthur Venis, (Reprint from the Pandit), Benares, 1898.

(vii) Jainism.

1. *The Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* of Umasvati, with *the Bhāṣya* by the author himself (Bibl. Indica), 1903.

2. *The Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra.* A treatise on the essential principles of Jainism; edited with introduction, translation, notes and comments in English, by J. L. Jaini, (SBJ., vol., 2) Arrah, 1920.

3. *The Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara, with Sanskrit text and commentary, edited by Satiśacandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa (Library of Jaina Literature Series), Arrah, 1915.

4. *The Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra* of Māṇikya Nandī together with *Parīkṣā-mukha-laghu-vṛtti* by Anantavīrya (Bibl. Indica, NS.), 1909.

5. *The Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra* of Deva Sūri, with *the Vivṛtti* named *Ratnākara*, Chapters I-IV, Bombay, 1914.

6. *The Pramāna-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra* of *Ś*rī Vadi Devasūri, with the commentary *Ratnākarāvatārikā* of *Ś*rī Ratnaprabhācārya (Chapters 3-8)—(Yashovijaya Jaina Granthamālā, 21), Benares, 1910.

(viii) **Buddhism.**

1. *The Dīgha Nikāya*, edited by Prof. T. W. Rhys Davids, Ph. D., LL. D., and Prof. J. Estlin Carpenter, M. A., vols. I and II, London 1890, 1903 (Pali Text Society)

2. *The Milindapañho*: being dialogues between King Milinda and the Buddhist Sage Nāgasena. The Pali Text edited by V. Trenckner, London, 1880.

3. *The Lalita Vistara* or Memoirs of the Early life of *Ś*akya Sinha, edited by Rajendralal Mitra, (Bibl. Indica), Calcutta, 1877.

4. *Kathāvatthu-PPakaraṇa-Atthakathā* (Journal of the Pali Text Society) London, 1889.

5. Compendium of Philosophy, being a translation now made for the first time from the original Pali of the *Abhidhammatthasangaha*, with introductory essay and notes (PTS.) London, 1910.

6. *Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā* (*Prajñā-pāramitā*), a collection of discourses on the Metaphysics of the Mahāyāna School of the Buddhists, edited by Rajendralal Mitra (Bibl. Indica), Calcutta, 1888.

7. Texts, Documents, and Extracts chiefly from Manuscripts in the Bodelian and other Oxford Libraries, Aryan Series, vol. I, Part I. Buddhist Texts from Japan: *Vajrakkhedikā*, edited by F. M. Müller, Oxford, MDCCC-LXXXI.

8. ditto.—Part III. The Ancient Palm Leaves and the *Prajñā-pāramitā-hridaya-sūtra* and the *Uṣṇiṣa-Vijaya-Dhāraṇi;* edited by F. M. Muller and Bunyin Nanjio, with an appendix by G. Bühler, Oxford, 1884.

9. *The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* edited by Bunyin Nanjio, Bibl. Otaniensis, 1923.

10. *The Lañkāvatāra-sūtra*, edited with notes by Satiśchandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa (BTS.) Darjeeling, 1900.

11. *The Mādhyamika-kārikās of Nāgārjuna*, with the commentary of Candrakīrti, edited by L. de la Vallee Poussin (Bibl. Buddhica), 1913.

12. *The Mādhyamika-kārikās*, edited and translated with notes by Satiśchandra Vidyabhūṣaṇa (JBTS.) Calcutta, 1896-97.

13. *Fragments from Diṅnāga*, compiled by H. N. Randle (Royal Asiatic Society), London, 1926.

14. *The Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā* of Dharmottarācarya, to which is added *the Nyāya-bindu*, edited by Peterson (Bibl. Indica, N. S.), 1889.

15. Dharmakīrti's *Nyāya-bindu-prakaraṇa*, with Dharmottara's Commentary, edited and translated into Russian by Stcherbatsky, St Petersburg, 1903.

(ix) Other Texts.

1. *The Rāmāyaṇa*, Poema Indiano Di Valmici—Per Gaspare Gorresio, vols. I-XI, Parigi, 1843-1867.

2. *The Mahābhārata.* An Epic Poem written by the celebrated Veda Vyāsa Riṣi, vols. I-V, Calcutta, 1834-1839.

3. *The Mānava-dharma-śāstra* (Institutes of Manu) with the commentaries of Medhātithi, Sarvajñanārāyaṇa, etc. and an appendix by Visvanāth Nārāyaṇa Mandlik, Bombay, 1886.

4. *The Artha-śāstra* of Kauṭilya, A New Edition by J. Jolly and R. Schmidt, vol. I. (The Punjab Sanskrit Series, No. 4), Lahore, 1923.

5. *The Caraka-saṃhitā*, Nirṇayasāgar Press, Bombay, 1867.

6. *The Suśruta-saṃhitā*, edited by Śrī Jīvānand-vidyāsāgara, 3rd edition, Calcutta, 1889.

7. *The Caraka-saṃhitā*, translated into English by Kaviraj Avinash Chandra Kaviratna, Calcutta 1902.

8. *The Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* or an epitome of the Different Systems of Indian Philosophy, by Mādhavācārya, edited by Paṇḍita Iśvarachandra Vidyāsāgara, (Bibl. Indica), Calcutta, 1858.

II. Modern Authors (arranged alphabetically).

Barua, B. M.	A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, Calcutta, 1921.
Belvalkar, S. K.	The article on Maṭhara-vṛtti, Bhandarkar Commemorative Essays, 1917.
Bloomfield, M.	Religion of the Veda. The ancient religion of India (from Rig-veda to Upanishads)—American Lectures on the History of Religions, New York, 1908.
Bosanquet, B.	The Essentials of Logic, being Ten Lectures on Judgment and Inference, London, 1906.
Broad, C. D.	'Is there knowledge by acquaintance ?' ASP. Supplementary volume II, 1919—Problems of Science and Philosophy.
Chakravarti, V.	The Pramāṇas of the Hindu Logic. JASB. 1910.
Chatterji, S. C.	The Nyāya Doctrine of Pramāṇa, Journal of the Department of Letters, Calcutta University, vol. XVI, Calcutta, 1927.

Davies, J. — Hindu Philosophy. The Sāṃkhya Kārikā of Īśvara Kriṣṇa. An Exposition of the System of Kapila with an Appendix on the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Systems, London, 1881.

Dasgupta, S. — History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, Cambridge, 1922.

Deussen, P. — Allegemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. I, Leipzig, 1894.

Dhruva, A. B. — 'Trividham Anumānam', Proceedings of the First Oriental Conference, Poona, 1919.

Edgell, B. — 'Is there knowledge by acquaintance ?' ASP. Supplementary Volume II, 1919—Problems of Philosophy.

Faddegon, B. — The Vaiśeṣika-System, described with the help of the oldest texts, Amsterdam, 1918.

Garbe, R. — 1. Die Sāṃkhya Philosophie, Leipzig. 1894.
2. Sāṃkhya and Yoga, Strassburg, 1896.

Geldner, K. F. — 1. Der Rigveda in Auswahl, II, 1909.
2. Der Rigveda Ūbersetzt und Erläutert I, Gôttingen, 1923.

Hegel, — The Logic of Hegel (English

Translation by Wallace, Second Edition), 1892.

Hertel, J. — Die arische Feuerlehre, I, Leipzig, 1925.

Hicks, D. — Is there knowledge by acquaintance? ASP. Supplementary Volume II, 1919—Problems of Science and Philosophy.

Hillebrandt, A. —
1. Vedisch Yakṣa, Aus Indiens Kultur Festgabe Richard von Garbe, 1927.
2. Vedische Mythologie, Breslau, 1910.

Hobhouse, L. T. — The Theory of Knowledge, London, 1896.

Hoernele, A. F. R. — Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, I, Osteology, Oxford, 1907.

Jacobi, H. —
1. Garbe Richard—Die Saṃkhya Philosophie—Review in Gôttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen, 1895.
2. The Date of the Philosophical Sūtras, JAOS. XXXI, 1911.
3. Vīta and Avīta, Aus Indiens Kultur Festgabe Richard von Garbe, 1927.

Jaini, J. L. —
1. Outlines of Jainism (Jaina Literature Society) 1916.

2. Jaina Gem Dictionary, Arrah, 1918.

Jha, G. N. — 1. The Prābhākara School of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, Allahabad, 1911.
2. Nyāya Philosophy, Sādholal Lectures (Indian Thought).

Kant. — Critique of Pure Reason, (English Translation by Norman Kemp Smith, 1929).

Keith, A. B. — 1. Indian Logic and Atomism, Oxford, 1921.
2. Religion and Philosophy of the Veda, vol. II, (HOS.), 1925.
3. History of Sanskrit Classical Literature, Oxford, 1928.
4. Karma-mīmāṃsā.

Locke, J. — An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Abridged and edited by A. S. Pringle-Pattison, Oxford, 1924.

Moore, G. E. — 'Is there knowledge by acquaintance?' ASP., supplementary Volume II, 1919—Problems of Science and Philosophy.

Muir, J. — Original Sanskrit Texts, vol. V, London, 1870.

Prasad, J. — 1. Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Allahabad, 1928.

2. 'The Philosophical Significance of Ṛgveda, X. 129,5 and verses of allied nature' JRAS. July, 1929.

3. Discussion of the Buddhist Doctrines of Momentariness and Subjective Idealism in the Nyaya-sūtras, JRAS, January, 1930.

4. 'The Date of the Yoga-sūtras, JRAS. April, 1930.

Radhakrishnan, S. — Indian Philosophy, Vols I and II. London, 1923-27

Ranade, R. D. — Constructive Survey o Upaniṣadic Philosophy.

Randle, H. N. — Fragments from Diṅnāga London, 1926.

Russell, B. — Problems of Philosophy London, 1928.

Scheftelowitz, B. — Śivasaṅkalpopaniṣad, ZDMG 1921, also translated by A Weber in Ind. Stud. Vol. II.

Scherman, L. — Philosophische Hymnen au der Rig-und Atharva-ved Saṃhitā, Strassburg, 1887.

Shastri, H. P. — An Examination of the Nyaya sūtras, JASB, 1905.

Stcherbatsky, Th. — The Conception of Buddhi Nirvāṇa, Leningrad, 1927.

Stout, G. F. — Manual of Psychology (3rd edition).

Thomas, E. J. — The Life of Buddha as Legend and History, London, 1927.

Thomas, F. W. — An Indian Doctrine of Perception and Error, ASP., 1921-22.

Tucci, G. — Buddhist Logic before Diṅnāga (Asaṅga, Vasubandhu,, Tarka-śāstras). JRAS., July, 1929.

Udayavīra, — Antiquity of the Sāṃkhya-sūtras. Proceedings and Transactions of the Fifth All-India Oriental Conference, vol. I, 1928.

Ui, H. — The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy according to Daśapadārtha Śāstra, London, 1917.

Vidyābhūṣaṇa, S. — History of Indian Logic (Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools), Calcutta, 1921.

Welden, F. A. — The Sāṃkhya Teachings in the Maitrī Upaniṣad, American Journal of Philology, 35, (1914).

Whitney, W. D. — The Cosmogonic Hymn, Rig-veda, X, 129, JAOS. XI, 1885.

Winternitz, M. — Geschichte der indischen Litterature, III, 1922.

Preface.

The following pages are the result of a first-hand study of such Sanskrit texts as have been found important for tracing the origin and development of the theory of knowledge in Indian philosophy. Although the main object in writing this work has been to provide a systematic account of the epistemological thought as it is to be had in the works of Indian philosophers, the attempt to achieve this by means of a direct study of the authors has necessarily involved a discussion of the interpretation of a number of Sanskrit texts, especially because a good deal of difference of opinion has existed with regard to their exact philosophical import. Hence, side by side with an exposition of the subject proper there will be found in this work such discussions pertaining to the nature and significance of texts as are relevant to our enquiry.

It has not been my aim to enter into chronological controversies, and consequently I have eschowed them for the purpose of this treatise. In most cases I have followed the latest accepted views on Indian chronology; and where definite dates are not available, I have adopted such chronological as has been suggested by the logical development of thought and has not been found improbable otherwise. Whenever I have happened to differ, however, from the usual view about the date of an important work or author, I have given reasons for having done so[1].

1. For instance with regard to the date of the *Yoga-sūtras*. (pp. 65-81).

As regards the value of this work as an original contribution to the subject with which it deals, it may be said that, so far as I know, it represents the first systematic attempt to determine the origin and development of epistemological thought in Indian philosophy on the basis of the original Sanskrit texts, and to provide, in one place, an account of the views, on the subject, of the philosophers of the various schools so as to show their relations to one another in the history of this particular branch of study[1]. In this treatise I have also made a serious effort to interpret the thought of some of the most important authors independently of their scholastic commentators, thus to avoid the common pitfall of taking for granted that their interpretations were necessarily correct.

Besides the general treatment of the subject as a whole on the lines indicated above, the following are some of the main sections of this work which are original in the sense that they contain either matter first noticed and expounded as having a bearing upon the subject of epistemology, or discussions of certain views held by commentators and modern scholars on topics of epistemological

---

1. I must mention here a work by Dr. H. N. Randle: '*A study of the Nyāya-darśana in its relation to the early logic of other schools*', which mainly deals with the logic and epistemology of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in relation to the Mīmāṃsā and the Buddhist logic of the Mediaeval Period. I have had the opportunity of consulting a typed copy of this work through the courtesy of the author, as it was not published when this thesis was being written.

importance with the object of arriving at a satisfactory solution of the problems concerned.

1. The philosophical back-ground of Indian epistemology in the early literature, including the Vedic, the Brāhmaṇic and the Upaniṣadic scriptures of the Hindus and the *Prajñā-pāramitās* of the Buddhists, (pp. 19-61).

In connection with this subject the following views have been particularly discussed:—

(a) That some verses of Ṛgveda, I, 164 and X, 129 contain a doctrine of scepticism or agnosticism, the view held by Dr. Barua, Keith, Ranade, and others (pp. 19-34)

(b) That Ṛgveda X, 129, 5 signifies the recognition of a distinction between the worlds of appearance and reality, —the interpretation of the verse according to Deussen[1].

2. That the exposition of the theory of knowledge in the various Philosophical Sūtras may serve as an indication of their relative dates. In this connection, a discussion of the arguments given by Professors Jacobi and Woods for the late date of the *Yoga sūtras*[2].

3. That the doctrine of voidness (*śūnyatā*) as found in the *Mādhyamika-kārikāṣ* of Nagarjuna is one of absolute reality and not nihilism, or of relativity as held by Stcherbatsky, (pp. 102-111).

4. A discussion of the significance of the terms *citta*, *vṛtti*, *vikalpa* and *smṛti* in the *Yoga-sūtras*, especially a criticism of the interpretation of *vikalpa* by the commentators as a form of error, (pp. 112-119).

---

1. This verse has been discussed by me in a separate article published in the *JRAS*, July 1929.

2. This section is published as an article in the *JRAS.*, April 1930, under the title, *The Date of the Yoga-sūtras.*

5. The beginnings of the Nyāya epistemology as found in the *Caraka saṃhitā*, (pp. 120-133).

6. The following points in the theory of knowledge according to the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*:—

(a) Discussion of the significance of *SV.* III, 1, 1 to III, 1, 19 with particular reference to the traditional view that they deal with the question whether sense-cognition is a true mark of the existence of soul or not, (pp. 136-143)

(b) Cognition of substance, attributes, actions, and relations, (pp. 143-147).

7. The following topics in the epistemology of the *Nyāya sūtras*:—

(a) A discussion of the significance of the definition of *pratyakṣa* as given in the *Nyāya sūtras* with reference to the interpretations of important commentators, (pp. 154-163).

(b) A discussion of the three kinds of inference mentioned in *NS.* I, 1, 5 with reference to the traditional views of the commentators and the interpretations of some of the modern scholars, (pp. 163-173).

(c) The nature of *buddhi*, according to the Nyāya and the Sāṃkhya, with reference to the controversy as to whether it is permanent or temporary, (179-180).

A discussion in this connection of *NS.* III, 2, 10 to III, 2, 18, which have been supposed to contain a discussion of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. It is shown that they really contain a discussion of the nature of *buddhi*[1].

1. The subject has been discussed by me in an article in the *JRAS*, January 1930, under the title *'Discussion of the Buddhist doctrines of Momentariness and Subjective Idealism in the Nyāya-sūtras'*.

(d) A discussion of *NS.* IV. 2. 26 ff., which have been supposed to discuss the Buddhist doctrine of subjective idealism. It is maintained that they really refer to the cognition of the whole in relation to its parts.

8. The following points in connection with the theory of knowledge in the *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra*—

(a) Definition of *pramā* and *pramāṇa* in *SPS.* I, 87 discussed with reference to the interpretations of the commentators, (pp. 189-195).

(b) Significance of the definitions of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* in the *SPS.* (pp. 195-196).

9. Significance of the classifications of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* in the *Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra* of Maṇikya Nandī, (pp. 228-230) and the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra* of Deva Sūri (pp. 232-234).

10. Vācaspati Miśra's real position with regard to the division of *pratyakṣa* intc *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* (pp. 249-252).

11. The nature of *buddhi* according to the Vṛttikāra quoted in the *Śabara-bhāṣya*, and a discussion of the text '*tasmān na vyapadeśyā buddhiḥ*'...etc., (*ŚB.* p. 10)—(pp. 259-262).

12. A criticism of the interpretations of *āpta śrutiḥ* in *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, 5, according to Gauḍapāda (pp. 293-295) and Vācaspati Miśra (pp. 298-299), and an explanation of *pramāṇa* according to Vācaspati Miśra with reference to Dr. G. N. Jhā's translation of *anadhigata-viṣayā* under *SK.* 4. (pp. 295).

13. A criticism of the doctrine of knowledge (*vidyā*) and ignorance (*avidyā*) as expounded in the opening lines

of Śaṃkara's commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras*—(pp. 309-315).

14. A critical and comparative study of the problem of 'Acquaintance' or 'Simple Apprehension', (the Appendix).

Besides the above, the other chapters also,—especially those on Praśastapāda, Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Gauḍapāda, Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja,—will be found to contain a good deal of matter presented in such a way as to bring out the contributions of these authors in the history of Indian epistemology.

A list of the works which have been consulted in preparing this dissertation and to which there is a reference in the following pages is given separately. The references to the texts have been invariably given either in the footnotes, or in the body of the work. Important texts have been always quoted in original; and, in most cases, an English translation has also been provided.

As regards the selection of the sources for the purpose of this thesis, it may be said that mostly such literature has been chosen as has been found to be of basic importance and to have constructive value. Consequently, works of a purely dialectical nature with no constructive doctrines or criticisms to offer have been excluded. Similarly, such commentaries or sub-commentaries and manuals have also been left out as are only a belaboured elaboration or a compendium of what has been already said in the original works or the earlier commentaries.

In accordance with the aim of this work, the treatment has been confined to such material from the sources as has been found to be of epistemological value. Details of formal logic, such as forms of syllogistic inference and

the classification of fallacies, have been eliminated as outside the scope of the enquiry. Similarly, grammatical topics, such as discussions about the meanings of words and sentences, have also been left out.

In the arrangement of the various sections, I have departed from the usual practice of dealing with *all* the authors of one particular school in one place irrespective of their position in the general development of philosophical thought and their relations to the thinkers of the other schools. There could hardly be any excuse fo adhering to this unscientific method of exposition, especiall when the aim is to study the origin and development o one particular branch of study as a whole, and not onl as it grew in the various schools. I have not followe also the other alternative of dealing with the variou aspects of the epistemological enquiry, such as perceptio inference, etc., each in a separate section; fc although it is a good plan in itself, it is ill-adapted to tl purpose I have in view, viz. to trace not only the develo ment of the particular problems of the theory of kno ledge, but also to study the epistemological position of t important authors as a whole, so as to determine wl contributions they have made, and in what relations th stand to one another in the history o' the subject. Besid discussions concerning the texts of the various works, which there is quite a large number in this dissertati could not have been appropriately and effectively inser under any arrangement other than that which has b adopted here, viz. that of having separate sections for various works or authors, and considering their doctri and the relevant texts in one place.

I have also found it necessary to depart from the usual English terminology in translating certain Sanskrit technical terms. My aim has been to translate the terms as literally as possible, so as to retain their original shade of meaning, and thus also to make it possible to use consistently one and the same rendering for one particular term throughout the work, the peculiar significance of a term in any particular work or author, if any, having been explained in its context. To quote an instance, I have always translated '*pratyakṣa*' as 'direct knowledge' rather than 'sense-cognition', 'perception', or 'intuition'; for while it is a more literal rendering of the term, it has also the advantage of being applicable to all kinds of *pratyakṣa* both sensuous and non-sensuous. Similarly, *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka* are more correctly translated by 'reflective' and 'non-reflective' than by 'determinate' and 'non-determinate', or by 'mediate' and 'immediate', the terms which have been most used to express them. For a rendering of *upamāna* I have preferred the phrase 'knowledge by similarity' to the usual word 'analogy', in order to avoid the inplications of this term as used in European logic; or to 'comparison' which is neither a good translation nor a correct interpretation of *upamāna*.

A complete list of the abbreviations used in the thesis is given in the beginning.

In the preparation of this dissertation I have had the benefit of guidance by Dr. E. J. Thomas, who was my Supervisor. He has twice read the various portions of the Thesis, and his valuable criticisms have helped me a good deal in putting my thoughts into the form in which they are presented now. I am further indebted to him for his

frequent suggestions with regard to the works on the subject by foreign authors and his readiness to help me in referring to them.

Outside Cambridge, I have to express my thanks to Professor F. W. Thomas of the Oxford University, and Dr. H. N. Randle of the India Office Library. During my two visits to Oxford, Professor Thomas gave me an opportunity of not only meeting him but also discussing with him two of my papers which have since appeared as articles in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. To Dr. Randle I am obliged for having made it possible for me to borrow several important books from the India Office Library, and also for having sent to me at my request a typed copy of his work '*A study of the Nyāyadarśana in its relation to the early logic of other schools*' which was in the Press when this was being written by me. I have occasionally consulted this work in order to compare my views on certain topics with those of Dr. Randle's.

PART I

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION.

The Problem of Epistemology and its Treatment in Indian Philosophy.

Man finds himself in the possession of certain convictions which, roughly speaking, he calls knowledge. Further he finds that all his convictions are not of the same value, and that he has to distinguish them as true and false. The awareness of this distinction naturally leads him to enquire into the origin and validity of all knowledge. Such a study, which, in the words of the late Dr. Ward, is a 'systematic reflection concerning knowledge, and which takes knowledge itself as the object of science', is epistemology. It will appear that while the acquirement of knowledge is common to all men, a systematic reflection about it has been the concern of a few. Even among philosophers it is not all who have been alive to the problem of knowledge as a distinct branch of study. In the history of European philosophy, the beginnings of a systematic study of the theory of knowledge may be traced to Locke's enunciation of the enquiry in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*,[1] and a definite formulation of it to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.[2] In

---

1. I, 1, 2 and 4 *(Pringle Pattison's Edition).*
2. *Introduction (English Translation by Norman Kemp Smith, p. 46).*

Indian philosophy, the first systematic treatment of the means of knowledge (the *pramāṇas*) is to be found in Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtras*, which also deal with the objects of knowledge (the *prameyas*). Later, this study concerning knowledge came to be gradually separated from that of the objects of knowledge, and thus there came into existence works on pure logic and epistemology. This departure is noticeable first in the works of the Buddhist and the Jaina philosophers, and may be said to have taken place about the time of Diṅnāga (about 450 A. D.). The logicians of the *Nyāya* School, who were most of them commentators on the *Nyāya-sūtras* for a long time, adhered to the old practice of treating epistemology as a part of metaphysics until the time of Bhāsarvajña (about 950 A. D.), who included only the study of the means of knowledge in his *Nyāya-sāra*. The New School of Logic (*Navya-nyāya*), however, founded by Gaṅgeśa (about 1250 A. D.), settled down to a very subtle and systematic study of the means of knowledge as an altogether independent and distinct branch of study; and for a few centuries epistemology came to be regarded in India as not only an important but an indispensable part of the philosophic discipline. This separation of epistemology from metaphysics in the New School, however, did not necessarily mean any substantial advance in the study of the subject itself. The epistemological position of Gaṅgeśa and his successors is not very different

from that of his immediate predecessors in the old *Nyāya* School. The most distinguishing features of the New School really consist in a subtle dialectic and a highly complex technicality.

As a science of knowledge, which it is accepted to be on all hands, epistemology has to be considered in its relation to such other sciences as metaphysics, psychology and logic, which also treat of the same subject. In spite of a comparatively indifferent attitude of modern writers towards defining the exact nature and status of epistemological enquiry, I think, in order to understand and appreciate the standpoint of Indian philosophers on this subject, and also in view of the fact that there has been a radical difference of opinion concerning this topic among some of the older thinkers of the West, it is necessary to enter briefly into what may be called a critique of epistemology.

To begin with, let us consider what the datum of epistemology is. Can we take knowledge as its datum or not? In other words, does the study of epistemology start with the recognition of the fact that there is what, roughly speaking, we call knowledge, or is it supposed to question the very existence and possibility of knowledge, and claim to begin its enquiry without any assumptions whatsoever? It will apear that Kant, who represented the development of a line of thought on this subject started in Locke, thought, in any case, as Hegel understood him, that a critical

enquiry concerning knowledge is to be an *altogether preliminary study*; and Hegel, disagreeing with Kant, repudiated such a conception of epistemology. 'A main line of argument in the Critical Philosophy', says Hegel, 'bids us pause before proceeding to enquire into God or into the true being of things, and tells us first of all to examine the faculty of cognition and see whether it is equal to such an effort. We ought, says Kant, to become acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which it is employed; for if the instrument be insufficient, all our troubles will be spent in vain. The plausibility of this suggestion has won for it general assent and admiration; the result of which has been to withdraw cognition from an interest in its objects and absorption in the study of them, and to direct it back upon itself; and so turn it to a question of form. Unless we wish to be deceived by words, it is easy to see what this amounts to. In the case of other instruments, we can try and criticize them in other ways than by setting about the special work for which they are destined. But the examination of knowledge can be carried out only by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim.'[1] I need not add much to what has been said by Hegel in this criticism of a

1. *The Logic of Hegel, (English Translation by Wallace, Second Edition), Introduction*, p. 17.

;onception of epistemology which would start without ıssuming the existence of knowledge. The very possi- ›ility of an examination of knowledge rests upon the ıssumption that first there *is* knowledge; and in the 'ery act of denying knowledge, even the most vehe- nent sceptic or agnostic tacitly assumes that there *is* :nowledge.[1] This fact was recognised by the philoso- ›hers of all the schools of Indian philosophy except hose who represented the school of the Mādhyamika 3uddhism, which held the doctrine that the whole vorld of experience, including knowledge and the neans of knowledge, has only an illusory existence. ;autama Akṣapāda, the first systematic writer on logic n Indian philosophy, discusses the question whether it s possible to conceive the means of knowledge inde- ›endently of knowledge and the objects of knowledge[2].

---

1. Cf. Bertrand Russell—'When, however, we speak of philosophy as a criticism of knowledge. it is necessary to impose a certain limitation. If we adopt the atti- tude of a complete sceptic, placing ourselves wholly outside all knowledge, we are demanding what is im- possible, and our scepticism can never be refuted. For all refutation must begin with some piece of knowledge which the disputants share: from blank doubt, no argument can begin'; and again, 'Some knowledge, such as knowledge of the existence of our sense-data, appears quite indubitable, however calmly and thor- oughly we reflect upon it'—*Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 234-35.
2. *Nyāya-sūtra*, II, 1, 8 to 11; 1, 19.

He maintains that while the existence of the means of knowledge is proved by the fact that there is knowledge of objects, just as the existence of a (distant) drum is proved by the fact that there is sound produced out of it[1], their validity is proved by the means of knowledge themselves. In this respect he compares the means of knowledge to a lamp which illumines other things as well as itself.[2]

An examination of knowledge, such as epistemology undertakes, provides, however, a *method* of metaphysical enquiry and criticism; and we find that, in the history of philosophy, whether consciously or unconsciously, it has been used as such. This is most true of our own times, when all metaphysical problems are attacked through an analysis of knowledge; and again, all philosophical criticism is usually based upon epistemological ground. The same conception is implied in the term '*pramāṇa*' in Indian philosophy, which signifies both means of knowledge and means of proof. The beginnings of the analysis of knowledge in Indian philosophy, first psychological and then epistemological, were due to a need on the part of the thinkers to find means of proof for the beliefs which they had come to hold, for their own satisfaction, but still more, for producing conviction in others. This is evident from the fact that systematic logic in India took its rise from such rules and forms of debating aa are found in some of the works of

1. *Ibid.* II, 1, 15.
2. *Ibid* II, 1, 19.

:he early period. Hence to regard epistemology as a nere formal analysis of knowledge is not only futile out also untrue to facts.

Considered from this point of view epistemology can be exactly distinguished from logic only in so ar as the latter is treated in its purely formal aspect; otherwise they are substantially the same. In pracice, however, we find that while works on epistemoogy confine themselves to a general treatment of the neans of knowledge and the criterion of truth, those on logic undertake a detailed analysis and classification of the forms of knowledge and error, such as rules of lefinition and division, syllogistic inference, the classiication of fallacies; although in this respect too the practice varies greatly. In Indian philosophy epistenology was always treated as a part of logic.

In order to discuss the validity of the various neans of knowledge, epistemology has to depend upon n analysis of the mental processes leading to them, nd hence it is intimately connected with psychology. t was because of this close connection between the wo studies that in the earlier works of Indian philoophy an enquiry into the nature of the *pramāṇas* is of a mixed or rather confused nature; that is to say, he distinction between the psychological and the pistemological aspects of the enquiry is not quite clear.

To come to the details of the analysis of knowledge n Indian philosophy, it may be said that the means of

knowledge (the *pramāṇas*) which have been considered possible and have been discussed (not necessarily accepted by all the schools) are: (i) direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), including sense-cognition and other direct means of knowledge; (ii) inference (*anumāna*); (iii) knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*); (iv) verbal testimony (*śabda*), including scriptural testimony (*śāstra* or *āgama*); (v) presumption (*arthāpātti*); (vi) implication (*sambhava*); (vii) non-existence (*abhāva*); and (viii) tradition (*aitihya*). This is, however, the later stereotyped list. The first distinction in the analysis of knowledge, the signs of which are traceable even as early as some of the hymns of the *Ṛgveda* was that between knowledge of things immediately present to the senses (*pratyakṣa*) and those remote from the senses (*parokṣa*). Of these the latter were supposed to be known by divine testimony, or by reflection. According to the early Jaina logicians, however, the distinction between direct and indirect knowledge was different. They called the knowledge derived through the senses indirect, and that by intuition direct. The later Jaina writers on logic, however gave up this peculiar division, and accepted the ordinary classification of the Hindu logicians. In some of the texts of the early Hindu and Buddhist literature we can trace the development of a psychologic analysis which, in course of time, helped to shape the epistemological doctrines as found in the later literature of the *Sūtras* and other works. One of the ea

liest lists, it may be the earliest, of the means of knowledge is to be found in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, where they are said to be (i) codes of law (*smṛti*); (ii) direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), meaning by this sense-cognition; (iii) tradition (*aitihya*); and (iv) inference (*anumāna*), a list which clearly belongs to an early period, for it includes tradition which was discarded later on by most of the schools as unreliable. The first treatment of the means of knowledge, which forms the nearest approach to the later systematic exposition of the same in the *Nyāya-sūtras*, is to be found in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* in which there is also a remarkable discourse on the limitations of sense-cognition and the need of having recourse to verbal testimony and inference. The classification of knowledge as found in the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* of the Jaina logician Umāsvāti and the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* of Buddhism are extremely complex, cumbrous and confused; and contribute very little to the development of the future epistemological doctrines even of the Jainas and the Buddhists.

In spite of all the doubts and differences of opinion as regards the exact relations between one school and another about the time of Diṅnāga and before him, one outstanding fact that can hardly be denied is that all the works of the *Sūtra* period, and those subsequent to them, bear the stamp of being influenced by the logic of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools, if not exactly of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*.

So far as I can see, the developed Buddhist logic found in the works of Nāgārjuna, and the Jaina lo as represented by Siddhasena Divākara, have antecedents in their own schools such as might just us in assuming that they had an independent grow in the line of their own literature. In fact, the whc terminology employed by the Buddhist and the lat Jaina writers on logic is that of the *Nyāya* and t *Vaiśeṣika* schools. Further a reference to logicia under the name of *takkin* or *takkika* in the Pāli Bu dhist literature may indicate the presence of a logic school which was evidently non-buddhist, as the te *takkin* is used along with *Vīmaṃsin* (Skt. *mīmāṃsin* and whatever logical terms are found in the earli Buddhist writers were evidently imported from so other school. On the other hand, in the early Hin literature, both logical and non-logical, there are signs to show that the Hindu authors were aware the existence of any such thing as an early school Buddhist logic or even the beginnings of it; and t should be an indication of the fact that there was such school. That the logic of the *Nyāya* schc was influenced by that of the Buddhist writers af Nāgārjuna, and more particularly and effectively af Diṅnāga, is also a fact which can hardly be deni and has already received acceptance at the hands scholars. As regards the exact relations between o author and another, e. g., between Praśastapāda a

1. *Dīgha.*, 1, 16.

Diṅnāga, nothing can be said definitely; for, as Professor Tucci has tried to show recently,[1] the authors who are supposed to have borrowed from each other, merely because of a similarity of terms or affinity of logical doctrines, may have derived their material from a common older source, of which we happen to be ignorant at the present time. After Diṅnāga, the chronological order of the authors is almost definite, and in most cases exact dates are available. The one point to remember about the results of the influence of one school on another is that it was mostly

---

1. *Buddhist Logic before Diṅnāga, JRAS, July, 1929.* Professor Tucci has also tried to show in the same article that a number of *Tarka-śāstras* existed before Diṅnāga, and presumably even before the time of the final redaction of the *Nyāya-sūtras.* One of these, he thinks, was the work of a Buddhist writer, but about the authorship of the others he is not sure. I hope Prof. Tucci does not mean to imply that '*Tarka-śāstras*' in the plural number refers to some particular works bearing that title as a proper name, and presumably written by Buddhist authors. The more probable explanation would be that it is just a common name referring to a class of works on logic, and is synonymous with the equally familiar '*hetu-śāstras*' or '*hetu-vidyā*'. If so, the term '*tarka-śāstras* is more likely to refer to that literature of the earlier period, which is known to be preliminary to the developed form of the Nyāya school, than to any works of Buddhist writers about the existence of which there is no evidence so far.

the formal aspect of logic that was affected; the main epistemological doctrines of each school remained unchanged. Each school adhered to its own doctrines, and modified its logical form only in so far as it was consistent with its intrinsic epistemological and metaphysical position, and at the same time helped it to keep abreast of the progress in the formal logic of the times.

Besides works which strictly belong to the category of logic there were others which owed their origin to a different class of literature, but which also contain valuable matter on epistemology. Such are some of the works of the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta* schools. Not much epistemology can be found in the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta* Sūtras themselves, but the later exponents of their doctrines like Kumārila and Prabhākara of the Mīmāṃsā school, and Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja of the *Vedānta*, have made distinct contributions to epistemological thought; and as they lived and wrote in times when the philosophical doctrines of the various schools had been more or less consolidated, and a zeal to defend them against the attacks of opponents was at its highest, some portions of their works contain acute metaphysical speculation, and show a fairly high standard of epistemological criticism.

Gaṅgeśa represents the culminating point in the development of the epistemological analysis in the *Nyāya* school; although in his hands the study became rather formal, and it continued to be so in the works of his followers for a long time. There grew up,

however, after, Gaṅgesa, another set of authors, who tried to combine the logic of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools by writing short manuals, and reverted to the old practice of dealing with the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) along with the objects of knowledge (*prameya*). There is nothing original in these works and they only serve as compendiums of the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* philosophy.

A word may be added with regard to the epistemology of the *Cārvāka* school, especially because, for want of the original sources, it has not been considered in this work. The only sources of our knowledge of this materialistic system is the Chapter dealing with it in the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* of Mādhvācārya and a few stray references in some other works.[1] From the account of the system in the *SDS.* we know that it accepted sense-cognition as the only means of knowledge. The other means of knowledge including inference were rejected on the ground that they could not establish a universal and necessary connection (*avinābhāva*) and could, therefore, provide no ground for such universal propositions as 'Where-ever there is smoke, there is fire'. The usual idea of concomitance was explained as due to custom based upon past sense-cognition, or error.[2] This view was

1. These have been collected by Dakshinaranjana Shastri, in the Appendix to his work on the Cārvākas–*Chārvāka-shashthi*, Calcutta.

2. *SDS.* B. Indica, p. 5. It will appear that this view

vehemently attacked by the writers of the other schools; and the discourse in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* on the limitations of perceptual knowledge is a typical example of the argument adduced on the subject by the opponents of the *Cārvāka* school.

While the most usual view about the Materialistic school is that it admitted self-cognition only as the means of knowledge, a passage in the *Nyāya-mañjarī*, which appears to be based upon the authority of some original work of the Cārvākas known to the author of the *Nyāya-mañjarī*, indicates that the exact position of a thorough-going Cārvāka materialist was that it is absolutely impossible to determine either the exact number or the exact character of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) and the objects of knowledge (*prameya*).

---

that it is impossible to have a truly universal and necessary proposition corresponds to that of Hume's on the same subject.

1. *Nyāya-mañjarī*, pp. 36 and 64; also quoted in *Indian Thought*, vol. V, p. 319, "*aśakya eva pramāṇa-saṃkhyā-niyama iti suśikṣita-cārvākaḥ*" *p. 36.*

'Cārvaka-dhūrtas tu athātas tattvaṃ vyākhyāsyāma iti pratijñāya pramāṇa-prameya-saṃkhyā-lakṣaṇa-niyamāśakya-kāraṇīyatvam eva tattvaṃ vyākhyātavān', p. 64.

PART II

The Philosophical Background in the Early Literature.

The Philosophical Background in the Early Literature.

1. THE VEDIC LITERATURE.

It is evident that no epistemology as such can be found in the literature of the Vedic and the Upaniṣadic periods. What we do find is certain notions about the nature of the universe and an effort to analyse them, which in course of time led to the formulation of definite ideas about the nature of consciousness and the ways and means of acquiring knowledge. At first the analysis was mostly psychological, and it was only as late as the period of the Philosophical Sūtras that something like an epistemological viewpoint was positively attained. It will be helpful, however, to trace the origin and development of this epistemological consciousness from the very earliest indications of it in Indian literature.

(i) The Earliest Signs of a Distinction between Direct and Indirect Knowledge in the Ṛgveda.

The earliest texts which appear to be significant for our enquiry are some verses[1] in *Ṛgveda*, I, 164; X, 82; and X, 129. A study of these, as will be

---

1. The most important verses are: I, 164, 4 & 37; X, 82, 3 & 7; X, 129, 6 & 7.

shown presently, indicates on the part of their authors a consciousness of the following facts: *firstly*, that there are two kinds of objects: (i) those that are immediately present to the senses; and (ii) those that are not immediately present to the senses, that is to say, those that are remote; *secondly*, that those which are immediately present to the senses, are, of course, known through the senses; but those which are remote are not known by means of the senses; and hence there must be, if any, some other means of their knowledge; and, *thirdly*, that the knowledge of these remote objects can be had either by means of divine testimony, for nothing is remote to God, or by reflection. Thus it will appear that we find in the texts of these verses the germs of the distinction between what came to be known later on as direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect knowledge (*pārokṣa*). It may be mentioned here that some of these verses, viz. I, 164, 4 & 37; and X, 129, 6 & 7 have been usually understood by scholars[1] to signify a sceptical attitude on the part of their authors, and hence they have discovered a doctrine of scepticism, or even agnosticism in these hymns of the *Ṛgveda*. In X, 129, 5 Deussen read an indication of the fact that the author was conscious of a distinction between the world of appearance and that of reality, and that the verse contains a reference to the knowledge

1. For instance, Barua *HPIP.*, pp. 16 & 29; Ranade, *OSUP.*, pp. 3 & 149; Keith, *RPV.*, II, p. 435.

of these two kinds of reality.[1] This verse I have already discussed in a separate article[2] in which I have offered an explanation of my own, and have tried to show that Deussen's interpretation cannot be accepted. The other verses I shall consider presently, and shall try to prove that they do not signify a sceptical attitude as they have been supposed to do by some scholars.

Let us first take verses I, 164, 4 & 37.[3] A perusal

1. *Gesch. der Phil.*, I, pp. 124, 125.
2. *JRAS*, July, 1929, pp. 586-99.
3. *Ko dadarśa prathamam jāyamānam*
   asthanvantam yad anasthā vibharti,
   Bhūmya asur asṛgātmā kva svit ko
   vidvāṃsam upagāt praṣṭum etat. (I, 164, 4)
   Na vijānāmi yadi vedam asmi
   niṇyaḥ sannaddho manasā carāmi,
   Yadā māgan prathamajā ṛtas-
   yādidvāco aśnuve bhāgam asyāḥ. (I, 164, 37)

   Who has seen that the boneless bears the bony when being born first ? Where may be the breath, the blood, the soul of the earth ? Who would approach the wise to make this enquiry ?

   I do not know whether I am like this; ignorant, prepared I go about; when I partake a portion of this speech, the first products of truth come to me.

   It may be mentioned that Sāyaṇa's rendering of the verses is slightly different, and that modern scholars have also differed from one another with regard to the exact significance of such terms as *asthanvantam* and *anasthā*, but it is unnecessary to discuss all the details

of the hymn (I, 164) to which they belong will show that it is one of such discourses as served the purpose of introducing discussions on the occasion of a sacrifice–the *brahmodyas* as they were called–by raising questions about the nature of the universe. In the first of the two verses (I, 164, 4) questions have been asked with regard to the origin and the vital principle of the universe: *firstly*, Who has seen the universe (the bony—the created universe) being evolved out

---

of interpretation here, as they are irrelevant to our enquiry.

In verse, I, 164, 4 Hillebrandt (*Vedische Mythologie* I, p. 338) interprets *asthanvantam* and *anasthā* as signifying the moon and the sun respectively; and according to him it is said in the verse that the sun supports the moon–*asthanvantam yad anasthā vibharti*. This interpretation is mainly based upon Hillebrandt's supposition that the moon looks bony. But it will appear that in the second line of the verse there is a reference to the soul of the earth, and as in such other verses of the *Ṛgveda* as X, 90, 2; 3 and X, 121 the sun is spoken of as the soul of the universe, it is more likely that it is the sun who is meant by *asthanvantam*. This interpretation is still further strengthened by a text of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* : *hṛanyagarbham paśyati jāyamānam*, etc., (IV, 12) which is evidently an echo of this same verse of the *Ṛgveda*, as so many other texts of the Fourth Chapter of the *Śvetāśvatara* are of *Ṛgveda*, I, 164. Similarly, the earth, which has been referred to in the second line of the verse, has been called 'all-supporting' and 'mother-earth' in such

of its undeveloped state (the boneless)?; and, *secondly*, Is there any one who would go to a wise man and enquire what and where the vital principle (the breath, the blood, the soul) of this earth is? The poet philosopher here tries to understand the origin and the life principle of the universe on the analogy of an animal body. The bony body of an animal is delivered of the boneless womb, or is developed from a boneless state, and is believed to have a vital principle—breath, blood, or soul. Now the question is whether any one can explain how this universe came into

---

verses as *Atharva*, XII, 1, 5 & 6, and it is that which is naturally signified by '*anasthā*'.

Geldner (*Der Rigveda Ubersetzt und Erlautert Gottingen*, I, p. 206) follows Sāyaṇa's interpretation of the verse.

A word may be said about my interpretation of *sannaddhaḥ* as 'ready' or 'prepared', which is a very usual meaning of this word. Sāyaṇa renders it as 'one who is fettered by actions resulting from ignorance and desire.' Thic rendering, so far as I can see, is inappropriate; for, in the first place, it contains much more than the word *sannaddhah* can mean: and in the second place, if it be accepted, the notion expressed by that word will be more or less a repetition of what is already signified by *niṇyah* which immediately precedes it. On the other hand, *sannaddḥo manasā* makes quite a good sense if taken to mean 'with a mind prepared (to learn)'; and it fits in very well with the context of the verse and the hymn.

being, and what and where its vital principle is. It will appear that such questions as mentioned above do not at all suggest an attitude of scepticism or agnosticism on the part of the author as they have been supposed to do by some scholars. Either they are simply meant to introduce a discussion, or at the most they indicate a confession of ignorance on the part of the individual who puts them. A study of the whole hymn shows that Dīrghatamas, its author, figures in it as an earnest and modest seeker after truth. He does not say (what would be scepticism) that it is impossible to find an answer to the questions concerning the universe, but confesses his own ignorance and also declares his readiness to be instructed by those who may be wise. For instance, in *Ṛgveda*, I, 164, 5 he calls himself 'unripe in mind' and 'in spirit undiscerning'[1]; in I, 164, 6 'one unknowing,' who would approach the wise to be enlightened.[2] The same notion is found in I, 164, 37, where he says first that he is ignorant and goes about seeking knowledge, and then that it was through the divine speech that the truth first began to appear to him. The view that Dīrghatamas was a sceptic would be further seen to be untrue from the fact that in some of the other verses of this same hymn, for instance, I, 164, 20 & 46, he has even to say something positive with regard

1. *pākaḥ pṛcchāmi manasāvijānan.*

2. *acikitvāñ cikituṣaś cidatra kavīn pṛcchāmi vidmane na vidvān.*

to the nature of spirit and the material universe. In I, 164, 20,[1] which is a well-known verse, he unmistakably refers, though metaphorically, to the nature of the universal and the individual spirits and their relation to the material universe. In I, 164, 46 he emphasises the fact that it is one and the same being who is called by different names, etc.,[2]

The fact that God is the repository of knowledge and that he is the source of enlightenment to man is further emphasised in X, 82, 3.[3] Assuming that Prajāpati Parameṣṭhin, the seer of X, 129, was also a sceptic like the Dīrghatamas of I, 164, Dr. Barua has held that *Ṛgveda*, X, 82 contains a refutation of his scepticism.[4] It will appear, however, that it is as wrong to hold that the views contained in some of the verses of X, 129 represent a doctrine of scepticism as to say that Dīrghatamas was a sceptic.

Ṛgveda, X, 129, called the Nāsadīya hymn after the first two words in it, is the well-known cosmogonic hymn attributed to Parameṣṭhin. It has been translated and commented upon by every Vedic scholar. It is not my object here to enter into all the discussions

1. *Dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā samānam vṛkṣam pariṣasvajāte, etc.,*
2. *Ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti, etc.*
3. *Yo naḥ pitā janitā yo vidhātā*
   dhāmāni veda bhuvanāni viśvā ;
   Tam yo devānām nāmadhā eka
   eva tam sampraśnam bhuvanā yantyanyā.
4. *HPIP., pp. 36 & 37.*

about its philosophical significance. As already men tioned, I have discussed the meaning of X, 129, 5 in a separate article, and have considered therein the propriety of the interpretations by various scholar including that by Deussen. Here I propose to conside verses 6 & 7[1] of the hymn and to show that they also represent the same trend of thought with regard to the knowledge of the universe as is to be found in some of the verses of *Ṛgveda*, I, 164 and X, 82 referred to above. I shall also try to show that they do not con tain a doctrine of scepticism or agnosticism as the have been supposed to do by most of the scholars.[2]

In these two verses, first a question is asked 'Wh verily knows, and who can say whence this creatio has come into being? etc., and then follows th answer, supported by a kind of argument, that as a beings, including the gods, came into being after th creation, it is only the creater who could have born the universe before it was created, and who coul

1. *Ko addhā veda ka iha pravocat*
kuta ājātā kuta iyam visṛṣṭiḥ,
Arvāg devā asya visarjane-
nātha ko veda yat ābabhūva.
Iyam visṛiṣṭir yat ābabhūva
yadi vā dadhe yadi vā na,
Yo 'syādhyakṣaḥ parame vyomant
so aṅga veda yadi vā na veda.

2. Barua, *HPIP.*, p. 16; Ranade, *CSUP.*, p. 3; Keit *RPV.*, p. 435.

know how it was created.[1] It will appear that these two verses also provide an answer to the questions contained in *Ṛgveda*, I, 164, 4. In X, 129, 4 it is stated that the sages found the bond of being (*sat*—the manifested universe) in non-being (*asat*—the unmanifested universe) by means of reflection.[2]

Now a careful study of the verses considered above

---

1. *Yadi vā dadhe yadi vā na; so aṅga veda yadi vā na veda*—These two clauses do not express doubt or ignorance, but mean, and that quite in accordance with idiom, that it is only He who bore it, and no body else, and it is only He who knows it, and no body else respectively. Those who translated them more or less as Griffith does viz., 'whether he formed it all, or did not form it,' and 'He verily knows it, or perhaps, He knows not,' are naturally apt to regard the verse as one expressive of doubt. But there is no evidence to show that in this hymn, or in any other cosmogonic hymns of the *Ṛgveda*, or even later, there is ever expressed a doubt with regard to the divine origin of the universe and the omniscience of God. Prof. Keith, who also thinks that these verses are expressive of doubt, has a significant remark to make, which will support the view expressed here. Speaking about X, 129 he says: 'While much of its content is repeated in the latter philosophy, its spirit of doubt is wholly alien to the classical philosophical systems of India' (*RPV.*, II, 435). The fact is, as I have tried to show, that there is no spirit of doubt in this hymn. (Also compare Sāyaṇa's interpretation of the verse which agrees with that of mine).
2. *Sato bandhum asati niravindan hṛdi pratīṣyā kavayo manīṣyā.*

will show that consistently with the cosmogonic nature of the hymns to which they belong they raise questions about the nature of the universe, and then try to answer them. The answer mainly consists in asserting that as the creation of the universe took place at a time when neither men nor gods had come into existence, it is only the creator who knows about it; and it is only from him, that is to say, by means of divine testimony, that we can expect to have knowledge of it. In X, 129, 4 there is just a mention of the fact that the sages understood the cause of the universe by means of reflection, which appears, in this apparently late hymn, to have been regarded by its author as another means of knowing about things which are remote. The view that the verses I, 164, 4 & 37; and X, 129, 6 & 7 contain the doctrine of scepticism is evidently based upon the superficial consideration that they contain questions about the nature of the universe and sometimes a confession of ignorance on the part of the author. But simply to raise questions, or to confess ignorance, about something which is beyond the range of the senses, e. g., the origin of the universe, is not scepticism or agnosticism.

(ii) Conception of Mind as a Psychical Faculty in the Vājasaneya-saṃhitā XXX-IV, 1-6.

The development of psychological notions which, in course of time, led to the formulation of epistemological ideas, is traceable through the conception of

mind (*manas*) in the early literature. In the *Ṛgveda* for example, in X, 129, 4 we read of mind as the cosmical principle of which desire is said to be the creative energy[1] In the six verses of the *Vājasaneya-saṃhitā* which I propose to consider here, mind appears as a distinctly psychical faculty. They contain, although in the form of a hymn, the most remarkable description of mind that I know of in the whole of the Vedic literature, and it is strange that they have remained unnoticed so far by scholars.[2]

The text of the verses with an English translation is as follows:—

Yaj jāgrato dūram udaiti
daivam tadu suptasya tathaivaiti
Dūraṅgamam jyotiṣām jyotir ekam
tanme manaḥ śiva-saṃkalpam astu–I

May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve, which is divine; which goes out afar when I am awake, and which similarly comes back when I am asleep; that which goes far and wide, and is the light of lights.[3]

---

1. *Kāmas tad agre samavartatādhi manaso retaḥ prathamam yad āsīt.*
2. It was only a few years back that I, while collecting material for this work, noticed them and submitted a paper on their significance to the All-India Phil. Congress, Bombay, 1927.
3. The six verses discussed here have also been supposed to be a part of what Scheftelowitz has called the *Śiva-saṃkalpa Upaniṣad*, in which there are altogether 28 verses. As he also admits, the remaining other verses of the

Yena karmāṇy apaso manīṣiṇo
yajñe kṛṇvanti vidatheṣu dhīrāḥ,
Yad apūrvam yakṣam antaḥ prajā-
nām tan me manaḥ śivasaṃkalpam astu.–2

May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve with the aid of which wise and brave men diligently occupied perform their duties pertaining to sacrifice and war[1]; that which is a unique sacred thing in the heart of beings.

Yat prajñānam uta ceto dhṛtiśca
yajjyoytir antar amṛtam prajāsu,
yasmān na ṛte kiṃcana karma
kriyate tan me manaḥ śivasaṃkalpam astu

May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve,

Upaniṣad are of a different nature, and evidently a later addition (*ZDMG.*, 1921, p. 201). It may be pointed out that the interpretation of *manas* as spirit by Scheftelowitz is rendered improbable by the fact that in this verse *manas* is described as going out during wakefulness and coming back during sleep, which could not be true of spirit. The further description of *manas* as given in the other verses also applies more appropriately to a psychical faculty than to a spiritual substance. These verses have also been translated and discussed by Weber in *Ind. Stud.* II, p. 51 ff.

1. *Vidatheṣu* may mean either 'in assemblies' or 'in wars, but the use of the word *dhīrāḥ*, which I think is used in the sense of 'brave' here, suggests that the latter meaning i more appropriate. To take '*dhīrāḥ*' in the sense of 'wise mer

which is intelligence, feeling[1] and resolution–the eternal light in the heart of all beings; that without which nothing can be accomplished.—3

Yenedam bhūtam bhuvanam bhaviṣyat
parigṛhītam amṛtena sarvam,
Yena yajñas tāyate sapta-hotā
tan me manaḥ śiva-saṃkalpam astu.–4

May that mind be of auspicious resolve, which, being immortal, holds the past, the present and the future all together: that with the aid of which that sacrifice is performed in which seven persons take part.—4

Yasmin ṛcaḥ sāma yajūṃṣi yasmin

---

would not be so happy, as the word *manīṣiṇo* has also been used in the same sense. Similarly *yakṣam* in the sense of 'sacred' or 'wonderful' suits the context better than in the sense of 'spirit' which, as I have already pointed out, is not meant to be described in these verses. (See Hillebrandt's *Vedisch Yakṣa*, *Festabe Richard Von Garbe*, pp. 17-23; also Hertel's *Die ariche Feuerlehre*, I).

1. In this verse the only word about the meaning of which there may be a difference of opinion is '*cetaḥ*'. It has been usually translated by some word or other which means 'consciousness' *Cetayati samyag jñāpayati tac cetaḥ*—explains Mahīdhara. Griffith translates it 'intelelect'. I have translated it 'feeling', for the word is frequently used to signify the emotional aspect of consciousness, and here this meaning quite fits in with the context, where knowing and willing are already signified by '*prajñānam*' and '*dhṛtiḥ*.'

pratiṣṭhitāḥ ratha-nabhāvivārāḥ
Yasmiṅś cittaṃ sarvam otam prajā-
nām tanme manaḥ śiva-saṃkalpam astu–5

May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve, in which the *Ṛg*, the *Sāma*, and the *Yajur Vedas* are stuck up like spokes in the nave of a chariot, and in which the entire consciousness(thoughts)of beings is held together.—5

Suṣārathir aśvān iva yan manuṣ-
yān nenīyate bhiṣubhir vājina iva,
Hṛtpratiṣṭham yad ajiram javiṣṭham
tan me manaḥ śiva-saṃkalpam astu.—6

May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve, which leads and controls men, just as a good charioteer does the horses with his reins; that which residing in the heart of men is the swiftest, and free from decay.–6

A study of the above verses will show that in them all the essential characteristics of mind have been mentioned in one place, as if in a discourse on mental functions. Here mind appears as an entirely psychical faculty and the epistemological subject. It neither takes the place of soul or spirit, nor is it regarded as a mere physical sense-organ like the other sense-organs. It is one whole psychical unity with all the characteristics of the subject as the knower in relation to the object as the known. In the first place, it is described as 'that which goes out afar', and as the swiftest[1], the implication being that like the sense-

1. Verse, 1 above ;

organs it is unhampered in its activities by the limitations of time and space. In the second place, it is said to be intelligence, feeling and resolution,[1] which correspond to the tripartite division of mental life. This description given in the third verse is distinctly borne out by what is said in the other five. For example, in the first verse, mind is spoken of as 'the light of all lights', that is to say, that which illuminates the sense-cognitions.[2] The same cognitive aspect of mental life is beautifully described in the fourth and the fifth verses, where mind is called the abiding and the unifying principle of knowledge—that which being eternal holds the past, the present, and the future, all together; and 'that in which the *Ṛg*, the *Sāma*, and the *Yajur* hymns are stuck up like spokes in the nave of a chariot, and in which the entire consciousness of beings is held together.' The sixth verse brings out the volitional aspect of mind;—'that which leads and controls men as a good charioteer does the horses with the reins.'[3] Similarly, in the second and the third verses: 'that

1. Verse, 3 above.
2. Cf. Mahīdhara's commentary: '*Yac ca mano jyotiṣām prakāśakānām śrotrādīndriyāṇām ekam eva jyotiḥ prakāśakam pravartakam ityarthaḥ.*' In later philosophical literature this quality of illuminating the senses is attributed to self or spirit.
3. This simile of the charioteer, the chariot, the reins, and the horses became very popular in later literature, e. g. *Kaṭha.* I, 3, 3-4.

with the aid of which constant and wise men perform their duties pertaining to sacrifice and war'; and 'that without which nothing can be accomplished'. Then at the end of each verse there is the prayer that the mind be of auspicious resolve.

Thus as we pass from the *Ṛgveda*, X, 129, which I discussed in the last section, to this part of the hymn in the *Vājasaneya-saṃhitā*, we find that notions about mind as a psychical faculty are assuming a systematic definiteness and its functions as such are classified under certain broad heads. It is interesting to see that Mahīdhara, while commenting on these verses, distinctly treates *manas* as a psychical faculty and not as spirit or soul.[1]

The Beginnings of the Upaniṣadic Doctrine of Self and the Conception of Name and Form as Forms of Knowledge in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa.

In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, X, 6, 3,[2] which i said to embody the views of a sage called Śāṇḍīlya,[3] man is spoken of as a being possessed of understandin

1. These verses are frequently used in India as a prayer fo the uplift of one's mind.
2. *Atha khalu kratumayo 'yam puruṣaḥ............ha smā Śāṇḍīlya evam etad iti.*
3. Śāṇḍīlya is a familiar name, after which we hear *Śāṇḍīlya-vidyā*. This particular passage is repeated the *Chāndogya*, III, 14, 4 with a slight difference

(*kratumayaḥ*).[1] It is further said that the self, both universal and individual, has intelligence (*manomayaḥ*) and will (*saṃkalpa*). It is the duty of man, as a being possessed of understanding, to meditate upon the nature of self, and see that the individual self is identical with the universal self. One who realises this truth will be free from doubt.[2] The ideas underlying this teaching are clearly a development of the notions found in the Vedic hymns already referred to, and in their turn they are the precursor of the more elaborate doctrines to be found later on in the *Upaniṣads*. The doctrine of the identity of the individual and the universal self emerges distinctly, and knowledge of the self is declared to be the key to the knowledge of the whole universe. If one knows the self, nothing remains to be known, and consequently, there is no room for doubt. It may be pointed out that this solution of the entire problem of knowledge at one bold

language. *Śāṇḍilya-vidyā* is mentioned in Śaṃkara's commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*, III, 3, 31. Then we have the *Śāṇḍilya-vidyā*, which goes by the name of the same sage.

1. The word '*kratu*' has also been translated as 'will', for example, by Max Müller (*Chānd.*, III, 14, *SBE.*), but considering that there is a reference to meditation in the context, to take the word in the sense of understanding, as Eggeling also does, appears to be appropriate.
2. This teaching is also embodied in the *Śāṇḍilya-sūtras*, 31, where in the commentary a reference is made to the passage in the *Chānd.*, III, 14.

stroke in metaphysics is the characteristic feature of all Vedic thought, especially of the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads.* It implicitly rests upon the ground that from the knowledge of the whole or the universal follows the knowledge of the parts contained in that whole, or of the particulars subsumed under that universal,—upon a kind of deductive inference. And Brahman or self is this whole or the universal. It is thus mainly a kind of metaphysical epistemology that we find in this literature, the psychological analysis being usually vague and unsystematic.

Before I pass on to the next section, I would like to notice briefly another passage in the same *Brāhmaṇa* (XI, 2, 3, 1)[1], which is the earliest expression

1. *Atha brahmaiva parārdham agacchat tat parārdham gatvā aikṣata katham nvimān lokān pratyaveyam iti, tad dvābhyām eva pratyavaid rūpeṇa caiva nāmnā ca sa yasya kasya nāmasti tan nāma, yasyāpi nāma na asti yad veda rūpeṇa idam rūpam iti tad rūpeṇa etāvad vā idam yāvad rūpam caiva nāma ca. Ye haite brahmaṇo mahatī abhve, sa yo haite brahmaṇo mahatī abhve veda mahad dhaivābhvam bhavati.*

Here I may make a few observations on the translation of certain words in the text, for there appears to be a difference of opinion about their meaning. The first of these is *pratyaveyam* with its another form *pratyavaid.* Eggeling translates the clauses containing these words in the above passage thus: 'How can I *descend* again into these worlds? It then *descended* again by means of these two: Form and Name.' (*SBE.*, Vol., XLIV, pp.

of the doctrine of name (*nāma*) and form (*rūpa*). Later, it is mentioned in some of the *Upaniṣads*, and figures conspicuously in Vedāntic thought. The passage

---

27, 28; italics are mine). It will appear that this rendering is altogether inappropriate here; for, in the first place, the phrase *imān lokān*—to those worlds, clearly refers to the *parārdha* where Brahman is said to have repaired, and there would be no sense in the question: 'How can I *descend again* into these worlds?, and in the report that he descended again, when Brahman is said to be already present in those regions; and, in the second place, the idea of descending by means of form and name is altogether unintelligible. Perhaps a more acceptable, although incorrect, translation is by Muir: How can I pervade all these worlds? He then pervaded them with two things:—with form and with name (*OST.*, Vol., V, p. 388). But the sense of pervasion does not fit in with the general context of the passage which is distinctly psychological. Sāyaṇa is much nearer to the sense when he explains *pratyaveyam* as *pratyekam prāpnuyām*–how shall I *attain* each of them. It will appear, however, that the most suitable rendering of the phrases will be: How can I *know* each of these worlds?. He then knew them with these two: with form and with name. The root 'i' (*iṇ*) with the prefix '*ava*' means 'to know', and the further prefix '*prati*' makes the sense distributive. In a parallel passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (I, 4, 7) the world is spoken of as *avyākṛtam*—undifferentiated in the beginning, and then, it is said, that it is differentiated by name and form—*tan nāma-rūpābhyām vyākriyate*. The same, or similar, is the sense of the words '*pratyaveyam*' and '*pratyavaid* in the passage of the *Śatapatha*.

when divested of its allegorical part, contains th following statements:—

(i) That every object is known either by its form or name, or both.

(ii) That what may not be known by name, i known by its form.

(iii) That objects having name must also hav form, but not *vice versa;* and hence form is more im portant for knowledge than name.

(iv) That form is something which belongs to mind for it is by mind that one knows the form, and there fore, in a sense, mind itself is form.

(v) That name is something which belongs tc speech; for it is by speech that one utters a name and therefore, in a sense, speech itself is name.[1]

(vi) That the whole universe is co-extensive with these two universal principles of form and name;[1] and he who understands these attains a comprehensive and universal knowledge of the universe, and acquires a very superior personal merit.[2]

The above is a fairly close analysis of the original passage, which, unless the language and the thought contained in it be regarded as a matter of happy chance, certainly appears to be of some philosophical merit. It is like an oasis in the arid deserts of the Brāhmaṇic literature, and an oasis, although rare,

1. *etad vai idam sarvam yāvad rūpam caiva nāma ca.*
2. *sa yo ha ete brahmaṇo mahatī abhve veda mahad ha eva abhvam bhavati...*

is not an impossibility after all. The cognition of things by name and form, the superior importance of form; the relation of form to mind, and apparently a recognition of these two as general principles of the universe and knowledge–all these indicate an acute power of analysis.

The doctrine of name and form, as has already been mentioned, is found in a number of *Upaniṣads*, and also in Buddhism. The one common idea underlying the various statements of the doctrine is that name and form constitute the principle of individuality. It is by its name and form that one individual is distinguished from another. According to those who hold the doctrine of absolute existence, the individuals lose their name and form as soon as they are merged in the absolute; for instance, in *Brahman*:

Yathā nadyāḥ syandamānāḥ samudre
'stam gacchanti nāmarūpe vihāya,
Tathā vidvān nāma-rūpād vimuktaḥ
parāt param puruṣam upaiti divyam.

(*Muṇḍaka*. III, 2, 8)

Just as the rivers flowing down merge in the sea having given up their name and form, so does a wise man attain the highest celestial being having become free from name and form.

In the *Upaniṣads* and Buddhism, however, the doctrine of name and form appears more as a metaphysical principle of individuality than as the epistemolo-

gical category of experience. In Buddhism *nāma-rū-pa* usually signifies mind-and-body.[1]

(iv) Further Advance in Psychological Analysis, and the Doctrine of Mind-dependent Reality in the Aitareya Āraṇyaka.

In the second chapter of the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* we find a further advance in psychological analysis, and also a clear enunciation of an idealistic doctrine, according to which all reality is mind-dependent; in fact it is knowledge itself. A distinction is drawn between self as the real knower and mind as simply a sense-organ. The various mental states pertaining to knowing, feeling and willing are mentioned. Further the cognitive act is analysed into the knower, (*prajña*), the intellect (*prajñā*), and cognition (*prajñāna*) including the object cognised. It is also maintained that all reality exists only in so far as it is known, and hence it is mind-dependent—*prajñā-netram prajñāne-pratiṣṭhitam*. The views expressed here have been attributed to Mahīdāsa Aitareya, who is supposed to be either the author or the compiler of the *Āraṇyaka*.[2]

In II, 3, 2, it is explained how the self of man is more developed in respect of understanding and

1. Cf. *Compendium of Philosophy (Abhidhammathasangaha)*, pp. 271-272.
2. See Keith's *Introduction to Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, pp. 15-26. According to him, the date of the *Second Āraṇyaka* must be somewhere about 600 B. C.

knowledge than that of other beings. 'The self is more developed in man,' says the author of the *Āraṇyaka*, 'for he is most endowed with knowledge (*prajñānena sampannatamaḥ*). He says what he has known; he knows tomorrow; he knows the world and the non-world; he desires the immortal by means of the mortal, being thus gifted. As for the other animals, their experience is confined to (the objects of) hunger and thirst. They do not speak out what they know, they do not know tomorrow: they know not the world and the non-world'.

Then the nature of this knowledge (*prajñāna*) is further described in II, 6. 'What is that self which is the object of our meditation? Which is the self? (It is) that by which one sees, by which one hears, by which one smells scents, by which one speaks, by which one discriminates between the tasteful and the tasteless. That which is the heart and the mind; awareness (*saṃjñā*), comprehension (*ājñānam*), understanding (*vijñānam*), knowledge (*prajñānam*), retentiveness (*medhā*), insight (*dṛṣṭiḥ*), resolution (*dhṛtiḥ*), opinion (*matiḥ*), memory (*smṛtiḥ*), reflection (*manīṣā*),

1. *Sa hi, prajñānena sampannatamo vijñātam vadati, vijñātam paśyati, veda svastanam, veda lokālokān, martyenāmṛtam īpsaty evam sampannaḥ. Athetareṣām paśūnām āśana-pipāse evābhivijñānam, na vijñātam vadanti na vijñatam paśyanti, na viduh svastanam na lokālokān ta etāvanto bhavanti yathā-prājñānam hi sambhavaḥ.*

impulse (*jūtiḥ*), will (*saṃkalpaḥ*), purpose (*kratuḥ*), life (*asuḥ*), desire (*kāmaḥ*), control (*vaśaḥ*), all these being the names of knowledge (*prajñāna*)'. Having thus described the psychical aspects of the self, the author proceeds to show the identity of the self and the universe, and declares that all reality depends upon knowledge. "That (self) is Brahman, Indra, Prajāpati, all the gods, these five great elements: earth, air, ether, water, lights (fire); these and other small ones of a mixed nature, seeds of various kinds, those born of eggs, born from perspiration (heat), those germinated out of the ground, horses, cows, men, elephants, and all that breathes, whether it walks or flies, and that which moves not, all that is known by the intellect (*prajñā*); it is contained in knowledge (*prajñāna*); the world depends upon the intellect; is its seat or substratum (*pratiṣṭhā*); and knowledge is Brahman."[1]

Commenting upon the above Professor Keith says: 'The question is whether this justifies an attribution to the author of the doctrine that knowledge alone exists. It is quite open to argue that we are only given the doctrine that the world is guided by knowledge, which leaves us with a final dualism. I think probably the author went further and intended to assert the origin of all from knowledge, cf. II, 4. If

1. While translating this passage I have had Keith's translation before me, but it will be found that I have differed from him in translating a number of terms. It is

so, he represents exactly the later *Bhāgavata* view, perhaps that of Bādarāyaṇa, of the nature of reality. The self, or god, is conceived as creating the material world as a reality, but the exact nature of the creation is left vague. The relation of *brahman* and *ātman* is likewise left vague, a mere identification such as may have been meant being of little value."[1] Elsewhere,[2] referring to the *Aitareya Âraṇyaka*, II, 1, 3 and II, 4, 6, he says: 'The doctrine of both *Upaniṣads* is purely pantheistic or cosmogonic (it is not possible, we consider, to separate these ideas in these early *Upaniṣads*) ......To a Pantheist the world is the revelation of the divinity, to the Idealist it is the cloud which hides it. Indian Philosophy is not absolutely dominated by Idealism.'

Without at first giving any technical name to the

---

unnecessary to discuses at length the propriety of the various renderings, for the differences do not matter much so far as the general sense of the passage as a whole is concerned. I may simply say that in the last part of the sentence, I have treated *prajñā* and *prajñāna* as distinct from each other in sense, and have translated them as 'intellect' and 'knowledge' respectively. For the same reason, I have consistently translated '*prajñāna*' as 'knowledge' throughout the passage. Also cf. Ranade, *CSUP.*, p. 118.

1. The *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, *English Translation*, p. 236.
2. *JRAS.*, 1906, p., 493; the reference to p., 590 of the same in Keith's *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, p. 236 must be a misprint for p. 490.

philosophical views expressed in these passages, let u analyse their contents and see what conclusions w can draw from them with regard to the nature o reality and its knowledge. The following statement have been made:—

That self (*ātman*) is the knower; it is the hear and the mind with all the psychical aspects or proce sses which can be attributed to them. (II, 3, 2; II, 6 III, 2, 4).

Further, as the pure knower, it is not the objec of knowledge,–*sa yo 'to 'śruto 'gato 'mato 'nato, 'dṛṣi 'vijñāto 'nādiṣṭaḥ'*—that which is not heard, not reach ed, not thought, not subdued, not seen, not know not defined (III, 2, 4).

That all the mental processes are only so man names of knowledge (*prajñāna*)—*sarvāṇy evaitā prajñanasya nāmadheyāni bhavanti.* (II, 6)

That the self is the whole created universe in a its forms,—from the gods down to inorganic things-*eṣa brahmaiṣa Indra eṣa prajāpatiḥ*, etc. (II, 6).

That the whole created universe is known by tl intellect (*prajñā*), and is established in knowled (*prajñāna*)–*tat prajñā-netram prajñāne pratiṣṭhita* (II, 6).

That knowledge is Brahman, or *vice versa*,–*pr jñānam brahma* (II, 6).

From the above statements, which are simply analysis of the original texts, it is evident that acco ing to the author of the *Āraṇyaka*, all reality is kno

ledge. This he has said so often and in so many ways. Further, it is knowledge in the sense that it consists of either the knower, which is the self, or the psychical processes involved in knowing, or the objects known. In other words, all reality must be a reality in experience, and as a part of experience. This experiential character (if I may be allowed to use that word, for 'empirical' would not be correct) of reality, however, does not mean that reality, as we have it in the world of experience, has no objective existence. It is also plain that it is the self, which appears as the subject (*prajñā*), as the faculties of knowing, and also as the objects known; and it is left open to regard it as something more and above these aspects of reality. It is a kind of cosmogonic pantheism that we have in the *Araṇyaka*,–a pantheism which has not yet quite detatched itself from the Vedic cosmogonic theism and is just on the border of a full-fledged idealism. It clearly recognises the mind-dependence of reality, and this recognition by itself, on its part, brings it quite within the class of idealism.[1] It is an idealistic pantheism, so to say.

What is significant and epistemologically impor-

1. It need not be pointed out that there are various shades of idealism. The doctrine of mind-dependent reality is, however, an essential character of all idealism and a definite sign of it. Cf. Ranade, *OSUP.*, pp. 119-20, where he also compares this doctrine of the *Āraṇyaka* with that of Berkeley.

tant to note is that in this *Âraṇyaka* the whole experience–the subject, the process of cognition, and the object, is explained in terms of knowledge, and knowledge only, and thus one of the greatest difficulties of epistemology, viz., that of reconciling the disparity between the subject and the object does not arise at all. There is no trace of an antithesis between *ātman* (self) on the one hand, and *prakṛti* (matter) on the other. Thus we have in the Āraṇyaka notions of epistemology which are based upon a consistent metaphysics. But what proof is there to show that the metaphysical assumptions are correct ? The only answer is that there is none except the testimony of the scriptures, or the revelation. However, an account of the epistemological position of the *Âraṇyaka* would be incomplete, if it were not mentioned again that, according to him, human reason has the power of not only remembering the past, but also of looking into the future, of penetrating into that which is not immediately present to the senses. In other words, besides perception, reasoning and inference seem to be recognised as means of knowledge.

(V) The Development of the Doctrine of Illusory Existence and the Notions of Knowledge (vidyā) and Ignorance (avidyā) in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the other Upaniṣads.

The doctrine of the identity of self and the universe which we found to be emerging gradually

through the texts of the *Śatapatha* and the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* was bound to result, as it actually did, in the doctrine that the world of experience is illusory. For if self is the only reality, this apparent plurality and its materialistic appearances must be false. Such is the view of most of the *Upaniṣads*, and we find it enunciated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* by Yājñavalkya, a teacher of considerable reputation. Closely connected whith this theory of illusory existence is that of knowledge and ignorance expressed by the terms *vidyā* and *avidyā*[1] which appear conspicuously later on not only in the *Vedānta* but also in the other schools. It will be found, as we come across these terms in the later literature, that they have been both used for 'knowledge' and 'ignorance' as understood in the *Upaniṣads* and the *Vedānta*, and 'truth' and 'error', as used in the ordinary epistemological sense in the other schools.

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* II, 4 there is a dialogue between Yājñavalkya and his wife Maitreyī, in which the self is described much in the same way as in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*; that is to say, as that which is the cosmic principle of the universe, and by knowing which everything else in the world becomes known. 'It is the self, which ought to be seen, heard, thought (*mantavyaḥ*) and meditated upon (*nididhyāsitavyaḥ*); for it is by seeing, hearing, thinking, and understand-

1. *Īśāvāsya*, 9, 10, 15; *Chānd.* I. 1. 10; *Bṛhad.* 4, 3. 20; 4, 4. 3, 10; *Kaṭha*, 2. 4, 5; *Śvet.* 5. 1; etc.

ing the self that all this (world) is known, says *Yājña-valkya*.[1] In the same dialogue the self is also described as the source of all knowledge and literature. It is said that all the *Vedas*, the legends (*itihāsa*); the *purāṇas*, the sciences, the *Upaniṣads*, poetry, aphorisms, comments and commentaries, have been breathed forth from that great being (the self)—'*Asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitam etad*'[2]. As the knower, the self is described as that which can never become an object of knowledege—'whereby would one know that by which all this is known? Whereby would one know that which is the knower?'[3]

The unity of all reality as of the nature of the self is declared in a dialogue between Yājñavalkya and the philosopher king Janaka. 'By the mind only is it (the self) to the perceived. There is no plurality here. One who perceives this as diverse gets one death after another. This unknowable enduring being should be perceived as one; this unborn, great and enduring self, which is spotless and beyond space. It is by knowing it alone that a wise Brāhmaṇa should seek enlightenment. He should not devote himself to many words,[4] for that is only a weariness of

1. *Bṛhad.* II. 4. 5; (cf. *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, II. 6; *Chānd.*, VI. 12, *Taitt.* II. 1. 98; II. 6; *Muṇḍ*, I. 1. 6).
2. Ibid, II. 4. 10.
3. Ibid, II. 4. 14.
4. The meaning seems to be that for enlightenment study is

speech."[1]

In another dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Gārgī,[2] the categories of time and space, along with the self as the ultimate category, have been recognised 'O, Yājñavalkya,' asks Gārgī, 'that which is above the sky, that which is between the two, the sky and the earth, these which the people call the past, the present, and the future,–across what is that woven warp and woof?" And Yājñavalkya says in answer that it is space across which all this is woven warp and woof; and on being asked further as to across what space is woven in its turn, he says that it is woven across the imperishable—(*Akṣara*).'[3]

The above quotations represent the general trend of the Upaniṣadic thought as regards knowledge and reality. The chief remarkable point is the conception of self as the knower,—the epistemological subject, which never becomes an object, and which is

---

not of much use, which idea was not uncommon with those who laid stress upon meditation, cf. *Ṛgveda* I. 164. 39, *Yastanna veda kimṛcā kariṣyati*'; also, *Chānd.* III. 18. 1; VII, 16, 17, Kaṭha, I, 2–22; I. 3–12. *Muṇḍ.* I. 13, I. 4, 5; *Śvet.* I. 10; *Praśna*, I. 16; VI. 5.

1. *Bṛhad.* IV. 19-21.
2. Ibid, III. 8.
3 Adopted from my article in *JRAS*, July, 1929, pp. 595-96.

endowed with all the psychical faculties usually attributed to mind in modern psychology. Mind, in most of the Upaniṣads, as also later on, comes to be regarded as simply a physical sense-organ possessed of the power of thinking, and depending for its quality and and efficiency upon food.[1] In some texts, however, it has been identified with Brahman or reality.[2] Self is to be known by meditation, which usually signifies both reflection and mystic concentration. Knowledge of the real nature of self is true knowledge (*vidyā*); to take its appearance in the form of the created universe for reality is ignorance (*avidyā*). The doctrine of appearance and reality is thus positively found in most of the *Upaniṣads*.[3] However, it is to be noted that this doctrine of appearance and reality, and that of the allied theory of knowledge and ignorance as found in the *Upaniṣads*, although identical with that in the *Vedānta*, is different from that to be met with in the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools, for it does not refer to the ordinary cognitions of individual things like a man or a post, but to the knowledge of the universe as a whole. But, as will be seen in the sequel, the theory of truth and error as found in the Philosophical Sūtras was not altogether uninfluenced by this conception of knowledge and ignorance as found in the *Upaniaṣads*. In fact, so far as one ca

1. *Chānd*, VI. 5. i, vi, 5. 4; vi. 6, 1 and 2; VII, 26, 2.
2. *Chānd*. III. 18. 1; VII. 3. 1.
3. E. G., *Chānd*. V. 1. 2-7.

see, it was this very conception which developed later into the epistemological notions of truth and error. One indication of this is to be found in the fact that the same Upaniṣadic terms, viz., *vidyā* and *avidyā* continued to be used in order to express truth and error in the *Sūtras*. In some of the comparatively later *Upaniṣads*, for instance, in the *Maitrī*[1], the use of such terms as *pramāṇa*, *prameya* and *anumiti* is to be found.[2]

---

2. THE PRAJÑĀ-PĀRAMITĀ LITERATURE.

The Doctrine of Voidness (śūnyatā) and the Denial of Knowledge in the Prajñāpāramitās.

Although the various texts constituting the *Pāramitā* literature belong to an altogether different school, from the point of view of both the style and the essentials of their doctrine they may be truly called the *Upaniṣads* of Buddhism. They form the basis of the

1. VI. 14, '*na vinā pramāṇena prameyasya upalabdhiḥ*
   VI. 1. '*Bahirātmakyā gatyāntarātmano 'numīyate gatiḥ.*'
2. In order to avoid unnecessary repetitions, I have thought it fit, so far as the subject of this thesis is concerned, to take Aitareya and Yājñavalkya as the representative philosophers of the Upaniṣadic period. References to important parallel passages in the other *Upaniṣads* have, however, been given in the foot-notes. That some of the *Upaniṣads* differ from one another in their metaphysical doctrines I duly recognise, but so far as psychological analysis or epistemological notions are concerned, they are much the same in all of them.

Mādhyamika-kārikās of Nāgārjuna, and should serve as a useful introduction to the philosophy of that work, which has been variously understood and described by scholars as nihilism, negativism, relativity, and so on. The main doctrine of the Pāramitās, as also of Nāgārjuna's *Kārikā,* is voidness (*śūnyatā*), which, I shall try to show, is not a theory of negation or nihilism, but one of absolute existence, very much corresponding to the Brahman doctrine of the *Upaniṣads.* The same earlier affinity between the *Upaniṣads* and the *Pāramitās* should explain the later similarity between the *Vedānta* and the *Mādhyamika* School of Buddhism. In fact, the Vedāntists, especially of the school of Gauḍapāda, have been called Buddhists, in disguise (*pracchanna bauddhāḥ*) by the followers of the other Hindu schools. But it will appear from a careful comparative study of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Pāramitās*, that evidently the authors of the latter had followed the *Upaniṣads* both in style and thought with such modifications as were necessary to make their works conform to the essentials of the Buddhist doctrine. For instance, while describing the ultimate reality as an absolute existence, mostly in the Upaniṣadic sense, they only excluded the conception of self, because that would have been inconsistent with the Buddhistic doctrine. Similarly, it will appear that later on Gauḍapāda's position was much the same as that of Nāgārjuna with the exception that, while Nāgārjuna described the absolute existence as voidness, Gauḍapāda called it self or Brahman.

Consistently with their doctrine that the whole world of experience is unreal, or rather illusory, the *Prajñāpāramitās* hold that no real knowledge is possible; which theory was more elaborately worked out, later on, by Nāgārjuna by showing that all notions about the world of experience were either relative or contradictory, and hence devoid of truth.

One of the important works of the *Pāramitā* literature is the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*. The first chapter of this treatise deals with the 'knowledge of all forms'—*sarvākārajñatā*, and it is maintained that consciousness (*citta*), the various *skandhas*, signs (*lakṣaṇa*), and the objects signified (*lakṣya*)—are all unreal, literally, devoid of the forms and characteristics which they seem to possess. In a dialogue between Sāriputra and Subhūti, the nature of consciousness is discussed, and following a statement on the part of Subhūti that consciousness is non-consciousness, and that its nature is illumination (*prakṛitis cittasya prabhāsvarā*), Sāriputra asks Subhūti to explain further what he means by consciousness, which, according to him, is non-consciousness. Subhūti, having first elicited from Sāriputra the assertion that the quality of non-consciousness (*acittatā*) does not admit of the predication of being (*astitā*), says that it is something which does not admit of any modification (*avikārā*) or variation (*avikalpā*).[1] In another portion of the dialogue it is main-

1. *Aṣṭa*, pp. 5 and 6.

tained that the various skandhas[1] viz., *rūpa* (form and substance), *vedanā* (feeling), *saṃjñā* (cognition), *saṃs-kāra* (dispositions), and *vijñāna* (knowledge) are devoid of their respective natures. Similarly perfection of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*), omniscience (*sarvajñatā*), signs (*lakṣaṇa*) and the things signified (*lakṣya*) are also devoid of their respective natures. And, to make the doctrine complete, it is maintained lastly that the nature of things is itself devoid of its own nature—*svabhāvalakṣaṇenāpi svabhāvo vivahitaḥ.*[2]

In Chapter, XIII (*Acintya-parivarta*), dealing with the 'inconceivable', the Lord says that all subs-tances (*sarvadharmāḥ*) are inconceivable (*acintyāḥ*), incomparable (*atulyāḥ*); such as cannot be counted (*asaṃkhyeyāḥ*), and devoid of inequality or equality (*asaṃa-samāḥ*). Then by way of an explanation it is asserted that they are inconceivable, because the intellect cannot get at them (*cittoparamatvāt*); they cannot be compared, because they are beyond com-parison (*tulanā-samatikrāntatvāt*); and they cannot be measured, and do not admit of counting and the dis-tinctions of equality and inequality, because they are beyond measuring, counting and comparing.

1. A rendering of the names of the *skandhas* into English always presents a difficulty, for they are used in various senses. Some of these have been noticed by Dr. E. J. Thomas in his *The Life of Buddha as Legend & History*, pp. 194-95.

2 *Aṣṭa.*, p. 10.

The doctrines of suchness (*tathatā*) and voidness (*śūnyatā*) are expounded in Chapters XVI and XVIII respectively, and in spite of the paradoxical nature of the language, it is clear they they represent a philosophy of absolute existence. Subhūti first asserts that the 'suchness', which really means the 'in-itselfness' of a thing, of the Tathāgata and his own are the same; and then goes on to say that the 'suchness' of all substances is the same as that of the Tathāgata; and, is, therefore, like that of his, beyond all change and variation, and also all-pervading.[1] The identity of all 'suchness' is asserted in the most unequivocal terms when it is said that: that which is the suchness of the Tathāgata; and that which is the suchness of all the substances—these are one and the same suchness (*ekaivaiṣā tathatā*) which is non-dual (*advayā*), non-distinguishable as two (*advyaidhikārā*), not a suchness (*advaya-tathatā*); that suchness is not to be found anywhere (*na kvacit tathatā*); it is not from anywhere (*na kutaścit tathatā*), and it does not belong to anyone (*na kasyacit tathatā*).[2]

The doctrine of voidness is allied to that of suchness. It is dealt with in Chapter XVIII. In response to a request made by Subhūti to explain to him the

1. Aṣṭa., p. 307, '*Yathāca tathāgata-tathatā 'vikārā, nirvikārā, avikalpā, nirvikalpā, na kvacit pratihanyate, evam sarvadharma–tathatā avikalpā, nirvikārā, avikalpā, nirvikalpā, na kvacit pratihanyate.*

2. *Aṣṭa*, p. 307.

prfound doctrine, the Lord said that the profound (*gambhīram*) and voidness were identical, and that whatever was without sign (*animitta*), unthought (*apraṇihita*), devoid of dispositions (*anabhisaṃskāra*), unproduced (*anutpāda*), without birth (*ajātiḥ*) ; non-existent (*abhāva*); free from attachment (*virāga*), of the nature of restraint, (*nirodha*), cessation (*nirvāṇa*), and the ultimate (*vigama*)-all that is the same as the profound. This profoundness, the Lord said, belongs to all things including the *skandhas*, and it appears from his description that it is the same as the suchness and voidness of things. For, he said 'with regard to these, O, Subhūti, according as there is the suchness of *rūpa*, (*rūpa-tathatā*), so is there a profound *rūpa*, according as there is the suchness of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *saṃskāras*, and as *Subhūti*, there is the suchness of *vijñāna*, so is there a profound *vijñāna*. *O*, Subhūti where there is no *rūpa*, that is the profoundness of *rūpa*; where, Subhūti, there is no *vedanā*, no *saṃjñā*, no *saṃskāra*, no *vijñāna*, there is the profoundness of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāras* and *vijñāna*. Having heard this discourse, Subhūti says: 'O Lord, it is wonderful that my attention has been turned away from the forms and substances (*rūpataśca nivāritaḥ*) by a subtle method (*sūkṣmeṇopāyena*) and *nirvāṇa* has been taught to me (*nirvāṇam ca sūcitam*). Similarly, my attention has been withdrawn by a subtle method from *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāras* and *vijñāna*, and *nirvāṇa* has been taught to me.[1] Another passage, in the same chapter,

1. *Aṣṭa.*, pp. 341-42.

which throws light upon the doctrine of voidness is as follows: 'The Lord said, O, Subhūti, those things which are void are also without destruction (*akṣayāḥ*); that which is voidness is also immeasurability (*aprameyatā*); therefore, then, O Subhūti, there is not perceived any real distinction or plurality among these. These are mere (distinctions of) words—mere words as spoken by the Tathāgata: (that voidness is) 'that which cannot be measured, that which cannot be counted, that which is without destruction, that which is without cause, that which is beyond thought, etc.[1] Then it is further asserted that the character of all things is indescribable (*anabhilapyaḥ*), for the voidness of them is indescribable[2]. At the end of the discourse Subhūti asks: 'O Lord, what is this, again, the highest perfect knowledge (*anuttara samyak-sambodhiḥ*)?; and the Lord answers: 'Subhūti, it is this suchness which is the highest perfect knowledge. That suchness neither increases nor decreases'.[3]

The larger and the smaller *Hṛdaya-Sūtras* and the *Vajra-chedikā* are three other treatises of the *Pāramitā* class. The first two appear to be simply an abridgment of the doctrines of such bigger works as the *Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā*, and there is nothing new in them. In the *Vajra-chedikā* we come across some remarkable

1. Cf. *Chānd.* vi. 1, 4-6.
2. *Aṣṭa.*, p. 348.
3. *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, pp. 350-51.

passages about the nature of the Tathāgata and his teachings, which distinctly show that the *Pāramitā* philosophy stands for the doctrine of an absolute existence, very similar to that of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Vedānta*. The Tathāgata is said to represent the suchness of things (*bhūta-tathatāyā etad adhivacanam*), the nature of non-productiveness (*anutpāda-dharmatāyāḥ*); the cessation of form and substance (*dharmocchedasya*) and that which is altogether unborn (*atyantānutpannasya*). The Tathāgata is not to be supposed as having gone anywhere, nor as having come from anywhere. Finally it is said that those who think that the Tathāgata can be seen by means of form (*rūpa*), or can be heard by means of sound, are engaged in a futile effort.[1] It will appear that this description of the Tathāgata very nearly approaches the Vedāntic conception of the absolute self.

The following passage is another remarkable expression of a doctrine of absoluteness :–'And verily, again, O, Subhūti, the *dharma* which has been discerned, taught and thought out by the Tathāgata, admits neither of truth nor falsehood (*na tatra satyam na mṛṣā*). It is like this, Subhūti, that just as a man immersed in darkness would not see anything, in the same way, should the Bodhisattva, immersed in reality (*vastu-patitaḥ*), be looked upon, as one who gives away alms as one immersed in reality. And, O Subhūti, just as

1. *Vājra-chedikā. Max Müller's ed. Oxford,* XVII, XIX, XXVI.

a man immersed in darkness would not see anything, in the same way, should the Bodhisattva, immersed in reality (*vastu-patitaḥ*), be looked upon, as one who gives away alms as one immersed in reality. And O, Subhūti, just as a man with the eyes would see various kinds of forms on the passing away of night and the rising of the sun, in the same way should the Bodhisattva immersed in non-reality (*avastu-patitaḥ*), be looked upon, as one who gives away alms as one immersed in non-reality.'[1] The passage evidently contains the doctrine, according to which, reality-in-itself is an undifferentiated homogeneous absolute, a darkness in which all cows are black, as Hegel puts it, and this experience, according to the *Vajra-chhedikā*, one has when one is actually immersed in reality. The opposite of it is the world of plurality and heterogeneity, and it is so to one who is not immersed in reality. The real world of the wise man is compared to night, and the unreal world of the layman to the state of wakefulness.[2] That the universe is further regarded as an illusion, a passing phantom, is evident from the last verse of the *Vajra-cchedikā*, which has been translated by Max Müller as follows:—

> 'Stars, darkness, a lamp, a phantom, dew, a bubble;
> A dream, a flash of lightning, and a cloud–thus
> We should look upon the world (all that was made)[3]

1. *Vajra-cched. XIV.*
2. Cf. The *Bhagavadgītā*:
   "*Yā niśa sarva-bhūtānām tasyām jāgarti saṃyamī,*
   Yasyām jāgrati bhūtāni sā niś'ā paśyato muneḥ".
3. *Tārakā timiram dīpo māyāvaśyāyabudbudam,*

Now to sum up, it will appear from the various quotations given above that according to the Prajñāpāramitās, (i) the suchness of things, that is, their intrinsic character (*tathatā*) is voidness (*śūnyatā*), and hence, all things of the world including consciousness (*citta*) and knowledge are devoid of the nature which they seem to possess (*Aṣṭa.* I), (ii) the real nature of things is incomprehensible (*acintya*), for it is beyond the reach of the intellect (*Aṣṭa.* XIII); (iii) suchness of things is an undifferentiated absolute existence (*Aṣṭa.* XVI); (iv) suchness, voidness and profoundness are identical, and these constitute true or perfect knowledge, they are also indestructible (*akṣayāḥ*) and immeasurable (*aprameyāḥ*); the same are *nirvāṇa*; eveything else is a matter of mere verbal talk (*abhilapyaḥ*) (*Aṣṭa.* XVIII). It must be clear from this description of voidness, suchness, or *nirvāṇa* that they are not the name of non-being but of an absolute ultimate entity, which, in the *Vajra-cchedikā*, has even been identified with the Tathāgata, and hence there is no reason to call the philosophy of the *Pāramitās* nihilism or negativism. The doctrine of the illusory nature of the phenomenal world and the consequent denial of knowledge in the *Pāramitās* is essentially the same as the *Māyā* and the *Avidyā* doctrine of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Vedānta*.[1] The former re-

Svapnam ca vidyudabhram ca evam draṣṭavyam saṃskṛtam.

1. It is usually maintained, and to a certain extent rightly too, that the conceptions of *Māyā* and *Avidyā*, as found

appears in a developed form in Nāgārjuna, and the latter in Gauḍapāda and Śaṃkara.

---

in the earlier *Upaniṣads*, are different from those found later in Śaṃkara's *Vedānta*, but it has to be remembered that the idea underlying the use of those terms both in the *Upaniṣads* and the later *Vedānta*, *viz.*, the illusory nature of the phenomenal world, is essentially the same. Further in some *Upaniṣads*, which are not very late after all and much prior to Śaṃkara, e. g., in the *Śvetāśvatara*, *Māyā* is actually called *prakṛti*, which notion of *Māyā* would distinctly correspond to Śaṃkara's.

In an article on the *Philosophy of the PP.* (*J BT S.* iv. iii) V B. quotes certain passages which show that according to the *Prajñāpāramitā* the appearance of the phenomenal world is due to a *Māyā* in the sense it is used in the *Upaniṣads.* The lord is said to have cited the example of a magician and to have declared that substances appear to have the various characteristics which they possess because of the character of *Māyā* '*dharmataiṣā sarvadharmāṇām māyādharmatām upādāya*'. Similarly *avidyā* has been described, in the Upaniṣadic sense, as that cognition which perceives things, which are not existent, as existent—*yathā Sāriputra na samvidyante tathā samvidyante evam avidyamānas tenocyante avidyeti*'. Unfortunately VB. did not say from which *Prajñā-pāramitā* he got these passages, and I have been unable to trace them to their source.

PART III

Epistemology of the Philosophical Sūtras.

1. INTRODUCTORY.

(i) The Philosophical Sūtras

The various shades of philosophical thought found in the early literature assumed definite shape in course of time, and gave rise to a number of schools. The doctrines of most of these were put together in works which have come down to us as the Philosophical Sūtras. Of the Hindu philosophical schools, it will appear that while the *Mīmāṃsā*, the *Vedānta*, the *Sāṃkhya*, and the *Yoga* owe their origin directly to the Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas, and the Upaniṣads, the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya*, which represent a different type of thought, had their source in another kind of literature. That the texts of the Vedic literature form the basis of the doctrines of the *Mīmāṃsā*, the *Vedānta*, the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Yoga* schools is a fact which now requires no proof. And again, that there is no appreciable basis for the essential tenets of the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya* schools in the Vedic literature is also evident and an admitted fact. This being so, it is only reasonable to expect that the doctrines of the *Mīmāṃsā*, the *Vedānta*, the *Sāṃkhya*, and the *Yoga* schools would have assumed a definite form earlier than those of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools, and that they really did so is evident from a frequent mention of these four schools in the early literature of the post-vedic period, and almost an absence of reference in it to

the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools as such. Thus proceeding on the assumption that there was a tendency to put together the doctrines of a school in the form of Sūtras as soon as, or within a reasonable period after, they had assumed a definite shape one may well expect that the Sūtras of the *Mīmāṃsa*, the *Vedānta*, the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Yoga* schools would have been compiled first and much about the same period, while those of the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya* schools would have followed later on. This expectation, however, seems to be belied by the fact that the present *Sāṃkhya-sūtras* have been proved to belong to a very late period, as late as the fourteenth century A. D.; and the *Yoga-sūtras* are now believed by a number of scholars, following Professors Jacobi and Woods, to be as late as the fourth or fifth century A. D. Now, while the gap of an early systematic work on the Sāṃkhya is filled up by the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, or it may be explained by the surmise that there was an early *Sūtra* work, either a shorter form of the present one or altogether different from it, which is lost, the *Yoga-sūtras* are all that we have as a systematic exposition of the Yoga doctrines, and there is no reason to believe that they were preceded by another work of a similar nature. The question, then, is whether the systematization of such an early school of thought as the Yoga would have been postponed until as late as the fourth or fifth century A. D., and until after the systematization of the doctrines of even

the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya schools, which began later on, and the *Sūtras* of which definitely contain a reference to the Yoga doctrines of mystic intuition and concentration.

The arguments adduced for the late date of the *Yoga-sūtras* are mainly those given by Professor Jacobi in his article on the dates of the Philosophical Sūtras[1], and these I propose to consider presently.

Professor Jacobi's arguments may be summarized as follows:—

1. A discussion of the Buddhist denial of the external world in *YS.* iv, 15 f., indicates that these *sūtras* refer to the Buddhist doctrine of *Vijñāna-vāda* and hence Patañjali must be later than the middle of the fifth century A.D.

2. That the Patañjali of the *Yoga-sūtras* is different from the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* bearing the same name, and hence "the only argument for the great antiquity of the *Yoga-sūtras* is fallacious".

3. There are certain doctrines in the *YS.* which are not countenanced by the Sāṃkhya and the early Yoga, and which hence have been adopted by Patañjali from other systems; and this fact indicates that the *YS.* belong to a late period. The doctrines alluded to are explained by Jacobi as follows:–

(*a*) The doctrine of *sphoṭa* has been adopted from the Vaiyākaraṇas; it is expounded in the *Bhāṣya* on *YS.* iii, 17.

(*b*) The doctrine of the infinite size of the *antaḥkaraṇa* seems to have been adopted from the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It is given in the *Bhāṣya* on *YS.* iv, 10, and there ascribed to the "*Ācārya*".

(*c*) The atomic theory, which originally belonged to the Vaiśeṣika, is clearly referred to by Patañjali in *YS.* i, 40 (cf. *Bhāṣya* on iii, 44).

1 *Journal of American Oriental Society, XXXI, 1911.*

(*d*) The doctrine that time consists of *kṣaṇas*, which was first put forth by the Sautrāntikas, is clearly assumed in iii, 52, though the details are explained in the *Bhāṣya* only.

A CRITICISM OF THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS

The first argument is evidently based upon the assumptions that (*a*) there is a refutation of *Vijñāna-vāda* in YS. iv, 15 ff.; and (*b*) that it is the *Vijñāna-vāda* of Vasubandhu which is refuted. As regards the first of these it will appear that it is only the *Sūtra*, *na caika-citta-tantraṃ vastu tad apramāṇakam tadā kim syāt* which lends support to the view that *Vijñāna-vāda* is refuted. There is nothing either in the preceeding *sūtra* or the following one to indicate definitely that there is reference to *Vijñāna-vāda* in this context. The *Sūtra* iv, 15, is: *vastu-sāmye citta bhedāt tayor viviktaḥ panthāḥ*, of which a faithful rendering into English will be, "because of the difference of the intellect (thoughts), the object being the same (or similar), the path of the two is different." It will appear that neither the Sanskrit commentators nor modern scholars have faithfully followed the wording of the *sūtra* in commenting upon it, or translating it into English.[1] The author of the *Bhāṣya* is prepossessed with the notions of *Vijñāna-vāda* and its refutation in this section of the YS., so much so that he starts a discussion on

1. E. g. Rajendralal Mitra: "Even in the sameness of object the course (courses ?) of the two are distinct, from *diversity* of the thinking principle." *Bibl. Indica* edition; and Woods, "Because, while the (physical) thing remains the same the mind-stuffs are different, (therefore the two are upon) *distinct levels of existence*," "Yoga System of Patañjali", *HOS.*

In the above translations I find no justification for the renderings italicized by me.

the subject even in his comments upon the previous *Sūtra;* iv, 14 : *pariṇāmaikatvād vastu tattvam,* which has not even the semblance of having anything to do with *Vijñāna-vāda* or its refutation, and hence the remark by Vācaspati Miśra *tad evam utsūtram bhāṣyakṛd vijñānātirikta-sthāpana-yuktim uktvā sautrīṃ yuktim avatārayati–,* "so having thus gone beyond the *sūtra* in giving the reason for establishing something besides knowledge, now the author of the *Bhāṣya* introduces the argument as given in the *sūtra* itself," i. e. in iv, 15. The interpretation of the first commentator has since been followed by the later ones, and by modern scholars. It will appear, however, that the *sūtra* in itself is evidently intended to say that the same or similar object of a certain nature (according to the combination of the three constituents–*guṇas*: *sattva, rajas,* and *tamas*) affects different minds differently because of the difference in the nature of those minds; the main point emphasized being not the *diversity of minds* but the *difference of mentality.* The term *citta-bhedāt* in the *sútra* may signify "difference of intellect (thoughts)" with reference to one and the same individual, *or* different individuals, as the case may be. For, one and the same individual may also be said to have different "minds" according as he happens to be in the mood of *sattva, rajas,* or *tamas,* and to be, therefore, affected differently by one and the same, or a similar object ; and such a case also is evidently covered by the *sútra.* This interpretation is confirmed by the context of the two previous *sútras,*[1] and is also supported by the example given by the commentators

1. *YS.* iv, 13 : *te vyakta-súkṣmáḥ guṇātmánaḥ ;* and iv, 14: *pariṇámaiktavád vastu-tattvam,* in which an object is said to be composed of the three constituents of *sattva, rajas,* and *tamas.*

that the presence of a young woman affects different men in a different manner according to the character of those men. Similarly, *Sūtra* iv, 17: *tad uparāgāpekṣitvād asya vastu jñātājñātam* simply asserts that a thing is known according as it produces an impression upon the mind or not; and there is no reference to *Vijñāna-vāda* in it, even according to the commentators. As has already been said, it is only *Sūtra* iv, 16: *na caika-citta-tāntraṃ vastu tad apramāṇakam tadā kiṃ syāt-*, "nor is an object dependent upon one intellect; that (being) not a proof, what would happen then?", which lends support to the view that there is a refutation of *Vijñāna-vāda* in this section, or in the *Yoga-sūtra.* Now, it is interesting to find that this *sūtra* has not only been not commented upon by Bhoja, the author of the *Rāja-mārtaṇḍa-vṛtti,* but evidently not treated by him as a *sūtra* at all; for it does not appear in the editions of his *Vṛtti* and *Sūtra* iv, 17, as found in the editions of the *Bhāṣya,* and Vācaspati Miśra's commentary has been numbered as *Sūtra* iv, 16 and so on. This omission of the *sūtra* by Bhoja clearly indicates that the copy or copies of the *Yoga-sūtras* which he used did not contain this *sūtra.*[1] What could be the explanation then of the appearance of this *sūtra* in the editions of the other commentators? Considering that Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra were the predecessors of Bhoja, it is improbable that he should not have known their commentaries, and should not have been aware of this *sūtra,* had it been regarded as a *sūtra* in his time; and yet we have the commentaries on this *sūtra* by both Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra in the editions that have come down to us. The only explanation of this discrepancy is that the clause *na caika-citta-tantraṃ vastu*

1. Cf. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy,* i. p. 233, note 1.

tad-apramāṇakaṃ tadā kiṃ syāt was originally a line in the middle of the *Bhāṣya* on *Sūtra* iv, 15, immediately following the last sentence of what is now regarded as the *Bhāṣya* on iv, 15. viz. *ta etayā dvārā sādhāraṇatvaṃ bādhamānāḥ pūrvottara-kṣaṇeṣu vastu-svarūpam evāpahnuvate*, and the *Bhāṣya* on iv, 15, really ended with the last sentence of what is now regarded as the *Bhāsya* on iv, 16. Similarly, the comment of Vācaspati Miśra on iv, 15 and 16, according to the present editions also originally must have formed one entire comment on iv, 15; and it was in this form that the *Yoga-sūtra* and the commentaries of Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra must have been known to Bhoja. It was only later on that either by mistake or otherwise, this particular clause in the *Bhāṣya* came to be treated as a separate *sūtra*, and the commentaries were also divided accordingly. This mistake, or misinterpretation, could not have been possible in the case of Bhoja's commentary, for it is of an independent nature and does not usually follow or repeat the texts of the previous commentaries; and hence the edition of the *Yoga-sūtra* as found with his commentary may be regarded as authentic. This explanation of the discrepancy about *Sūtra* iv, 16, is rendered more than plausible by the further facts that: (*a*) the clause which is regarded as *Sūtra* iv, 16, now, does not read like a *Sūtra* at all; (*b*) it quite fits in with the context if it is regarded as a part of the *Bhāṣya* immediately following the last line of the present *Bhāṣya* on iv, 15; and (*c*) the present commentaries of Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra on iv, 15 and 16, if treated as commentaries only on iv, 15, and read together, form one continuous whole without the slightest indication that those latter portions which are supposed to belong to iv, 16, could not have been a part of the commentaries on iv, 15.

It is rather curious that this discrepancy about *YS.* iv, 16, which is so important for the point under discussion, has not been mentioned at all by either Professor Jacobi or Professor Woods.

If what has been said above about *Sūtra* iv, 16, be true, there is no reason to believe that independently of the commentaries the *Yoga-sūtras* contain a refutation of *Vijñāna-vāda* at all. Further, even if there were a reference to *Vijñāna-vāda* in any of the *Yoga-sūtras*, no argument has been given by either Jacobi or Woods to show that it is the *Vijñāna-vāda* of Vasubandhu which is meant. "We cannot it is true," says Professor Woods, "maintain that the *Vijñāna-vāda* here attacked by the *Sūtra* must be the idealism of Vasubandhu"[1]; and then again he rightly admits that "there surely were idealists before him, just as there were pre-Patañjalian philosophers of Yoga".[2] All this admission, coupled with the fact that the very authenticity of the *sūtra* iv, 16, is extremely doubtful, takes away the force of the whole argument for a late date of the *Yoga-sūtras* based upon the fact that there is a reference to *Vijñāna-vāda* in them.

Before I pass on to the next argument I wish to utilize this opportunity of pointing out one thing about references to *Vijñāna-vāda* in particular and other doctrines in general. It will appear that in the Philosophsical *Sūtras* when a certain doctrine other than its own is mentioned or criticized the name of the author or the school of thought to which it belongs is seldom mentioned. It is only in the commentaries that specific names are mentioned, and it is found that whenever there is the slightest scope for interpreting a *sūtra* as referring to, and providing a criticism of, what may be called by the

1. *Yoga System of Patañjali*, Introd., xvii.
2. Ibid., xviii.

general name of *Nirālambana-vāda*, the commentators are only too eager to put it down as containing an argument against the *Vijñāna-vāda* or the *Śūnya-vāda* of Buddhism. Now the fact that in most cases the *Sūtras* were composed or compiled much earlier than the date of the commentators, and that their authors have not mentioned any particular names while criticising doctrines different from their own, should be a warning against reposing an unqualified confidence in the interpretations of the commentators. This should be the more so because most of the early commentators lived and wrote their commentaries at a time when the Hindu-Buddhistic polemics were at their highest, and the Hindu writers were only too glad to use anything which they could lay their hands on as a missile against their opponents. Let us take, for instance, general references in the *Sūtras* to an idealistic doctrine such as has been called *Vijñāna-vāda* in Buddhism, even where they actually exist. The usual tendency is to suppose, often without any arguments or proofs, that they must be to Vasubandhu's *Vijñāna-vāda*, although it is also admitted at the same time that there was *Vijñāna-vāda* in Buddhism even before Vasubandhu. Further, it seems to have seldom occurred to scholars that such *sūtras* may not refer to any particular school or author at all, and may simply have in view the idealistic position in general; or, again, they may refer to such idealism as is found in some of the early *Upaniṣads*. That besides the *Vijñāna-vāda* of Buddhism there was also an old Hindu theory of idealism, even of the type of the Buddhistic *Vijñāna-vāda*, in so far as the doctrine of mind-dependent reality is concerned, is a fact which has to be admitted, but which usually seems to be forgotten by scholars when discussing references to the idealistic doctrines in the *Sūtra* literature. For example, the philosophy of such an early work as the *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka* is as good a *Vijñāna-*

vāda as any other could be. All things of the world are described as knowledge (*prajñānam*) and having their existence only in and through knowledge—*sarvaṃ tat prajñā-netram, pajñāne pratiṣṭhitam, prajñā-netro lokaḥ, prajñā pratiṣṭhā, prajñānam brahma.*[1] Similarly the denial of plurality and the doctrine of absolute existence in such Upaniṣads as the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* very much approximate the doctrine of illusory existence as found in the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism. Both these doctrines, even as they were to be found in Hinduism, would not be tolerated by such later realistic schools as were represented by the Philosophical *Sūtras*; and what wonder if, when the authors of the *Sūtras* discussed these, they should have had these Hindu doctrines only, or also, in view.

The second argument given by both Jacobi and Woods for the late date of the *Yoga-sūtras* is that the author of the *Yoga-sūtras* is different from that of the *Mahābhāṣya*. Now, even granting that this view about the authorship of the *YS.* be true,[2] I do not see how this by itself can prove that the date of the *YS.* is late, or cannot be earlier than the fourth or fifth century A. D. The question of the date of the author of the *YS.* still remains undecided and open. It may be late, or it may be early.

The arguments 3 (*a*) and 3 (*b*) based upon the presence in the *Bhāṣya* of a reference to the doctrines of *sphoṭa* and the infinite size of the *antaḥkaraṇa* are admitted by Jacobi himself to be weak, for no reference of this kind is to be found in the *Sūtras* themselves. Speaking of the first he says: "This theory is, however, not directly mentioned in the *Sūtra*, and *its introduction rests entirely on the authority of*

1 *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, ii, 6; *Ait. Upaniṣad*, iii, 3, 3.

2 However, see Dasgupta on this point, *History of Indian Philosophy*, i, pp. 231–2.

the Bhāṣya[1]; and about the second: "It is given in the *Bhāṣya* on iv, 10, and there ascribed to the '*Ācārya*'."[1] I have only to add that it is evident that these references prove nothing with regard to the date of the *Sūtras*.

The next arguments are 3 (*c*) and 3 (*d*), viz. that the atomic theory is referred to in *YS.* i, 40: *paramāṇu-parama-mahattvānto' sya vaśīkāraḥ* and the doctrine of *kṣaṇas* in *YS.* iii, 52: *kṣaṇa-tat-kramayoḥ saṃyamād vivekajaṃ jñānam.* In connection with these references Jacobi says: "The *Sphoṭa-vāda* and the *Mano-vaibhava-vāda* (1 and 2) may be later additions to the system, but the *paramāṇu-vāda* and the *kṣa-ṇika-vāda* must be ascribed to Patañjali and cannot be later than him "[1] Now again, even granting what Jacobi says here with regard to these references, I am unable to see how they can prove that the *Yoga-sútras* belong to a late date, unless it could be shown that these doctrines belong to a late period. On the other hand, Jacobi's own statements in the article under discussion indicate, what is really true about them, that they can be traced back to quite an early period, in Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism. Speaking about the adopting of these doctrines by Patañjali he says: "That he did adopt them, directly or indirectly, from the Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists, though of course not in their original form, presupposes that these doctrines had somehow ceased to be shibboleths of hostile schools, and that the general idea underlying them had been acknowledged by other philosophers too. We know that this has been the case with regard to the atomic theory which has also been admitted by Buddhists, Jainas, Ājīvakas, and some Mīmāṃsakas"[1] The conception of *aṇu* is expressly found in some of the earlier *Upaniṣads* also, e. g.

1 *JAOS.*, xxxi, p. 28; italics are mine.

in *Kaṭha* ii, 20, *aṇor aṇīyān*, or in *Muṇḍaka* ii, 2, 2, *yad aṇubhyo 'ṇu.*[1] Similarly, about what Jacobi calls *kṣaṇika-vāda*, and what really is the use of *kṣaṇa* in the sense of a moment, he admits that "the *kṣaṇika-vāda*, in an altered and restricted form, has been adopted by the Vaiśeṣikas",[2] the *Sútras* of whose school, according to Jacobi, are earlier than the *Yoga-sùtras*. Then, after having made all these statements, he concludes: "This adoption of originally heterodox doctrines by Patañjali therefore unmistakably points to a relatively modern time." Now, even if it be granted that Patañjali was the first to introduce these doctrines into the Yoga system, this fact does not prove that he belonged to a late date; for the doctrines of *aṇu* and *kṣaṇa* have to be admitted to belong to quite an early period, even on Jacobi's own statements, and they might have been imported into the Yoga at any reasonable time even before the fourth or fifth century A. D.; for instance at about the same time as they were imported into the Vaiśeṣika system.

Professor Woods' argument,[3] based upon *Sútra* ii, 52, of Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama-sútra* does not prove anything definite. In fact, the *TS.* ii, 52: *aupapattika-caramā-dehottamapuruṣa-saṃkheya-varṣāyuṣo 'napavartyāyuṣaḥ* cannot be said to refer to *YS.* iii, 22: *sopakaramaṃ nirupakramaṃ ca karma tat-saṃyamād aparānta-jñānam ariṣṭebhyo vā.* So far as the two *sútras* are concerned they have neither the affinity of language nor of thought. The one (*TS.* ii, 52) discusses the period of life of the various kinds of beings, and the other (*YS.* iii, 22) the attainment of a certain kind of

1 Also *Chānd.* iii, 14. 3; *Bṛhad.* iv, 1, 1, vi, 3. 13.

2 *JAOS.*, xxxi, p 28.

3 *Yoga System of Patañjali*, Introduction.

yogic merit, *siddhi*. What we find is that Umāsvāti in his own commentary on *TS.* ii, 52, uses the terms *sopakrama* and *nirupakrama*, which are also found in *YS.* iii, 22, and uses the illustrations found in the *Yoga-bhāṣya* of this *Yoga-sūtra*. Now there can be two alternative explanations of this: either (1) Umāsvāti had in his mind this particular *Yoga-sūtra* and the *Yoga bhāṣya* on it while writing his commentary on *TS.* ii, 52; or, (2) he used the terms *sopakrama* and *nirupakrama* and the illustrations independently simply because they were known to him as apt and usual in connection with the topic which he was discussing, just as in logic so many of us use such familiar examples as "Man is mortal", "Socrates is a man", etc. Now, if the first alternative be true, it only proves that Umāsvāti was later than the *Yoga-sūtras* and possibly also the *Yoga-bhāṣya*; and the *Yoga-sūtras* might belong to any date before Umāsvāti, late or early. And, if the second alternative be true, which is more probable, it proves nothing with regard to the relation between Umāsvāti and the author of the *Yoga-sūtras*. Professor Woods, however, argues on the authority of Professor Stcherbatskoi that, as Diṅnāga (about A. D. 550, according to Woods' estimate) does not seem to know anything of Patañjali, he could not be much earlier. As regards this argument, it has to be noted, firstly, that our knowledge of Diṅnāga and his works is still very imperfect and incomplete; secondly, there might have been no occasion for Diṅnāga to refer to Patañjali; and thirdly, the clear implication of this argument, if it be accepted, is that Patañjali was later than Diṅnāga, and consequently the date of the *Yoga-sūtras* is to be pushed still further to about the seventh century A. D. ! This goes against Professor Woods' own statement, in which he says: "The date for Siddhasena is set by Professor Jacobi (*ZDMG.* 60, 289, Leipzig, 1906, re-

print, p. 3, *Eina Jaina-Dogmatik*) at the middle or end of the sixth century. Umāsvāti precedes him; and Patañjali the philosopher would not be later than A. D. 400 and might be much earlier."

It is evident that very little can be proved about the date of the *Yoga-sūtras* by alluding to the presence in them of such philosophical doctrines as can be traced back to a very early period, or again by referring to such authors or works containing references to the *Yoga-sūtras* as belong to a late period. The arguments based upon both these kinds of references leave a very wide margin both for the earlier and the later limits.

Besides references to particular authors or doctrines, another criterion for determining the relative dates of certain works will be a comparison of their philosophical position with regard to such problems as may be common to them. For example, for determining the relative dates of the Philosophical Sūtras, one such problem may be the theory of the means of knowledge (the *pramāṇas*). We know that of all the Philosophical Sūtras it is to be found in the most developed form in the *Nyāya-sūtras*, and also that all the works which we definitely know to be later than the *Nyāya-sūtras*, and which have dealt with the *pramāṇas*, show evident signs of being influenced by the theory of the *Nyāya-sūtras*. On the other hand, the theory of the *pramāṇas* as found in the Sūtras of the other schools is clearly of a primitive nature. The *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta* Sūtras hardly contain anything which may be called the

theory of the *pramāṇas*; the *Yoga-sūtras* are a little better; and the position of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* appears to be just preliminary to the theory as found in the *Nyāya-sūtras*. Take, for instance, the definition of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) as given in the various Sūtras. It will appear that the definition of *pratyakṣa* as given in the Sūtras other than the *Nyāya* is simply psychological, viz. that knowledge which is the result of the contact of the sense-organs with the object, *indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam*, and it is only in the *Nyāya-sūtras* that the conditions *avyapadeśyam* (non-inferential, literally that which is not the result of a sign or mark), *avyabhicāri* (non-discrepant), and *vyavasāyātmakam* (definite) have been added, and then these have formed the basis of later definitions. Similarly it is in the *Nyāya-sūtras* that the three kinds of inference: *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* are first enunciated, and these are found in some form or other in most of the later works on logic. In the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* we just find in Sūtra, IX, 2. 1. what appears to be a preliminary statement of this classification of inference in the *Nyāya-sūtras*. The *Sāṃkhya kārikā*[1] definitely assumes the three kinds of inference as given in the *Nyāya-sūtras*. The case of the *Sāṃkhya-sūtras* in this respect is rather curious

1 *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, 4

for although they have been proved to belong to a very late period, the definitions in them of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*)[1], direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*)[2], and inference (*anumāna*) are of a peculiar nature. While one would have expected that these definitions in the *Sāṃkhya-sūtras* would have borne the marks of the latest developments in the theory of the *pramāṇas*, they show resemblance neither to the definitions of the *pramāṇas* in the *Nyāya-sūtras* and the later works nor to those given in the other Sūtras and the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*. All these facts about the theory of the *pramāṇas* in the Philosophical Sūtras go to show that (1) the *Nyāya-sūtras* are the latest of all the Sūtras except the *Sāṃkhya*; (ii) the *Mīmāṃsā*, the *Vedānta*, the *Yoga* and the *Vaiśeṣika* Sūtras are earlier than *Nyāya-sūtras* and probably succeeded one another in the order in which they are mentioned here; (iii) the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* is later than the *Nyāya-sūtras*; (iv) the *Sāṃkhya-sūtras* in the present form decidedly belong to a late date because of evidece other than that of the theory of the *pramāṇas*, but the peculiar nature of the definitions of the *pramāṇas* suggests a very probable hypothesis that these definitions originally belonged to an early *Sāṃkhya* work most probably earlier than the *Nyāya-sūtras*, which is either lost, or has been incorporated in the present *Sāṃkhya-sūtras*. From the point of view of the epistemological development of thought the

1 *Sāmkhya-sūtras*, I, 87
2 *Ibid.* I, 89

Nyāya-sūtras form a very definite and convenient landmark for determining the relative position of the other works, and unless there be other reasons to prove the contrary, the chronological order suggested by the epistemology of the various Sūtras may be accepted as fairly correct. It will further appear that the conclusions arrived at by this method are also in accordance with the expectation that the Sūtras of the *Mīmāmsā*; the *Vedānta*, the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Yoga* schools should have been, in the ordinary course, compiled earlier than those of the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya*.

The same criterion may be applied to some of the early works of Jainism and Buddhism also. It will appear that Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* and the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* are earlier than the *Nyāya-sūtras*, for neither of them shows any signs of being influenced by the logic of the *Nyāya-sūtras*; and in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* the query about future logicians and the answer to it given in the prophetic style indicate that the *Nyāya* school was yet in the process of formation and had not attained the stage represented by the *Nyāya-sūtras*. Nāgārjuna's works, specially those on logic, definitely presuppose the philosophy of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, and hence he must be later than the *Nyāya-sūtras*.

(ii) The Development of the Nyāya Epistemology.

As has already been pointed out it is in the *Nyāya-sūtras* that we first find a systematic treatment of the means of knowledge. The doctrine of the *Nyāya-sūtras* was, however, the result of a series of previous developments in the earlier literature. The dialogues and discourses which were the characteristic features of the Upaniṣadic period naturally resulted, in course of time, in the formulation of definite methods of debating and forms of reasoning; and these gave rise to a science, which was originally called *ānvīkṣikī*–the science of enquiry, then *tarka-vidyā*–the science of debating; or *hetu-vidyā*–the science of reasoning; and ultimately, *Nyāya-śāstra* the science of logic. *Ânvīkṣikī* began as a science of general enquiry, which included in its scope both metaphysics and logic. Later on it assnmed a more specific form and became the science of pure reasoning: This transition in its connotation can be discovered in the texts of such important works of the period as the *Mānava-dharma-śāstra*,[1] the *Mahābhārata*[2], the *Rāmāyaṇa*[3], and the *Artha-śāstra* of Kauṭilya. It is

1 *MDS'*, *Hetu-śāstra*, II. 11, *Vāda*, VI, 50; *Tarka*, II, 106, 111; *Ātma-vidyá*, VII. 43.

2 *MB.* *Śānti-parva*, 180, 47; 210, 22; 246, 18; *Aśva-medha*, 85, 27.

3 *Rám.*, I, 13, 23;

rather significant with regard to the nature of *ānvīkṣikī* and also of the systems with which it is identified, that in the *Artha śāstra*, the *Sāṃkya*, the *Yoga* and the *Lokāyata* are said to be *ānvīkṣikī–Sāṃkhyam yogo lokāyatam cetyānvīkṣikī.* (I, 2) and it is further described as the light of all the branches of studies *pradīpaḥ sarva–vidyānām.* Thus it will appear that by the time of Kauṭilya[1] *ānvīkṣikī* had come to be regarded mainly as the science of logic, and not much later on it actually became the *Nyāya-śāstra.* The fact that the name *ānvīkṣikī* had been applied to the *Sāṃkhya*, the *Yoga* and even the *Lokāyata* indicates the rationalistic character of the science probably as against the dogmatic nature of the other schools of thought. And we actully find that because of this rationalistic bent, the study had already fallen into disrepute with those who regarded the scriptures as the ultimate and unquestionable authority.[2]

Along with a mention of *ānvīkṣikī*, *tarka-vidyā* or

---

4 *Aś.*, 1. 2, 7. (N. B.) For most of these references I am indebted to V B.'s H *I L.*

1 Indian tradition would put the *AS'.* in the fourth Century B. C. on the assumption that it was written by Cāṇakya during the time of Candra–gupta. According to most of the European scholars, however, it should belong to the third Century, A. D. See Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. III, pp. 517—24.

2 *MDS.*, II, 11; *MB. Śānti.* 180, 47.

hetu-vidyā we find in the literature of this period the use of certain technical terms signifying what came to be known as *pramāṇa*–means of knowledge, and *tantra-yukti*—forms of argumentation. The terms *smṛti*, *pratyakṣa*, *aitihya* and *anumāna* are found as early as the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka.[1] In the *Mānava-dharma-śāstra*, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śāstra* are mentioned[2]; while in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, *aitihya anumāna* and *śāstra* are described as the source of enlightenment. In the *Mahābhārata*, *pratyakṣa*, *kṛtānta* (*anumāna*), *aitihya* and *āgama* are mentioned, and it is said that according to the materialists *pratyakṣa* is the only reliable proof. Similarly such terms as *vāda*, *prayojana*, *chala*, *tarka*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā*, *nirṇaya* and *yukti* are found in the *Mānava dharma-śāstra*, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*[3]. Kautilya mentions thirty-two technical terms called *tantra-yukti* in his *Artha-śāstra*, and these are repeated in the *Caraka*[4] and the *Suśruta*[5] *Saṃhitās* with this difference that in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* the number is thirty-four. It

1 I, 2; 1; The verse is as follows:—

Smṛtih pratyakṣam aitihyam, anumānam catuṣṭayam,
Etair āditya-maṇḍalam sarvair eva vidhāsyate.

2 *MDS'*. XII, 105

3 Cf. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, *HIL.*, chap. iv.

4 *Siddhānta-sthāna*, XII

5 *Uttara-tantra*, LXV.

is not necessaay to go into the details of the meaning and the use of these terms here. What is important to note is that the presence of these terms in the literature of the period, which does not yet represent systematic philosophy, shows how the whole system of logic and epistemology was just in the melting pot. So far as the earlier literature of the period is concerned, for instance the *Mānava-dharma-śāstra*, the *Mahābhārata*, and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, we find in it only an occasional mention of the means of knowledge or forms of argumentation. In the *Carakā-saṃhitā* however, there are a few sections in which we find a fairly systematic treatment of the nature of knowledge including a logical definition of the *pramāṇas* and a psychological analysis of experience[1]. Besides a mention of the logical categories referred to above, we also find in this literature a distinct and frequent referencc to the existence of the schools of the materialists, the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Yoga*, which, it appears, had already acquired prominence.

(iii) The Beginning of Jaina and Buddhistic Epistemology

About the same period as the *Nyāya* arose the schools of Jainism and Buddhism as the result of the teachings of the two great masters—Mahāvīra and Gautama Buddha. But just as we do not find any systematic treatment of Hindu logic and epistemology

1 See *infra* Part III, 3 (ii).

until the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya Sūtras*, there is no sign of a regular system of logical doctrine in the history of Jainism until the time of Umāsvāti, and in that of Buddhism until Nāgārjuna. In the early works of both these religions we just find a mention of certain logical terms and rules of argumentation much in the same way as in the literature of Hinduism. For example, there is a description of *naya* or the relativity of knowledge in the *Bhagavatī-sūtra*, the *Sthānaṅga-sūtra*, and the *Prājñāpanā-sūtra* ; and a classification of the means of knowledge (*pamāna*) and knowledge (*ñāna*) in the *Sthānaṅga-sūtra* and the *Bhagavatī-sūtra*. Similarly the terms *vitarka*, *tarka*, *pakṣa* and *chala*, the various kinds of example (*naa*), the expedients in as a debate (*vivāda*), and the defects of a debate also find a place in the *Sthānaṅga-sūtra*.[1] In the history of Buddhism there is practically no logic in the Pāli literature. In the *Tipitaka*, however, we find a classification of knowledge and also a reference to the existence of a certain class of logicians called *takkika*. In the *Brahma jāla-sutta* there is a reference to certain Śramanas and Brāhamaṇas who were *takki* and *vimaṃsi*[1]. In the *Milinda-pañha*, Milinda is spoken of as one versed in *nīti* or *nyāya*[2]. An explicit reference to logic as a distinct

1 *Digha Nikāya*, I, 16.

2 *Milindapañha*, p. 3

study begins only in the Sanskrit literature of Buddhism, when in *Lalita-vistara*[1] it is mentioned under the name of *hetu-vidyā*.

(iv) Relation between the Hindu and the Non-Hindu Schools on the Subject of Epistemology.

It will appear from the following chapters that the works of the period of the Philosophical Sūtras—both orthodox and heterodox–contain reference to the doctrines of the various schools, although not to those of any particular works or authors. In the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* of Umāsvāti there is a reference to the six means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) admitted by the *Mīmāṃsā* school. The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* refers to the teachers of the *Sāṃkhya*, the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya*; and the works of Nāgārjuna clearly presuppose the *Nyāya* epistemology in their refutation of the validity of the means of knowledge. Similarly, most of the Hindu Philosophical Sūtras presuppose the existence of heterodox doctrines such as those of the Materialists, the Jainas, and the Buddhists; and the *Vedānta*, the *Vaiśeṣika*, and the *Nyāya-Sūtras* definitely contain a discussion and refutation of these. Throughout the history of Indian

---

1 XII, p. 179 (also quoted in *HIL* p. 243.)

epistemology the orthodox and the heterodox schools have influenced one another in the development of thought, although it is not possible now to determine exactly the priority or pcsteriority of particular authors or works during this period. In order to make a beginning, howewer, it will be consistent with the development of thought as we find it in the works of various schools during the period that the earlier Jaina and Buddhist epistemology be considered first and the epistemology of the Hindu schools afterwards.

---

2. THE EARLIER JAINA AND BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGY

(i) The Beginnings of Jaina Epistemology in Umāsvāti's Tattvādhigama-sūtra.

The *TS.* begins with the assertion that the path to emancipation consists of (acquiring) right conviction (*samyag-darśana*), right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*), and right conduct (*samyak-caritra*). (I, 1).

Knowledge (*jñāna*) is classified as *Mati*, *Śruta*, *Avadhi*, *Manaḥ-pāryāya*, and *Kevala* (1, 9). These are called the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*). The first two, that is, *Mati* and *Śruta*, are called indirect (*pārokṣa*), and the rest direct (*pratyakṣa*). (1, 11 & 12)

Mati is either knowledge obtained through the five sense-organs (*indriya-nimitta*), or without the aid of the sense-organs (*anindriya-nimitta*), which latter may be either reflective knowledge (*mano-vṛtti*), or general undifferentiated knowledge (*ogha-jñāna*)[1]–(I, 14, and the *Bhāṣya*). The terms *mati*, *smṛti*, *saṃjñā*, *cintā* and *abhinibodha* are said to be synonyms (1, 13) *Mati* knowledge is further sub-divided into *avagraha*, *īhā*, *apāya*, and *dhāraṇā*.

1 I have followed the editor of the *TS.* (Bibl. Indica) who, in a foot-note, explains *ogha* as *sāmānyam apravibhakta-rūpam.* (p. 16)

Avagraha is explained as an indistinct (*avyaktam*) apprehension and grasping of objects as they are in themselves (*yathā–svam*) by means of the sense-organs. *Avagraha*, *grahaṇa*, *ālocana*, and *avadhāraṇa* are said to be synonyms.

Īhā is a desire to know more particulsrly and definitely about an object, after it has been indistinctly perceived first (*avagṛhīta*)[2], *Īhā*, *ūhā*, *tarka*, *parīkṣā*, *vicāraṇā*, and *jijñāsā* are said to signify the same thing.

Apāyā is the determination by means of reflection of the nature of the perceived object with regard to its perfection or imperfection (*samyag asamyag iti*) merits and defects (*guṇa doṣa vicāraṇā*)[3]. *Apāya*, *apagama*, *apanoda*, *apavyādha*, *apeta*, *apagata*, *apaviddha*, and *apanutta* are synonyms.

Dhāraṇā is the (final) cognition of the object as it is[4], and forming a definite notion about it in the mind. *Dhāraṇā*, *pratipatti*, *avadhāraṇa*, *avasthāna*, *niścaya*, *avagama*, and *avabodha* are the same.

The above kinds of knowledge may be furthur differentiated according as the objects perceived are

---

1 *Tatrāvyaktam yathā-swam indriyair viṣāyaṇām ālocanāvadhāraṇam avagrahaḥ*, *TS.* p. 17.

2 *Avagṛhīte viṣayārthaikadeśāc cheśānugamanam niścaya-viśeṣa–jijñāsā īhā.*, Ibid., p. 17.

3 *Avagṛhīte viṣaye samyag asamyag iti guṇa–doṣa-vicāraṇādhyavasāyapanodo pāyaḥ.*, Ibid., p. 17.

4 *Dhāraṇā pratipattir yathā swam matyavasthānam avadhāraṇam ca.*

many, or of various kinds, perceived quickly or slowly, and so on. (I, 16). They pertain to the objects of sense-(*arthasya*)-(I, 17).

The knowledge of *vyañjana*, which, as will appear from its description, evidently signifies an invisible object, can be had only through *avagraha* with the limitation that it cannot be perceived by sight nor by mind. (1, 18 & 19)

It is said that thus *avagraha* is of two kinds: (i) of *vyañjana*, and (ii) of *artha*. Of these the first does not take place through sight and mind, but it is possible through the rest of the four senses[1]. Knowledge of the class of *īhā* and the rest pertains only to *artha*.[2].

The term *vyañjana* in 1, 18 and the *Bhāṣya* is very obscure, and it has not been explained directly. It has been usually translated as (intermediating) sensation[3], or as indeterminable object[4]; neither of which seems to represent the exact meaning of the author. Although the term has not been defined, it appears from the author's own commentary on *Sūtra*, 1, 18 and 19, as explained above, that a distinction has been drawn between such objects of cognition as can be perceived by means of all the senses including mind and those which can be perceived only by means

1. *Cakṣuṣā no-indriyeṇa ca vyañjanāvagraho na bhavati, caturbhir indriyaiḥ seṣair bhavatītyarthaḥ.*, p, 19.
2. *Ihāyāstu arthasyaiva.*, p. 18.
3. J. L. Jaini, *Outlines of Jainism*, p, 63.
4. *TS.* p, 27.

of the four senses of touch, taste, smell and hearing. The former have been called *artha* and the latter *vyanjana.* The underlying idea in regarding knowledge called *īhā* and the rest as applicable to *artha* only, and *avagrah* as applicable to both *artha* and *vyañjana* is that it is only the visible objects that admit of such determination and definiteness as is achieved by *īhā* and the rest, and invisible objects admit only of such indeterminate knowledge as is signified by the term *avagraha.* According to the author, these invisible objects cannot also be the object of mind or reflection.

Śruta knowledge is preceded by *mati* knowledge (1, 20). It is of two kinds: (i) That which is external to the *Aṅgas* (*aṅga vāhyam*), and (ii) that which is included in the *Aṅgas* (*aṅga-praviṣṭam*). And these are further sub-divided into a number of classes. *Śruta, āptavācanā, āgama, upadeśa, aitihya, āmnāya, pravacana, jina vacana* are all synonyms.

The difference between *mati* knowledge and *śruta* knowledge is that while the former pertains to the objects existing at the present time, the latter pertains to the object existing in all the three times, and is also more pure (*viśuddhataram*). Further while *mati* knowledge is the result of the activity of the self as the knower, and is obtained either through the sense–organs or without them, the *śruta* knowledge, which is based upon *mati* knowledge is the result of communication from some reliable authority (*āptopa-*

deśād bhavati)[1].

. *Avadhi* knowledge is not defined at all either in the Sūtras or the commentary.[2] It is said to be of two kinds: (i) that which belongs to gods and the denizens of the hell, in whose case it is innate, and (ii) that which belongs to man and other beings, in whose case it is acquired (I, 21–23). The latter kind of *avadhi* knowledge is further sub-divided into six kinds according as it lasts for a short time or long time, or as it tends to increase or decrease, etc. . In the commentary on I, 26, while comparing *avadhi* knowledge with *manaḥ paryāya*, the author says that *avadhi* knowledge has for its objects only some aspects of material substances;[3] and this assertion is repeated in I, 28.[4] Further it has already been classed as direct knowledge. Thus it appears that *avadhi* is a kind of direct knowledge of material substances.

Manaḥ-paryāya is of two kinds: (I) *ṛju-mati*, and (ii) *vipula-mati*. The difference between the two is

1. p. 31
2. It is interpreted by Jaini as visual or direct material knowledge (*TS. SBJ.*, p, 39); as knowledge of the remote or past (*Outlines of Jainism*, p, 59); and as visual knowledge, direct knowledge of matter, limited as to (subject-matter), place, time and nature, i. e. without the help of the senses (*Jaina Gem Dictionary*, p. 29)
3. *Rūpi-dravyeṣv asarva-paryāyeṣv avadher viṣaya-nibandho bhavati*, p. 25
4. *Rūpiṣv avadheḥ*, p, 26

that the latter is purer (*viśudda-tara*) than the former, and while the former might cease (*pratipatati*), the latter cannot (*na pratipatati*), I, 24, 25. *Manaḥ-paryāya* is compared with *avadhi* knowledge as follows:—

(a) *Mànaḥ-paryāya*[1] is purer than *avadhi*, for the material objects which are known by the possessor of *avadhi* knowledge are known in a purer form and mentally (*manogatāni*) by the possessor of *manaḥ-paryāya*.[2]

(b) While *manaḥ-paryāya* is confined to the universe inhabited by human beings, *avadhi* can extend to the whole universe.

(c) While *avadhi* knowledge can belong to all beings, whether of disciplined lives or not, and in all conditions *manaḥ-paryāya* can belong only to men with disciplined lives.

(d) While *manaḥ-paryāya* has for its object material substances in all their aspects, *avadhi* has these only in a limited number of aspects.

Kevala knowledge is perfect (*paripūrṇa*), complete (*samagra*), unique (*asādhāraṇa*), absolute (*nirapekṣa*), pure (*viśuddha*), all-comprehensive (*sarva-bhāva-jñāpaka*), that which has for its object both the world

---

1. *Manaḥ-paryāya* again has not been defined. It has been called mental knowledge' (*TS.* (*SBJ.*), p, 40); and 'mind-reading knowledge (*O J.* p. 64); direct knowledge of another's thoughts about matter (*J. G. D.* p. 66).
2. pp. 24, 25

and the non-world (*lokaloka viśaya*), and infinite (*ananta–paryāya*),–(I, 30, and the *Bhāṣya*).

Summing up, the author says that the objects of *mati* and *Śruta* knowledge are all the substances, but not in all their aspects (*asarva-dravyeṣu asarva-paryāyeṣu* ; of *avadhi* only material substances, but not in all their aspects (*rūpiṣveva dravyeṣu asarva-pariyāyeṣu* ; *manaḥ-paryāya*) is a purer and infinitely subtle knowledge of the material substances known by *avadhi*; and *kevala* has for its object all the substances, and in all their aspects (*sarva-dravyeṣu sarva–paryāyeṣu ca*) (1, 27–30, and the *Bhāṣya*).

Of the above four kinds of knowledge, *mati*, *śruta* and *avadhi* can be erroneous. Error (*viparyāya*) is that which is the opposite of knowledge, and consists in a failure to distinguish between that which is and that which is not (*sad-asator aviśeṣād*); as for example, to perceive a horse as a cow, and *vice versa.* (I, 32, 33, and the *Bhāṣya*).

Such is the classification of knowledge as found in the *TS.* and its commentary by the author of the *Sūtra* himself. The terms employed are peculiar to the *Sūtras*, and their exact significance is far from being clear. The first point to be noted is that what is perceived through the senses is regarded in this earlier Jaina logic as indirect (*parokṣa*), and that which is perceived without the medium of the senses as direct (*pratyakṣa*). In this particular work, *mati* knowledge pertains to the objects of the senses, and is either

perceptual cr reflective,–the latter also covering knowledge by inference. *Śruta* is knowledge by testimony. *Avadhi*, *manaḥ-paryāya* and *kevala* are forms of direct knowledge with such distinctions as have been explained above. *Avagraha* and the rest three kinds of *mati* are the various degrees of sense-cognition according to its clearness and definiteness.

The *nayas* have been described as the various ways of determining the nature of an object of perception, and have been classified in the usual way. It is not necessary to go into a detailed explanation of these; for, in the first place, their meaning is obvious, and in the second place, they are of little importance from the epistemological point of view.

The author of the *TS.* and the *Bhāṣya* is aware of the existence of the school of philosophy which holds that the *pramāṇas* include inference (*anumāna*), knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*), scriptural testimony (*āgama*), implication (*arthāpatti*), probability (*sambhava*), and negation (*abhāva*). It is maintained that all these are included in the *mati* and *śruta* knowledge, for they are based upon a contact between the sense-organs and the object. (*Bhāṣya*, I, 12). This fact indicates that probably Umāsvāti, while referring to these *pramāṇas*, had the *Mîmaṃsā* school in mind. He does not show any signs of knowing, or being influenced by the *Nyāya* school, and, hence, as has already been suggested, he seems to have lived before the compilation of the *Nyāya–sūtras*. Siddha-

sena Divākara, the next important writer on Jaina logic and epistemology, is much later than Umāsvāti, and as we shall see, he is distinctly influenced in his doctrines by the works of the Hindu and Buddhist writers.

(ii) The Doctrine of Knowledge and Reality in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.

In spite of the fact that the *LS.* is believed to belong to a comparatively later date (about 300 A. D.) the language and the thought of the work are not very different from those of the *Prajñā-pāramitās.* Although the *LS.* is mainly a work of the *Vijñāna-vāda*, it is not altogether devoid of the doctrine of *Śūnya vāda*; for while it is maintained that the world is only knowledge (*vijñāna*) or conciousness (*citta*)[1] on the one hand, it is also emphasised in several passages that knowledge and consciousness themselves are just as illusory as the objects of experience. In fact the doctrine of voidness (*śūnyatā*) is clearly taught in some of the passages[2]. Similarly the doctrine of appearance and illusion (*saṃvṛti*) and that of reality and truth (*paramārtha*) is distinctly found in this

---

1. E. g. Chap. II, verse, 136; *citta-mātram yadā lokam prapaśyanti jinātmajāh*, etc; also verses, 139, 140 ff.
2. *LS.* (BI) Chap. II, pp. 73. *ff.* especially verse 137 *Deśemi śūnyatām nityam śāśvatoccheda varjitām, Saṃsāram svapna-māyākhyam na ca karma vinaśyati.*

work[1]; and what is still more interesting is the presence of the notions of *samāropa* and *apavāda*[2] very similar to the later *adhyāsa* doctrine of the *Vedānta*. The fact that the classification of knowledge in this work, as will be seen presently, does not show any signs of the influence of the *Nyāya* school, and that there is a reference to the *tārkikas* and the *naiyāyikas* and their future[3] just in the same way as in the older literature, goes to indicate that the *LS.* must be earlier than the *Nyāya sūtras*, and I am inclined to think that its date is not much later than that of the *Prajñā pāramitās*.

The classification of knowledge (*vijñāna*) is found in a few passages of Chapter II. It is very complex and contributes little to the subsequent epistemology of Buddhism. It may be worth while, however, to state briefly what this classification is, especially because, so far as I know, it has not been presented in English in its exact form. It occurs in a discourse between the lord and Mahāmati.

1. Ibid., II, 187, *Saṃvṛti paramārthāśca tṛtīyam nāsti hetukam*, etc.

2. *LS.*, verse, 191:
Nāsti vai kalpito bhāvaḥ para-tantraś ca vidyate,
Samāropāpavādaṃ hi vikalpanto vinaśyati
Also cf. verses 149—160

3. *Ibid.*, Chap. II, verses, 2: *Naiyāyikāḥ katham brūhi bhaviṣyanti anāgate.*

According to the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, there is a permanent basic consciousness called the *ālaya-vijñāna*, out of which all forms of knowledge arise. It does not disappear with the disappearance of the various forms of consciousness. The *ālaya-vijñāna*, as it is in itself, is called *sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa*. Two of the forms of the *ālaya-vijñāna* are called the *khyāti-vijñāna* and the *vastu pratıvıkalpa-vijñāna*. The former is said to be the effect of the consequences of inconceivable innate impressions (*acintya-vāsanā pariṇāma hetukam*), and forms the subjective factor in experience; while the latter is the result of sense-impressions and the activity of the subject. *Vijñāna* is again called *pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa* and *karma-lakṣaṇı*, which are evidently transitory states of consciousness as distinguished from the *sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa*, which is permanent and abiding. *Pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa vijñāna* is said to be both different and non-different from the *ālaya-vijñāna*. It is different from it in so far as it is a transitory form of the *ālayā-vijñāna*, and it is non-different from it in so far as it is caused by it. It appears to be the name of sense-cognitions. No definition or description of *karma-lakṣaṇa vijñāna* is given[1]. It is said that there is no cessation (*nirodha*) of *sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa-vijñāna*, but there is a cessation

1. Vidyābhūṣaṇa translates the term as 'reminiscence' or 'impression' (i. e. past acts or states of knowing), in his edition of *LS.*, p. 44.

of *karma-lakṣaṇa vijñānas*. *Karma-lakṣaṇa vijñāna* may mean that knowledge which is the result of past deeds. 'Just as Mahāmati,' says the lord, 'a lump of clay is neither different (*anya*) nor non-different (*ananya*) from the particles of clay, so also gold is neither different nor non-different from a gold ornament. O, Mahāmati, if the lump of clay were different from the particles of clay, it would not be made of them ; but as it is made of them, it is not different from them. On the other hand, if it were non-different from them, there would be no such distinction as between the particles of clay and the lump of clay. Similarly, Mahāmati,, if *pravṛtti-vijñānas* were different from the *ālaya vijñāna* of the character of *jāti* (*ālaya-vijñāna-jāti lakṣaṇād*), they would have for their cause that which is not *ālaya-vijñāna* (which is absurd). On the other hand, if they were non-different (from the *ālaya-vijñāna*), the cessation of the *pravṛtti-vijñāna* would be the cessation of the *ālaya vijñāna* : but there is no cessation of the *sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa*. Therefore, O, Mahāmati, there is no *sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa-nirodha* of *vijñānas* but *karma-lakṣaṇa-nirodha*. On the disappearance of the *sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa*, there would be the disappearance of the *ālaya vijñāna* ; and if the disappearance[1] of the

---

1. I have adopted the Tibetan version '*nirudhyamāne*' instead of '*nirūpyamāne*', (p. 39). The reason is obvious.

ālaya-vijñāna is admitted, this doctrine would not be different from that of cessation held by the Tīrthakaras; for the doctrine of the Tīrthakaras is that on the ceasing of the apprehension of the object, there is the cessation of the cognising activity (*vijñāna-pravṛtty-uparamaḥ*)[1], and on the cessation of the cognising activity, there would be the cessation of the beginningless activity of cognition (*anādi-kāla-prabandha-vyucchitti*). The Tīrthakaras describe the activity of cognition as due to cause, and do not attribute the visual knowledge (*cakṣur-vijñāna*), which appears because of colour and light, to anything other than cause. And the cause, Mahāmati, is the primordial matter (*pradhāna*), the spirit (*puruṣa*), time (*kāla*), and the verbal testimony (*anupravādāḥ*)."[2]

The above quotation will bear out my interpretation of the various kinds of knowledge expounded in the *LS.* It is not quite clear which school of teachers is meant by the Tīrthakaras. The description of their teachings as given above is applicable in a considerable degree to the *Sāṃkhya* system.

---

1. I have adopted '*Vijñāna-pravṛtty-uparamaḥ*' according to the Tibetan version instead of *vijñāna-prabandhoparamaḥ*' (p. 39).
2. *LS.*, *Bib. Buddhica*, pp., 37–39.

(iii) The Illusory Nature of Knowledge & the Doctrine of Absolute Reality in the Mādhyamika-kārikās of Nāgārjuna.

The only Sanskrit work of Nāgārjuna available to us is the *Mādhyamika-kārikās.* It is a work more on general philosophy than on logic and epistemology. There are a few sections, however, which indicate Nāgārjuna's attitude towards the problem of knowledge. The general philosophical position of the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* appears to be much the same as that of the *Prajñāpāramitās,* but the work suffers from a kind of verbal jugglery, which inevitably makes the thought obscure and confused. It is for this reason that there has been a good deal of difference of opinion with regard to the exact nature of Nāgārjuna's philosophy. It has been supposed to be a doctrine of nihilism by some, and that of relativity by others. It will appear, however, as will be shown presently, that the real doctrine of the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* is that of phenomenal existence (*saṃvṛti*) and real existence (*paramārtha*). The former is shown to be false or illusory by demonstrating that the notions pertaining to it are relative or contradictory; and the latter is characterised as devoid

of all attributes and relations. The means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) as belonging to the phenomenal world are also regarded as illusory.

The Third Chapter of the *Kārikās* deals with the examination of the senses, and there an attempt is made to prove that there is no sense in maintaining that the various senses and their functions are real. It is argued that as the sense of sight cannot see itself it cannot see anything else (III, 1), and as neither the sense of sight sees, nor does that which is not the sense of sight, there is nothing which sees, and so there is neither the seer nor the object seen (III, 4 6). Then follows a *kārikā* which explains how knowledge is produced. It is as follows :

Pratītya mātāpitarau yathoktaḥ putra-sambhavāḥ
Cakṣu-rūpe pratītyaivam ukto vijñāna-sambhavaḥ.

Just as the birth of a son is spoken of as due to the father and the mother, so is the production of knowledge spoken of as due to (the contact of) the eye and the object.

Now Vidyābhūṣaṇa, while explaining the meaning of this *kārikā*, says : 'The purport of the aphorism is that the objects signified by the terms father, mother and son, and the act signified by the term 'production' are not real, the existence of each being dependent on that of others. So also the eye, the colour, the seen and the act of seeing are merely relative terms, having no reality in themselves'[1] It will appear

1. *JBTS.*, Part III, 1896, p. 5.

that so far as the text of the Kārikā goes, it does not admit of the interpretation that the eye, the colour, the seen and the act of seeing are merely relative terms having no reality in themselves. What is meant to be explained in this particular verse is the production of knowledge–*vijñāna-sambhavaḥ*, and when it is read along with, and interpreted in the light of, the next two verses in the same Chapter[1], it appears that what the author says is that knowledge is produced by the contact of the sense–organs with the object. This is confirmed by the comments of Candra-kīrti on these verses. He says: Thus knowledge arises on perceiving that which is to be seen (*draṣṭavyam*) and the act of seeing (*darśanam*). Contact with the object of sense is the result of the three[2] combining together. Feeling (*vedanā*) arises along with the contact with the object (*sparśa-sahajā*) and it is the cause of desire. Therefore, because of the existence of their effects (*kārya-sad-bhāvād*) that which is to be seen and the act of seeing exist (*draṣṭavya-darśane vidyete*)[3]. The meaning of the Kārikā evidently is that just as the existence of a son

1. III., 8 and 9. These do not appear in the text and translation as published by Vidyābhūṣaṇa in the *JBTS.* and form the last verses of Chapter III in the edition of *Bibl. Buddhica*, IV.

2. That is to say, *draṣṭavya*, *darśana* and *vijñāna.*

3. *MK. Bibl. Buddhica*, pp. 118, 119.

can be supposed only on the assumption that there are parents, so the existence of knowledge can only be admitted on the assumption that there are the object seen and the act of seeing. In other words, the existence of the object of sight and the act of seeing are presupposed by the existence of knowledge. What applies to the sense of sight, also applies to the other senses (III, 9).

Now unless the verses III. 8 and 9 be later interpolations, the conclusion of the author with regard to the senses, in this chapter anyhow, is not that they are not real, or that they are merely relative notions, but that while they, their functions, and there objects cannot be perceived directly, they are inferred from the existence of their product–viz. knowledge.[1]

The Fourth Chapter deals with the *skandhas*, of which the first-*rūpa* is selected for discussion. Evidently two points are emphasised: *firstly*, that the forms (*rūpa*) and their cause go together[2]; *secondly*, neither can it be said that the effect is like

1. Cf. Candra-kīrti's introductory sentence to his comments on verse 7: '*atrāha vidyete eva draṣṭavya-darśane tat-kārya-sad-bhāvād*'—'So it is said here that the object to be seen and the act of seeing do exist, because of the existence of their product.' *MK Bibl. Buddhica*, p. 118.

2. *Rūpa-kāraṇa-nirmuktam na rūpam upalabhyate*
Rūpeṇāpi na nirmuktam dṛśyate rūpa-kāraṇam. IV, 1.

the cause, not that it is unlike it.[1] It is distinctly stated that no form can be conceived to be without a cause—*niṣkāraṇam punā rūpam naiva naivopapadyate* (IV, 5). What applies to *rūpa* also applies to the other *skandhas* (IV, 7).

Now while it appears from the arguments in Chapters III and IV that reality and causation are not denied altogether, and that the principle of causation is rather emphasised in both of them, in Chapter V, which deals with the examination of the physical elements (*dhātu-parīkṣā*) we find an explicit denial of being (*bhāva*), non-being (*abhāva*), characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) and that which is characterised (*lakṣyaṁ*).[2] That this denial refers to the phenomenal world is evident from the last verse of the Chapter in which it is said that those ignorant people, who perceive being and non-being, do not see the blissful nature of things (*śivam*) where there is a cessation of

---

1. IV, 6. It will appear that Vidyābhūṣaṇa's translation and explanation of IV, 7 and 8 are different from the comments of Candrakīrti. The latter's interpretation is quite consistent with the context and the language of the text, and it is evident that the former's is incorrect. I think it unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the comparative merits of the two explanations, as the verses have no direct bearing upon the subject of this thesis.

2. V, 5, 6, 7.

perceivability (*draṣṭavyopaśamam*).[1]

The Ninth Chapter deals with being in relation to the various senses. The question to be considered is whether there is being (*bhāva*) prior to the senses, or after them, or it is not at all. As against the argument that seeing, etc. cannot be possible unless there is some being prior to the senses, it is said that it is inconceivable that something should exist prior to the functions of the various senses. For, *in the first place*, if it be granted that an entity can exist prior to seeing etc. it might also be granted that seeing etc. can exist independently of being; and, *in the second place*, it is impossible to speak of the existence of a thing unless it is *known* by means of some sign or signs. Everything exists only as in relation to something else. Similarly, it is further maintained that being cannot be supposed to exist either simultaneously with or after the senses. Consequently, it does not exist at all '*na vidyateti nāstīti nivṛttāstatra kalpanāḥ.*'

1. Here again there is a difference of reading between Vidyābhūṣaṇa's (*JBTS.*) and De La Vallée Poussin's editions, and also a difference of interpretation between Vidyābhūṣaṇa and Candrakīrti. In fact the text and translation as published in the *JBTS.* appear to be defective in a number of ways. Besides unsatisfactory readings, the verses from Candrakīrti's commentary are mixed up with the *Kārikā* texts, and are apt to be taken as the *Kārikās* themselves, the more so as Vidyābhūṣaṇa apparently treats them as such.

The same conception of the relative dependence of being and the senses is expounded in the Tenth Chapter by the example of fire and fuel which also depend upon each other for their existence.

In the Twenty-third Chapter which deals with misapprehension (*viparyāsa*), the illusory nature of the various objects of the sense is clearly expressed in the eighth *Kārikā* which is as follows:—

Rūpa-śabda-rasa-sparśagandhā dharmāsca kevalāḥ,
Gandharva nagarākārā marîci-svapna sannibhāḥ.

Forms, sounds, tastes, touches, smells and objects of thought are only of the shape of a city of Gandharvas, and like a mirage or dreams.

And as these are only imaginary they do not admit of the distinctions of *śubha* (lit. auspicious) and *aśubha* (lit. inauspicious)—XXIII, 9.

It will appear from the passages quoted and referred to above, and also from the rest that the *Mādhyamika-kārikās*, on the whole, aim at showing the inconsistent and illusory nature of the phenomenal world and maintaining that the ultimate reality is beyond comprehension and description. In other words, it is a reasoned continuation of the same line of thought as we find in the *Prajñā-pāramitās*. The philosophy of Nāgārjuna as contained in the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* has been called nihilism and, recently, the doctrine of relativity, but it will appear that it is really neither the one nor the other; *it is a doctrine of absolute existence.* What we find in the *Kārīkās* is an attempt to show

the illusory or unreal nature of the phenomenal world by bringing out the antinomies of empirical relations, and to emphasise that the ultimate and true reality can be only that which is free from these. What Nāgārjuna says about the phenomenal world has been erroneoulsy regarded by some as the doctrine of nihilism with regard to the nature of *all* reality; and what he employs as a method, viz., to show that all things of experience exist as only in relation to one another, and that these relations lead to all kinds of inconsistencies and antinomies, has been regarded by others as the doctrine of relativity. Nāgārjuna would not say or admit that *all* is unreal, or *all* has a relative existence only. On the other hand, there are some explicit passages to show that, according to him, the real is the absolute, and therefore beyond the categories of being and non-being and the rest of the empirical relations. In other words, Nāgārjuna's doctrine is the same as that which maintains the distinction of the worlds of *samvṛti* and *paramārtha*. This is clear from the following verses of the *Kārikā*:—

Dve satye samupāśritya Buddhānām dharma-deśanā,
Loka-samvṛiti satyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ.
Ye 'nayor na vijānanti vibhāgam satyayordvayoḥ,
Te tattvam na vijānanti gambhīram Buddha-śāsane.

XXIV, 8 and 9.

The teaching of the doctrine of the Buddhas is based upon two kinds of truth; that which is truth with regard to the conditional world and that which

is true in the highest sense.

Those who do not know the distinction between these two kinds of truth do not know the profound truth in the teaching of the Buddhas.

In fact to call the doctrine of *śūnyatā* a doctrine of relativity, as Stcherbatsky does, and following him others have done, is a contradiction in terms.[1] A good deal of confusion has arisen by mixing up Nāgārjuna's views about the nature of the phenomenal world (*saṃvṛti jagat*) with those about the real world (*pāramārthika jagat*), and even in the case of the phenomenal reality relativity is more of a method with Nāgārjuna than a metaphysical doctrine. It is a method employed to show the illusory and inconsistent nature of the world of experience. The ultimate reality, according to him, as according to his predecessors of the same school, is characterised by *śūnyatā*[2] which is the most expressive name for a thoroughgoing absolute existence, an existence which has been described as *prapañcopaśamam śivam*—that auspicious condition in which

1. *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, pp. 42–43. "Since we use the term 'relative' to describe the fact that a thing can be identified only by mentioning its relations to something else, and becomes meaningless without these relations, implying at the same time that the thing in question is unreal, we, safely, for want of a better solution, can translate the word '*śūnya*' by 'relative' or 'contingent,' and the term '*śūnyatā*' by 'relativity' or 'contingency."

2. *M.K.*, I. I.

there is a cessation of all phenomenal existence or as *darṣṭavvopaśamam*[1]—one in which there is a cessation of all perceivability. Such doctrine of absolute existence as this should be the last thing to be called the doctrine of relativity. That the doctrine of relativity is not the ultimate creed of Nāgārjuna and Mahāyānism appears to have been seen by Stcherbatsky at times, but he seems to be too prepossessed by the notion that *śūnyatā* is the doctrine of relativity to hold any other view.[2]

Consistently with his absolutism Nāgārjuna does not admit the validity of the *pramāṇas*. This is clear from his other works bearing directly upon the subject, such as *Pramāṇa-vihetana* (*or Pramāṇa-vidhvaṃsana*), *Vigraha-vyāvartanī-kārikā* and *Upāya-kauśalya hṛdaya-śāstra*. The Sanskrit originals of these works are lost, and only Tibetan versions are available.[3]

1. *M.K.*, V. 8.
2. Speaking of the principle of relativity Stcherbatsky says: 'This principle, the pivot of the system, is called upon in order to destroy all theories and to replace them, as we have seen above, by direct mystic intuition, not in order to replace it by a new theory. As a theory it is just as bad as the old ones, it is even much worse. "If something non-relative" says Nāgarjuna, "did really exist, we would then likewise admit the existence of the relative, but there is absolutely nothing non-relative, how then can we admit the existence of the relative (or the truth of Relativity)" *CBN.*, p. 49.
3. Vidyabhusana *HIL.*, pp. 256–261.

3. The Earlier Hindu Epistemology.
(iii) Espistemology of the Yoga-sūtras.

I have already discussed the date of the *Yoga-sū-tras*, and have tried to show that they appear to be earlier than the *Nyāya-sūtras*, and also the *Sāṃkhya-Kārikās*. Thus it will appear that they contain the earliest exposition known to us of the *Saṃkhyā Yoga* epistemology. The *Yoga-sūtras* begin by defining *Yoga* as the inhibition (*nirodha*) of the activity (*vṛtti*) of the intellect (*citta*). In order to correctly under-stand the epistemology of the *YS.* it is important that the exact significance of '*citta*' and '*vṛtti*' should be understood. A study of the use of '*citta*' in the various *Sūtras* shows that its connotation in the *YS.* corres-ponds to that of '*buddhi*' in the *Sāṃkhya*. This is evi-dent from the use of '*citta*' and '*budhi*' in the *YS.*, iv. 20. '*Cittāntara-dṛśye buddhi-buddher atiprasaṅgaḥ sm-ṛti-saṃkaraśca*'[1], and of *buddhi* in *YS.*, iv. 21. '*citer-apratisaṅkramāyās tadākāra-pattau svabuddhi-saṃve-danam*'[2], where the two terms are synonymous. In

---

1. 'If one cognition be cognisable by another, there will result an excessive series of one cognition after another and also a confusion of memories.

2. 'There is a consciousness of its own cognition when the cognition takes the form of the non-moving intelligence (*citiḥ*), (which is identified with *puruṣa*).

fact these are the only two *sūtras* in which the word '*buddhi*' is to be found in the *YS.*, the other term '*citta*' being used elsewhere. What is to be remembered about '*citta*' is that, like '*buddhi*' in the *Sāṃkhya*, usually it denotes the cognitive faculty, but at times it also signifies cognitive acts.[1] The other term '*vṛtti*', which is often used with *citta* in the compound '*citta-vṛtti*', means 'activity'; *citta vṛtti* being the activity of the intellect.[2]

The activity of the intellect is said to be five-fold, viz., that pertaining to the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), wrong cognition (*viparyaya*), imagination (*vikalpa*), sleep (*nidrā*) and memory (*smṛti*).

It will appear that the above classification is peculiar to the *YS.*, and does not show any signs of the influence of the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* epistemology. It is

---

1. It will appear that such English renderings of '*citta*' as 'mind-stuff' adopted by Woods or 'thinking principle' employed by Rajendralal Mitra are not quite intelligible. The term 'intellect', when the cognitive faculty is meant, and 'cognition' when the act of that faculty is intended, are the more straight-forward translations of '*citta*'.

2. Here again such renderings of '*vṛtti*' as 'fluctuation' by Woods, or 'modification' do not seem to be quite appropriate, for they really express the result of the interaction between '*citta*' and its object *through vṛtti* rather than the activity of the *citta* itself.

also of the primitive type.

The *pramāṇas*, according to the *YS.* are direct knowledge *pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and scriptural testimony (*āgama*)-(*YS.*, 1.7). These are simply mentioned and not defined. The list is the same as that found in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikās*, with this difference that in the *SK.* we have '*dṛṣṭa*' for '*pratyakṣa*' and '*āptavacana*' for '*āgama*'.

Viparyaya is defined as wrong cognition *mithyā-jñāna*) which is based upon a form of the object which is not its own—*atadrūpapratiṣṭham* (*YS.*, 1.8) An example of *viparyaya* will be the perception of a rope as a snake.[1]

Vikalpa is that notion which follows the knowledge of words—*śabdajñānānupāti*, and is devoid of an object—*vastuśūnya*. The commentators, all of them, understand by '*vikalpa*' that notion which is the result of predicating an attribute of a subject in a proposition which does not express the real nature of the object denoted by the subject. The example which has been given to illustrate it is : 'The true nature of the spirit

1. Here again the term '*viparyaya*' has been translated variously into English. Both Rajendralal Mitra and Woods translate '*viparyaya*' as 'misconception,' which word is apt to suggest that '*viparyaya*' does not include the error of sense-cognition, and simply refers to an error of judgment. The word is not peculiar to the *Yoga-sūtras* and is always used in the sense of wrong cognition as opposed to right cognition.

is intelligence'—'*cāitanyam puruṣasya svarūpam.*' It is said that although the proposition verbally conveys the sense that the attribute of intelligence belongs to the spirit, the spirit being intelligence itself '*citir eva puruṣah*'–*YB.*, the notion resulting from the verbal proposition has no truth corresponding to it, the term '*vastu*' being evidently taken in the sense of truth or real fact. It is maintained that this kind of notion expressed by the term '*vikalpa*' is not included in either *pramāṇa* or *viparyaya.* It is evidently for this reason that Woods following the interpretation of the commentators,[1] has translated '*vikalpa*' as a 'predicate-relation.' Now the question is whether '*vikalpa*' is to be treated as a form of error, as the commentators treat it, or it is to be taken in the sense of imagination. The language of the *Sūtra* and the context strongly suggest that it is imagination which is meant. There is no reason why *viparyaya* should not be taken to cover all kinds of error *mithyā-jñānam,* including the kind of error which, according to the commentators, is meant to be expressed by *vikalpa.* The definition of *vikalpa* as given in the *Sūtra* says that it is something which follows the knowledge of (the meaning of) words, and is devoid of an object; that is to say, it is a notion associated with the use of words without the presence of the object referred to by them. There is nothing in the text to indicate that the notion is of the nature of an error, or that the

1. *Yoga System of* Patañjali, (*HOS.*)

object referred to should not be real in the sense that it should not be existent. All that is meant is that the object is *not present along* (co-existent) with the notion. Such knowledge, it will appear, corresponds to what we call imagination in modern psychology.

The definition of sleep (*nidrā*) is : *abhāva-pratyayālambanā vṛttir nidrā* (*YS.*, I, 10)—'Sleep is that activity which rests upon the notion of non-existence.' The commentators emphasise the point that the word '*vṛttiḥ*' has been particularly used in the *Sūtra* to draw attention to the fact that sleep is a positive activity and not the absence of activity. The content of this activity is the notion of non-existence, that is to say not an absence of consciousness, but an awareness of non-existence, the existence of which becomes evident on waking.

The definition of memory is given in rather obscure language. It is : *anubhūta-viṣayāsampramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ* (*YS.*, I, 11), the chief difficulty about which is the exact meaning of '*asampramoṣaḥ*.' The *Bhāṣya* does not comment upon the text at all ; Vācaspati Miśra explains it as 'non-stealing' (*asteyaḥ*),[1] while Bhoja in his *vṛtti* renders it as 'retention in the

1. '*pramāṇādibhir anubhūte viṣaye yo 'sampramoṣaḥ asteyaḥ sā smṛtiḥ.*' Memory is the non-stealing with regard to an object which has been cognised by means of *pramāṇas* and other means; that is to say, that which is due purely to impressions (*saṃskāras*) is memory.

intellect by means of an impression' '*saṃskāra-dvāreṇa buddhāvupārohaḥ.*' Woods, following the interpretation of Vācaspati Miśra, translates the *Sūtra* as 'Memory (*smṛti*) is not-adding-surreptitiously (*asampramoṣa*) to a once experienced object.' Now it will appear that of the two renderings as given by Vācaspati Miśra and Bhoja, the one by the latter is the more straightforward and natural. Vācaspati Miśra's rendering is based upon a rather far-fetched notion, and simply emphasises the fact negatively that memory is exclusively due to past impressions, while Bhoja's interpretation lays stress upon the factor of retention which is the essence of memory. The definition as given in the *Sūtra* would thus be 'Memory is the retention (lit. not letting go) of an experienced object.'

An object is known or not known, according as it is reflected or not reflected in the intellect, (*YS.*, IV, 16). As regards the question how the intellect is cognised, it is said that the intellect cannot cognise itself, for *firstly*, it is not the principle of knowing, but only an object which is knowable (*YS.*, IV, 18); *secondly*, it cannot be occupied with both the object and itself at the same time (*YS.*, IV, 19); and *thirdly* in case it be said that one cognition might cognise another cognition, there will be a *regress ad infinitum*, which is undesirable (*YS.*, IV, 20). The intelligence of the *puruṣa* (*citiḥ*), however, becomes aware of its own cognition (*buddhi*) when it assumes its form (*tadākā-*

rāpattau) in the act of cognition,[1] (IV, 21). The intellect is able to perceive things when it is reflected upon by both the seer and that which is to be seen, that is to say, when it is connected with both the self and the object to be perceived (*YS.*, IV, 22).

That true knowledge is acquired by the practice of *yoga*, and that this knowledge is different from that obtained by the ordinary means called the *pramāṇas* including testimony is clearly indicated in *YS.*, I, 48 and 49. It is said that as the result of *yoga*, the intellect (*prajñā*) becomes cognitive of truth (*ṛtambharā*—lit. truth-bearing), and that this yogic intellect has objects for its cognition different from those that are cognised by it through testimony and inference, for those objects are of a special nature.[2]

Before I close this section on the *YS.* I want to

1. Here I have accepted the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya* and the *Tattvavaiśāradī*. Bhoja's interpretation according to which it is said in the *Sūtra* that *buddhi* knows itself when it is reflected in the intelligence of the *puruṣa*, is evidently wrong, for it is inconsistent with the Yoga doctrine, according to which *buddhi* or *citta* is altogether devoid of intelligence and hence precluded from knowing anything by itself.
2. According to the *Bhāṣya* '*viśeṣārtha*' means particular objects as opposed to those which are general. But there is no reason to hold the view that, according to the author, the Yogic intellect cognises only particular objects, nor is there anything in the text of the *Sūtra* to suggest that meaning.

point out that in the *YS.*[1] the term *avidyā* is used in its Upaniṣadic sense of *ignorance* with regard to the true nature of reality and not in the sense of *error*, which meaning also it acquires in the *Vaiśeṣika*[2] and the *Nyāya Sūtras.*[3] The term *viparyaya* is used for error. This is another indication of the fact that the *YS.* are one of the earlier *Sūtras*.

The *YS.* may also be regarded as the first systematic exposition of the nature of mystic intuition, which came to be recognised by almost every later school and as providing thus an epistemological basis for the doctrine of appearance and reality.

---

1. *YS.*, II, 3—5 and 24. The definition is contained in II, 3—5 "*anitya-śuci-duhkhānātmasu nitya-śuci-sukhātma-khyātiravidyā.*
2. *VS.*, IX, 10—12.
3. *NS.*, IV, 2.4.

(ii) The Beginnings of the Nyāya Epistemology as found in the Caraka-saṃhitā.

It is interesting to find that the Hindu medical writers like Caraka and Suśruta did not consider the treatment of their particular subject complete without devoting some sections of their work to the problem of knowledge and reality. In the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, especially, one finds a brief account of a complete system of philosophy. The *Saṃhitā* as it has come down to us has evidently passed through the hands of a number of medical writers beginning with Ātreya, who was probably the original author of the treatise, and who is believed to belong to about the Sixth Century B. C. It was revised by Caraka who is known to have been a physician at the Court of Kaniṣka, in about the Second Century A. D., and it is after his name that the treatise is now known. Further additions to it were, however, made by another medical writer called Dṛḍhabala, who must have lived, according to Hoernele's estimate, in about the Eighth Century A. D.[1] He added the last two books and some Chapters in the Sixth Book. The philosophical sections of the *Saṃhitā* are mostly found in the *Sūtra-*

1. *Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, I, Osteology-Introduction.* pp. 7—16; Also Keith, *History af Sanskrit Classical Literature.* pp. 506—507.

sthāna First Book) the *Vimāna-sthāna* (Third Book) and the *Śarīra sthāna* (Fourth book), which, in any case, can be taken to be not later than the Second Century A. D. the date of Caraka. It is evident from the philosophical doctrines of the treatise that they belong neither to such an early period as the Sixth Century B. C., which is supposed to be the date of Ātreya, nor again to such a late period as the Eighth Century A. D., the probable date of Dṛḍhabala. They may, therefore, quite reasonably be taken to belong to Caraka, who really seems to be the author or compiler of the major part of the *Saṃhitā*, and that is also why it goes after his name.

While the philosophical position of the *CS.* as a whole, as will be shown presently, accords with that of the *Nyāya* school, the author appears to be quite conversant with the terminology and the notions of the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools. He freely employs such *Sāṃkhya* terms as *vyakta*, *avyakta*, *prakṛti*, *puruṣa*, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, etc.[1] Similarly, he mentions and defines the *Vaiśeṣika* categories of *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya*.[2] The fact that Caraka's definitions on the whole are not as elaborate as those of the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya* Sūtras indicates that he was prior to the compilation of these *Sūtras*, although he appears to have belonged to a period when the doctrines of the

1. *Śarīra*—, I.
2. *Sūtra*—, I.

various schools had assumed a fairly definite shape.

Professor Dasgupta, however, thinks that the VS. must be earlier than the *CS.*, for the *CS.* quotes a *VS.* and the list of *Guṇas* in it includes the six attributes absent in the *VS.* but found later on in the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* manuals. I have not been able to trace the reference to the *VS.* in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* (Śarīra, 39) as given by Professor Dasgupta, but his argument based upon the inclusion of the later six *Vaiśeṣika Guṇas* in the list of the *CS.* seems to be quite plausible. There are some facts, however, which suggest that the author of the *CS.* was not aware of the *VS.* and its author. In the first place, in the opening verses of the *Sūtra-sthāna* names of a large number of sages are mentioned as those who have been the traditional inheritors of the knowledge contained in the *CS.*, but the name of Kaṇāda is absent even where we ought to have expected it, that is in connection with the mention of the doctrine of *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, etc., for the first time in the verses, *Sūtra-sthāna* I. 27 and 28, which are as follows:—

Maharṣayas te dadṛśur yathāvaj jñāna-cakṣuṣā,
Sāmānyam ca viśeṣam ca guṇān dravyāṇi karma cā–27
Samavāyam ca tajjñātvā tantroktam vidhimāsthitāḥ,
Lebhire paramam śarma jīvitam cāpi nirgadam.—28.

In the second place, the statement '*samavāyam ca tajjñātvā tantroktam*' which alludes to *Samavāya* as *tantrokta* in the above verses indicates that the source

1. *HIP*, I, p. 180.

of this list of the categories, according to the author of the *CS.* is not the *VS.* but some other books which probably dealt with the rules of debate. This is confirmed by the fact that this list of the six categories appears as a part of the various factors of debate mentioned in *Vimāna.* VIII. 24, where also the various means of knowledge are mentioned. It is clear that these categories in the *CS.* are not treated as metaphysical in the sense in which they are in the *VS* Further, the definitions of these as given in the *CS. Sūtra* I do not show any definite signs that the author of the *CS.* was aware of the definitions of these as given in the *VS.* On the other hand, the description of '*Sāmānya*' as that which is the cause of increase, and of '*Viśeṣa*' as the cause of decrease in *Śarīra.* I. 43 is very peculiar and, so far as I know, has no basis in the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine. The verse is as follows:—
Sarvadā sarva bhāvānām sāmānyam vṛddhikāraṇam,
Hrāsa hetur viśeṣaśca pravṛttir ubhayasya tu.

Although the metaphysical doctrines of the *CS.* have been discussed, the epistemological aspects of its philosophy have not been considered so far, and it is these which I propose to bring out here. Of the sections dealing with the philosophical problems, the *Śarīra-sthāna* is the most interesting and important. It opens with a number of questions, asked by Agniveśa, about the nature of reality and its knowledge, and these are followed by answers to them as given by the sage Punarvasu, who appears to be one of the

prominent teachers of the doctrines contained in the *CS.* Having first asserted that those who are conversant with the self (*ātman*) say that it is inactive, self-dependent, self-controlled, all-pervading, puissant, as also knower of matter and the witness of everything, along with other questions Agniveśa asks the following with regard to the nature of the knower and the known.

Which is prior, the knower of matter, or matter? Here is a doubt: Without the prior existence of matter which is to be known, it is not reasonable to hold that there should be a knower of matter. If again, matter be prior, the knower of matter cannot be regarded as eternal. (*Śarīra.*, I, 6—7).

Then speaking of self as one 'possessed of omniscience, aloof from all things, freed from connection with everything, existing above, tranquil and the soul of every being,' it is asked, 'What are those indications by which it can be known—*kair lingair upalakṣyate* (*Śarīra.*, I, 12).

Punarvasu, in answer to the above and the other

1. For translation I have freely adopted Avinash Chandra Kaviratna's English translation of the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, with such alterations at times as I have considered necessary. It may be noted, however, that the numbers of verses as given in the translation differ very much from those in the original Sanskrit edition of the Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay, which I have used and to which references are given here.

questions, deals with the matter of all the forms of reality and his statements which are scattered over, and have been repeated in several sections and verses, may be summed up as follows:—

All besides the unmanifest (*avyakta*) is known as the objective world (*kṣetra*), and the unmanifest is the knower of this world (*kṣetrajña*)—(*Śar.*, I. 64) That which is manifest (*vyakta*) is of two kinds: (a) that cognisable by the senses; and (b) that beyond the senses, but which can be grasped by inference (*Śar.*, I. 61).

The manifested reality which constitutes the born self (*puruṣa*) consists of twenty-four elements or principles, viz., the five physical elements, the intellect, the unmanifest, self-consciousness, the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, mind, and the five objects of the senses. Of these, twenty-three (excluding the unmanifest) have been called the objects of knowledge, while the unmanifest is the knower of these (Śarīra., I, 62—64).

It is from the unmanifest that the *puruṣa* attains to the condition of being manifest, and from the condition of being manifest he once more reverts to that of being unmanifest. When dissolution comes, he is once more dissociated from the various forms of manifested reality, the union of which with him is the result of desire. (*Śarīra.*, I, 66 and 67). Desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, activity, consciousness, voli-

tion, understanding, memory and self-consciousness, these are the indications of the great self (*paramātmanaḥ*).[1]

All things are of two kinds: existent (*sat*) and non-existent (*asat*); and these can be examined in four ways: (1) Testimony or words of trustworthy teachers (*āptopadeśa*); (2) direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*, in the sense of sense-cognition); (3) inference (*anumāna*); and (4) argumentation (*yukti*). These are explained as follows:—

Testimony. The *Veda*; whatever else is not contrary to the import of the *Veda*, and has been affirmed by the observant, whatever has been approved by those called righteous; and all the declarations of the scriptures calculated to benefit the world, constitute testimony which is trustworthy. (*Sūtra*., xi, 25).

Direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*). That cognisance which takes place and displays itself vividly at the moment, in consequence of the soul, the senses, the mind, and the objects of the senses being all united together, is said to be direct knowledge (*Sūtra* xi, 18).

The various factors in direct knowledge are further explained as follows:—

The senses. There are five senses, five materials that constitute the senses (the five physical elements); five resting places of the senses (the sense-organs);

1. '*paramātman*' here is evidently not used in its usual sense of God, but in the sense of a soul (*Jīva*).

five objects of the senses (colour, taste, sound, etc.); and five kinds of cognitions obtained through these senses. (*Sūtra.*, VIII, 1). That particular sense into whose composition a particular element (earth, fire, etc.) enters, follows or apprehends that particular object which has that particular corresponding element for its essence, the reason being that both partake of the same nature and the one is invested with power over the other (*Sūtra.*, VIII, 10).

Mind. Mind is regarded as something different from the senses. Its functions pertaining to its objects depend upon the soul. (*Sūtra.*, VIII, 1). The attributes by which one may define mind are the presence and absence of knowledge, since, though the soul, the senses, and their objects might exist in a state of juxtaposition, yet when there is no attention on the part of the mind, there can be no knowledge, it is only in consequence of the mind being present that knowledge arises. Subtility and oneness have been regarded as the two attributes of mind (*Śarīra.*, I, 16 and 17). It may be supposed that there is more than one mind in one and the same person in consequence of the variety that is observable in the objects of the mind, in those of the senses, and in the resolutions of the mind, as also in consequence of the union of all the three constituents, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* with the mind. In reality, however, there is no multiplicity of minds in one and the same individual. If the mind were more then one it could simultane-

ously attend to more than one object. (*Sūtra.*, VIII, 3). The mind is unconscious and active. It is the supreme soul that makes it conscious. When the soul becomes united with the mind, it is then that actions are imputed to it (*Śarīra.*, I, 74). Since the soul is endued with consciousness, therefore is it regarded as the actor. In consequence of its being unconscious, the mind, even though active, is said not to be the actor. (*Śarīra.*, I. 75). The senses become capable of grasping their respective objects only when they are led by the mind (*Sūtra.*, VIII, 34). Mind thinks about objects (VIII, 13).

Conditions of perceptual knowledge: The self is the knower. In consequence of its union with the organs its knowledge springs. When those organs become stained, or are not united with it, knowledge does not arise (*Śarīra.*, I, 53). Of one competent to behold, no vision arises in a stained mirror, or in a turbid water. After the same manner, if the mind happens to be obstructed, no knowledge can arise. (*Śarīra.*, I. 54).

Limitations of perceptual knowledge. The question of the limitations of perceptual knowledge arises in connection with the problem of existence after death, and the discourse, a part of which is reproduced here, is remarkable both for its acute reasoning and terseness of expression. 'Hence arises the doubt' says the author, 'as to whether, there is

a state of existence after death or no such existence. Respecting this topic, however, he that is endowed with intelligence should cast off unbelief and that conduct which is likely to spring from unbelief. The reason for casting off unbelief is this; the portion of things that are addressed to the direct cognisance of the senses is small; while the portion that is beyond their direct cognisance, but in whose existence faith is placed in consequence of the declarations of the scriptures, of immediate inference, and of reasoning, is great. The very senses by whose aid we become cognisant of objects within their direct sphere are themselves beyond their cognisance. As regards the forms, again, of all existing objects, it is known that if these be very close to the senses, or very distant from them, or covered by other objects, or if the senses be weak and deranged, or if the mind be otherwise engaged, or if any of those objects be mingled together with others of their class, or if any of them be overwhelmed by something of superior energy, or if any of them be very minute, they cease to be directly cognisable even though they are before the senses. Hence, if it be affirmed that only those objects exist that are addressed to the direct cognisance of the senses, and those that are not so addressed do not exist, it would be a statement unsupported by reason. (*Sūtra*, XI, 5—6).

The importance of the physiological basis of perception is also realised when it is said that in conse-

quence of the excessive use, the absence of use and the impropriety of the use of the senses in relations to their objects, the senses including the mind falling away from their normal condition, become obstructive to the perceptions of which they are the respective sources or channels. In consequence again of a judicious correlation of the senses with their objects, they preserve their normal condition, and mantain in their normal condition the perceptions or knowledge respectively derived through them. (*Sūtrā*, VIII, 11).

Inference (*anumāna*). Inference, which is based upon previous direct knowledge, is of three kinds, as having reference to the present, the past, and the future. For example, the existence of concealed fire inferred from smoke, the fact of sexual congress from conception, and beholding that fruit is produced from seeds, men of intelligence infer future fruits of a similar nature from similar seeds (*Sūtra.*, XI, 19 & 20).

Argumentation (*yukti*). This is a peculiar means of knowledge in the *CS.* and its meaning is not very clear. The following verse contains the clearest description of *yukti* that we can get in the work:

Buddhiḥ paśyati yā bhāvān bahu-kāraṇa-yogajām,
Yuktis trikālā sā jñeyā tṛvargaḥ sādhyate yayā.
Sūtra., I. 23.

In the above verse '*bahu-kāraṇa-yogajām*' is evidently a misprint for '*bahu-kāraṇa-yogajān*'. The cognition which perceives things as the product of the combination of a number of causes is known as

yukti belonging to the three times, by which the triad is achieved. The text gives as instances of *yukti* the facts that crops grow because of water, ploughing, seed and the weather, or that conception takes place because of the combination of the six elements (*ṣaḍ-dhātu-saṃyogād*)—*Sūtra.*, I. 21.

The syllogistic form of inference is also recognised and explained in the *Saṃhitā* under the Technical Terms where '*pratijñā*', '*upanaya*', '*hetu*', '*dṛaṣṭānta*' and '*nigamana*'—the five parts of a syllogism are defined and illustrated much in the same way as in the *Nyāya-sūtras* of Gautama. In the same section '*aupamya*'—knowledge, by similarity, and '*aitihya*'—tradition are also mentioned as means of knowledge. (*Vimāna.*, VIII. 24).

It would be of no great use from the point of view of our enquiry to go into the details of the definitions of the various technical terms. It is to be noted, however, that most of them, together with the examples given to illustrate them, are the same as those given in the *Nyāya-sūtras.*

The next important point to be noticed in connection with the analysis of knowledge as given in the *CS.* is a recognition of the various factors which constitute the subject (*adhyātma*) in experience. It is said that the mind, the functions of the mind, the intellect (*buddhi*) and the soul constitute, in brief, the substances and qualities that are known by the name of '*adhyātma*'. (*Sūtra.*, VIII, 8.).

Now after having given a complete analysis of the philosophical position of the author of the *CS.* on the basis of the statements, which are scattered over a number of sections of the work, I would point out that the doctrines contained therein are distinctly in the same line with, and a development of those that we find in the Vedic literature of the previous period. The two-fold nature of the self—the one pure and the other cosmic, the two kinds of reality—the existent or manifested and the non-existent or unmanifested, the instruments of knowledge and the analysis of experience, the distinction between the soul, mind and the intellect, the knowability of that which is beyond perception by reasoning through inference, and by testimony, are all substantially the same as we found in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*,[1] the *Aitareya Araṇyaka*[2] and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*[3] and the other Upaniṣads, and the traces of which we can discover even in the hymns of Dīrghatamas, Viśvakarman and Parameṣṭhin. The psychological and the logical analysis is, however, much advanced—more acute and systematic, and one can really feel that in the sections to which I have referred, the author has definitely and consciously tried to consider the problem of reality and its knowledge, not only in its bearing upon the nature of the ultimate principle of the universe, as the authors of

1. This work, Part II, (iii).
2. *Ibid.*, II, (iv).
3. *Ibid.*, II, (v).

the Vedic period did, but also with reference to the objects of ordinary experience. As has already been remarked the sections in the *Saṃhitā* dealing with the philosophical problems are distinctly indicative of the fact that the foundations of the systematic period of Indian Philosophy had already been laid. With regard to the general nature of the *Caraka* philosophy it may be said that it represents a metaphysical system which has an appearance of the *Sāṃkhya* because of some of the later *Sāṃkhya* terms which it employs but, which, in reality is as much of Vedic theism as any other system could be. The epistemological aspect of the *CS.* is distinctly of the type of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school, although crude and such as appears to be preliminary to the more developed doctrine of the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya Sūtras*. That it is so will be seen clearly when we come to discuss the epistemology of these two works.

(iii). Theory of Knowledge in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.

Like most of the Philosophical Sūtras, the *Vaiśe-ṣika-sūtras* also start on their enquiry with a view to find the means of obtaining the supreme good. It is said that it is the knowledge of the essential nature of substance (*dravya*), attribute (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*), which brings about the supreme good. It is also added that this knowledge is the result of a special merit on the part of the knower (*dharma-viśeṣa-prasūtad*), and is obtained by an observation of the resemblances and differences of the categories.[1] A comparison of this enunciatien of the nature and the contents of enquiry in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* with that of the *NS*.[2] indicates that while the subject of the *VS*. is mainly physical and metaphysical, that of the *NS*. is logical and epistemological; although the metaphysical treatment is also included under 'the objects of knowledge' (*prameya*). Considered from the

---

1. *VS*., I, 1. 4. *Dharma-viśeṣa-prasūtād, dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyanām padārthānām sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyām tattva-jñānān niḥśreyasam.*

2. *NS*., I, 1. 1. *Pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntā-vayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpavitaṇḍ-hetvābhāsa-chala-jāti-nigraha-sthānānām tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ.*

epistemological point of view, the *VS.* definitely appear to be prior to the *NS.*, for their treatment of the means of knowledge is not so elaborate as that in the *NS.* Definitions of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) in the *VS.* are still of a primitive type, although it is also evident, e. g. from the description of inference, that certain logical notions in the *VS.* are just preliminary to those of the *NS.* This comparison of the *VS.* with the *NS.* from the point of view of the theory of knowledge confirms the view, which has come to be accepted for other reasons also, that the *VS.* are earlier than the *NS.*[1]

The most important topic in the epistemology of the *VS.* is the cognition of substance, and it will appear that its treatment is marked by a high standard of philosophical analysis. It forms the chief argument for maintaining the reality of substance as something independent of cognition. There are no signs, however, to show that the argument is meant to be a refutation of any particular school of subjective idealism.

According to the *VS.* there are strictly speaking only two means of knowledge: direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), and inference (*anumāna*). Knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*), presumption (*arthāpatti*), implication (*saṃbhava*) and non-existence (*abhāva*) are regarded as only modes of inference.

We do not find any pointed definition of direct

1. See *Ui, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, Introduction.*

knowledge in the *VS.* like the one we have in the *NS.* However, it is clear from the description of direct knowledge as given in a number of sūtras, especially in III, 1. 18—*ātmendriyārthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat*, that one form of it is regarded as the product of the contact of an object with the sense-organs and the soul. The agency of mind as a faculty of attention and volition is also recognised (III, 2. 3). Knowledge is ultimately a quality of the soul, as in the *NS.*

There appears to be a good deal of confusion about the interpretation of certain sūtras which are supposed to explain cognition and also the inference of the existence of the soul. *VS.*, VIII, 1. 1.–*dravyeṣu jñānam vyākhyātam*, has been taken by the commentators to mean that 'cognition has been explained while dealing with the subject of substance,' and they think it refers to Sūtras, III, 1. 2—*indriyārtha-prasiddhir indriyārthebhyo 'rthāntarasya hetuḥ* and III, 1. 18 already quoted above. Then the whole section from *Sūtra* III, 1. 1[1] to III, 1. 19[2] is supposed to deal with the question whether sense-cognition is a true mark of the existence of the soul or not. Now the difficulties which present themselves in accepting the traditional interpretation are as follows: (1) texts of the sūtras, especially those of III, 1. 3 to III, 1. 8 do not at all admit of the interpretation put upon them by the commenta-

1. *prasiddhāḥ indriyārthāḥ.*

2. *Pravṛtti-nivṛttiśca pratyaga ātmani dṛṣṭe paratra liṅgam.*

tors, and this is evident from the many assumptions which they have to make with regard to the nature of the *pūrva-pakṣa* and the *uttara-pakṣa*; (2) the marks (*liṅga*) of the inference of the soul are distinctly enumerated elsewhere in III, 2-4 and the whole subject of the proof of the soul is discussed in the subsequent sūtras, and hence we already have a section in the *VS.* which is entirely devoted to this subject; (3) If the Sūtra III, 1. 1 to III, 1. 19 be taken to refer to a discussion about the inferential mark of the soul *only*, the reference in Sūtra,, VIII, 1. 1 that 'cognition has been explained while dealing with the topic of *substances*' (*dravyeṣu*) will hardly be justifiable. The reference, if right, clearly shows that in these sūtras the subject of cognition has been discussed with reference to substance in general, and not with reference to any particular substance. Further, if Sūtras, III, 1. 2 and III, 1. 18 only be taken as an explanation of the nature of cognition, it will appear that they by themselves hardly contain any such explanation. Personally I think the *Sūtra*, VIII, 1. 1 does not refer to this section at all, and I shall give my reasons for holding this view in the sequel. Faddegon[1] has noticed the enigmatical nature of the sūtras in this section, but in the absence of a better alternative, he accepts the traditional view that that they deal with the proof of the existence of the soul.

It will be seen from the following interpretation of the sūtras that they really deal with the value of what

1. *The Vaiśeṣika System*, pp. 300-302.

may be called, in modern phraseology, the sense-dat for the knowledge of substance by inference. A dis tinction is evidently drawn between the objects of th senses (*indriyārtha*) and objects of cognition in gene ral (*artha*). The meaning of *artha* is explained i VIII, 2. 3 as substance, attribute and action—'*arth iti dravya-guṇa-karmasu*'. The objects of the sense are the well-known five qualities of colour, taste smell, touch and sound, either singly, or in combina tion with one another.

Now it is said in *Sūtra*, III, 1. 1 '*prasiddāh indri yārthāḥ*' that the objects of the senses are quit familiar.[1] In *Sūtra*, III, 1. 2 *indriyārtha-prasiddhi indriyārthebbyo arthāntarasya hetuḥ*'—it is stated tha this well-known familiarity with the objects of th senses is the mark of (the existence of) an objec different from the object of the senses.

Now here no particular kind of object is mention ed, but it is said that familiarity with the objects o

---

1. It is important that the exact significance of '*prasiddiḥ* should be understood. 'Cognition' or 'experience' wit or without the adjective 'universal' does not express th sense of 'familiarity' which is chiefly meant to be ex pressed here. It is not tne cognition of the objects o sense, but a familiar association of the same with certai objects which is regarded as of value in them for servin as a mark of inference. A realisation of this point wil further show the untenability of the view which regard these sūtras as establishing the existence of the soul on th

the senses is the mark of an object different from the objects of the senses. These other objects could, therefore, be substance (*dravya*) and action (*karma*); but as action, by its definition, does not possess qualities–*eka-dravyam aguṇam*; etc. (I., 1. 17), it is only substances of which it is said that familiarity with the cognised qualities forms a mark, and these may be either the soul or any of the rest.

In *Sūtra* III, 1. 3–'*so napadeśaḥ*'–'*saḥ*' can only refer to '*hetuḥ*' *in the previous sūtra*, and so the meaning of the *sūtra* is 'that familiarity with the objects of the senses as a mark is no mark (of a substance). The reasons for this objection are given in the following three sūtras. *Firstly*, because the cause (of the objects of the senses, *i.e*, of the qualities) is not known—'*kāraṇājñānāt*' (III, 1. 4); *secondly*, because, among the effects, some have (the quality of) knowledge, while others do not have (the quality of) knowledge—'*kāryeṣu jñānāt* (III, 1. 5) and '*ajñānācca*' (III, 1. 6)[1]. What is said by way of an objection to the *pūrvapakṣa*

---

ground of the *cognition* of objects. Compare the *Sūtra*, III, 1. 14, '*prasiddhi-pūrvakatvād apadeśasya*' in which it is said that an inferential mark is preceded by the existence of a familiar relation, and *Sūtra* III, 1. 15, '*aprasiddho' napadeśah*, etc.' that which is not familiar is not an inferential mark.

1. Cf. Candrakīrti Tarkālaṅkāra, who treats these two aphorisms as one and explains it to mean that because cognition is found in one kind of effect e. g. the body, and is not found in another kind of effect, e. g. a jar, etc.

is that familiarity with the objects of the senses cannot serve as a mark of any substance, for the cause of these qualities is not known; and if it be said that the nature of the cause can be inferred from the nature of the effects, the difficulty is that some of them have knowledge, while others are without it. The main point in the objection is that unless a certain mark is previously known to be associated with a certain object, it cannot serve as a mark of any definite object. It cannot be said definitely whether cognised qualities are the mark of the soul, or of any of the other substances; for we do not know what their cause is. And as regards the effects among material things, some e. g. the bodies, have (appear to have) knowledge, while others, e. g. a jar etc, are without it, and so it cannot be said for certain that material substances like bodies cannot be the cause of these qualities.

Then, in case it be said that the mark is something different (from being the effect of a particular kind of cause), it is further urged that (such a mark) is no mark '*anyad eva hetur ityanapadeśaḥ*'; for any one thing cannot be the mark of any other thing—'*arthāntaram hi arthāntarasya anapadeśah.* That is to say, nothing can arbitrarily serve as a mark of anything else. The mark and the object of which it can be a mark must stand in some definite relations to each other, and these are discussed in the following sūtras from III, 1. 9 to III, 1. 17, the last three of these containing a classification and examples of false marks (*anapadeśa*). Then it is pointed out in III, 1. 18 that what

is known by the contact of the soul, the senses and the objects is different from a false mark—'*tad-anyat*', and hence it can serve as a mark of the existence of the substances with which it is known to be associated. Thus it will appear that the whole section really deals with the value of sense-data for inferring the existence of objects, and is also calculated to establish a metaphysical realism as against a subjective idealism which would maintain that all that we have is simply ideas as the result of cognition or against a scepticism which would hold that there is no proof of the existence of any substance spiritual or material behind or beyond the sense-impressions.

The above interpretation easily fits in with the language of the sūtras and the general context, while it is evident that the traditional interpretation is extremely strained, and works out only by a number of assumptions and insertions which are altogether unwarranted by the text and the context of the sūtras. As Faddegon observes, the commentators, in the interpretation of these sūtras, have been actuated by the idea of finding in the *VS.* a parallel to the section in the *NS.* which aims at showing that cognition cannot belong to the body; and in doing so they have extremely distorted the natural meaning of the texts.

It will appear that a detailed discussion of the subject of cognition is started in the Eighth Book, which begins with the *Sūtra*, '*dravyeṣu jñānam vyākhyātam*'. It has been mentioned that this has been taken by the commentators to mean that the subject of cognition

has been explained in dealing with the subject of substances, and they think it refers to Sūtras III, 1. 2 and III, 1. 18, which I have already quoted and discussed above. This interpretation, I think, is incorrect, for, in the first place, neither in Sūtras, III, 1. 2 and III, 1. 18, nor in any of the others, do we find *an explanation of cognition as such.* The subject discussed in that section, as has been shown, is really the value of the sense-data as marks of inference; and in the second place, the language of the text of the *sūtra* suggests more that the reference is to the explanation of cognition with reference to substances which is going to be undertaken in the Eighth book, rather than to a previous explanation which is to be found nowhere at all. The locative case in '*dravyeṣu*' does not mean 'in the course of dealing with substances', as the commentators take it, but 'with reference to substances' just as it does in '*jñānanirdeśe*' in *Sūtra*, VIII, 1. 3—'*jñāna-nirdeśe jñāna-niṣpatti-vidhir-uktaḥ*', *and* '*dravye*' in *Sūtra* VIII, 1. 7—'*dravye dravya-guṇa-karmāpekṣam*'. further the past participle '*vyākhyātam*' has been used in the sense of 'being explained' with reference to the explanation of cognition of subtances that follows in the Chapter, rather than in the sense of 'has (already) been explained.' A parallel use of a past participle in this sense is to be found in the third *sūtra* of the same chapter, which has been quoted above, where '*uktaḥ*', even according to Śaṃkara Miśra, is used in the sense of 'incipient action', and what follows confirms this

interpretation. That the *Sūtra*, VIII, 1. 1. refers to the discussion which follows in the Chapter is further confirmed by the initial word of the next *Sūtra*, *'tatra ātmā manaścāpratyakṣe'*—of these (that is, among the substances *'dravyeṣu'*) soul and mind are not known by sense-cognition. The commentators have altogether neglected or missed the force of 'tatra', in the *Sūtra*.

After having introduced the subject of particular kinds of cognitions in VIII 1. 3, the explanation follows; and it will be found that a fairly deep insight into the nature of cognition is evinced in this section of the *VS*. The following statements are made:

When qualities (*guṇa*) and actions (*karma*) are cognised the substance is the cause of their cognition. That is to say, according to the *VS*. the substance to which the attributes and actions belong makes an impression upon the mind through the sense-organs, and hence is a cause of cognition. Behind the sense-data there is a substance as the cause of their cognition (VIII, 1. 4).

It is also from substance that we have the cognition of generality (*sāmānya*) and particularity (*viśeṣa*), for they, respectively, have no generality and particularity (VIII, 1. 5)[1]. Generality and particularity have been described as notions depending upon cognition *'sāmānyaviśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam* (I, 2. 3). The meaning

1. *'tata eva jñānam'* should be translated according to the text as 'it is, also *from that* that there is cognition,' and not 'it is the cause of the cognition' as several commentators have done.

is that the notions of generality, e. g. substanceness, and particularity, e. g. earthness, are not cognised like other qualities, but are known by an observation of substances in which they are found exemplified.

The cognition of substance, attribute and action depends upon the cognition of generality and particularity (VIII, 1. 6). A substance, an attribute, or an action can be definitely cognised as this particular substance, this particular quality or this particular action only when their generality and particularity are distinctly marked out.

The cognition of a substance is dependent upon the cognition of substance, attribute and activity. For the cognition of a substance it is necessary that its attributes and activity should be cognised, but a cognition of these by themselves will not constitute the cognition of a substance. They should be cognised as belonging to a substance, and hence the cognition of substance also has been included as one of the conditions (VIII, 1. 7). It might be noted that the example given by Śaṃkara Miśra to illustrate the meaning of this *sūtra*, viz. 'A white cow with a bell is going' is not a happy one; for if by the cognition of substance as a condition is meant that there should be cognition of some particular object, like the bell, in connection with the substance to be cognised, it will appear that this need not be so; for the individuality of a substance can very well be marked out by its special attributes, and another substance like a bell need not always be present in combination with the substance to be cognised.

That a particular substance is not regarded as the cause of the cognition of another substance by the *VS.* is clear from VIII 1. 10—'*dravyeṣu anitaretara-kāraṇāḥ*', which says that among the substances one is not the cause of (the cognition of) another substance; for each of them, in case a number of substances are cognised in succession, is cognised because of its own cause, and the cognitions follow one another because of the sequence in their causes and not because one substance is the cause of that which follows it in cognition. (VIII, 1. 11).

In the case of attributes and actions, as they themselves do not possess other attributes or actions, the cognition of them does not depend upon the cognition of any other attributes or actions. In other words, they are cognised directly (VIII, 1. 8). However, in the case of the cognition of a substance as possessing a certain attribute, e. g. a white object, the cognition is due to the presence of whiteness as a co-existent quality in the substance and the cognition of this whiteness (VIII, 1. 9).

Relations, such as found in 'this man', '(something) done by you', 'feed this man,' depend upon understanding, that is to say, they do not belong to the objects in themselves (VIII, 2. 1); and this is so because they exist only in so far as they are cognised, and do not exist when they are not cognised (VIII, 2. 2).

Non-existence is also cognised by contrast. The non-existence of that which has ceased to exist is cog-

nised by the absence of the past perception of it and the remembrance of the past; the non-existence of that which has become existent is cognised by the perception of its existence and the memory of its previous non-existence; and similarly the cognition of the non-existence of one thing in another thing e.g. of a cow in a horse. That which was never produced is absolutely non-existent. (IX, 1. 6-10).

A special kind of direct knowledge (*prātyakṣa*) is possible in the case of Yogins and those who have practised Yogic concentration, according to which even the soul can be known directly by being presented to the mind. To them other substances together with their attributes and actions are also revealed in their intrinsic nature. (IX, 1. 11-15).

From these sūtras it is evident that, according to the *VS.*, there is a distinction between the appearance and the reality of things—both spiritual and material. The appearance is open to the ordinary means of cognition, while the reality is disclosed only to the specially disciplined minds. The fact that while describing the direct knowledge of soul and other substances, also the actions and attributes of these have been mentioned as knowable directly by the disciplined minds shows that, according to the *VS.* there is a distinctinon between the appearance and the reality of attributes and actions as well. In other words, the reality behind its appearance is not attributeless; and this doctrine, although peculiar and difficult to under-

stand, is nevertheless consistent with the conception of a substance that it should possess attributes and actions. The recourse to a Yogic mind for the acquirement of true knowledge both in the *NS.* and the *VS.* is rather significant; and the implications of this doctrine, so far as I know, have not been realised. While in the *NS.* there is simply a mention of the fact that true knowledge is acquired by the practice of *Yoga*, in the *VS.* we have sufficient details to show that, according to it, behind the world of appearance there is another world of reality, and that while the former is cognisable by the ordinary means of knowledge, the latter is revealed directly (without the medium of the senses) to those who have acquired special powers of concentration. To say that, in the *NS.* for example, the only distinction between true and false knowledge in view is such as is to be found in the correct perception of a post and the wrong perception of it as a man, is evidently wrong; for certainly one does not require the discipline of a Yogic practice to dispel such an error of perception as that of perceiving a post to be a man.

Inference is called cognition by means of a mark (*laiṅgikam*), and is characterised by such relations as (i) this is its effect (ii) this is its cause, (iii) this is its conjunct, (iv) this is its contradictory, (v) this is its co-existent (IX, 2. 1)[1]. The inference based upon these marks is drawn by means of the premises of an

1. *asyedam kāryam, kāraṇam, samyogi, virodhi, samavāyi, ceti laiṅgikam.*

argument (IX, 2. 2)[1].

It will be shown in the section dealing with the *NS.* that these distinctions of inference in the *VS.* correspond to the three kinds of inference as described in the *NS.*, viz. *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa.*[2]

Memory is explained as the result of a special contact between the soul and mind, and of past impressions (IX, 2. 6). Dreams are also explained likewise.[3]

(It may be noted that IX, 2. 5—*asyedam iti buddhyapekṣitvāt*, which has been taken by the commentators to mean that knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*), presumption (*arthāpatti*), *implication* (*sambhava*), *etc.* are included in cognition by inference, for they depend for their origin upon the cognition 'it is its', evidently does not mean all this, and simply contains an argument in support of the statement made in the previous *Sūtra*, IX, 2. 4 that '*hetu*, *apadeśa*, *liṅga*, *pramāṇa* and *karaṇa* are not different from one another in this respect that all depend upon the cognition 'it is its', that is to say, upon a relation. This is another instance of a strained interpretation by the commentators)[4].

Doubt is explained as the result of the cognition of the generality (*sāmānya*) of an object and the non-

---

1. *Asyedaṃ kārya-kāraṇa sambandhaś cāvayavād bhavati.*
2. Cf. Jayanārāyaṇa's Vivṛtti on IX, 2. 1. which also compares these with the three kinds of inference in the *NS.*
3. Cf. *NS.* IV, 2. 34, *smṛti-saṃkalpavacca svapnaviṣayābhimānaḥ.*
4. Cf. Faddegon, *Vaiśeṣika System*, p. 310, who, I find, after I had noted this point independently, also has to make the same observation on the interpretation of this *Sūtra.*

cognition of its particularity (*viśeṣa*), together with the remembrance of the particularity[1]; e. g. when an object appears to be like something, or unlike something which has already been seen,[2] and we are not sure what it exactly is. Doubt arises from both knowledge (*vidyā*) and ignorance (*avidyā*); that is to say, knowledge of the general nature of the object of perception and ignorance of its particularity. For instance, in the case of doubt with regard to a tall thing as to whether it is a post or a man, the tallness, which is the common property of a post and a man, is perceived, while the particular characteristics of a post or of a man, which will distinguish the one from the other, are not cognised.

It is to be noted that in the *VS.* the terms '*vidyā*' and '*avidyā*' are used in the sense of knowledge and error also respectively with regard to the ordinary objects of perception. *Vidyā* is defined as knowledge free from defect or error—*aduṣṭam vidyā* (IX, 2. 12); and *avidyā* as defective knowledge—*tad duṣṭa-jñānam* (IX, 2. 11). This defective knowledge is attributed to the defect of the sense-organs, or that of the past impressions—*indriya-doṣāt saṃskāra-doṣāccāvidyā* (IX, 2. 10). As has already been pointed out, the use of the terms '*vidyā*' and '*avidyā*', in this sense, appears to be a new departure in the *VS.*

---

1. *VS.*, II, 2. 17 "*sāmānya-pratyakṣād viśeṣāpratyakṣād viśeṣa-smṛteśca saṃśayaḥ*". Cf. *NS.* II, 1. 22.
2. *VS.*, II, 2. 18 and 19.

(iv) Epistemology of the Nyāya-Sūtras.

As I have already said, and as one can see from the literature of the preceding period, the *NS.* represent a system, which was the result of a gradual development of the logical tendencies of the thinkers who lived during the post-Upaniṣadic period, and it, in its turn, became the basis of logic and epistemology as found in the later period. Thus the *NS.* occupy a very important place in the history of Indian epistemology. In them we find a reference to the views of a number of schools of thought, although no special names are mentioned, and this absence of particular names has led to a good deal of speculation on the part of the commentators with regard to the nature and significance of these allusions. Some sections of the Sūtras have been supposed to refer to Buddhist doctrines, and to contain their refutation, and on the basis of these references inferences have been drawn by modern scholars with regard to the date of the *NS.* I shall have to say something about the nature of such sūtras in the sequel. At first I propose to deal with the theory of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) in the *NS.*

According to the *NS.*, there are four means of knowledge, and these are: direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*, in the sense of sense-cognition), inference (*anumāna*); knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*); and verbal testimony (*śabda*)[1].

---

1. *NS.* I, 1. 3.

In the course of critical examination of the theory of the means of knowledge an objection is raised that direct knowledge and the rest cannot be regarded as the means of knowledge, for they cannot be shown to operate in any of the three distinctions of time. For, *firstly*, if the means of knowledge be conceived to operate prior to the object cognised, it cannot be maintained that direct knowledge results from the contact of the senses with the object cognised; *secondly*, if the means of knowledge operate after the object cognised, the existence of the object is not proved by means of them; and *thirdly*, if they operate simultaneously with the objects cognised, then, inasmuch aa each cognition is restricted to its own object, there can be no sequence among cognitions, that is to say, the cognitions of various objects must be simultaneous, and this would be inconsistent with the character of mind, which can attend to only one thing at a time.[1]

The above objection is answered as follows: If there be no means of knowledge, then the denial of them also cannot be established, for that cannot be shown to exist in any of the three distinctions of time. If what is denied, that is to say the means of knowledge, does not exist, its denial also cannot exist. Further, if there be no means of knowledge to establish the existence of a thing, there will be nothing to establish the denial of the means of knowledge. On the other hand, if the denial of them be established on the basis of some means

1. *NS.*, II, 1, 8-11.

of knowledge, the existence of the means of knowledge also gets established *ipso facto*. Besides, it is not true to say that the means of knowledge cannot be shown to operate on the cognised object in any of the distinctions of time, for the existence of a cognised object and the operation of the means of knowledge can be proved in the same manner as that of a musical instrument by means of its sound. In other words, the existence of the means of knowledge is inferred from the fact that there is actually knowledge of the cognised object.[1]

The following objections are further raised: (*a*) that if the means of knowledge are proved by other means of knowledge, these, in their turn, must depend for their proof upon still others, and thus there will be an infinite regress, and (*b*) that if for the cognition of the means of knowledge, other means of knowledge are not needed, then just as the cognition of the means of knowledge would be accomplished without the other means of knowledge, so would the cognition of the object also.[2] These objections are met by the assertion that the apprehension of the means of knowledge is similar to that of lamp-light, that is to say, just as the lamp-light illuminates other objects and the lamp itself, so do the means of knowledge: they are the means of the cognition of things, and also of themselves.[3]

1. *NS.*, II, 1, 12-16.
2. *NS.*, II, 1, 17 and 18.
3. *NS.*, II, 19. Cf. S. C. Chatterji, *The Nyāya Doctrine of*

Before considering the definitions of the various means of knowledge, I would like to make a few observations concerning their general nature as it has been described in the *NS*. We do not find any definition of *pramāṇa* in the *NS*. The *pramāṇas* have simply been enumerated and explained. In so far as they prove the existence of an object, as it were by illuminating it, they have been compared to a lamp. It is to be remembered, however, that the term '*pramāṇa*' is an ambiguous term, and may mean either (a) the means of knowledge, or (b) the form of cognition, or again (c) the means of proof; and it is freely used to express any of these[1]. The discussion of the nature of the means of knowledge with reference to the objects of knowledge as stated above is not very clear. The main object in introducing it appears to be to emphasise the important fact that the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge go together, and that they are inter-dependent for a proof of their existence. If it is the very essence of the means of knowledge that they have reference to some object, it is absurd to ask whether they are prior, or posterior to the objects of cognition. The assertion, however, that if the means of knowledge be supposed not to

---

Pramāṇa, Journal of the Department of Letters, Calcutta University, XVI, pp. 43-44.

1. Cf. G. N. Jhā, *Sadholal Lectures*, p. 28; also F. W. Thomas, *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, 1921-22 p. 29, where he calls the *pramāṇas* 'the "*means to truth.*"

exist, their denial also is not possible, is clearly based upon a confusion between an existential proposition and a factual existence. For the denial of a mere existential proposition, e. g. that the means of knowledge exist, it is not necessary that there should be first a factual existence of them.

Direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) is defined in *NS.*, I, 1. 4: '*indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam*'. Before translating the *Sūtra* it is first necessary to discuss the exact significance of the terms *avyapadeśyam, avyabhicāri*, and *vyavasāyātmakam* used in the definition. To me the *Sūtra* appears to contain one of the most remarkable definitions of direct knowledge by means of sense-cognition that I know of, and also, at the same time one which has been most misunderstood by the commentators and other later writers. The first part of the definition, viz., *indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam*—'knowledge produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the objects', is the usual form of the definition of sense-cognition as found in the earlier literature. It is the last three epithets which form the characteristic feature of the definition in the *NS* The first of these is '*avyapadeśyam*', about the meaning of which the commentators have differed from one another.

Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra have all of them discussed the meaning of '*avyapadeśyam*' in their commentaries. The first two of these

hold that it means '*unnameable*'[1], while the third maintains, or rather explains the view, that it is impossible to have a sense-cognition which is not connected with a name, and that the word '*avyapadeśyam*' means 'that which is not the result of an inferential mark.'

Vātsyāyana says that 'the name is not operative at the time of the apprehension of the object, it is employed only for the sake of expression (*vyavahāra-kāle tu vyāpriyate*). Therefore the cognition of an object produced by the contact of sense-organs with it is non-verbal (*aśābdam*).[2]

Anticipating Vācaspati Miśra's explanation of '*avyapadeśyam*, Uddyotakara said: 'Some commentators explain that the qualification '*avyapadeśyam*' is added with a view to exclude inferential cognition. This is not right. Why? Because the definition already mentions the qualification 'produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object.' As a matter of fact, inferential cognition does not proceed from the contact of the cognised object with the sense-organ; hence the definition[3] could not apply to inferential cognition.[4]

The following extracts from Vācaspati Miśra's *NVTT.* clearly bring out his interpretation. First he

1. Dr. Rüben in his recent edition of the *Nyāya-sūtras* (Leipzig, 1928) appears to follow this, 'nicht im Worte zu fassen', but he gives no discussion.
2. *NB.*, I. 1. 4.
3. That is to say even without the qualification *avyapadeś-yam.*
4. *NV.*, I, 1. 4 (*Indian Thought*, Vol. V, No. 1. pp. 40, 41).

shows that all sense-cognition must be connected with name. He says: 'every object has a name; there is nothing that is devoid of name; this establishes the identity of the thing with its name; the name is not the means by which the object is known; as the object cow, when perceived, is perceived as 'this is cow', where there is a distinct co-ordination between the *this* and the *cow*, both of which are in the same case; thus things being identical with the name, the perception of things must involve the perception of the name also; hence there can be no perception devoid of verbal expression. Next he explains how *avyapadeśyam* has been used in the *sūtra* to exclude inferential cognition: When, from the contact of the sense-organ with objects we infer the motion of the sense-organ, the inferential cognition of this motion is also 'produced by the contact of the sense with an object', as it is from this contact that the inferential cognition proceeds. And it is with a view to exclude such inferential cognitions from the category of sense-cognition that the qualification '*avyapadeśyam*' has been added. '*Apadeśa*' is the statement of the reason or premise; '*vyapadeśa*' is the correct statement of the premise; '*vyapadeśyam*' is that cognition which is obtained from the said '*vyapadeśa*' or the statement of the premise; and '*avyapadeśyam*' is that cognition which does *not* follow from the statement of the premise; thus then '*avyapadeśyam*' is equivalent to 'non-inferential'[1].

1. Both the extracts are also quoted in *Indian Thought* under *NS.*, I, 1. 4.

Now in order to determine the meaning of '*avyapadeśyam*' according to the author of the *NS.* we have to consider the use of '*vyapadeśa*' and '*apadeśa*' elsewhere in the older literature, and then the significance of the form '*avyapadeśyam*' as found in this particular aphorism. The term '*apadeśa*' occurs in the *Tantra-yukti* as given in Kauṭilya's *Artha-śāstra.* Then we find it in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* IX, 2. 4 in which it is said that *hetu, apadeśa, liṅga, pramāṇa* and *kārma* are not different from one another in sense : *hetur apadeśo liṅgam pramāṇam karaṇam ityanarthāntaram.* It is actually used in the sense of an inferential mark in *VS.* III, 1. 14—*prasiddhi pūrvakatvād apadeśasya.* Its contradictory '*anapadeśa*' is used in *VS.* III, 1. 3, III, 1. 3, III, 1. 7 and III, 1. 8 in the sense of that which is not an inferential mark. In *VS.* IX, 1, 1 and IX, 1. 3 we find the word '*vyapadeśa*' itself: '*kriyā-guṇa-vyapadeśābhāvād prāg asat*' and '*asataḥ kriyā-guṇa-vyapadeśābhāvād arthāntaram.* In the *NS.* themselves, besides '*avyapadeśyam*,' which has been used only once in the aphorism under consideration, '*apadiṣṭa*' and '*apadeśa*' have been used in other aphorisms. The meaning of '*apadeśa*' in all its forms is 'name', 'mark' or 'sign', including the inferential sign called '*hetu*' or '*liṅga*'.

It will appear that the controversy of the commentators over the meaning of *avyapadeśyam* is based upon a failure to understand the correct nature of the definition of direct knowledge as given in the *NS.* In

the *first place*, it is wrong to think that the three epithets *avyapadeśyam*, *ävyabhıcāri*, and *vyavasāyātmakam* are meant to express something in addition to what is said in the phrase '*indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam*'. They simply bring out what is implied in that phrase; that is to say, the whole clause is an analytic proposition. Thus, even though the phrase '*indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam*' might exclude inferential knowledge the term '*avyapadeśyam*', in the sense of 'non-inferential' will not be out of place in so far as it brings out the implication of that phrase. In the *second place*, the term '*avyapadeśyam*', as we have seen, may mean that which is not the result of both name and inferential mark; and this meaning would be quite consistent with at least one view of the nature of direct knowledge, viz., that which regards it as both non-descriptive and non-inferential—knowledge corresponding to our modern conception of 'simple apprehension' or 'acquaintance', and which came to be known as *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* later on. Vācaspati Miśra's objection to Vātsyāyana's and Uddyotkara's interpretation of '*avyapadeśyam*' is evidently based upon the view that there cannot be any non-descriptive knowledge, which, although, one which is held by some of the thinkers even in modern times, there is no reason to believe, was held by the author of the *NS*. On the other hand, as will be shown presently, the other two epithets also '*ävyabhicāri*' and *vyavasāyātmaka*' indicate that direct knowledge, as defined in the *NS*. cor-

responds to what is called 'simple apprehension,' or 'acquaintance' in modern terminology.[1]

Even if we consider the three epithets as indicating the nature of direct knowledge over and above what is said in the phrase *'indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam'*, the term *'avyapadeśyam'* in the sense of 'that which is not the result of a mark or sign' will serve the purpose of distinguishing between sense-cognition on the one hand, and inference and verbal testimony on the other. For it will appear that in inference and testimony also there is a contact of sense-organs with their objects, although not with the particular object which is said to be inferred or known by testimony. But all that is said in the *sūtra* is 'the contact of a sense-organ with its object'—*'indriyārtha-sannikarṣa'*, and this by itself will not exclude inference or testimony from the definition. In the knowledge of fire by noticing smoke, there is the contact of the eye with the smoke; and the knowledge of fire is the result of this contact of a sense-organ with its object. Similarly, in knowing, on the testimony of the reports which appeared in the papers, that the king was ill, there was the contact of my eye with the words of the reports that I read in the papers, or of my ear with the words of the report which might have been

1. In my paper on 'Is there Acquaintance or Simple Apprehension?' I have discussed the nature of this kind of knowledge from the point of view of both European and Indian philosophers. (See the Appendices)

read out to me by some other person; and the knowledge of king's illness was the result of such a contact. The knowledge of fire by inference, or of king's illness by testimony as described above, however, is the result of a certain mark or sign—'*apadeśa*', or '*vyapdeśa*' which is meant to be excluded from the definition of *pratyakṣa*; and hence the condition that it should be *avyapadeśyam.*

That '*vyapadeśyam*' was used in earlier literature to denote that which is the result of an inferential mark, and that *pratyakṣa* was regarded by some early philosophers as '*avyapadeśyam*' in the sense that it is not the result of an inferential mark is conclusively corroborated by a passage in the *Śabara-bhāṣya* under *MS.*, I, 1. 5, where it is shown that while all cognition is known by inference as the result of a mark in the form of the cognised object, and is, therefore, '*vyapdeśya*', *pratyakṣa* is direct apprehension of an object and hence it is '*avyapadeśya*'[1].

The next term to be considered in the definition of direct knowledge is '*avyabhicāri*', which means 'non-discrepant', and has been taken to signify that direct knowledge is non-erroneous. '*Atasmins tad iti tad vyabhicāri; yat tu tasmins tad iti tad avyabhicāri pratyakṣam iti*', says Vātsyāyana in *Bhāṣya* on *NS.*, I, 1. 4. Although the connotation of *avyabhicāri*—'non-discre-

1. *Na cārtha-vyapadeśam antareṇa buddheḥ rūpopalambhanam; tasmān nāvyapadeśyā buddhiḥ, avyapadeśyam ca nāpratyakṣam*—*ŚB.*, (*BI.*), p. 10. This text has been discussed by me under *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, *Śabara-bhāṣya.*

pant' is not strictly the same as that of *abhrānta*—'non-erroneous', which term was later on used by Dharmakīrti in his definition of direct knowledge, there is no reason to believe that the author of the *NS.* did not use it in the sense of 'non-erroneous'; for the term '*avyabhicāri*' appears to have been quite freely used as an equivalent of '*abhrānta*' by quite a good number of early authors[1]. The main object in laying down the condition that direct knowledge should be 'non-erroneous' is to emphasise its epistemological nature as a *pramāṇa* as distinguished from the mere psychological process of sense-cognition as it was defined to be by the earlier authors.

The third term: '*vyavasāyātmakam*' also explains one of the essential characteristics of direct knowledge, viz., that it is definite; that is to say, what is perceived directly is of a definite character so far as it goes. For example, if I hear a sound, it is bound to be of a definite pitch and of a definite quality, although I may not know the nature of its source.

Thus the definition of *pratyakṣa in the NS.* would be: 'that cognition which is the product of the contact of the sense-organs with the object; which is non-inferential and non-descriptive; non-discrepant and definite'. This corresponds to the later *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* in Indian philosophy, and to 'simple apprehension' or 'acquaintance' in the systems of some modern thinkers, with this exception, which I think

1. *Śabara-bhāṣya—pp. 7 and 8.*

is correctly made, that according to the definition in the *NS. pratyakṣa* is said to be definite, while, the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* has been supposed to be vague in character.

Those who drew a distinction between the *nirvikalpaka* and the *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* later on have tried to find a support for this division in the definition of *pratyakṣa* in the *NS.* by suggesting that the term '*avyapadeśyam*' implies the *nirvikalpaka*, and '*vyavasāyātmakam* the *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*. The construction of the *sūtra*, however, does not in the least admit of this interpretation; for evidently '*avyapadeśyam*' and '*vyavasāyātmakam*' do not signify two *alternative* characteristics of *pratyakṣa* in the *Sūtra*.

In the course of an examination of the nature of direct knowledge in the *NS.* an objection is raised that all sense-cognition is a case of inference; for it takes place by means of the cognition of only a part of the cognised object.[1] This is met by the assertion that only so much of the cognition is direct knowledge as is cognised directly[2]. This statement is a clear indication of the fact that, according to the author of the *NS.*, direct knowledge is only that sense-cognition which is simple apprehension, or mere acquaintance with the sense-data. All complex perception, such as was called *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* later on, and as is called

1. *NS.* II, 1. 30. *pratyakṣam anumānam ekadeśa-grahaṇād upalabdheḥ.*
2. *Ibid.* II, 1. 31. '*Na, pratyakṣeṇa yāvat tāvadapyupalambhāt.*

knowledge by description in modern philosophy, has an inferential element in it.

Inference is defined as that which is preceded by direct knowledge, and is said to be of three kinds: *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*.[1] Much ingenuity has been spent by the commentators upon the the interpretation of '*tat-pūrvakam*' and the three kinds of inference. There is no difficulty about the meaning of '*tat-pūrvakam*' for in the preceding *sūtra* we have a definition of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*),[2] and '*tat*' naturally refers to that. Whether it is one act of direct knowledge that precedes an inference, or more than one, does not matter. The terms '*pūrvavat*' and '*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*' are really obscure; and the explanations given by the commentators, as will be seen presently, are conflicting and inconsistent.

To take Vātsyāyana only, who is the earliest commentator known to us, the explanation of the three kinds of inference, according to him is as follows:—

(1) 'The *pūrvavat* inference is that in which the effect is inferred from the cause; *e. g.*, 'when we see clouds rising, we infer that there will be rain.'

'The *seṣavat* inference is that in which the cause is inferred from the effect; *e. g.* 'when we see that the water of the river is not like what it used to be, the stream is full and the current swift, we infer that there

1. अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववच्छेषवत् सामान्यतो दृष्टं च ॥ अ० १ आ० १ सू० ५.

2. व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम्.

has been rain at the source' (up the river).

'The *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inference; *e. g.*, we have observed in all cases that we see a thing in a place different from where we saw it before, only when it has moved; and this is found to be so in the case of the sun; therefore, we infer that the sun moves, or has moved, although we cannot cognise it directly.

'*Or (another explanation may be as follows)*:—

The pūrvavat inference is that in which out of two things as cognised by sense on some former occasion, the one that is not perceived (at the time of inference) is inferred from the sense-cognition of the other; *e. g.* when fire is inferred from smoke.

The word '*śeṣavat*' means remainder; hence, the *śeṣavat* inference is that in which with regard to an object some of the likely properties being denied (eliminated), and this elimination being not applicable to other likely properties, we have the cognition of those that *remain* (thus uneliminated); *e. g.* with regard to sound we find that it is an entity (*sad*), and is transient (*anityam*); and as these two properties are found to be common to substance (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*), and actions (*karma*) only, their presence in sound distinguishes it from the remaining categories of generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inference (*samavāya*).[1] Then there being a doubt as to whether sound is a substance, or a quality, or an action, (we reason as follows): Sound cannot be a

1. All of which three are entities (*sad*) but eternal (*nityam*).

substance, because it inheres in a single substance (*eka-dravyatvāt*); it is not an action, because it is the cause of another sound (*śabdāntara-hetutvāt*); therefore sound is seen to be quality which is the only alternative left by elimination.

The *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference is that in which the relation between the probans (*hetu*) and the probandum (*sādhya*) being imperceptible, the imperceptible probandum is inferred from the similarity of the *probans* to something else; *e.g.* when the self is inferred from desire; desire, etc. are qualities, and qualities always inhere in substances; therefore that which forms the substratum of these[1] is the self (*ātmā*).[2]

After Vātsyāyana, Uddyotkara has still more ingenious explanations to offer. According to him, the three kinds of inference may mean: *firstly*, (1) inference by agreement (*kevalānvayi*), (2) inference by difference (*kevala-vyatireki*), and (3) inference by agreement and difference (*anvaya-vyatireki*); or *secondly*, they mean *the conditions of all inference*: (1) *Pūrvavat*—that the probans (*hetu*) should be invariably accompanied by the probandum (*sādhya*); (2) *Śeṣavat*—that the probans (*hetu*) must have been noticed as invariably accompanied by the probandum (*sādhya*)

1. That is to say desire, etc.

2. In translating the *Bhāṣya* I have mainly followed Dr. Jhā's English Transl. (*Indian Thought*) with such alterations as I have considered necessary.

in other cases (*śeṣa*); and (3) *sāmānyātodṛṣṭa*, which is '*sāmānyataḥ*' and '*adṛṣṭa*'—that the probans (*hetu*) is *not common* to the probandum (*sādhya*) and that which is not-probandum (*sādhyābhāva*). It is further said that the implication of '*ca*' in the *sūtra* is that (a) the inference should not be opposed to sense-cognition (*pratyakṣa*), and (b) it should not be opposed to the scriptures (*āgama*); *thirdly*, the three kinds of inference may denote what the *Bhāṣya* has said in the first explanation, although the example of the sun as given by Vātsyāyana to illustrate the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* does not meet Uddyotakara's approval. According to Uddyotakara, *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is that general case in which the relation between the probans and the probandum is not causal, and yet the inference is valid. For example, from the appearance of cranes at a certain spot it may be inferred that there is water near it.

Uddyotkara has still more explanations to offer, and after him Vācaspati Miśra too has his own. They are so many, so varied, so divergent, so long, and in some cases, so off the the text of the *NS.* that neither is it possible, nor is it worth while, to mention all of them.

All modern scholars, like Garbe,[1] Jacobi,[2] Keith,[3]

---

1. *Sāṃkhya und Yoga*, p. 13, and *Sāṃkhya Philosophie* pp. 153 ff.
2. *Gottingische Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1895, p. 204.
3. *ILA.*, pp. 88-90.

and Rüben,[1] usually follow Vātsyāyana's first explanation of the three kinds of inference, although several of them have noted the unsatisfactory and uncertain nature of the interpretations of the commentators.

According to Garbe's interpretation, inference is of three kinds: it may proceed from cause to effect (*pūrvavat*), or contrariwise (*śeṣavat*), or it may proceed from the general concept (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*) in such a way that one infers a characteristic observed in the case of one object also in the case of another object which falls under the same concept. The last kind of inference was formerly regarded by Garbe (in *Sāṃkhya Philosophie*) as *inductive*, but later on (*in Sāṃkhya und Yoga*) he accepted Jacobi's view that it is *deductive*. Keith has followed Vātsyāyana's interpretation, although he points out the incoherence of Vātsyāyana's explanation of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* with the examples given in *NS*. II, 1. 37 and 38. Rüben translates *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as inference by analogy, which phrase represents more his interpretation of this kind of inference than a translation of the term *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.

What strikes one most about these interpretations is that they are not, in most cases, in accordance with the significance of the technical names given to these inferences and the examples cited in the examination of inference in the *NS*.[2] The inge-

1. *Die Nyāya-sūtras*, Leipzig, 1928.
2. *NS*., II, 1. 37 and 38.

nious explanations given by the various writers may be all very good as the possible forms of inference, and yet they may not represent the view of the author of the *NS.* For example, Uddyotakara's attempt to show that these names do not represent three different kinds of inference, but three *conditions* of all inference, is certainly not in accordance with the meaning of the *NS.* where it is distinctly said that inference is of three *kinds*: '*tri-vidham anumānam pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānytodṛṣṭam ca*'. The various alternative and divergent explanations of the commentators are a distinct proof of the fact that they could find nothing as a sure guide of the determining of the exact significance of the three kinds of inference according to the author of the *Nyāya-sūtras.* I venture to offer an interpretation of my own, which I think is consistent with the examples given in the *Nyāya-sūtras* II, 1. 37 and 38, and has its support in *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* IX, 2. 1, which contains the marks of inference according to the author of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.* The three examples cited in the course of the examination of inference should naturally refer to the three kinds of inference enumerated along with the definition of inference and the marks of inference mentioned in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* should be a better guide to the interpretation of the three kinds of inference given in the *Nyāya-sūtra* than an exposition of the same subject by writers and commentators who were far more removed in time than the author of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, and who were influenced in their writings by schools of philosophy

more divergent in their doctrines than the *Vaiśeṣika* school. Let us first consider the terms themselves. Uddyotakara has raised the question of the meaning of these in the *Nyāya-vārtika*. He says: "The term '*pūrvavat*' has been used. What is the denotation of '*pūrvavat*' then? Does it denote an effect or a cause? *If 'purvavat' means that which has an antecedent, then it denotes an effect* (*kārya*) *and in that case it becomes a contradiction to say that it* (*pūrvavat*) *denotes an inference from a cause to effect.* We do say (hold) that '*pūrvavat*' is that which has an antecedent (*purvam asyāstīti pūrvavat*), but it does not signify an effect. What is it then (which it signifies)? It means cognition (*jñānam*), that there is an antecedent object to cognition (*jñānasya pūrvaṃ viṣayaḥ*); and thus *pūrvavat* signifies the inference of an effect. Similarly, *śeṣavat*, etc. apply to the cognition of their objects. Or, the affix in *pūrvavat* may be taken as '*vati*' (denoting 'similarity' and not 'possession' as *matup*'), the meaning being that an object is cognised by inference just as it was known by inference, and hence it is known as before (*pūrvavad dṛṣṭo bhavati*).[1]

The above attempt by Uddyotakara at determining the derivative eaning of the various terms is unfortunately as vague and rambling as that at explaining the various types of inference denoted by them. The aphorism in which the terms occur is: *Atha tat-pūrvakaṃ tri-vidham anumānam pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānya-*

1. *NV.* p. 852.

todṛṣṭam ca. Here the plain syntax is that the three words: *pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṭam* qualify *anumānam*, the meaning being that inference (*anūmana*) is that which has an antecedent (*pūrvavat*), that which has a remainder (the implication by antithesis being 'that which has a consequent'–*śeṣavat*), and that which has been commonly seen (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*) as the object of cognition. Uddyotakara also admits that '*pūrvavat*' means 'that which has an antecedent', but then his interpretation that it might refer to the inferencc of an effect is unjustifiable both from the point of view of the text of the *sūtra* and the general context. The other interpretation, which he puts forth following Vātsyāyana, that '*pūrvavat*' signifies a cognition by inference similar to one previously obtained by sense-cognition is in no way applicable to '*pūrvavat*' inference only, for all kinds of inference by their very nature and definition are *pūrvavat* in that sense; that is to say, they are based upon, and are according to, a connection between the probans and the probandum previously cognised by sense-cognition. It will appear that the plain and straightforward interpretation suggested by me finds its support not only in the *Nyāya-sūtras* themselves, but also in a few reliable authorities outside them. Now in the *Nyāya-sūtra* II, 1. 37 the first two examples are those of embankment (*rodha*) and damage (*upaghāta*) with a view to show that the swelling of a river may be due to an embankment and not to the falling of rain,

and the carrying off of eggs by ants may be due to a damage to their nest rather than it be an indication of the approach of rains. In other words, the first example refers to the inference of an antecedent–of a cause, from the observation of a consequent–of an effect; and the second, to the inference of a consequent—of an effect, from the observation of an antecedent. The carrying of eggs by ants may be taken as an antecedent sign of the rain, but whether it can be reckoned as a cause is questionable.[1] The first of these is, therefore, *pūrvavat* and the second *śeṣavat*. It will appear that in the *Vaiśeṣika* IX, 2. 1—'*asyedam kāryam kāraṇam saṃyogi virodhi samavāyi ceti laiṅgikam*', we have a mention of three kinds of inferential marks in the order of (1) this is an effect of this, (2) this is a cause of this, and (3) this stands in the relation of conjunction, contradiction and inherence to this.

It will be seen that the *pūrvavat and the śeṣavat* inferences in the *Nyāya-sūtras* correspond to the first and the second in the above *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. The relations of conjunction, contradiction and inherence as mentioned in the *VS*. evidently refer to the relation of co-existence both in its positive and negative aspects and we shall see that the *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, is much the same. The term means 'that seen or known by common experience', that is to

1. Cf. G. N. Jhā., *Indian Thought*, VIII, pp. 238 & 239 note.

say, an inference based upon a well-known relation of co-existence or the absence of co-existence. For instance, to take the example given in *NS.* II, 1. 37, 38 from the screaming of a peacock we infer the presence of a peacock, for the screaming of a peacock and a peacock are known to co-exist.[1] Thus it will appear that while the *pūrvavat* and the *śeṣavat* refer to the relations of antecedence and consequence respectively, the *samānyatodṛṣṭa* refers to that of co-existence or concomitance. This interpretation fits in with the examples of inferences given in the *Nyāya-sūtras* themselves, and also with the description of the inferential marks in the *VS.* IX, 2. 1.[2] The *Vārtika,* while commenting upon *NS.* II, 1. 37, curiously enough admits that the examples

1. To take the screaming of a peacock as a sign of the approach of clouds or rain, as some have done, would not be a specific example of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa,* for that may as well be an example of *śeṣavat.* In the *Sūtra* itself we have simply '*sādṛśya*'.
2. Also cf. *Vṛtti* on II, 1. 37 where it gives an alternative explanation which exactly corresponds to that given by me. 'Or, in the *Sūtra* containing the definition *pūrvavat* is that whereby an antecedent probandum is inferred; *Śesavat*—that whereby a consequent probandum is inferred; and *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*—that whereby a present or concomitant probandum is inferred.'

Also cf. *Caraka-Samhitā, Sūtra-sthāna* XI, 19, 20 where inference is classified as referring to the present, the past and the future. The discussion about the reality

given in the *Sūtra* illustrate the three kinds of inference mentioned in *NS.*, I, 1, 5. It says: what inference is has already been explained in Sūtra, 1, 1. 5. The following are the examples of the three kinds of inference *pūrvavat*, and the rest (enumerated under *Sūtra*, I, 1. 5): (1) The full river (leading to the cognition its having rained up the river); (2) the running about of ants with their eggs (leading to the cognition of coming rain); and (3) the scream of the peacock (leading to the cognition of the presence of the peacock)'. It will be found, however, that this interpretation here is inconsistent with its comments upon *NS.*, I, 1. 5.[1]

of the distinctions of past, present and future in *NS.* II. 1, 39-43, immediately following the examination of inference also lends support to the same interpretation of the three kinds of inference.

1. Dhruva in a paper: *Trividham Anumānam* or A study in *Nyāya-sūtra* I, 1, 5 (Proceedings of the First Oriental Conference, Poona) first shows the unsatisfactory nature of the explanation of the three kinds of inference as given by the commentators including Vātsyāyana, and then tacitly assumes that Vātsyāyana's explanation was correct. About Vātsyāyana's explanation he says first 'The two sets of explanations, together with their illustrations are so radically different from each other that the writer evidently seems to be groping in the dark for the real meaning of the *Sūtra*' (p. 253), and then at another place, he asserts: Vātsyāyana, when he says that *Pūrvavat* and *Śeṣavat* may mean, respectively, infer-

In the examination of the definition and classification of inference an objection is raised that the conclusion of an inference may be vitiated by the existence of the plurality of causes, or the similarity of a co-existent sign. For example, the swelling of a river may be due to a local embankment instead of the falling of rain up the river; ants may be carrying off their eggs out of fear because of damage to their nest; and lastly, the supposed screaming of a peacock may be only a mimicking of the same by some man. These objections are answered by the assertion that the real grounds or signs of inference are different from the false ones; or in other words, the plurality of causes is denied, and it is maintained that the relations of cause and effect, or those of the marks of inference and that which is inferred, are reciprocal; and, therefore, of a unique nature.

Knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*) is defined as the cognition of an object by means of its resemblance to something well-known[1]; as for example, to know that a certain animal is *bos gavaeus* by virtue of its

---

ence from cause and inference from effect, is doubtless in possession of the real meanings of the terms as used in the Sūtras, (p. 262). Professor Dhruva, curiously enough, neglects altogether the examples of inference as given in the *NS.* II, 1. 37 and 38, and does not explain how and why one of the explanations as given by Vātsyāyana may be accepted as correct.

1. *NS.* I, 1. 6.

resemblance to a cow, which is a well-known animal.

In the examination of knowledge by similarity as a means of cognition the following objections are raised :—

(a) That knowledge by similarity does not provide any sure basis for right cognition in so far as neither a complete similarity, nor a considerable similarity, nor again a partial similarity can establish the identity of an object.[1]

(b) Knowledge by similarity is not different from inference, for both of them seek to establish the existence of something unperceived by means of that which is perceived.[2]

The above objections are answered by the assertions: (a) that knowledge by similarity depends upon a well-known similarity—'*prasiddha-sādharmyād upamāna-siddheḥ*[3], and not on degrees of similarity; and (b) that in cognition by similarity it is not that some-

1. *NS.* II, 1. 44.
2. *NS.*, II, 1. 46.
3. To translate this text as 'through similarity in a high degree', as Vidyābhūṣaṇa has done, *NS* (*SBH.*, p. 35) is evidently wrong both from the point of view of the language and the context. For 'similarity in a high degree' is not different from 'considerable similarity' mentioned in *NS.* II, 1. 44, and the answer to the objection contained in that sūtra means to suggest a different *kind* of similarity as the basis of similarity viz. *prasiddha-sādharmya* —a well-known similarity.

thing unperceived is cognised by that which is perceived, but that the object known by similarity is also perceived; and hence knowledge by similarity is different from inference. Further, the use of 'so' (*tathā*) in the act of comparing shows that it is different from inference (where the word 'because' would be used).[1]

It will be seen that knowledge by similarity has not been recognised as an independent means of knowledge by several schools. The essential value of knowledge by similarity appears to consist in a definite identification of an object as so and so called by a certain name. So far as mere sense-cognition is concerned, it can certainly be complete without a comparison —a *bos gavaeus* can be completely cognised as some thing without comparing it with any other object, but the definite knowledge that it is this particular animal would depend upon the act of comparison with reference to some kind of similarity.[2]

Verbal testimony is defined as the assertion of a reliable person and is said to be of two kinds: (1) that which refers to things seen, and (2) that which refers to things unseen.

In the examination of verbal testimony an objection is raised that it is only a case of inference and

1. *NS.* II, 1. 45, 47, 48.
2. Cf. *Tātparya* on *NS.*, II. 1. 46—"So that in cognition by similarity, the cognition of the perceived bull gives rise to the cognition of *the animal bearing the name of* '*gavaya*' which is not perceived".

not a separate means of knowledge; for just as in inference, so in verbal testimony, something unperceived is known by means of a sign or a mark, which is the word, and that the relation between a word and that which it signifies is of the same kind as that between an inferential mark and that which is inferred.[1]

In answer to the above objection it is denied that the relation between a word and what it signifies is of the same kind as between an inferential sign and the object inferred. The former is said to be conventional as distinguished from the latter which is natural. Further the ultimate ground of verbal testimony is to be found not in the word itself, but in the reliability of the person from whom it proceeds.[2]

A further objection that the testimony of the Veda is unreliable because it is vitiated by the faults of untruth, contradiction and tautology is answered by the assertion that these are not defects of the Veda, but that untruth is due to some defect in the act, the sacrificer, or the materials of sacrifice; that the so-called contradiction is not contradiction but an assertion of certain alternatives, and that the so-called tautology is a repetition on purpose.[3]

It will be seen that like knowledge by similarity verbal testimony also has not been recognised as an

---

1. *NS.*, II, 1. 49-51; 54
2. *NS.*, II, 1. 52, 53, 55, 56.
3. *NS.* II, 1. 57-61.

independent means of cognition by some schools of philosophy.

The *NS.* thus admits direct knowledge, inference, knowledge by similarity, and verbal testimony as four independent means of knowledge. Tradition (*aitihya*) is regarded as included in verbal testimony; and presumption (*arthāpatti*), implication (*sambhava*), and non-existence (*abhāva*) are treated as cases of inference.[1]

The various factors involved in sense-cognition are the soul, the mind, the senses and the object of cognition. It is the soul to which knowledge belongs; the mind and the senses are only the instruments of acquiring knowledge.[2]

The soul is defined as that which is characterised by desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition.[3] It is shown that the soul is different from the senses and the body by a number of arguments, the chief of them being that it acts as a uniting and permanent factor in knowledge, which neither the senses nor the body could do.[4] The materialistic view that desire and aversion belong to the body, inasmuch as activity and forbearance are seen to belong to it, is met by the assertion that these belong to the body in the same sense as they belong to such implements as an axe and so on. Further, we do not find these in such

1. *NS.* II, 2. 1-12.
2. *NS.* III, 2. 19-42.
3. *NS.* I, 1, 10.
4. *NS.* III, 1, 1-15.

material things as pots, etc.[1]

Mind is that which is characterised by the non-production of simultaneous cognition..[2] For the same reason it is one and atomic (*aṇu*).[3]

The senses and their objects are defined in the usual way. They are material and composed of the various elements which they respectively perceive.[4]

Buddhi, according to the *NS.*, is identical with apprehension (*upalabdhi*) and knowledge (*jñāna*). Thus it is a temporary mental act rather than a permanent faculty as the *Sāṃkhya* school regards it to be. This topic is discussed at length in a section of the *NS.* where the *Sāṃkhya* view about *buddhi* is criticised.[5] The one point in connection with all controversy about the nature of *buddhi* between the *Nyāya* and the *Sāṃkhya*, which was usually overlooked by the disputants in the past, and which is, I think, overlooked even now, is that the dispute between the *Nyāya* and the *Sāṃkhya* is really about two different things called by the same name. The *buddhis* (cognitions) of the *Nyāya* are really equivalent to the *functionings* (*vṛtti*) of the *buddhi* (the intellect) of the *Sāṃkhya*, and about the correspondence of these there can hardly be any dispute between the two schools. Thus a good deal

1. *NS.* III, 2, 37–40.
2. *NS.* I, 1. 16.
3. *Ibid.* III, 2, 57–60.
4. *Ibid.* III, 1, 63, 64,
5. *Ileid.* III, 2, 1–49.

of this controversy about *buddhi* is merely verbal and irrelevant, and it is futile to go into its details at length.

Two sections of the *NS.* viz. Sūtras, III, 2, 10 to III. 2, 18, and IV. 2, 26 and the following sūtras, which respectively deal with the temporary nature of cognition (*buddhi*) and the cognition of the whole (*avayavī*) in relation to its parts, have been regarded by the commentators as dealing with the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism respectively. I have discussed the whole subject in a separate article,[1] and have tried to show that the interpretations of the commentators and the views of modern scholars based upon them are unjustifiable.

The whole of the Second Chapter of the Fourth Book deals with the acquirement of true knowledge, and the result of the whole discussion is that (1) cognitions (*upalabdhi*) may be right or wrong; (2) that a wrong cognition is destroyed by the appearance of right cognition '*mithyopalabdhi vināśas tattva jñānāt*'[2]; (3) a wrong cognition is detected by seeing a contrast between the real object and its counterpart[3], e. g. by seeing the distinction between a real man and a post that appeared to be a man. And then as the question finally turns upon the way to acquire true knowledge,

1. *Discussion of the Buddist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism in the Nyāya-Sūtras, JRAS.* January, 1930.

2. *NS.*, IV, 2. 35.

3. *NS.*, IV, 2. 37.

the subsequent sūtras suggest various means of developing the powers of one's mind, which include practice of meditation and academic discussions.

To sum up, in the *NS.* we find a systematic and critical exposition of direct knowledge, inference, knowledge by similarity, and verbal testimony. Direct knowledge in the *NS.* is yet only sense-cognition, and, as I have tried to show, of the nature of simple apprehension, very much like the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* of the later works. The definition and classification of inference are clearly a development of the doctrine of inference as found in the *Caraka-saṁhitā* and the *VS.* The exact significance of knowledge by similarity and verbal testimony is brought out in explaining how they are different from inference. The pramāṇas are regarded as means of knowledge, or forms of cognition, or again as means of proof; but I am inclined to think that it is the first meaning which is the most usual. The possibility of doubt and error is admitted. Doubt arises out of a conflicting sense-datum or testimony, and is removed by definite cognition. The presence of error is detected when a contrast is revealed to us between a false appearance and the true reality of an object; e. g. when one finds that what one took to be a man was really a post. But this is evidently arguing in a circle. The question, 'What is true reality, and how to be sure that one knows it'? still remains to be answered. The whole world may be a

life-long dream; and, therefore, as unreal as the dream world of our sleep. The *Nyāya-sūtras* do not offer any further criterion of truth beyond the *pramāṇas*, but enjoin a life of moral and intellectual discipline; e. g. *Yoga* practices and academic discussions, which alone, according to it, can give powers of philosophical insight.

Before I close this chapter on the *NS.* I would say, and this has been felt by many a scholar now,[1] that the original philosophy of the *NS.* has been grossly obscured by the confusion created by the distinguished commentators beginning with even the first of them, Vātsyāyana or Pakṣila-svāmin, and it needs the devoted labours of a competent scholar to dig it out and present it in its original form. Certain assumptions on the part of the first commentator have simply been accepted by the subsequent writers, and as certain anomalies due to those assumptions could not be explained, fresh assumptions have been made and new theories have been put forth to overcome the difficulty. Examples of some of these have been given in this chapter, but many more can be found by a more intensive and independent study of the whole work.

---

1. Cf. Hara Prasad Shastri, *JASB.*, (1905) pp. 245 ff. Vanamali Chakravarti, *JASB.*, (1910) pp. 289 ff.

CHAPTER V.

Epistemology of the Sāṃkhya system as found in the Sāṃkhya-kārikā and the Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra.

The two main works of the *Sāṃkhya* system are the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra* attributed to Kapila. Although the *SPS.* is believed to belong to a very late date, one curious fact about it, which one cannot help noticing, is that its definitions of right cognition (*pramā*); direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) are of a very peculiar nature. They are different from those given in any other work including the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, and do not indicate any signs of the influence of any of the authors who are supposed to be earlier than the *SPS*. This peculiarity of the definitions together with the fact that the commentators do not appear to be quite sure of the exact significance of the *sūtra* which contains the definition of *pramā*, probably because a definite traditional meaning had been lost to them, strongly suggests that the *ūtras* in question are the relics of an ancient work on the *Sāṃkhya* which was earlier than the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* and even the *NS.*[1] The *Sāṃkhya* doctrine of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) as contained in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*

---

1. Cf. Weldon, *American Journal of Philology*, 35; (1914) p. 34 ff.

was developed by Gauḍapāda in his *Bhāṣya* on the *SK.* and still more by Vācaspati Miśra in his *Sāṃkhya-tattva kaumudī.* But the *SPS*, which is supposed to be later than either of these, does not show any signs of the influence of these developments in the *Sāṃkya* theory. On essential points the epistemological position of the *SPS.* is the same as that of the *SK.*, and to treat the theory of knowledge as contained in the *SPS.* as posterior to Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra seems to be altogether preposterous. Hence I have thought it fit to deal with the epistemology of the *SK.* and the *SPS.* in one place. That I am not altogether unjustified in holding that some of the sūtras pertaining to the theory of knowledge in the *SPS.* might belong to an early period will be seen in the sequel. I shall deal with the *SK.* first.

The Sāṃkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Like most of the philosophical treatises in Indian Philosophy, the *SK.* also starts with the assertion that desire for knowledge arises out of the need of ending misery. It is further pointed out that a scientific knowledge of the unmanifested, and the manifested nature, and of the knower (the spirit) is preferable to any other kind of knowledge, such as revelation or popular opinion.[1]

A *pramāṇa* is defined as that by which an object is proved to exist; and it is of three kinds: sense-cognition (*dṛṣṭa*); inference (*anumāna*) and reliable

1. *SK.*, 2.

testimony (*āpta-vacana*). The rest of the *pramāṇas* accepted by other schools[1] are regarded as forms of one or other of these.

Sense-cognition is a definite knowledge obtained through the sense-organs. Inference is cognition based upon the relation of the mark and that to which that mark belongs, and it is of three kinds.[2] Reliable Testimony is the word communicated by trustworthy persons (*āpta-śrutiḥ*).[3]

Objects beyond the senses are known by means of the inference called *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*; and that transcendent reality, which is not cognised even by this, is proved by reliable testimony.[4]

The causes of the non-apprehension of objects by means of the senses are excessive distance, extreme proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, inattention, minuteness of the object, obstruction, predominance of objects other than that to be perceived, and intermixture of the object with similar objects.[5]

The intellect (*buddhi*) emanates from nature (*prakṛti*) and is defined as 'determination' (*adhyava-*

1. *SK.*, 4.
2. Viz *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.*
3. *SK.*, 5. '*āpta-s'rutiḥ*' need not mean 'true revelation' as Gaṅgānātha Jhā, following the *Tattva-kaumudī* translates it, and considering the rationalistic attitude of the *Kārikā* it is better to translate it literally as 'the word of a trustworthy person.' Cf. *Kārikā* 2 and 6.
4. *S.K*, 6.
5. *SK.*, 7.

sāya). It is said that virtue (*dharma*), knowledge (*jñāna*), dispassion (*virāga*), and power (*aiśvarya*) are its forms when it is of the nature of *sattva*; and the reverse of them when it is of the nature of *tamas*.[1]

In the above description of the intellect, the term '*adhyavasāya*' has been variously translated. The best alternative is to take it in its usual meaning of 'determination', for it fits in with the functions of the intellect as the faculty which determines both knowledge and action. This is evident from the description of *buddhi* which follows in the *Kārikā*. As in the other schools, so here, the acquirement of knowledge has been regarded as purposive, as something which leads to action with a view to achieve the highest goal. Hence, it is said that if the intellect is prompted by '*sattva*' it leads to virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power; and if prompted by '*tamas*' to the opposite of these. The intellect in the *Sāṃkhya* is material, and hence characterised by the three constituents (*guṇas*) of matter. The enumeration of virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power is evidently not based upon any principle of logical division, and the words have their ordinary meaning.

The next internal sense is egoism (*ahaṅkāra*) which is defined as self-consciousness (*abhimāna*). From consciousness proceeds self-consciousness, but it has to be remembered that both of them are the evolutes of matter. From egoism proceed the eleven sense-

1. *SK.*, 23.

organs and the five subtle elements (*tanmātrāṇi*). It is evident that in this process of evolution, although the psychical functions are recognised, they are regarded as the result of and as dependent upon a physical evolution of the primordial matter.

The *Kārikā* follows the usual classification of the sense-organs, and regards mind as a sense-organ of double nature—viz. as one both of knowledge and action. It is the organ of reflection. Although one, it appears to be many and diverse because of the particular modifications of the *guṇas*-'*guṇa pariṇāma-viśeṣāt*'.[1]

The phrase '*guṇa-pariṇāma-viśeṣāt*' here is rather ambiguous. Does the word '*guṇa*' here mean the special *Sāṃkhya* constituents of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*?; or does it signify the ordinary qualities of *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, etc.? Gauḍapāda has taken it to mean the latter; for he says: 'so mind becomes various from its connection with the eye or any other organ, being identified with it, and being diversified by the modification of the function of sight, and the rest of the organs'.[2] Vācaspati Miśra also appears to hold the same view. But, howmuchsoever plausible this interpretation may be, considering the peculiar sense in which the words '*guṇa*' and '*pariṇāma*' are used in the *Sāṃkhya* system, it is highly improbable they have been used here in a different sense. Further the view

1 *SK.*, 27.

2. Translation from Davies' *Hindu Philosophy*, p. 64.

that mind should appear many and different because of the particular modifications of the three constituents –*guṇa-pariṇāma-viśeṣāt* is only consistent with the general *Sāṃkhya* doctrine that the diversity and individuality of things is determined by the peculiar and particular modifications of the three *guṇas*.

There are altogether thirteen organs, viz, the three internal organs of *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *manas*; and ten external organs:—five sense-organs and five organs of action. Of these the three internal organs are applicable to all kinds of objects, and in all the three distinctions of time; while the others are of use only with reference to the object of sense and those which pertain to the present. The intellect is the most important of all, and it is to it that the external sense-organs present their respective objects.[1]

The above is all that one can find in the *SK.* itself by way of the analysis of knowledge; and it is evident that there is not much of epistemological value in it. The *SK.* is mainly a treatise on metaphysics. There is a mention of five forms of error[2]—*viparyaya-bhedāḥ*; but, if we accept the interpretation of the commentators, they are not logical errors, but forms of a wrong attitude towards the world.

It must be noted, however, that this particular notion of error, expressed variously by the terms, '*avidyā*', etc. is not only present in the *VS.* and the

1. *SK.*, 32-36.
2. *SK.*, 47.

NS. but forms in them also, the main and ultimate antithesis to knowledge.

The Theory of Knowledge in the Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra.

As I have already pointed out, in spite of the fact that the *SPS* has been regarded as a work of late date, the theory of the means of knowledge as found in it points to the great probability that the sūtras pertaining to this topic belong to an earlier work. As in the other works, so here also, the problem of knowledge is raised in connection with a discussion of the various ways of obtaining salvation.

Knowledge (*pramā*), and the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), have been defined in a rather obscure *sūtra ; dvayor ekatarasya vāpi asannikṛṣṭārtha-pari-cchittiḥ pramā, tat-sādhakam yat tat tri-vidham pra-māṇam*[1], which has been interpreted differently by Aniruddha and Vijñāna-bhikṣu. According to the former, '*dvayoḥ*' refers to sense and object, in the case of sense-cognition[2]; and '*ekatarasya*' to a mark or a word, in the case of inference or verbal cognition. In place of '*vā api*', he reads '*ca api*', and takes '*asanni-kṛṣṭārtha-parichhittiḥ*' to mean 'the determination of objects not previously determined'.[3] Thus the mean-

1. *SPS.*, I. 87 ; in place of '*vāpi*' another reading is '*cāpi*'.
2. *Indriyārthayor vidyamānayoḥ pratyakṣe.*
3. *aparicchinnārtha-paricchittiḥ*'.

ing of the first clause, according to Aniruddha, is: *Pramā* is the determination of undetermined objects as the result of both (the sense and the object), (in the case of perception), and of either of the two (a mark or a word, (in the case of inference or verbal cognition). According to Vijñāna-bhikṣu, '*dvayoḥ*' refers to *buddhi* and *puruṣa*[1] and '*asannikṛṣṭārtha-paricchittiḥ* means 'the ascertainment of objects which are not present in, or known to (*buddhi* and *puruṣa*).[2] The definition of '*pramā*' in the *sūtra*, according to Vijñāna-bhikṣu, is thus the ascertainment of objects which are not already present in, or known to both (*buddhi* and *puruṣa*), or either of them.

Now my objections to the above interpretations are as follows: *Firstly*, the interpretation of '*dvayor ekatarasya*', according to both Aniruddha and Vijñāna-bhikṣu is entirely arbitrary. Neither the language of the present *sūtra*, nor a use of the same or of a similar phrase elsewhere, lends any support to the interpretations of the commentators which are themselves entirely different from each other, and are an indication of the fact that both the commentators had nothing by way of a reliable tradition or authority to go by. According to Aniruddha's interpretation, the *sūtra* contains a definition not only of *pramā*, but also of all the three *pramāṇas*. It is to be noted, however, that a definition of the respective *pramāṇas* is given

1. '*dvayor buddhi-puruṣayoḥ*'.
2. '*asannikṛṣṭaḥ pramātary anārūḍho nādhigataḥ iti yāvat*'.

subsequently in sūtras, I, 89, 100 and 101; and the present *sūtra* is meant only to give a general definition of *pramā* and all that Aniruddha has to assume and insert in interpreting '*dvayor ekatarasya*' so as to make the phrase applicable to the particular *pramāṇas* is as uncalled for as it is unwarranted by the text of the *sūtra*. Vijñāna-bhikṣu's interpretation that the phrase refers to *buddhi* and *puruṣa*, or either of them, and that *pramā* is that which belongs to both of them or either of them, is evidently not in accordance with any definite view of cognition including that of the *Sāṃkhya*; and the various explanations of *pramā* and *pramāṇa*, which he gives in his *Bhāṣya*, are indicative of the fact that he himself was not quite sure of the exact definition meant to be given in the *sūtra*.[1] It is evident that, according to the *Sāṃkhya* doctrine, the act of cognition (*vṛtti*) belongs to *buddhi*, and this, in its turn, is illuminated by the intelligence of *puruṣa*. Cognition cannot result without the co-operation of both the *buddhi* and the *puruṣa*[2]. Where then is the room for interpreting the *sūtra* so as to mean that cognition belongs to *either* both of them *or* one of them? Secondly, although there could be no objection to the

---

1. The text of the *Bhāṣya* beginning with '*atra yadi pramārūpam phalam* and ending with '*paramparayaiva sarvatheti bhāvaḥ*'.

2. Cf. The *Bhāṣya* "*sā ca vṛttir arthoparaktā prativimbarūpeṇa puruṣārūḍhā satī bhāsate puruṣasyāpariṇāmitayā buddhivat svato arthākāratvāsambhavāt*".

statement that cognition is the ascertainment of that object which is not already present or known to the mind, *'anadhigatārtha gantṛ pramāṇam'* as Aniruddha calls it, it is difficult to see how the compound *'asannikṛṣṭārtha-paricchittiḥ'* means the same here. The interpretations of *'dvayor ekatarasya* and *'asannikṛṣṭārtha-paricchittiḥ'* depend upon each other, and for the meaning of the whole clause it has to be decided in what grammatical relation the second phrase stands to the first.

'Dvayoḥ' and *'ekatarasya'* literally mean 'of both', and, 'of one of them' respectively. There is no mention of any two objects in any of the immediately preceding or the following sūtras to suggest what two particular objects might have been referred to in the *sūtra* under consideration. However, the very expression *'dvayor ekatarasya'* has been used in two other sūtras, viz. I, 75—*'pūrva-bhāvitve dvayor ekatarasya hāne 'nyatara-yogaḥ'* and III, 65—*'dvāyor ekatarasya vāudāsīnyam apavargaḥ'*, in both of which the phrase, as the commentators themselves agree, clearly refers to *puruṣa* and *prakṛti.* Now this parallelism strongly suggests that also in the *sūtra* under discussion the phrase might refer to *'puruṣa'* and *'prakṛti'*, and we have to see whether this interpretation of the phrase can be justifiable consistently with the use of the other terms in the *sūtra* and an intelligible definition of *pramā.* The next phrase is *'asannikṛṣṭārtha-paricchitiḥ'*, which I take as a *Bahuvrīhiḥ* compound to mean 'that

ascertainment or determination in which the object (of cognition) is not in contact with or is not directly presented (to the senses)', the phrase being governed by '*dvayor ekatarasya*', and case in apposition with '*pramā*'. The meaning of the whole clause will thus be: '*pramā*' is an ascertainment of both (*puruṣa* and *prakṛti*), or of one of them (either *puruṣa* or *prakṛti*) in which the object (to be cognised) is not directly presented (to the senses). Now this, I think, forms a fairly intelligible definition of *pramā* from the *Sāṃkhya* point of view. The whole object of knowledge, according to the *Sāṃkhya*, is the ascertainment of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, and this act has been called *pramā* in the *sūtra*. That this is the meaning here is further corroborated by *SPS*, I, 102, which, at the end of the present section dealing with *pramā* and *amāṇas*, says that the subject of *pramāṇa* has been explained here because it is by means of *pramāṇa* that both (*puruṣa* and *prakṛti*) are proved–'*ubhaya-siddhiḥ pramāṇāt tad upaaeṣaḥ*. Further, neither *puruṣa* nor *prakṛti* is directly presented to the senses; and hence the act of cognition, through which their existence is ascertained, is defined as *asannikṛṣṭārtha*' with reference to them, although the *pramāṇa*, which brings about that ascertainment—*tat sādhakam*, may be, as it really is, in the case of all the forms, that in which there is a contact of the sense-organs with the objects of the manifested universe.[1]

1. Cf. The *Bhāṣya* on *SPS.*, I, 103—*atra hi pratyakṣa—siddham* etc. which says: 'after apprehending the fact,

The condition of '*asannikṛṣṭārtha*' would further dis tinguish the ordinary human cognition of *puruṣa* an prakṛti from such direct knowledge of the same as i possible to the Yogins. This is the best sense that can make out of the *sūtra* consistently with the lan guage of the text and the *Sāmkhya* doctrines. Th main difficulty is to find a suitable interpretation o '*asannikṛṣṭārtha*', which according to the ordinar usage of the terms, '*sannikarṣa*' and '*artha*', shoul mean 'the objects not in contact'. This sense quit fits in with the interpretation according to which th reference in the *sūtra* is to the cognition of *puruṣa* an *prakṛti*; they being signified by the phrase *dvayor eka tarasya*'. It is to be admitted that such a definition o *pramā* is rather unusual, but it would not be incorrect if it is remembered that right cognition strictly inter preted according to the notions of the *Sūtra* perio should pertain to the ultimate and intrinsic forms o reality—viz. *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* in the *Sāmkhya*. Th use of the word '*paricchittiḥ*' in the *sūtra*, which strictl means '*limitation*', instead of the usual term '*jñanam* is also significant, and lends support to the view tha what is meant by *pramā* in this *Sūtra* is what has bee called *viveka* 'discrimination' elsewhere in the *SPS* that is to say, knowledge which defines the limit between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*.

---

which is proved by sense-cognition, namely, that a hou and such other things exist for the sake of the body, etc on the basis of the manifested nature (*pradhāna*) inf rence is drawn about the existence of *puruṣa* who different in nature from it.'

That which leads to right cognition has been called *pramāṇa*, and this is of three kinds: direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and verbal testimony (*śabda*). These include the rest which are regarded as separate *pramāṇas* by some of the other schools.[1]

It is rather striking that as in the case of the definition of *pramā*, so also in the case of the definitions of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, the language used in the *SPS.* is very different from that used in the earlier works including the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, and one begins to think that the significance of the definitions is not the same as of those in the other works. The definition of *pratyakṣa* is '*yat sambaddham sat tadākārollekhi vijñānaṃ tat pratyakṣam* (I. 89), which translated literally will mean: 'that knowledge, which being connected (or related), portrays the form thereof, is *pratyakṣa*. The special feature of this definition seems to be to emphasise two points: (1) that the knowledge called '*pratyakṣa*' is regarded more as an act than as a product, which is the implication, for example, in the *Nyāya* definition; and (2) that it is the form of the object (*tadākāra*) which is cognised, and not the object itself; and it is probably for this reason that instead of employing some such words as '*artha-sannikarṣa*' etc. which denote a *contact of the object* cognised, the term '*sambaddha*' has been used in this Sūtra, and *asannikṛṣṭārtha-paricchittiḥ* has been included in the

1. *SPS.*, I, 88.

definition of *pramā* as given in I. 87. It is maintained that this definition of *pratyakṣa* is not faulty with reference to the *pratyakṣa* of Yogins; for, in the first place, it is not meant to be applicable to it, that perception being not external; and in the second place, even in the Yogic perception, there is a peculiar relation of the Yogin's mind to the object perceived (I. 90 and 91).

Inference is defined as knowledge of that which stands in a certain relation, on the part of one who sees (knows) that relation–'*prati-bandha dṛśaḥ prati-baddha-jñānam anumānam*'. Here again, the terms '*pratibandha*' and '*pratibaddha*' used in the definition are peculiar to the *SPS.*, while the inclusion of *prati-bandha-dṛśaḥ*' emphasises the essential feature of inference that it ultimately depends upon the mental activity of a person who knows the relation of the *vyāpaka* (expressed by the major term) and the *vyāpya* (expressed by the minor term).

Verbal testimony is defined in the usual way as the word of a reliable authority.

As has already been pointed out, it is said that an exposition of the *pramāṇas* has been given, because it is through them that *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are proved.[1] It is further stated that this proof ultimately depends upon the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference*, which proceeds on the basis of the principle of causation.

The definitions of *buddhi*[2], *ahaṅkāra*[3], *manas*[4] and

1. *SPS.*, I, 102.
2. *Ibid.*, II, 13.
3. *Ibid.*, II, 16.
4. *Ibid.*, II, 26.

the *indriyas*[1] are the same as given in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*; and the same functions and importance are attributed to each of them as in the *Kārikā.*

The nature of reality and illusion is discussed with reference to the views of the Buddhists, the Mimāṃsakas, the Vedāntists and the Naiyyāyikas; and what has been called *sad-asad-khyāti* is maintained to be the right doctrine, according to which an object is real (*sad*) or unreal (*asad*) according as it is not proved to be false, or proved to be false by subsequent experience (V, 52 to 56).

What strikes one most in the *SPS.* is the importance attached to *śruti* (scriptures), which is regarded as the highest unimpeachable authority–*śrutyā siddhasya nāpatāpas tatpratyakṣa-bādhāt* (I. 147)—'that which is proved by the scriptures is not to be denied, for it supersedes (the authority of) sense-cognition[2]; and then again *'nija-śakty abhivyakteh svataḥ prāmāṇyam'*—there is the self-validity (of the Vedas) because of the manifestation of their own power.[3]

The *SPS.* is one with the other systems in regard-

1. II, 19. 20.
2. The commentators have interpreted the *Sūtra* a little differently, but the sense emphasised here is not affected, and so I do not enter into a discussion of their rendering.
3. Aniruddha takes this *sūtra* to refer to all the three *pramāṇas*, but considering that the immediately preceding sūtras contain a discussion about the authority of the Vedas the context demands that the reference here is also to the same subject.

ing knowledge (*jñāna*) as the means of salvation—'*jñānān muktiḥ*' and in further holding that this knowledge, which is also called discrimination (*viveka*), is acquired by the practice of *yoga* and renunciation (VI, 29).

PART IV.

EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE SCHOLASTIC PERIOD.

IV. EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE SCHOLASTIC PERIOD.

The Philosophical Sūtras were followed by a number of commentaries and sub-commentaries, which, though they apparently aimed at only explaining their meaning, added much to what the Sūtras had contained, and not infrequently, also altered their original significance. The reasons for those additions and alterations on the part of the commentators were two-fold: *firstly*, they wanted to insert fresh matter on certain subjects with a view to keeping their own systems abreast of the developments in the other systems and *secondly*, they were anxious to find an authority in the original authors for whatever they had to say by way of refutation of the doctrines of their opponents. An example of the first of these is to be found in the fact that the epistemological theories of the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta* had their origin in the works of the commentators on the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta* Sūtras; and of the second in that most of the refutation of the Buddhist and the Jaina' doctrines in behalf of the Hindu Schools is the work of the commentators on the Philosophical Sūtras.

During the period under consideration while the Buddhist logic and the Jaina logic are evidently the result of the influence of the Hindu logic of the previous period, they, in their turn, are the occasion of some of the scholastic developments

in the later logic and epistemology of the Hindu writers. The positive theory of epistemology as found in Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti is a contrast to Nāgārjuna's denial of the means of knowledge, and is certainly a fresh departure in Buddhist philosophy. That the Hindu and the Buddhist writers did influence each other is evident from such affinity of doctrines as is to be found between Praśastapāda and Diṅnāga. Similarly, such facts as the introduction of epistemological discussions into the *Mīmāṃsā* system by Prabhākara and Kumārila; or into the *Vedānta* by Gauḍapāda, Saṃkara and Rāmānuja: or again the development of a more theoretical and exclusive treatment of logical and epistemological subjects in the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* School, which ultimately led to the creation of the New School of logic (*navya-nyāya*), were all the result of the existence of strong schools of the Buddhist and the Jaina logic during this period. The following sections dealing with the important authors of each of the schools will bear out the truth of these remarks.

1. THE LATER BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGY.

(i) A Positive Theory of Buddhist Epistemology according to Diṅnāga.

Ācārya Diṅnāga, the Buddhist logician may be said to have inaugurated a new era in the history of logic and epistmology in so far as, by treating the theory of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) as a subject by itself, he departed from the usual practice of the

previous Hindu schools of dealing both with the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge (*prameya*) together. In the history of Buddhist epistemology itself, his positive theory of knowledge presents a striking contrast to Nāgārjuna's denial of the means of knowledge. None of Diṅnāga's works exists complete in Sanskrit; but several are preserved in Tibetan translations[1]; and a few Sanskrit fragments[2], are found in the works of the *Nyāya* Commentators. The account of Diṅnāga's epistemology as given here is mainly based upon the Sanskrit fragments.

According to Diṅnāga, there are only two means of knowledge: direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*); for knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*) are, according to him, cases of either direct knowledge, or of inference. Knowledge by similarity is shown to be a case of verbal testimony, and this, in its turn, of direct knowledge, or of inference—*pratyakṣāgamābhyām nopamānam bhidyate*, etc.[3] The position of Diṅnāga on the subject and its refutation by Uddyotakara are found as follows in the *Nyāya-vārtika*: "Knowledge by similarity is not distinct from sense-

1. A summary of some of these has been given by *VB.* in his HIL.
2. These have been collected by H. N. Randle in his monograph on *Fragments From Diṅnāga* (Royal Asiatic Society publication); and some of them have also been noticed by Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his *HIL.*
3. **Nyāya-vārtika, p. 60, quoted in *FD.*, pp. 48 and 49.**

cognition and testimony. How so? Because when a person sees both the cow and the gayal, in that case, it is by sense-cognition that he apprehends that this is like that, and when he is *told* that the gayal is like the cow, in that case, it is just on the hearing of this that the knowledge arises in his mind that some of the qualities of the cow are found in the gayal and others are not; as otherwise the word 'like' would not have been used by the speaker; and he apprehends a preponderant sameness of the qualities of the gayal with those of the cow. For this reason, knowledge by similarity is not distinct from sense-cognition and verbal testimony. On this account of the matter, what the person apprehends is (in the latter case) the resemblance of the cow to the gayal, or (in the former case) the existence of the gayal (as qualified by resemblance to the cow)."

'What understanding the Bauddha shows of the nature of the *pramāṇa*' says Uddyotakara. 'The Sūtra[1] really means that as a result of apprehending the resemblance of the gayal to the cow, the person realises the relation of the name 'gayal' to this particular object. Therefore, what is urged is irrelevant and arises from ignorance of what the *Sūtra* means'.[2] This criticism of Diṅnāga's view on the subject is characteristic of the Nyāya School which maintains that neither sense-cognition nor verbal testimony by

1. Nyāya-sūtra, I, 1, 6.
2. Transl. as in *FD.*, pp. 49 and 50, with slight alterations.

itself will enable a person to identify the animal gayal as gayal.

The following quotation found in the *NVT.* with regard to verbal testimony has been identified by Vidyābhūṣaṇa from the Tibetan version as being a passage in the Second Chapter of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*[1]: *Āpta-vākyāvisamvāda-sāmānyād anumānatā*, 'it (verbal testimony) is of the nature of inference, because it is based upon the common character of corroborativeness belonging to the words of a reliable person'. Vācaspati Miśra commenting upon the *NV.* in connection with this subject says: 'Here, Diṅnāga, not putting up with (the view which regards) verbal testimony as a separate *pramāṇa*, attacks the definition[2] by means of a dilemma which is this: 'Reliable testimony means either the reliability of a trustworthy person, or the truth about an object. If it means the reliability of the person, then knowledge is obtained by inference; if it means the truth of the object, this is obtained by sense-cognition, for the truth about a thing is known (only) when a person apprehends the object by means of sense-cognition.'

According to Diṅnāga direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) is that which is other than imagination (*Kalpanāpoḍham*), and is unconnected with name, genus, etc.

1. *HIL.* p. 288; *FD.*; pp. 17 and 18.

2. As given in *NS.* I, 1, 7.

(*nāma jāty-ādy asaṃyutam*)[1]. It will appear that this definition of direct knowledge omits the usual condition of the contact of the (five) sense-organs with the objects of cognition, which is found in the earlier definitions of direct knowledge. This omission has evidently been made in order to include in the definition such forms of direct presentation as mental cognition (*mano vijnāna*), self-consciousness (*ātma-samvedana*) and mystic cognition (*yogi-jñāna*), which came to be distinctly recognised by Dharmakīrti as forms of direct knowledge in his *Nyāya-bindu.* Further, the condition in the definition that direct knowledge is other than imagination restricts its application, in the case of sense-cognition, to knowledge by mere presentation, such as was called *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* by the later *Nyāya* logicians. In fact, it was some such definition of direct knowledge as is found in Diṅnāga which must have provided the Hindu logicians an occasion for distinguishing direct knowledge as non-reflective and non-descriptive (*nirvikalpaka*) and reflective and descriptive (*savikalpaka*). This definition of *pratyakṣa* has been vehemently criticised by Uddyotakara in his *NV.* 1, 1, 4. It will appear though that most of his criticism is off the point. For example, Uddyotakara

1. This description of direct knowledge as found in Chap. I of the Tibetan version of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* has been rendered into Sanskrit by *VB.* (*HIL.*p. 277) as follows:

Pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham,
Nāma-jāty-ādy-āsaṃyutam-

observes: "Secondly (as regards the definition itself), if the expression *kalpanāpoḍham*' is meant to denote direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), then the definition involves a self-contradiction[1]. And, if direct knowledge is not denoted by the phrase *kalpanāpoḍham*, then the use of the phrase is altogether useless. Further[2], the statement: '*pratykṣam kalpanāpoḍham*' is in the form of a sentence. Now, what is expressed by this sentence ? If it is direct knowledge which is expressed by it, there is the same self-contradiction. How so ? Because direct knowledge is actually expressed, ex-hypothesi, by the phrase *kalpanāpoḍham* and yet it is called 'inexpressible' (*na abhidheyam*); who else except the Bauddha can make such a statement ? If, on the other hand, the phrase does not mean sense-cognition, then the assertion : *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham* becomes a mere utterance of (meaningless) words". The whole of this criticism is misdirected. It is based upon a confusion between the statement which constitutes the definition of direct knowledge and the act of cognition to which it refers. The definition of direct knowledge is not the act of cognition, and the fact that the definition is expressed in language does not mean that the act of cognition is thereby denoted by name or language and hence a contradiction arises as Uddyotakara would have us believe.

1. That is to say, *pratyakṣa* has been defined as that which connot be expressed by a name, and yet it is expressed here by the phrase '*kalpanāpoḍham*'.

2. *Now* speaking about the definition as a whole.

Although Uddyotakara strongly criticises Diṅnāga's definition of *pratyakṣa* for its laying down the condition that it should be unconnected with name, he has nothing to say against the definition of *pratyakṣa* as contained in *NS.*, I, 1. 4, which also, according to him, anyhow, requires that direct knowledge should be unnameable—*avyapadeśyam.*[1]

According to other fragments which presumably belong to Diṅnāga,[2] direct knowledge is described as that which determines its object (*paricchedakam*), represents the individual nature of that object (*viṣaya-svarūpānuvidhāyi*) and is cognised or proved by itself (*ātma-saṃvedyam*, or *pratyakṣenaiva siddhyati*).

While criticising the definition of direct knowledge as given in the *Nyāya-sūtras*,[3] Diṅnāga maintains, against Vātsyāyana, that the author of the *Nyāya-sūtras* did not include mind (*manas*) among the sense-organs[4], and the omission to do so is inconsistent with regarding pleasure and pain as objects of cognition. This is expressed in the following couplet which is found in *NVT.*, I, 1. 4., and has been identified by *VB.* by means of the Tibetan with a verse of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*[5] :—

1. *Yad idam anupayukta-śabdārtha-sambandhasya viṣaya-bhedānuvidhāyi vijñānam tat pratyakṣam*, etc. *NV.* (B. Indica) p. 38.
2. *FD.*, p. 9–*NV.* and *NVT.*
3. Viz. *indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam*, etc.
4. That is to say in *NS.* I, 1. 12. *Ghrāṇā-rasana-cakṣustvak śrotrāṇīndriyāṇi bhūtebhyaḥ.*
5. *VB.*, *HIL.*, p. 280; *FD.* p. 12.

Na sukhādi prameyam vā mano vāstīndriyāntaram,
Aniṣedhād upāttam ced anyendriya-rutam vṛthā.

Either pleasure, etc. are not objects of cognition; or else, mind is an additional sense-organ. If it be maintained[1] that it has been taken as a sense-organ (because in the *NS.*) there is no denial of it as such, then the mentioning of the other sense-organs is useless.[2]

The following fragment[3] found in *NVT.* refers to the *Vaiśeṣika* account of direct knowledge as given in *VS.* IV, 1.6 "*yadi rūpaṃ eva cākṣuṣam tato na dravyaṃ cākṣuṣam syāt tathā ca mahad-āneka*[4] *dravya-samavāyād rūpāc copalabhddir iti dravya-cākṣuṣatvābhidhānam vyāhanyate*"—if colour only is the object of sight, then substance cannot be the object of sight; and thus there will be a contradiction in the assertion of the visibility of substance which has been made in the sentence: '*tathā ca mahad-aneka-dravya-samavāyād rupāc copalabdhiḥ*'. As has been pointed out by the *NVT.*, according to the Vaiśeṣika, only those substances, viz. earth, water and fire, are cognised[5], which possess colour; not that only colour is cogniz-

1. As has been maintained by Vātsyāyana in his *NB.*
2. That is to say, the other sense-organs could as well have been left unmentioned.
3. *FD.* p. 16.
4. *VS.*, IV, 1. 6 reads *mahatyaneka* etc. according to all the editions that I have been able to consult. Cf. *Praśastapāda*, p. 186 (Vizianagram S.S.), *NVT.*, p. 129.
5. The word in the text is '*upalabdhiḥ*', which literally means 'apprehension'.

able. That is to say the substance is cognised along with and through its colour, although it will be true to say that it is only colour which is seen (*cākṣuṣam*). There is a clear distinction between visibility (*cākṣu-ṣam*) and apprehension or cognition (*upalabdhiḥ*), which does not appear to have been made either by Diṅnāga, or his critics, while considering this text.

In the *NV.* the text: '*apare tu bruvate nāntarīya-kārtha-darśanam tad vido' numānam,*"–others again say the cognition of a thing is (the instrument of) inference for one who knows that it is inseparably connected[1], probably refers to Diṅnāga's definition of inference. In Chapter, II of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, Inference is divided into two kinds: inference for oneself (*svār-thānumāna*) and inference for others (*parārthānu-māna*)[2]. Inference for oneself is defined as the knowledge of an object obtained through a mark or sign which has three characters: (1) effect (*kārya*) that is to say, the mark may be an effect of that which is inferred, (2) identity (*svabhāva*), the mark may be in essence identical with the thing to be inferred, (3) non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) the non-cognition of a mark may be indicative of the non-existence of that which is to be inferred.

According to Diṅnāga, who takes the usual example of fire and smoke, it is neither the fire, nor the connection between the fire and the hill, which is

1. *NV.*, p. 56, quoted in *FD.*, p. 21.
2. *HIL.*, p. 280.

inferred; it is the fiery hill which forms the object of inference. His argument is that the connection between fire and smoke is already known, (that is to say, before the inference), and there is nothing new to be inferred. As regards the inference of the connection between the fire and the hill, he says that only the hill is visible, and not the fire, and hence there can be no conclusion about the connection between the two. Hence, it is the fiery hill which is inferred.

The above contention of Diṅnāga is not right for the following reasons:

(1) What is inferred in a particular case is not the connection between smoke and fire in general, which, Diṅnāga says, is already known; but the connection between the particular column of smoke, which is seen at a particular time and place, and the fire which is the cause of it.

(2) In order to establish a connection by inference it is not necessary that both the objects which are connected with each other should be visible. If both of them were visible, it would be a case of sense-cognition. Hence on seeing the smoke arising out of a particular hill, the presence of fire on that hill can be inferred.

(3) I do not see the distinction which Diṅnāga proposes to draw between the hill as considered in connection with fire and the fiery hill. If the inference of fiery hill means simply the fact that from the observance of smoke it is inferred that the hill has fire on

it, then it is the same thing as to infer a connection between the hill and the fire— which inference Diṅnāga does not admit. If by 'fiery hill' is meant the hill as seen to have fire, the case would be one of sense-cognition of both the hill and the fire, and not that of inference[1].

Inference for others (*parārthānumāna*) is the demonstration to others of what has been cognised by oneself—*parārthānumānam tu svādṛṣṭārtha-prakāśanam*[2].

The *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* further deals with the various possible forms of syllogistic inference, which it will be out of place to mention here[3].

(ii) *Theories of Direct Knowledge and Inference in the Nyāya-bindu of Dharma-kīrti.*

The next important development in Buddhist epistemology is to be found in Dharma-kīrti's *Nyāya-bindu*. The special feature of this work is the four-fold classification of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) which includes three kinds of non-sensuous direct cognition. The influence of the *Nyāya* school on the epistemology of this work is evident from the fact that, in the definition of direct knowledge, the condition that it should be non-erroneous (*abhrānta*), which was absent in Diṅnāga's definition, has been

1. Cf. *NVT*. 1., 1. 5. p. 120.
2. Quoted in the *Ślokavārtika Ṭīkā*, p. 252., *HIL*., p. 282; *FD*., p. 28.
3. *HIL*., pp. 282-287.

included; and the test of the reality of a thing (*vastu*) has been accepted to be the same as that in the *Nyāya* school, viz., that it could serve some purpose—*artha-kriyā-sāmarthyam.*

The *Nyāya-bindu*[1] is a small work consisting of three chapters. The first chapter deals with the nature of direct knowledge. It begins with the assertion that all the objects of man's life are accomplished by means of right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*), and inference (*anumāna*). Of these direct knowledge is defined as that which is non-reflective (*kalpanā-poḍha*) and non-erroneous (*abhrānta*); the term '*kalpanā*' being explained as 'the cognition of an appearance which might be connected with words'—*abhilāpa-saṃsarga-yogya-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ*[2].

1. The work is available with its commentary *Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā* in Peterson's edition (*Bib. Indica*), and Stcherbatsky's edition in the *Bib. Buddhica Series.* I have used Peterson's edition for reference.

2. Vidyā-bhūṣaṇa understands '*kalpanā*' to mean error (*HIL.* p. 310). He says: "'Preconception refers to the experience of false images which appear real as if they were capable of being addressed and touched; e. g. the shadow of a tree may appear as the tree itself, or a rope may appear as a snake'. It is clear from Dharma-kīrti's own explanation of *kalpanā* that he does not mean by it 'false images" but a cognition which can be expressed by words. Cf. *NBT.* p. 10, *abhilapyate 'neneti abhilāpo vācakaḥ śabdaḥ'*; then '*abhilāpa-saṃsargāya yogyo' bhidheyābhāso yasyāṃ pratītau sā tathoktā.*

The examples of error are such as arise from darkness, quick whirling motion, journey by a boat, and shaking, etc. This definition of direct knowledge is the same as that given by Diṅnāga with the addition of the condition that it should be free from error.

Then follows a classification of direct knowledge. It is said to be of four kinds: (1) sense-cognition (*indriya-jñāna*); mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*); self-consciousness (*ātma-saṃvedana*), and mystic cognition (*yogi-jñāna*).

There is a disparity between the construction adopted by Peterson in the published Sanskrit text of the *Nyāya-bindu* and that followed by the author of the *Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā*. It is rather curious that Peterson, who edited both the text and the commentary for the first time and in one and the same volume, should not have noticed this disparity between the construction of the text which he had adopted and that followed by the commentator. In order to make the disparity clear, and discuss the interpretation of the text in question, it is necessary to quote the Sanskrit original as it is published in Peterson's edition.

Tac catur-vidham. Indriya-jñāna-sva-viṣayānantara-viṣaya-sahakāriṇendriyajñānena samanantara-pratyayena janitam tat. Manovijñānam sarvam citta caittānām ātma-samvedanam bhūtārtha bhāvanā prakarṣa-paryantajam yogi-jñān am ceti.

The construction followed by the author of the *NBT.* is as follows.

Tac caturvidham. Indriya-jñānam; sva-viṣaya...janitaṃ tan mano-vijñānam; sarvam citta-caittānām ātma-samvedanam; bhūtārtha...yogi-jñānam ceti.

Now the definitions of the four kinds of *pratyakṣa* would be different according to the reading adopted in the text. It is evident that Peterson did not attempt to divide the passage in question into all the possible sentences, for he has only two divisions of the passage, and these include four definitions. Further to treat *'indriya-jñāna'* as a part of the following compound *'sva-viṣaya'* etc. is clearly a mistake, and we should read *'indriya-jñānam'*. Hence, the unsatisfactory nature of the text in this edition is evident; and a mere disparity between the construction found in this text and that followed by the commentator would be no argument to question the definitions as understood and explained by the author of the *NBT.*[1]

The following are the definitions of the various kinds of direct knowledge according to the *NBT.*

1. *Sense-cognition* (*indriya-jñāna*) is that which belongs to the senses, or which depends upon the senses[2].

2. *Mental cognition* (*mano-vijñāna*) is that which is caused by an immediate and cognate condition[3] (in continuation) of a sense-cognition supported by an object, which is immediately contiguous to the

---

1, Stcherbatsky follows the *NBT* in determinig the division of the text for the purpose of defining the four kinds of inference.

2. *indriyasya jñānam indriyajñānam, indriyāśritam yat. NBT.*, p. 12.

3. *'samanantara pratyayena'* which is thus explained by *NBT. 'samaś' cāsau jnānāntareṇa anantaraścāsāvavyavahitatvena sa cāsau pratyayaśca hetutvāt samanantarapratyayaḥ.*

object which is its own (i. e. of the sense-cognition). This definition is explained by *NBT.* to mean that mental cognition is the grasping of an object the next moment after, and in continuation of the object of sense-cognition,[1] and further that it is regarded as *pratyakṣa* (of the nature of *mano-vijñāna*) after the sense-organ[2] has ceased in its operation; for so long as it is in operation the cognition depends upon the sense[3] only.

3. *Self-consciousness* (*ātma-saṃvedana*) is all that which belongs to *citta* and *caitta*, the former being explained by the *NBT.* as that which simply grasps the object—*artha-mātra-grāhi*; and the latter as those, such as pleasure etc. which grasp particular (mental) conditions. '*caitta-viśeṣāvasthā-grāhiṇaḥ sukhādayaḥ*'. The commentator further asserts that there is no state of *citta* in which the cognition of self would not be *pratyakṣa*, and that form of cognition by which the self is known is *pratyakṣa* called '*ātma-saṃvedanaṃ*'—'*yena hi rūpeṇātmā vedyate tad rūpam ātma-saṃvednam pratyakṣam*'.

4. *Mystic cognition* (*yogi-jñāna*) is that which is

1. "*tathā ca satīndriyajñāna-viṣaya-kṣaṇād uttara-kṣaṇe eka-santānāntarabhūto gṛhītaḥ*" *NBT.* p. 13.
2. The text of the commentary mentions only the eye *cakṣuḥ*.
3. "*etac ca mano-vijñānam uparata-vyāpāre cakṣuṣi pratyakṣam iṣyate. Vyāpāra-vati tu cakṣuṣi yad rūpa-jñānam tat sarvam cakṣurāśritam eva*" *NBT.* p. 13.

produced by the extreme limit of meditation upon the nature of reality. According to *NBT.*, the extreme limit of meditation is that stage where reality just falls short of being revealed fully[1].

The above are the definitions as explained by the author of *NBT.*, and, following him, by the later writers. If we are to follow the Sanskrit text as found in Peterson's edition, what is taken to be the definition of mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) by the author of the *NBT.* would be the definition of sense-cognition (*indriya-jñāna*), and it is not clear, anyhow from the text, what in that case would be the definition of mental cognition and self-consciousness. It is evident, however, that what has been treated by Peterson in his text as the definition of sense-cognition is not so; for the words: '*indriya-jñānena samanantara-pratyayena janitaṃ tat*'—'that which is produced by a cognate and immediate sense-cognition'[2] clearly indicate that the definition or description contained in this clause refers to something other than sense-cognition,

1. '*sampūrṇāvasthāyāḥ prāktanyāvasthā sphuṭābhātva-prakarṣaparyantā ucyate*'. *NBT.* p. 15.

2. Although the *NBT.* does not take '*samanantara-pratyayena*' as an adjective qualifying '*indriya-jñānena*', it recognises that sense-cognition is said to be the cause of mental cognition according to this description—'*tad anenaika-santānāntara-bhūtayor evendriya-jñāna-mano-vijñānayor janya-janaka-bhāve mano-vijñānam pratyakṣam ityuktam bhavati*' *NBT.*, p. 13.

viz. that which is produced by sense-cognition, and it is mental cognition (*mano vijñānam*) which is meant.

The object of direct knowledge is an entity as possessed of its own nature (*sva-lakṣaṇa*). An entity is said to be possessed of its own nature, when its proximity or remoteness makes a difference to its apprehension[1], that is to say, when it is actually presented. This is also called real existence (*paramārtha-sat*), for a real thing (*vastu*) is that which can serve some purpose—*artha-kriyā-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇatvād.*

This direct knowledge is the result of *pramāṇa*; for it consists of the apprehension of the object; while the *pramāṇa* itself is correspondence (of cognition) to the object, for it is through it that the apprehension of the object is established[2].

Such is the definition, the classification and the nature of direct knowledge as contained in the First Chapter of the *NB.* With regard to the definition of direct knowledge, as has already been pointed out, the condition that it should be free from error (*abhrānta*) has been added to Diṅnāga's definition of the same. The explanation of this addition is evidently to be found in the realistic position of Dharma-kīrti,

1. *Yasyārthasya saṃnidhānāsaṃnidhānābhyāṃ jñāna-pratibhāsa-bhedas tat sva-lakṣaṇam, NB.*, p. 102.
2. *Artha-svārūpyam asyāṃ pramāṇam tad-vaśād artha-pratīti-siddher iti.*

according to whom, things are *truly* real, and can, therefore, be also perceived as such by means of the *pramāṇas*. The definition of *pratyakṣa* given here agrees in this respect with that of the *NS.*, according to which also *pratyakṣa* is to be non-erroneous (*avyabhicāri*). In respect of the test of reality and the relation between cognition and the object cognised too, Dharma-kīrti's position is the same as that of the *Nyāya* school, viz. that an object is real in so far as it can serve some purpose, and it is cognised correctly in so far as the cognition corresponds to the object. In other words, it is a theory of representative perception which the author of the *NB.* holds. Cognition resembles the object by which it is produced; as for example, that which is produced by blueness resembles blueness. This resemblance is called its form (*ākāra*), as also its appearance (*ābhāsa*)"[1]—says Dharmottara, the author of *NBT.* while commenting on the text. The main difficulty of Dharma-kīrti's position is the same as that of any theory of representative perception, viz. the unwarranted assumption that cognition corresponds to reality.

According to Dharma-kīrti, while direct knowledge reveals the individual nature of an entity (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), inference has for its object the general nature (*sāmān-*

1. *Yasmād viṣayāj jñānam udeti tad-viṣaya-sadṛśam tad bhavati, yathā nīlād utpadyamānam nīla-sadṛśam, tac ca sādṛśyam ākāra ity ābhāsa ity api vyapadiśyate. NBT.* p. 18.

ya-lakṣaṇa) of it. This is evidently so, because, in inference, the object is not presented, and whatever is known about it can be only of a general nature.

Inference is of two kinds: (1) that for oneself (*svārtha*), and (2) that for others (*parārtha*).

Inference for oneself is the cognition of the object to be inferred by means of a middle term, which possesses three characteristics. These are as follows:

(a) That it should be present in the object denoted by the minor term (*anumeye sattvam*).

(b) That it should be present only in such objects as are of the same nature as that denoted by the major term (*sapakṣe evā sattvam*).

(c) That it should be absent from such objects as are of a different nature from that denoted by the major term (*asapakṣe cāsattvam eva*).

For example, in the following argument:

The hill has fire on it,
Because it has smoke on it,
Like a kitchen, but unlike a lake,

the inference is based upon (a) the presence of smoke on the hill; (b) the presence of smoke only at such places, like a kitchen, where there is fire, and (c) the absence of smoke from such places, as a lake, where there is no fire.

The Later Jaina Epistemology.

Like the later Buddhist epistemology, the Jaina epistemology also of the scholastic period shows evi-

dent signs of the influence of the Hindu schools. The definitions and classifications of the various kinds of knowledge as found in the works of such important Jaina logicians as Siddha-sena Divākara, Māṇikya Nandi and Deva Sūri present a remarkable contrast to those in Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* of the previous period. The definitions of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*) as found in these later Jaina works are altogether different from those given by Umāsvāti, and are in accordance with the definitions of these kinds of knowledge as given by the Hindu logicians. Direct knowledge comes to be defined as that which pertains to objects presented to the senses; and indirect knowledge that which has to do with objects beyond the senses. Similarly, the usual classification of knowledge in these later Jaina writers is more in accordance with the terminology found in the works of Hindu logic than with that found in the *TS*.

(i) Later Jaina epistemology as found in the Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara.

The first work in which we find the later modified epistemology of Jainism is Siddhasena Divākara's *Nyāyāvatāra*. It is a short treatise containing in outline the logical and the epistemological views of its author.

The work opens with defining *pramāṇa* as that knowledge which is free from obstruction (*bādha-vivarjita*), and which illumines itself and other things

(*sva-parābhāsi*). In accordance with the objects known by means of *pramāṇa*, it is either direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) or indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*).

Of the above, direct knowledge is that which takes cognisance of objects which are not beyond the senses; and indirect knowledge is that which is of a different kind. It will appear that the definition of direct knowledge as given here is the opposite of that found in the earlier Jaina works, which called knowledge obtained through the senses indirect.

Inference is that knowledge which determines the major term (*sādhya-niścāyaka*) through a mark (*liṅga*—the middle term), which is inseparably connected with the major term. Like direct knowledge (*samakṣavat*), being a means of knowledge inference is also free from error (*abhrānta*).[1]

Verbal testimony is defined as knowledge arising from words, which taken in their proper acceptance, express reality not inconsistent with what is established by direct knowledge.[2]

Scriptural testimony (*śāstram*) is the knowledge possessed by a reliable person, which is not to be transgressed (*anullaṅghya*), which is not contradictory to that established by direct knowledge, which communicates truth, which is universal (*sarva*) and which is destructive of the evil path.[3]

---

1. *NA.*, 5.
2. *NA.*, 8.
3. *NA.*, 9.

By its very definition and nature a *pramāṇa* is to be taken as free from error. It is a contradiction to say that *pramāṇa* is erroneous (*bhrānta*).[1] As it is not proved that the whole word of appearance is a matter of error, it is evident that *pramāṇa*, as determining itself and other things, serves to establish the reality of both.[2]

Direct knowledge and inference are sources of both knowledge for oneself (*svārtha*) and for others (*parārtha*). Like the acts of direct cognition and inference, the statements which express them are also called by those names, for they are means of communication to others.[3] It will appear that this division of inference has also been imported into Jaina logic from the Hindu logic.

Then after the nature of syllogistic inference and the fallacies incidental to it have been explained in detail, the author draws a distinction between the ordinary means of knowledge and the absolute direct knowledge (*kevalam pratyakṣam*), which latter is defined as that which is free from all obstruction (*sakalāvaraṇa-muktātma*), and which constantly illumines the essential nature of all things *sakalārthātma-satata-pratibhāsanam*).[1]

The result of the means of knowledge is the removal of ignorance (*ajñāna-nivārtana*) ; of absolute

1. *NA.*, 6.
2. *Ibid.*, 7.
3. *Ibid.*, 10-13.
4. *NA.*, 27.

knowledge (*kevalasya*) bliss and equanimity, and of the rest (kind of knowledge) the notion of selecting or rejecting an object (*ādāna-hāna-dhīḥ*).[1]

The doctrine of *naya* is introduced by the twenty-nineth verse. It is said that an object has various aspects, (*anekāntātmakam*), and all of them are the object of all-sided knowledge, while one particular aspect of it is the object of (knowledge called) *naya*. In other words the *nayas* are the ways of looking at an object from a particular point of view.

Knowledge which determines the complete meaning of an object from the point of view of the various *nayas*, or in other words, which looks at an object from all the points of view, is called *Syād-vāda-śruta*. The *nayas and syād-vāda* are explained in detail in the commentary *Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛttiḥ*.[2]

The soul is described as the knower (*pramātṛ*); that which illumines itself and others (*svānya-nirbhāsin*); the doer, the enjoyer, the changing (*vivṛttimān*); that which is proved by its own self-consciousness (*sva-saṃvedana-saṃsiddha*); one different in nature from the earth and the other elements.[3]

In the last verse it is said that the system of *pramāṇa etc.* is without a beginning or an end, (*anādi-*

1. *NA.*, 28.
2. The doctrines of the *nayas* and *syād-vāda* are well-known; and, hence, I have considered it unnecessary to deal with them here.
3. *NA.*, 31.

nidhanātmika) which, according to the commentator, implies that the world is eternal.

The next two important works on Jaina logic and epistemology during this period are the *Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra* of Māṇikya Nandi and the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra* of Deva Sūri. Both of them are written on similar lines, and differ in certain respects from Siddhasena Divākara's *Nyāyāvatāra* in their theory of knowledge.

(ii) Theory of Knowledge in the Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra of Māṇikya Nandi.

Pramāṇa is defined as that definite knowledge of an object which was not definitely known to oneself previously.[1] It takes the form of such a sentence as 'I know the jar by myself',[2] which implies the apprehension of an object, the agent, the instrument and the act (of cognition).[3] Like a lamp it illumines both itself and other things.[4] It will appear that this definition and description of *pramāṇa* exactly corresponds to that of the *Nyāya* School as found in the *NS.* and Vātsyāyana's *Nyāya-bhāṣya.* The condition that the object of knowledge should not be known to oneself

1. I, 1. *Svāpūrvārtha vyavasāyatmakam jñānam pramāṇam.* The '*apūrvārtha*' is explained in I, 4 as '*aniścito pūrvārthaḥ.*'
2. *I, 8. Ghatam aham ātmanā vedmi.*
3. I, 9. *Karma-kartr-karaṇa-kriyā-pratīteḥ.*
4. I, 1. 12. *Pradīpavat ;* I, 1, 13., *Tat-prāmāṇyam svataḥ parataś ca.*

previously (*svāpūrvārtha*) in the definition of *pramāṇa* here is just an equivalent of 'knowledge of that which is not known' (*anadhigatagantṛ*) used by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* writers later on.

Pramāṇa is divided into direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*) just as in the *Nyāyāvatāra*; and these are also defined in the same way. Indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*) is further subdivided into memory (*smṛti*); recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*); argumentation (*tarka*); inference (*anumāna*); and scriptural testimony (*āgama*).[1]

Memory is of the form of 'that is so', and is due to the awakening of past impressions; for example, the recollection: 'He is Devadatta'.[2]

Recognition is the ascertainment of an object (*saṁkalanam*) by means of perception through recollection (*darśana smaraṇakāraṇakam*), and takes such forms as 'this is the same' (*tad evedam*); 'this is like that' (*tat-sadṛśam*); 'this is different from that' (*tad-vilakṣaṇam*); 'this is the counter-part of that,' etc. (*tat-pratiyogītyādi*); as for example, 'this is the same Devadatta'; 'the gayal is like a cow'; 'the buffalo is different from a cow'; 'this is far from that'; 'this is a tree', etc.[3] It will appear from this definition of recognition that it includes what has been called knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*) in the Hindu schools.

1. III, 2.
2. III, 3, 4.
3. III, 5 and 6.

Argumentation, which is called *tarka* or *ūha*, is the knowledge of pervasion (*vyāpti jñānam*) based upon the presence or absence (of one thing in relation to another), and takes the form: 'If this is, that is, (If A is, B is)'; 'If this is not, that is not, (If A is not, B is not); as for example, If there is smoke, there is fire; If there is no fire, there is no smoke.[1] It will appear that this kind of reasoning is equivalent to what in Western logic is called a hypothetical—categorical syllogism, in which a conclusion is obtained by (a) affirming the antecedent, or (b) by denying the consequent, in the minor premise. For example:

(a) If there is smoke, there is fire;
There is smoke;
There is fire;

or (b) If there is smoke, there is fire;
There is no fire;
There is no smoke.

Inference is the knowledge of the major term (*sādhya*) by means of the middle term (*sādhana*).[2] The canon and the various parts of a syllogistic argument are defined in the usual way.

Scriptural testimony is that knowledge of objects which depends upon reliable utterance, etc.; for, specially qualified persons, etc. (*viśiṣṭādayaḥ*) are the cause of the cognition of the real nature of objects

1. III, 7 and 8.

2. III. 9; '*sādhanāt sādhya-vijñānam anumānam.*'

because of inspiration due to their natural capacity.[1]

The objects of knowledge are either general or particular in character.[2] The general are of two kinds: cross-wise (*tiryak*) and vertical (*ūrdhva-tā*).[3] The cross-wise general is a homogeneous attribute in a number of individuals of the same species; e. g., cowhood in a number of cows.[4] The vertical general is a homogeneous substance in a number of prior and posterior transformations of it (*parāpara-vivarta-vyāpidravyam*), e. g., clay in different things made of clay.[5]

The particular is also of two kinds: successive particulars (*paryāya*), and dissimilar particulars (*vyatireka*). The successive particulars are those which appear one after another in one and the same substance e. g. pleasure and pain in the soul[6]. The dissimilar particulars are those dissimilar forms which appears in different objects; e. g. cows, buffaloes, etc.[7]

1. III, 94 and 95.
2. IV. 1. *sāmānya viśesātmā tadartho viṣayaḥ.*
3. The terms 'cross-wise' and 'vertical' as translations of '*tiryk*' and '*ūrdhvatā* have been suggested to me through a paper by Prof. F. W. Thomas on '*An Indian Doctrine of Perception and Error*' in *ASP.*, 1921-22, pp. 31 and 32.
4. IV, 4.
5. IV, 5.
6. IV. 8. *ekasmin dravye krama-bhāvinaḥ pariṇāma-paryāyā ātmani harṣa-viṣādādivat.*
7. IV, 9. *arthāntara-gato visadṛśa pariṇāmo vyatireko go-mahiṣādivat.*

It is clear that the two kinds of 'generals' refer to the generality of attribute and of substance respectively; and the two kinds of 'particulars' to the particulars in one and the same substance, and those which represent different substances. The former kinds of particulars would thus be attributes as distinguished from the latter which would be substances[1].

This division of generals and particulars is, therefore, evidently based upon the distinctions of substance and attribute rather than upon any other principle[2]. It appears to be introduced for the first time into Jaina epistemology by Māṇikya Nandi, probably because of the influence of such Hindu writers as Prabhākara and Kumārila, who also discussed the subject in their works at about the same period. In *PMS.*, VI, 56 and 57, in connection with a discussion

---

1. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's renderings of the two kinds of generals (*HIL.*, p. 192) as homogeneous (*tiryak*) and heterogeneous (*ūrdhvatā*) are neither correct translations of the terms, nor are they indicative of the right interpretations of them. To speak of a 'heterogeneous general' is a contradiction in terms. Similarly his description of the particular called '*paryāya*' as 'relating to *action* such as pleasure, pain etc, experienced by the soul' is absolutely unjustifiable; for there is nothing in the text to suggest that this kind of particular pertains to *action*, and, further it is absurd to talk of pleasure and pain as *actions.*
2. This subject has been further discussed in the next Chapter in connection with a similar division by Deva Sūri in his *tPramāṇa-naya-attvālokālaṅkāra.*

about the number of *pramāṇas*, there is a reference to the Lokāyatika, the Buddhist, the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, the Prabhākara, and the Jaimini Schools, which would indicate that the outhor of the *PMS.* was in close touch with the developments in the Hindu schools of logic and epistemology, and had them in mind while writing this work.

(iii) Deva Sūri's Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra.

The definition and classification of knowledge in *PNT.* are very similar to those in the *PMS.* of Māṇikya Nandi and also to those in the *TS.* of Umāsvāti and the *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara. *Pramāṇa* is said to be definite knowledge which illumines itself and other objects, and is opposed to the super-imposition of one thing on another (*samāropaparipanthi*)[1]. Knowledge is either direct (*pratyakṣa*) or indirect (*parokṣa*)[2]. Of these the former is called clear and vivid (*spaṣṭa*) and the latter not clear (*aspaṣṭa*). Direct knowledge is divided into knowledge in the ordinary sense (*saṃvyāvahārika*) and knowledge in the highest sense (*pāramārthika*)[3]. The direct knowledge in the ordinary sense is further subdivided into the sensuous (*indriyā-nibandhana*)[4] and the non-sensuous

1. I 2, 7.
2. II, 1.
3. II, 4.
4. II, 5.

(*anindriya-nibandhana*). Both of these again are of the nature of *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya*, and *dhāraṇā*[1], which, as has already been explained in the chapter on Umāsvāti's *TS.*, are four grades of cognition according to the definiteness of knowledge. The direct knowledge in the higest sense depends for its production exclusively upon the soul (*utapattāvātma-mātrāpekṣam*)[2], and is of two kinds: (i) *vikala* (limited and defective), which includes *avadhi* and *manaḥ-paryāya*; and (ii) *sakala* (complete and correct) equivalent to *kevala*[3]. It will be seen that this division of direct knowledge is a combination of the classifications of knowledge as found in the *Nyāyāvatāra* and the *TS.*, with this difference that while sensuous knowledge is regarded as indirect in the *TS.*, it is called direct in this work.

Indirect knowledge is classified[4] as memory (*smaraṇa*); recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*); argumentation (*tarka*); inference (*anumāna*); and scriptural testimony (*āgama*); and these are explained in the same way as in the *PMS.*

Superimposition (*samāropa*), which is the opposite of knowledge, is defined as the cognition of a thing in another which is different from it[5]. It is of three

1 II, 6.

2. II, 18.

3. II, 19–23. *Avadhi* and *manaḥ-paryāya* have been defined in the same way as in *TS.*

4. III, 1, ff.

5. I, 8. *atasmins tad adhyavasāyaḥ samāropa iti*

kinds: (i) error (*viparyaya*); (ii) doubt (*saṃśayā*) and (iii) uncertainty (*anadhyavasāya*).[1] The example of error is the cognition of silver in mother of pearl; of doubt—whether the object is a post or a man; and of uncertainty-while a person is passing by, just an awareness that something (like straw) has been touched[2]. It will appear that the definition of *samāropa* is strictly applicable to *viparyaya* only; that is to say, to the case of an actual error in cognition. In the cases of doubt or uncertainty there is no superimposition of a thing on another different from it; and hence they should fall outside the scope of '*viparyaya*' as it has been defined here.

Scriptural testimony (*āgama*) is defined in the same way as in the *PMS*.

In P*NT*. also the objects of knowledge are distinguished as general (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*)[3]. The former is divided into cross-wise (*tiryak*) and vertical (*ūrdhvaṭā*); and the latter into (a concomitant) attribute (*guṇa*) and successive attribute (*paryāya*).

The cross-wise general is a homogeneous development in each of a number of individuals; for example, cowhood in a spotted cow and those born from her[4].

1. I, 9.
2. I, 14, 15, "*Kim ity ālocana-mātram anadhyavasāyaḥ; yathā gacchat tṛṇa-sparśa-jñānam iti*".
3. V, 1.
4. V, 4. *prati-vyakti tulyā pariṇatis tiryak sāmānyam, śabala-śābaleyādi-piṇḍeṣu gotvam yathā.*

The vertical general is a substance common to the prior and the posterior transformations of it; far example, gold persisting in a bangle; a bracelet; etc[1]. The distinctions of the two kinds of 'general' in this work also are based upon the principle of attribute and substance respectively[2].

---

1. V, 5. *pūrvāpara-pariṇāma-sādhāraṇam dravyam ūrdhvatā-sāmānyam kaṭaka-kaṅkaṇādy-anugāmi-kāñcanavat.*
2. In a paper on '*An Indian Doctrine of Perception and Error*' (*ASP.* 1921-22, pp. 31 and 32), Prof. F. W. Thomas, refers to this distinction in the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra*, V. 3-5, and observes thus: 'In thus discriminating two kinds of universal, of which one depends upon difference of individual and the other upon difference of time, the Jains would seem to have the support of a passage in Mr. Bradley's Logic (I. C. VI, §§ 30)'. It will appear from Prof, Thomas's own translation of the *sūtras*, however, that the two kinds of generality refer to the generality of attribute and substance. His rendering is as follows:

   ' Generality is of two kinds, cross-wise generality and vertical generality.

   Crosswise generality is a similar development in several particulars; for example, 'oxness' in bodies spotted and brindled.

   "Vertical generality is substance common to prior and posterior developments, for example, 'gold' persisting in armlet, ring, and so forth".

   Thus it is not 'the difference of individuals' which forms the distinguishing feature of crosswise generality; for in a case of vertical generality also there is a 'difference of individuals'. Armlets, rings, etc. made of gold

The division of particulars into *guṇa* and *paryāya* is different from that in *PMS.*, where they are divided into *paryāya* and *vyatireka.* The *paryāya* is common to both the works, and is defined in the same way, viz. as successive particulars such as pleasure and pains in the soul *paryāvas tu krama-bhāvi yathā tatraiva sukha-duḥkhādiḥ* (V,8). The *guṇa* particulars of the *PNT.* are, however, different from the *vyatireka* of the *PMS.* They are defined as concomitant attributes; as for example, consciousness, individuality, power, etc., in the soul—*guṇaḥ saha-bhāvī dharmo yathātmani vijñāna-vyakti-śaktyādiḥ* (V,7). Thus this division of particulars is based upon the principles of concomitance and succession; and appears to refer to attributes only. It is, therefore, not so satisfactory as that in the *PMS.* which includes both particular attributes and substances.

---

are as distinct individuals as spotted and brindled oxen. Similarly, in the case of vertical generality, it is not the difference of time which really matters but the persistence of one and the same *substance* (*dravya*), e. g. gold, through a number of things made out of it; although there will be a difference of time also if one and the same lump of gold is considered in relation to different forms into which it is moulded successively. It is evident, however, that this kind of generality will apply also to a number of gold ornaments existing at the same time, simply because all of them are made of gold. The examples of the two kinds of generality; viz. oxness in a number of oxen; and 'gold, persisting in armlet, ring and so forth' respectively clearly indicate the principle of classification. In the definition of the vertical general (*ūrdhvatā*), the very word '*dravyam*' is used—'*purvāpara-pariṇāma sādhāraṇam dravyam*', etc.

3. Later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Epistemology

(i) Analysis of Knowledge in Vātsyāyana's Nyāya-bhāṣya

I have already discussed Vātsyāyana's interpretations of the *Nyāya-sūtras* dealing with the theory of knowledge in the chapter on the *Nyāya-sūtras.* Vātsyāyana has not much to say on the subject of epistemology independently. He, however, supplements the treatment of the doctrine of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) in the *NS.* by giving an analysis of cognition, defining right cognition, and discussing briefly the comparative value of the various means of knowledge.

According to Vātsyāyana, the means of knowledge have reference to an object (*arthavad*), for it is only when objects are cognised by means of them, that it is possible to make an effort to achieve them[1]. He analyses knowledge into: (i) the knower (*pramātṛ*), who is prompted to action by a desire to acquire or discard an object; (ii) the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), that by means of which the object is known; (iii) the cognised object (*prameya*); and (iv) the form of cognition (*pramiti*), which constitutes the knowledge of the object (*artha-vijñāna*). It is asserted that a knowledge of the real nature of an object depends upon these four factors.

---

1. *'Pramāṇato' rtha-pratipattau pravṛtti-sāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam.*

In answer to the question as to what constitutes *right knowledge* it is said that it is to know an existent (*sad*) as existent, and not the contrary of it; and to know a non-existent (*asad*) as non-existent, and not the contrary of it[1]. This is followed by an explanation that a non-existent is perceived by means of its absence; for if it were present, it would have been perceived through the means of knowledge as the existents are.

Under *NS*. I, 1, 3, the applicability and the relative value of the various means of knowledge are discussed, and it is said that, while in some cases more than one of them can be applied; e. g. in the case of the soul, in others only one of them is applicable; e.g. in the case of thunder. Direct knowledge, by which sense-cognition is meant, is said to be the most convincing of all; for even after employing inference, knowledge by similarity, and verbal testimony, there is always a desire on the part of the cogniser to know the object directly.

Vātsyāyana's interpretations of *NS*. III, 2, 10 to III, 2, 18, which deal with the nature of cognition, and IV, 2, 26 ff. which discuss the cognition of the whole in relation to its parts, have been discussed by me in a separate article in the *JRAS*.[2] in which I have maintained that these two sections of the *NS*. do not deal with the Buddhist doctrines of momentari-

1. *sataśca sad-bhāvo, satascāsad-bhāvaḥ*, etc.
2. *JRAS.*, January, 1930.

ness and subjective idealism respectively as Vātsyāyana and, following him, other commentators have held.

(ii) Development of the Vaiśesika Theory of Knowledge in the Bhāsya of Praśastapāda

The *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* is the earliest known commetary on the *VS.* Unlike Vātsyāyana's *Nyāya-bhāṣva* on the *NS.* the *PB.* does not closely follow the *VS.* Although it claims to expound the doctrines of the *VS.*, it has added much to the matter found in the original work, and, therefore, it is usually considered as a work by itself. Another name for the *PB.* is the *Padārtha-dharma-saṃgraha.*

The section dealing with the theory of knowledge in the *PB.* opens with almost a quotation from the *NS.* I, 1, 15, which asserts that the terms '*buddhi*', '*upalabdhi*', '*jñāna*' and '*pratyaya*'[1] are all synonyms. Cognition (*buddhi*), it is said, although of a manifold nature according to the objects cognised, may be divided into two kinds: right cognition (*vidyā*) and wrong cognition (*avidyā*). Then each of these is of four kinds:

Right cognition is direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*laiṅgika*), memory (*smṛti*), and inspired knowledge (as of the sages-*ārṣa*)[2].

1. *Buddhir upalabdhir jñānam pratyaya iti paryāyāḥ. PB.* p. 171. Cf. *NS.*, 1, 1. 15 : *Buddhir upalabdhir jñānam ity anarthānantaram.*
2. In the *PB.* the four kinds of wrong cognition (*avidyā*)

Direct knowledge[1] is defined as mere undifferentiated apprehension consequent upon the knowledge of the generic and the specific properties of an objeet[2]. This is free from other means of knowledge. Another alternative definition of perception is given thus: 'that non-erroneous and non-inferential knowledge of things which is produced by the mutual contact of four, viz. soul, mind, sense-organs and the object'[3]. Direct knowledge may be either ordinary or mystic. The former is obtained through the sense-organs; and the latter by the direct contact of the soul and mind with their objects

Inference is that knowledge which is produced by noticing a sign or mark. This definition is the same as found in the *VS.*

Then the inferential mark or sign (*liṅga*) is defined as that (1) which is associated with that which is to be inferred (*yadanumeyena sambaddham*); (2) which is known to be found in all positive instances

are explained first. The use of '*vidyā*' and '*avidyā*' in the sense of knowledge and error is to be positively found here.

1. The word '*pratyakṣa*' is explained as *tatrākṣam akṣam pratītyutpadyate iti pratyakṣam.* Cf. Vātsyāyana *NB.* on *NS.* I, 1, 3, "*akṣasyākṣasya prativiṣaym vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam*".
2. *Sāmānya-viśeṣa jñānotpattau avibhaktam ālocana-mātram pratyakṣam*, p. 187.
3. *Athavā sarveṣu padārtheṣu catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād avitatham avyapadeśyam yaj jñānam utpadyate tat pratyakṣam pramāṇam.*

(i. e. in instances where the probandum is to be found) (*prasiddham ca tad anvite*); and (3) that which is not found in negative instances (*tad-abhāve ca nāsty eva*).

An inferential mark which does not conform to the above condition is fallacious, and Praśastapāda, while explaining the fallacies, refers to *VS.* III, 1, 15[1]. This reference also clearly shows that the allusion to Kāśyapa in this connection is to the author of the *VS*[2].

According to Praśastapāda, inference is of two kinds: (1) *dṛṣṭa* and (2) *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*. *Dṛṣṭa* inference is that where the species of the known instance (*prasiddha*) and that of the probandum (*sādhya*) are identical. For example, having observed that a dewlap is to be found only in a cow, on seeing a dewlap in another animal elsewhere, it is inferred that that animal must also be a cow.

---

1. *Aprasiddho 'napadeśo 'san sandigdhaś cānapadeśaḥ* (*PB.* p. 204).

2. *PB.* p. 200—*viruddhāsiddha-saṃdigdham aliṅgam kāśyapo 'bravīt'*. Some writers like Keith (*ILA.* p. 94) have regarded the reference to Kāśyapa in this verse as covering the subject of both the valid and the invalid marks of inference. But considering that the name is mentioned in the second of the two verses, which gives a classification of invalid marks only, the reference to Kāśyapa is evidently with, regard to this topic only. This is confirmed by Praśastapāda's later reference to the author of the Sūtras (*ity etad evāh sūtra-kāraḥ*), (*PB.* p. 204), exactly in connection with the same topic.

Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is that where the species of the known instance and that of the probandum are entirely different from each other, and the inference is based upon the presence of a common nature which can be inferred by means of the inferential mark. For example, having observed that the conduct of a farmer, a tradesman or a soldier is purposive, it is inferred that the conduct of those who observe the injunctions prescribed for the various castes and orders (*varṇāśramiṇām*) must also be purposive[1].

It will appear that the *dṛṣṭa* and the *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* inference of Praśastapāda are meant, as he himself explains in the *Bhāṣya*, to cover the inferential relations mentioned in *VS.*, IX, 2 1 ; the *dṛṣṭā* inference being apparently meant to correspond to the *pūrvavat* and the *śeṣavat* inferences of the *Nyāya-sūtras* and the *pratyakṣato dṛṣṭa-sambandha* of the *Mīmāṃsā* as explained in the *Śabara-bhāṣya* ; and the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* to the inference bearing the same name in the *Nyāya-sūtras* as explained by Vātsyāyana. The example of *dṛṣṭa* inference, however, as given by Praśastapāda is not happy; for it suggests that the *dṛṣṭa* inference is knowledge by similarity ; the animal which is cognised as a cow being itself perceived through the senses. In the case of an inference about the existence of fire on a hill on the other hand, it is only the smoke-the mark, which is perceived. His example would, however, be correct, if *only* the

1. *PB.* p. 206.

dewlap of the animal could be visible, and the phrase '*deśāntare 'pi sāsnāmātra-darśanād*' probably signifies that. But the appearance of only the dewlap without the other parts of the body is not at all a normal experience.

Then inference is further distinguished as inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and inference for others (*parārthānumāna*). It is usually assumed that Praśastapāda was the first to make this distinction. Inference for oneself consists of two premises and a a conclusion as follows :—

Wherever there is smoke there is fire ; (*apadeśa*)
There is smoke on this hill ; (*anūsandhāna*)
∴ There is fire on this hill. (*pratyāmnāya*)

Inference for others consists of five propositions:
Wherever there is smoke, there is fire ; (*apadeśa*)
As for example, in the kitchen ; (*sādharmyeṇa nidarśana*)
And wherever there is no fire there is no smoke, as in a pond ; (*vaidharmyeṇa nidarśana*)
There is smoke on the hill ; (*anusandhāna*)
∴ There is fire on the hill. (*pratyāmnāya*).

Of the above terms *apadeśa* corresponds to *hetu* ; *anusandhāna* to *upanaya* ; both the kinds of *nidarśana* to *udāharaṇa* ; and *pratyāmnāya* to *nigamana* of the Nyāya School.

Verbal testimony, knowledge by similarity, presumption, implication, non-existence, tradition, all these are shown to be cases of inference ; for in all

of them, it is maintained, cognition is the result of some mark[1].

Wrong cognition (*avidyā*) is also of four kinds: (1) doubt (*saṃśaya*); (2) error (*viparyaya*); (3) uncertainty (*anadhyavasāya*); (4) dream (*svapna*). Of these the first two are explained in the same way as in the *NS.* and the *Nyāya-bhāṣya.* Uncertainty means failure to determine the exact nature of an object, and may pertain to perception or inference. Dream is explained as knowledge arising from the contact of the mind and the sense-organ without the presence of objects.

Memory is defined in the usual way; and what has been called *ārṣa-jñāna* and put down as the fourth form of right cognition is substantially the same as the *yogi-jñāna* which has been described as a kind of direct knowledge.[2]

In the above account of the various means of knowledge according to Praśastapāda the following points are worthy of notice:—

(1) Praśastapāda gives two alternative definitions of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*). In the first of these he refers to the cognition of the generic and the specific properties of the object of cognition, which we find both in Māṇikya Nandi's *PMS.* and Deva Sūri's *PNT,* and in fact in the works of all later writers, especially in those of Prabhākara and Kumārila. In the second

1. *PB.*, pp. 213-230.
2. *PB.* pp. 256 and 258.

definition, he expressly includes soul (*ātman*) and mind (*manas*) as factors in cognition, which were absent in the definition of *pratyakṣa* as given in the *NS.*, and which omission had provided Diṅnāga an occasion to criticise Vātsyāyana in this connection. Further the omission of 'the contact of sense-organs with the object' *indriyārtha-sannikarṣa* in the first definition is analogous to the same omission in the definitions as given by the Buddhist and the Jaina writers beginning with Diṅnāga, and is certainly a fresh departure on the subject in the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* School. As has already been pointed out, this modified from of the definition of direct knowledge is meant to include such other kinds of *pratyakṣa* as mental cognition, self-consciousness, etc.

(2) The classification of inference as *dṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is intended to be an improvement upon a mere description of the various kinds of inference as contained in the *VS.*, IX, 2, 1 and three kinds of inference enumerated in the *NS.* although these two kinds of inference in the *PB.* are meant to cover the same distinctions as specified in the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya* Sūtras. The division of inference into *svārtha* and *parārtha* is also a fresh departure in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theory of knowledge, and is found in the works of all later logicians beginning with Diṅnāga.

(3) The division of wrong cognition (*avidyā*) into four kinds, viz. doubt (*saṃśaya*), error (*vipar-*

yaya); uncertainty (*anadhyavasāya*); and dream (*svapna*), appears to find its echo in Deva Sūri's division of superimposition (*samāropa*) into error (*viparyaya*); doubt (*saṃśaya*) and uncertainty (*ānadhyavasāya*).

(iii) Classifications of sense-contact and inference; and the theory of verbal knowledge in Uddyotakara's Nyāya-Vārtika

Uddyotakara's comments on the *NS.* dealing with the definition of sense-cognition and the classification of inference have already been discussed in the chapter on the *NS.* and his criticism of Diṅnāga. Besides these comments and criticisms, the following topics discussed by Uddyotakara in his *NV.* are important for our purpose :—

(i) His explanation of the different kinds of contact of the sense-organs (*sannikarṣa*) in sense-cognition[1].

(ii) His classification of inference as (a) ***anvayin***; (b) ***vyatirekin*** ; and (c) ***anvaya vyatirekin***[2].

(iii) His theory of verbal knowledge[3].

(i) The contact of the sense-organ with its object is of six kinds: (a) conjunction (***saṃyoga***); (b) conjoined inherence (***saṃyukta-samavāya***); (c) conjoined inherent inherence (***saṃyukta samaveta samavāya***); (d) inherence (***samavāya***); (e) inherent inherence

1. *NV.*, I, 1, 4.
2. *NV.*, I, 1, 5.
3. *NV.*, II, 2, 55 and 65.

(*samaveta-samavāya*); (f) the relation of qualification and the qualified (*viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva*). For example, (a) when a jar is cognised, the contact of the eye with the jar is a case of conjunction (*saṃyoga*); (b) when the colour of the jar is cognised, the contact of the eye with the colour, which inheres in the jar, is a case of conjoined inherence (*saṃyukta-samavāya*); (c) when 'colourness' is cognised, colourness is that which inheres in the colour which, in its turn, inheres in the jar; hence this is a case of conjoined inherent inherence (*saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*); (d) when sound is perceived, it is a case of inherence (*samavāya*), for the sound inheres in the ear-cavity; (e) when soundness is cognised, it is a case of inherent inherence (*samaveta samavāya*), for soundness inheres in the ear-cavity; (f) when the non-existence of an object is perceived by means of the particularisation of a spot which could be occupied by it, it is a case of the relation of qualification and the qualified (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*).

(2) According to Uddyotakara, inference is knowledge based upon relation between the middle term (*liṅga*) and the major (*parāmarśa*) term aided by a remembrance of that relation—'*smṛty-anugṛhīto liṅga-parāmarśo anumānam*'[1]. For example, the knowledge that the hill has fire on it is based upon the relation between smoke and fire and the remembrance of that relation. While explaining the three

1. *NV.*, pp. 47, 48.

kinds of inference mentioned in *NS.*, I, 1, 4 as has already been said, Uddyotakara called them (a) *anvayi*. (b) *vyatireki* and (c) *anvaya-vyatireki*, which names have been variously translated into English[1]. *Anvayi* is that inference in which the 'the probans subsists in the subject and other objects of its kinds, *vivakṣita-taj-jātīya-vṛttitve sati*, and there is, in regard to it, nothing in which the probandum is known to be absent; e. g. when one, who holds that all things are transient, argues that sound is transient, because it is a product; for there is nothing in which the probandum (here, transient character) does not exist. Such an inference would be best called *inference by agreement*. *Vyatireki* is that inference in which the probans subsists in the subject; where there is nothing besides the subject in which the probandum is known to be present, and where the probans does not subsist in anything where the probandum is absent—*vivakṣita-vyāpakatve sapakṣābhāve sati vipakṣāvṛttiḥ*, e. g. the living body is not without a soul, for if it were soulless, it would be lifeless. This kind of inference should be most suitably expressed by *inference by difference*. Lastly *anvayatireki* is that inference in which the probans

1. Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his *HIL.*, (pp. 130, 131) calls them exclusively—affirmative, exclusively-negative and affirmative-negative respectively. Gangānātha Jhā translates them as the universal-affirmative, the universal-negative, and the universal affirmative-negative. (*NS. Engl. Transl. in Indian Thought; NV.*, I, 1, 5).

subsists in the subject and other objects of its kind, and does not subsist in objects which are of a different kind, (that is to say, those in which the probandum does not exist)—*vivakṣita-taj jātiyopapattau vipakṣāvṛttiḥ*, e. g. sound is transient because while possessing generality and particularity (*sāmānya-viśeṣavattve sati*) it is cognised by the external sense-organs of human beings like ourselves, like a jar. Here the qualities of sound are to be fouud in transient things, and are absent in non-transient things, and the inference is drawn upon this basis of agreement and difference of qualities[1]. Hence the proper name for this kind of cognition will be *inference by agreement and difference*

Uddyotakara calls the inference by agreement *vīta* and that by difference *avīta*[2]. The terms recur in

1. There is evidently a mistake in Gaṅgānātha Jhā's English Transl. (Indian Thought, *NS.*, p. 163), of the *NV.* where it defines the *anvaya-vyatireki* inference. The translation is : 'the Universal Affirmative Negative is that in which the probans, while subsisting in the subject and other objects akin to it (wherein the probandum resides), *subsists in those where the prabandum is known to reside*'. Here the portion underlined is just the opposite of what it ought to be, viz. 'does not subsist in those where the probandum is not known to reside—'*vipakṣāvṛttiḥ*'. The foot-note, in which Dr. Jhā explains the example, represents the correct meaning.
2. *NV.*, p. 126. Uddyotakara explains the distinction between *vīta* and *avīta* thus : '*tatra sva-rūpeṇārthaparicchedakatvam vīta-dharmaḥ; avītaḥ punaḥ para-pakṣa-pratiṣedhenaiva pravartate*'.

the *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra, where *vīta* is explained as a positive inference covering the *pūrvavat* and the '*sāmānyātodṛṣṭa*'; and *avīta* as a negative inference equivalent to the *śeṣavat* of the *Nyāya-sūtras*.

Another important topic discussed by Uddyotakara under *NS.*, II, 2, 55 and II, 2, 65 is the theory of what has been called verbal knowledge, that is to say, of the denotation of words. How does a word, which consists of a number of letters, come to denote a thing; and, then what is the nature of this denotation? The *sphoṭa* doctrine of the grammarians and the *apoha* theory of the Buddhists are refuted. It is important to draw a distinction which is evidently overlooked by several writers between such verbal knowledge and what has been called verbal testimony as a means of knowledge. The former simply deals with the theory of language, and has to do with the significance of words irrespective of the truth or falsity of what they denote; while the latter is treated as a regular *pramāṇā*, which is concerned with the *validity* of knowledge conveyed by words. Even in the original works of Sanskrit writers the two topics seem to be mixed up; but the distinction between them is clear.

Also see Jacobi, *Fetgabe Garbe Richard von Garbe*, p. 8. ff.; Keith *ILA.*, pp. 90 and 91.

(iv) Distinctions of the non-reflective (nirvikalpaka) and the reflective (savikalpaka) direct knowledge, and the explanation of the theories of error in the NyāyaVārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā of Vācaspati Miśra

Besides Vācaspati Miśra's comments upon the texts of the *NS.* the *Bhāṣya* and the *NV.*, which have already been noticed in the chapter on the *NS.*, the special feature of his commentary on the *NV.* on the subject of epistemology is his distinction, for the first time in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School, between the non-reflective (*nirvikalpaka*) and the reflective (*savikalpaka*) direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*). In this work he also explains the various theories of error as held by different schools.

While introducing the subject of the two kinds of direct knowledge referred to above, Vācaspati Miśra observes that the authors of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* and the *Nyāya-vārtika* did not mention and explain this distinction because they considered it to be too evident. There is no reason, however, to believe that this essertion of VM's is true. He further declares that he has introduced the distinction of the two kinds of knowledge in his commentary following his own preceptor named Trilocana[1]. It is difficult to say exactly with whom this division of direct knowledge began. The earliest author we know of as making this distinction is either Prabhākara or

1. *NVTT.* p. 87.

Kumārila, whoever may be earlier. I have shown that the definition of direct knowledge as given in the *NS.* is really applicable to the kind of knowledge called *nirvikalpaka* later on, and the definitions of direct knowledge as given by Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti cleatly exclude such knowledge as is associated with reflection and the use of language. Now those later writers, who could not deny the existence of such direct knowledge and still wanted to maintain that sense-cognition associated with reflection and language is also direct, naturally drew this twofold distinction of *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka.* Prabhākara and Kumārila especially emphasise the point that the reflective sense-cognition (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) is also direct knowledge, and they evidently do so against the theory of the Buddhist logicians, according to whom only the non-reflective cognition is direct knowledge.

In the history of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika School, Vācaspati Miśra explains the twofold distinction of the non-reflective direct knowledge (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) and the reflective direct knowledge (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*), and tries to find support for it in the text of *NS.* I, 1, 4. According to him, the term *vyavasāyātmaka* in this *sūtra* denotes the reflective direct knowledge (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*); that is to say, 'that which is definite or certain', pointing to something specified by its genus and name;

while the word '*avyapadeśya*', which means 'that which cannot be expressed by words', refers to the non-reflective direct knowledge (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*), for it is not specified by a genus, and is, therefore, indefinite[1]. As has already been pointed out while discussing the definition of direct knowledge in the chapter on the *NS*, there is no justification whatsoever for holding the view that the terms *avyapadeśya* and *vyavasāyātmaka* in *NS*. I, 1, 4 refer to two kinds of direct knowledge; and none of the commentators before Vācaspati Miśra has interpreted them in that way.

It will further appear that Vācaspati Miśra has also explained how a sense-cognition cannot be considered apart from its expression in language, and how *avyapadeśya* in the *NS*. I, 1, 4 means 'that which is not the result of an inferential mark'. Now there will be a flagrant inconsistency, if this interpretation of *avyapadeśya* and the distinctions of the *nirvikalpaka* and the *savikalpaka* knowledge be both considered as representing Vācaspati Miśra's own view. The fact is that so far as one can see from his commentary, neither of these interpretations is

---

1. *NVTT*, p. 84.

तद्गृहीतसंकेतस्य प्रथममिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादालोचनेन शब्दसंसर्गरहितेनालोचितेऽर्थमात्रे तस्यार्थस्य शब्दभेदेन संबन्धाच्छब्दविषयसंस्कारः प्रबोध्यते स प्रबुद्धशब्दस्मृतिं जनयति ।

claimed by him as his own. Vācaspati is too much of a faithful commentator to put in any of his own notions. What he has done in commenting upon the *NV.* is that he has simply brought out the meaning of the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika.* Thus his explanation of how direct knowledge can be regarded as always associated with some name is merely a statement of the position of the object referred to in the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vartika* when it is said: 'With regard to this direct knowledge produced by the contact of the sense-organ with objects' the *Bhāṣya* has represented an objector as putting forward the objection that 'every direct knowledge is called after the name of its object, etc.[1]' Similarly, his explanation of how '*avyapadeśya*' means 'that which is not the result of an inferential mark' is simply a comment upon the *NV.* when it says: 'some (commentators) explain that '*avyapadeśya*' is added with a view to exclude inference. This is not so, etc'[2].

While commenting on *NS.* I, 1, 2 in connection with the distinction of right cognition (*pramā*) and wrong cognition (*apramā*), Vācaspati Miśra explains the various theories of error (*viparyaya*) according to the different schools. These may be classified as (1) *Ātma-khyāti*, usually held by the Yogācāra

1. *NV.* p. 38 *tac cendriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam viṣaya-nāmadheyenābhidhīyate iti bhāṣyam.*
2. Ibid. p. 38, 39, '*apare tvavyapadeśyam ity anenānumānam nirākurvanti, tac ca naivam*'.

School of Buddhism, according to which, a concept which exists only in the mind wrongly appears as a real thing in the external world; (2) *Asat-khyāti*, where an unreal thing, e. g. a piece of silver, which does not exist, appears as real, although it is only a piece of shell which exists; (3) *Anirvacanīya-khyāti*, where an object is cognised in such a way that it is possible to define it as either real or unreal; e. g. when a piece of shell is cognised as silver, what is cognised is neither the piece of shell nor a piece of silver; (4) *Akhyāti*, that wrong knowledge where the distinction between that which exists really and that which is cognised is not perceived. The illusion is partly remembrance and partly apprehension; but owing to the fact that this act of remembrance is not consciously taken note of at the time of false apprehension, the illusory perception also appears to be as true and valid as a correct perception[1]. This theory is held by the Prabhākara School of Mīmāṃsā. (5) *Anyathā-khyāti* or *viparīta-khyāti*, held by the Nyāya School, according to which wrong cognition consists in mistaking one thing for another, e. g. a piece of shell is mistaken for a piece of silver. The peculiar qualities of the object which actually exists, and of that which is wrongly perceived, are not noticed. A certain feature, or features, common to both is noticed; for example, the glow common to a piece of silver and a conch-shell; and by the accidental remembrance of

1. *I IP*. p, 121.

a piece of silver seen in the past, the present object of perception is also taken to be a piece of the same metal. This fact of remembering a piece of silver, however, is not taken note of at the time of the illusion. The theory holds that in addition to a failure to distinguish between the object, which actually exists, and that which is wrongly perceived, in every illusion there is also a positive false identification of the one with the other, for example, of a piece of silver with a piece of conch-shell. The *Akhyāti* theory of the Mīmāṃsā School does not recognise this last positive element[1].

Jayanta's *Nyāya-mañjarī* (880 A. D.)-a commentary on the *NS.* and Srīdhara's *Nyāya-Kandalī* (990 A. D.) on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* are other important works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School during this period subsequent to Vāchaspati Miśra. Neither of them has any constructive value. They are full of polemics against the Buddhists. The *Nyāya-kandaḷī* contains a refutation of some of the Mīmāṃsā doctrines of epistemology as found particularly in Prabhākara and Kumārila.

The Mīmāṃsā Epistemology.—As has already been observed, it is in the work of the commentators on the *MS.* that we find the origin and development of the theory of knowledge according to the Mīmāṃsā School. Of these Śabarasvāmin is the oldest commentator whose work, the *Śabara-bhāṣya*, is available

1. *IIP*- p. 120, 121.

now; although it is evident from the quotations from the work of a Vṛttikāra in the *Śabara-bhāṣya* that it is not the first commentary on the *MS.* Śabarasvāmin was followed by Kumārila and Prabhākara, who further developed the epistemological doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā School. A study of these authors, as will be seen presently, shows that while the existence of the theories of knowledge in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist Schools must have provided a stimulus for the origin and growth of a theory of knowledge in Mīmāṃsā, this, in its turn, had its influence in determining the subsequent epistemology of the Jaina and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. For instance, in the quotation from the Vṛttikāra in the *Śabara-bhāṣya*, the definition of direct knowledge and classification of inference show distinct signs of the influence of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School; while the discussion with regard to the view that cognition is identical with its object, or that cognition exists independently of an external object, is expressly undertaken with reference to the Buddhist doctrines of *Śūnya-vāda* and *Nirālambana-vada*. On the other hand, the distinction of the two kinds of direct knowledge-the non-reflective (*nirvikalpaka*) and the reflective (*savikalpaka*), which was adopted later on by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School, is known to us to exist first in the works of Kumārila and Prabhākara. Similarly, the discussion of the nature of the general (*sāmānya*) and the particular (*viśeṣa*) with referenee to the theory of cognition is first found

prominenly in the work of the same two authors.

With regard to the relative dates Kumārila and Prabhākara it is difficult to say which of them was really senior to the other; but a comparative study of the epistemological doctrines of the two suggests that Prabhākara may have written his works after Kumārila. For instance, if Kumarila had been posterior to Prabhākara one would expect him to particularly refer to such of Prabhākara's views as were different from his own, e. g. the non-acceptance of *abhāva* as a means of knowledge on the part of Prabhākara; or again the doctrine of *Tripuṭi-pratyakṣa*, which has been particularly emphasised by Prabhākara and his followers. As in my treatment of the Mīmāṃsā epistemology here I have dealt with the Prabhākara School as a whole, it has seemed most suitable that the chapter dealing whith the theory of knowledge according to this school should come after that dealing with Kumārila. It is well-known that according to tradition Prabhākara was a pupil of Kumārila.

(i) The Theory of Knowledge in the Śabara-bhāṣya of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtras.

The fourth aphorism of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*[1] contains a kind of definition of direct knowledge (*pratya-*

1. *Sat-samprayoge, puruṣasyendriyāṇām buddhi janma tat-pratyakṣam animittam vidyamānopalambhanatvāt.* It may be mentioned that Kumārila, in his *Śloka-vārtika*, objects to regarding the first part of the *sūtra* as a

kṣa) and declares that it cannot be the means of knowing duty (*dharma*) for through direct knowledge that only is known which is present. Direct knowledge is that apprehension which is produced by the contact of the sense-organs of man with something which exists. It is maintained by the commentators that inference (*anumāna*), knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*), and presumption (*arthāpatti*) are also implied in the MS. which contains the definition of direct knowledge, as they depend upon direct knowledge. Verbal testimony (*śabda*) and non-existence (*abhāva*) are referred to in MS. I. I. 5. Thus, according to Śabarasvāmin and Kumārila, six means of knowledge are recognised by the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, viz., direct knowledge, inference, knowledge by similarity, verbal testimony, presumption and non-existence. Of these it is only the verbal testimony which can be relied upon for knowing duty. It may be noted that the definition of direct knowledge as given in the *MS.* itself is analogous to those found in the earlier works; for in it also direct knowledge is defined simply as that which is produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the

definition of direct knowledge; for, according to him, that would make a defective definition, which one would not expect from the author of the *MS.* The Vṛttikāra, quoted by Śabara, has, however, taken it as a definition of direct knowledge, and, in any case, this is all that one can find in the *MS.* about the nature of direct knowledge.

object, and this fact should confirm the view, which is already held, that the *MS.* are earlier than the *NS.*

The *Bhāṣya*, however, by means of a quotation from the Vṛttikāra, elaborates the definition of direct knowledge as given in the *Sūtra*, and asserts that freedom from error is one of the essential conditions of direct knowledge. That which is direct knowledge is not erroneous; that which is erroneous is not direct knowledge-*yat pratyakṣam na tad vyabhicarati, yad vyabhicarati na tat pratyakṣam.* Further it explains the distinction between right apprehension and wrong apprehension as follows: when the mind is obstructed by the eye, etc., or the sense-organ by darkness, etc., or the external object because of minuteness, etc.- then there is wrong apprehension; for right apprehension is (only) when there are no obstructions (*anupahateṣu hi samyak-jñānam*); and the mutual contact of the sense-organ, mind and the object is the cause of right apprehension. When they are defects about these, the apprehension is false. But how does one know about it ? One knows about it when a right cognition is obtained by the removal of the defects (*doṣāpagame śampratipatti-darśanāt*). But then how to discriminate between what is defective and what is not ?. (*The answer is*) that if on careful investigation we do not find any defect, in the absence of any proof (for the presence of a defect) we presume that there is no defect. Therefore, only that apprehension is false (*asamīcīnaḥ pratyayaḥ*), and none other, which has

defective cause (*yasya ca duṣṭam kāraṇam*) and where it is perceived that it (the apprehension) is false (*yatra ca mithyeti pratyayaḥ*. [1]

Another important section of the *Śabara-bhāṣya* on the subject, which is also supposed to be an extract from the commentary of the Vṛttikāra[2] is that directed against those who would identify cognition with the object cognised. They would say we do not find any distinction of form (*ākāra bhedam*) between the object and its cognition, and it is our cognition which is directly apprehended *pratyakṣā ca no buddhiḥ*). Therefore we see that there is no object apart from it. 'This would be so', says the Vṛttikāra, if cognition be of the form of the object (*yady arthākārā buddhiḥ syāt*); but our cognition is without a form (*nirākāra*); it is the external object which has form; and it is that as related to the external world (*bahir-deśa sambaddha*) which is directly apprehended; for direct apprehension has some thing for its object (*artha-viṣayā*) and not another cognition, and the reason for this is that it is momentary (*kṣaṇikā*)

1. *Mīmāṃsā Darśana* (Śabara-bhāṣya) Bib. Indica, Vol. 1, p. 8.
2. I agree with Jacobi (JAOS, xxxi) in holding that all the passages beginning with '*vṛttikāras tu anyathemam grantham varṇayāmcakāra*' on p. 7, and ending with *bādarāyaṇa grahaṇam uktam*' on p. 18 of the Śabara-bhāṣya, are quotations from the Vṛttikāra. The editor of the *Bhāṣyā* also holds the same view, as is evident from his footnote p. 18.

and, therefore, would not last until the appearance of another cognition. If it be said that it (cognition) is known as it is being produced, and makes known another object, like a lamp; this is not so, for, no one apprehends cognition without an object being known (first), and when it (the object) is known, one knows (cognition) by inference (*jñāte tv anumānād avagacchati*); therefore, it is not right to maintain that it is known simultaneously (with the cognition of the object). Verily, we say that an object is known only when cognition is produced, and not until it is produced; and, therefore, cognition is produced first, and the object is known afterwards; yes, it is true that cognition is *produced* first, but not that it is *known* first. Sometimes it happens, however, that although an object is known, it is said to be unknown[1]. The form of cognition is not apprehended without an object serving as a mark-*nārtha-vyapadeśam antareṇa buddheḥ rūpopālambhanam.* Therefore there is no cognition which is not (apprehended as) the result of a mark or sign, and nothing is *non-pratyakṣa* which is not the result of a mark or sign; and hence cognition is not *pratyakṣa* [2].

1. '*bhavati hi kadācid etat yat jñāto py arthaḥ san ajñātaḥ ily ucyate*'. The signifcance of this assertion in the present context is not quite clear.

2. The text as published in the B. I. edition vol. I, p. 10 is '*tasmān na vyapadeśyā buddhiḥ, avyapadeśyam ca nāpratyakṣam, tasmād apratyakṣā buddhiḥ*'. The editior

It is further argued that if it be maintained that cognition and the object cognised are identical, it will mean the non-existence of cognition, and not of the object which is existent and directly apprehended

---

suggests in a footnote that for *nāpratyakṣam* we should read *'na pratyakṣam'*. It is evident that the reading suggested by the editior is incorrect; for if it be adopted the text would mean: 'that which is' *'avyapadeśya'* is not *'pratyakṣa,'* which, whatever be the meaning of *'avyapadeśya'* is just the opposite of what *'pratyakṣa'* has been usually understood to be. As the text stands, it means 'that which is *avyapadeśya* is not *non-pratyakṣa'*, that is to say, it is *pratyakṣa*, and this is quite correct according to the well-known definition of *'pratyakṣa'* in the NS., and elsewhere. However, while this clause, as it stands in the text, is correct, the one preceding it, viz. *'tasmān na vyapadeśyī buddhiḥ'* is certainly incorrect; and should read as *'tasmānna avyapadesyā buddhiḥ'*; for, as it stands, it means: 'therefore, cognition is not the result of mark or sign', which is opposed to the view of the author expressed in the immediately preceding clause, which gives the reason for what is meant to be asserted in the present clause, viz., 'the form of cognition is not apprehended without an object serving as a mark' and in another clause before that in the same paragraph, viz., no one apprehends cognition without an object being known (first), and when it (the object) is known, one knows (cognition) by inference'. It is evident what the author means to say is that there is no cognition which is not (apprehended as) the result of a mark or a sign, and this will be expressed by taking the text as *'tasmān na avyapadeśyā buddhiḥ'*,

(*pratyakṣasya sataḥ*). And it is not true that they are identical; for cognition, which is without form, is *inferred*, while the object, which has form, is *directly apprehended*. Hence, apprehension has an object for its cause (*arthālambanaḥ pratyayaḥ*). It is seen that the apprehension of cloth, which has a definite cause is possible only when the threads are cognised. Otherwise, it could happen, that sometimes the cognition of threads might give rise to the apprehension of a jar also, even in the case of a person who does not suffer from any defect in his sense-organs. But this does not happen, and hence an apprehension is not without a cause, and for the same reason, direct knowledge is not erroneous[1]. The theory that cognitions are without an external object as their basis like the cognitions of a dream—*sarva eva nirālambanāḥ svapnavat pratyayaḥ*, is refuted by pointing out that there is a difference between the cognitions of a dream and those of the waking state in so far as the former entirely vanish on waking up, while the latter do not[2].

According to the Vṛttikāra, in the *ŚB.*, 'inference is the cognition of an object not in direct, contact and forming one of the two sides to a known relation,one of which is directly apprehended'[3]. It is of two kinds: (1)

1. *ŚB.* p. 10.
2. *ŚB.*, pp. 8 and 9. The theory criticised here, although no name is mentioned, appears to be *Vijñāna-vāda*.
3. *Anumānam jñāta-sambandhasyaika deśā-darśanād eka-deśāntare 'sannikṛṣṭe' rthe buddhiḥ. ŚB.* p. 10.

That based upon a directly-apprehended relation (*pratyakṣato dṛṣṭasambandha*), and (2) that based upon a commonly-known relation (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭa-sambandha*). An example of the first will be the cognition of fire by apprehending smoke, and that of the latter one's being reminded of the sun having moved from a certain position, by virtue of one's previous knowledge that a person—say Devadatta, could get to another place only by having moved from his previous position.

Scriptural testimony (*śāstram*) is the cognition of an object not in sense-contact by means of the knowledge of words.[1]

Knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*) also (which means) resemblance, produces knowledge of an object which is not in sense-contact, e. g. the perception of a gayal reminds one of a cow.

Presumption (*arthāpatti*) is the surmise about an object on the ground that something which has been seen or heard cannot be possible otherwise[2]; e.g. the surmise that a person, say Devadatta, must have gone outside, a fact which is not directly apprehended on finding that he is not at home and on the assumption that he is alive.

1. '*śāstram śabda-vijñānād asannikṛṣṭe 'rthe vijñānam*'. *ŚB*. p. 10.
2. *Arthāpatti api dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vā 'rtho nyathā nopapadyate itg artha-kalpanā.*

Non-existence (*abhāva*) characterised by the absence of any other means of knowledge denotes something which is not in sense-contact and does not exist (lit. 'is not'—*nāstīti*).

The definitions of the various means of knowledge and the examples according to the Vṛttikāra, as given in the *Śabara bhāṣya*, clearly indicate similarity to those found in the *Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya* of the *NS.*, especially the example of the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inference. This shows that the Vṛttikāra belonged to a period when the usual examples of the various kinds of *pramāṇas* had already come into vogue, and Vātsyāyana, in illustrating the *NS.*, simply adopted them from such authors as the Vṛttikāra. The definition of knowledge by similarity as given in the *ŚB.* is different from that of the Nyāya School, in so far as it is supposed to refer to what is not present to the senses and is similar to what is actually perceived. The refutation of the views that objects are identical with cognition and that cognitions exist independently of external objects clearly refers to a definite established doctrine which denied the existence of external objects. The language of the Vṛttikāra suggests that the refutation refers to the *Nirālambana-vāda*[1] and the *Śūnya-vāda*[2].

1. *Nanu sarva eva nirālambanaḥ svapna-pratyayaḥ, pratyayasya hi nirālambanatā*—p. 8.
2. *Śūnyas tu, katham, artha-jñanayor ākāra-bhedam nopalabhāmahe iti.* p. 9. See Jacobi, *JAOS. XXXI*, pp. 18-24.

(ii) The Mīmāṃsā Epistemology according to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

The Mīmāṃsā theory of knowledge as developed by Kumārila is to be found in some sections of his *Śloka-vārtika*, which is a commentary on the Tarka-pāda of the *Śabara-bhāṣya*. He discusses the nature of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) under *MS.* I. 1. 4[1]. That the original *sūtra* did not contain a satisfactory definition of *pratyakṣa* as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), and that Kumārila tried to find a basis for his own definition of direct knowledge in this *sūtra* is evident from Kumārila's own treatment of the subject in the *Śloka-vārtika*. At first he tries to show that this *sūtra* does not contain a definition of direct knowledge, for, in so far it is too wide and applicable to erroneous cognitions also, it would be faulty in its present form, and the respected author of the *MS.* could not have formulated a faulty definition[2]. Later on, however, he finds an alternative interpretation, according to which the *sūtra* may be regarded as containing a definition of direct knowledge. He says that '*sat-samprayoge*' in the *sūtra*, instead of being taken to mean simply 'on the contact with reality', should be interpreted to signify 'on the right (*sam*) functioning (*prayoge*) with reference to reali-

1. '*Sat-samprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇām buddhi-janma tat pratyakṣam animittam vidyamānopalambhanatvād iti*'.
2. *MŚV.* verses, 1-37; (pp. 132-145).

ty or objects (*sat*)'. Thus the definition of direct knowledge will be that knowledge obtained by a person, which is the result of the right functioning of the sense-organs with reference to their objects[1]. Such a definition will exclude such erroneous cognition as that of silver in mother-o'-pearl.

Kumārila, probably for the first time in the history of Hindu epistemology, introduces the distinction of the two kiuds of direct knowledge thus: 'At first, there is cognition, which is mere apprehension (*ālocana-jñānam*) and non-reflective (*nirvikalpakam*), which resembles the cognition of a child or the dumb, and is caused by the mere object (*śuddha-vastu-jam*) (V. 112. p. 168.) At the time of such a cognition neither particularity nor generality is perceived; it is only the individual object, which forms the substratum of both these (*tayor ādhāra-bhūta*), which is cognised. (V. 113, p. 169). It is maintained, however, that both the particularity (*viśeṣa*) and generality (*sāmānya*) of an object are implicitly present even in the non-reflective cognition as forming the character of the object; although the knower perceives the mere object only, that to say, as devoid of these characteristics[2] (V, 118, p. 171).

1. *MŚV*. 38-39 (p. 145).
2. '*Nirvikalpaka-bodhe pi dvyātmakasyāpi vastunaḥ, Grahaṇam lakṣaṇākhyeyam jñātrā śuddham tu gṛhyate* (K. 118, p. 171).

Such an object is not cognised as particular (*asādhāraṇatvena*), for in the cognition other objects are not excluded; nor is it cognised as general (*sāmānyam iti nāpi*), for there is no inclusion of other objects in such a cognition (*viśeṣānugamā 'klṛpteḥ*) (V. 119). Subsequent to this, that cognition also by means of which the object is characterised by such attributes as generality, etc. (*jātyādibhiḥ*) is to be regarded as direct knowledge (*pratyakṣatvena sammatā*), (V. 120, p. 172). It is emphasised that all cognition which is the result of the contact of the sense-organs with the object, whether it be non-reflective or reflective is to be regarded as direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), and that which is not the result of sense-contact is not to be called direct knowledge (K. 124, p. 173). The point in emphasising this is that the fact that in the reflective direct knowledge there are other factors besides that of mere sense-contact does not preclude it from being *pratyakṣa*. It is further maintained that the general character, etc. perceived in reflective direct knowledge are to be treated as an integral part of the cognised object, and not as something simply imposed upon it by the understanding *'sthitam naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvam vyaktito hi naḥ'* says Kumārila (K. 141, p. 178), which Pārthasārathi Miśra explains thus in his *Nyāya-ratnākara*. The three (categories) viz. the general character, etc.[1], are not altogether

1. The other two being attribute (*guṇa*) and action (*karma*).

different from the individual. It is a matter of universal experience that an individual cow is perceived only as possessed of the generic character of cowhood[1] and this cognition could not be so if the general character were altogether different from the individual. In fact, it is this cognition (of the generic character as a part of the individual) which is the only proof of the generic character[2]. This cognition reveals the individual as always possessed of the generic character, and as there is nothing to contradict this identity between the generic character and the individual, it is really true and not false[3].

As against an alternative explanation, such as given by the Vaiśeṣika School, that there is an inseparable relation (*samavāya-sambandha*) between the generic character and the individual, it is argued that no such relation can exist between entities which are always found to be inseparable, nor can such relation exist between entities which do not exist yet (*aniṣpanna*—lit. not accomplished), and if they already exist (*niṣpattau*), then there is inseparability[4].

As regards the nature of substance it is maintained that it is not an aggregate of properties like a forest

1. '*Gaur iti gotvātmikaiva vyaktiḥ pratīyate*'; p. 178.
2. '*Iyam eva ca pratītir jātau pramāṇam nānyat*'; p. 178.
3. '*paramārthikam eva tadātmyam iti nāprāmāṇyam iti.*
4. *Na ca yuta-siddhānām sambandhitvena kalpanā. Naniṣpannasya sambandho nispattau yuta-siddhatā.* K. 146 p. 180.

which is a mere collection of trees. It is that to which the properties belong; which persists in and through the qualities which appear and disappear[1], and which can be apprehended before the cognition of the properties[2] (K. IV. 152). Hence the substance which is perceived as possessing a certain generic character, etc. is not to be regarded as unreal or of a different form (K. 153, p. 182).

The reality of substance is further maintained by denying that a thing is cognised only as identical with the word which signifies it. The thing and the word although related to each other, are essentially different from each other, and the notion of a thing can be produced through cognition independently of the word[3] (K. IV. 172 ff, esp. 175, 176, pp. 188-189). It is pointed out that the cognition of the character of a cow is in the form of a dewlap, etc., and that of the name cow (Sansk. *go*) in the form of the letters 'c' etc. (in Sansk. '*g*' etc.), while the act of cognising both these is without a form. Hence all these three are different from one another (K. IV. 185, p. 191). Further if the form of a thing be identical with its name, the various things denoted by one and the

1. *Āvirbhāva-tirobhāva-dharmakeṣv-anuyāyi yat.*
2. '*Yatra vā jñānam prāg dharma-grahaṇād bhavet*'. Jhā has evidently missed '*yatra vā jñānam*' in translating this verse—see *Ślokav.* Engl. Transl. p. 94.
3. *Na cāvikalpitaḥ śabdād-iti vācyo na gṛhyate. Tenāgṛhīta-śabdopi gotvādīn pratipadyate*—K. IV. 176, p. 189.

same word would be identical, which they are not (K. IV. 186, pp. 191–192).

This description of the nature of substance by Kumārila is evidently in defence of the reality of substance against the view of those who would identify it with either its qualities, or its cognition, or again its name. No particular names of schools or thinkers, whom Kumārila might have had in mind, have been mentioned.

While Kumārila admits non-reflective direct knowledge (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) as preliminary to the reflective one (*savikalpaka*), he insists that the latter should not be denied the name of direct knowledge, as the Buddhists have done, simply because there are other factors in it besides sense-cognition, such as memory, etc. 'It is no command of a king or the *Veda*', says Kumārila, 'that only that (cognition) is *pratyakṣa* which takes place before remembrance'[1]. All cognition which is produced from the contact of the sense-organs with the object, whether before or after remembrance, is to be regarded as *pratyakṣa*[2].

Kumārila begins his exposition of the doctrine of inference with a consideration of Śabarsvāmin's definition of inference in his *Bhāṣyā* viz. 'Inference is the cognition of an object not in direct contact, and forming one of the two sides to a known relation, one

1. K. IV. 234-235 (p. 203).
2. K. IV. 236-237 (p. 203).

of which is directly apprehended'[1]. He says that the 'known relation' (*jñāta-sambandha*) mentioned in the definition refers to the invariable concomitance of the character of the mark (*linga*—the middle term) with that which possesses the mark (*lingi*—the major term); and it is through the middle term that the major term is proved. (K. V. 4, p. 348). The object of inference, according to Kumārila, is the thing denoted by the minor term as qualified by the attribute signified by the major term; e. g. the place as associated with fire (K. V. 47–48, p. 359).[2]

Kumārila objects to Śabara's classification of inference as (1) that based upon a directly apprehended relation (*pratyakṣato dṛṣṭa-sambandha*), and (2) that based upon a commonly known relation (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭa-sambandha*); for he says that all inference is equally based upon some observed relation in particular cases, and that a general proposition such as that which forms the major premise is, in all cases, arrived at by a repeated observation of particular similar instances. The relation between motion and the change of position in the case of the sun[3] is as much based upon the direct apprehension of the cases of motion and the change of position in the

1. *anumānam jñāta sambandhasyaika-deśa-darṣnād eka-deśāntare 'sannikṛṣṭe' rthe buddhiḥ* ŚB. p. 10.

2. *Tasmād dharma-viśiṣṭasya dharmiṇaḥ syāt prameyatā sā deśasyāgni-yuktasya.*

3. Which is an example of the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inference.

case of particular persons such as Devadatta and others, as that between smoke and fire on the mountain[1] is upon the direct apprehension of the concomitance of the two in such particular places as the kitchen etc. (K. V. 138-140, pp. 390-391).

Kumārila devotes a long section of the *Śloka-vārtika* to the discussion of verbal testimony as a means of knowledge. As against such Buddhist logicians as Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers, he maintains that verbal testimony is distinct from inference; for it is devoid of the three conditions of inference (*trairūpya rahitatvena*), and the object of inference is different from that of verbal testimony (*tādṛg-viṣaya-varjanāt*). (K. V. 98, p. 378). He points out that what is meant by verbal testimony as a means of knowledge is not cognition by means of a word, which may be the object of inference, but the meaning of a sentence, and this cannot be the object of inference[2], for it is not arrived at by means of invariable concomitance (K. 108-110, pp. 432-433).

Following Śabarasvāmin, Kumārila also maintains that the object of knowledge by similarity is neither the object remembered, e. g. the cow, nor the object perceived e. g. the gayal, nor the mere similarity

1. This being an example of the *pratyakṣto dṛṣṭa* inference.

2. *Pramāṇam anumānam vā yady api syāt padānumitiḥ Vākyārthasyāgamārthatvād doṣo nāgama-vādinām*'. (V. 108 p. 432).

noticed in the object perceived e. g. the horns in the gayal, but the object remembered as qualified by similarity, e. g. the cow as qualified by similarity to the gayal, or similarity as associated with the object remembered[1]. The reason for this view is that in so far as the identification of a gayal is due to the information given by another person that it is similar to a cow, it is a case of verbal testimony; in so far as the gayal and the marks of similarity are actually cognised by the senses, it is a case of sense-cognition; and in so far as a person is reminded of a cow, it is a case of memory. It is only the cow as qualified by similarity which is not cognised by any other means; and hence it is the object of knowledge by similarity[2]. Knowledge by similarity is not a case of inference, for similarity is not known as a property before it is cognised through resemblance and hence it cannot provide a middle term, which is essential for all inference[3].

Presumption (*arthāpatti*) is the supposition of something unseen (*adṛṣṭam*) in order to avoid a contradiction which would be involved in accepting a cognition obtained by any of the six means of know-

---

1. *Tasmād yat smaryate tatsyāt sādṛśyena viśeṣitam, Prameyam upamānasya sādṛsyam vā tadanvitam.* (V. up. 37, p. 444).

2. *Viśiṣṭasyānyato 'siddher upamāna-pramāṇatā.* (V. Up. 38, p. 445)

3. V. Up. 43, (p. 446).

ledge[1]. Accordingly, Kumārila gives instance of presumption based upon sense-cognition, inference, verbal testimony, knowledge by similarity, etc. For example, the presumption that fire has the property of burning things is based upon the cognition that it burns things; that the sun has got the power of moving from one place to another is based upon the inference that it has actually moved from one place to another, and so on[2]. The stock example of Devadatta or Caitra that he must be out in case he is alive and not to be found at home, is a case of presumption based upon negation. It is shown at length that presumption is an independent means of knowledge, and not a case of inference, the main argument being that in the case of presumption we cannot find a suitable middle term. For example, in the above instance of the presumption that Devadatta must be out in case he is alive and not at home, it is maintained that 'the house as qualified by Devadatta's absence cannot be predicated as a property of that which is denoted by the minor term (viz. Devadatta) for at the time of making such an assertion Devadatta is not recognised as qualified by absence in the house[3]. The presumption

1. "*Pramāṇa ṣatka-vijñāto yatrārtho nānyathā bhavet, Adṛṣṭaṃ kalpayed anyaṃ sārthāpattir udāhṛtā.* p. 450 (V. Arthāp. 1).
2. V. Arthāp. 3-7, (pp. 451-452).
3. *Tad-abhāva-viśiṣṭam tu gṛham dharmo na kasyacit, Gṛhābhāva-viśiṣṭas tu tadāsau na pratīyate*—p. 453-K. 12

that one must be eating at night in case one is fat and does not eat during the day is a case of verbal presumption (*śrutārthāpatti*), and it is shown that it is neither a case of verbal testimony nor of inference[1].

The next means of knowledge recognised by Kumārila is non-existence (*abhāva*). It is the only mode of knowledge to establish the existence of a thing where the other five means of knowledge fail. Non-existence is of four kinds: (1) prior non-existence (*prāg abāva*), e. g. the non-existence of curd in milk; (2) non-existence after destruction (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*), e. g. the non-existence of milk in curd; (3) mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*), e. g. the non-existence of a horse in a cow, and vice versa, and (4) absolute non-existence (*ātyantābhāva*), e. g. the non-existence of horns on the head of a hare[2]. It is pointed out that if non-existence be not accepted as a means of knowledge, we shall have to grant the existence of curd in milk, of milk in curd, of the jar in a piece of cloth, of horns in a hare, of intelligence in the earth, etc., of shape in the soul, of odour in water, of taste in fire, and so on[3]. Further, if the classification of non-existence into prior non-existence etc. be not accepted as true, it will not be possible to draw a distinction between a cause and

1. p. 463, K. 51 ff.
2. p. 473, K. 1-4.
3. p. 473, K. 5-6.

an effect[1]. The same classification also shows that non-existence is to be regarded as a real entity (*vastu*), for an unreal entity cannot admit of such classification[2]. A further proof of the fact that non-existence is a real entity like a cow is that it can be apprehended as applicable or non-applicable to things and is the object of cognition[3].

Following Śabarasvāmin Kumārila admits the six means of knowledge explained above. Implication (*sambhava*) is regarded as a case of inference, for it is maintained that in such cases as the inclusion of the notion of 'one hundred' in that of 'a thousand', the knowledge is due to an invariable concomitance (*aviyuta-bhāvāt*), and, therefore, the cognition is inferential. As regards tradition (*aitihya*) it is pointed out that a good deal of it is found to be untrue, and hence, it is not a valid means of knowledge; and whatever tradition is true it is a case of scriptural testimony[4].

Kumārila undertakes a long dialectical refutation

1. p. 474, K. 7.
2. '*Na cāvastunā ete syur bhedās tenāsya vastutā*'.
3. *Yad vānuvṛtti vyāvṛtti buddhi grāhyo yatas tv ayam, Yasmād gavādi-vastu prameyatvāc ca gamyate*—p. 475, K. 9. G. N. Jhā translates '*anuvṛtti-vyāvṛtti-buddhi-grāhyaḥ*' as 'capable of forming the object of the notions of collective affirmation and differentiation', which I am unable to understand.
4. p. 492, K. 58.

of the doctrine that cognitions have no external objects as their basis (*nirālambana-vāda*). He begins his criticism of the theory by declaring that 'proof and non-proof (*pramāṇatvāpramāṇatva*); virtue and vice together with their consequences; the assumption of the objects of injunctions, eulogistic passages, mantras and names, etc., will be out of place if cognitions were to be regarded as devoid of objects[1]. Therefore, those who want to acquire merit should try to examine the problem of the existence and non-existence of things by means of the accepted means of knowledge.

As against the view that the external world may be supposed to have an illusory reality (*samvṛti*) and that thus it will serve all the purposes of a real external world, Kumārila pertinently points out that there can be no reality about illusory reality, and hence, it cannot be a form of reality; if it is real, it cannot be illusory; and if it is illusory, it cannot be real[2]. Whatever does not exist, is not real; and that which exists is real. Reality cannot be assumed to be of two kinds: that which is real and that which is

1. *Sarvam ityādy ayuktam syād artha-śūnyāsu buddhiṣu.* (p. 217, K. 1-3).

2. *Samvṛter na tu satyatvam satya-bhedaḥ kuto nvayam Satyam cet samvṛtiḥ keyam mṛṣā cet satyatā katham.* p. 218 K. 6.

false[1].

The reality of the external word is maintained against both the subjective idealists of the Yogācāra School and the Śūnya-vāda School of the Buddhists by mainly examining the nature of cognition and pointing out: firstly that in all cognitions there is present the distinction between the cogniser, the cognition and the object cognised, and that one and the same thing cannot be all the three; secondly, that cognition is not cognised by itself, but that it is inferred through the object which is cognised; and thirdly, if the idea of an object were identical with the object, the object would be present along with the idea of it in memory.[2]

Kumārila argues that all the various means of knowledge should be regarded as self-valid; for if self-validity does not belong to them as an inherent power,

---

1. *Tasmād yan nāsti nāsty eva yat tvasti paramarthataḥ Tat satyam anyan mitheyti na satya-dvaya-kalpanā*, p. 219, K. 10.

2. Long and complex dialectical arguments are put forth by Kumarila under *Nirālambana-vāda* and *Śūnya-vāda* of *Śloka-vārtika* against the *Vijñāna-vada* and the *Śūnya-vāda* schools of Buddhism, which it is unimportant to reproduce here; for they have no constructive value, and they are mainly an expansion of the much briefer and clearer refutation as given in the *Śabara-bhāṣya*.

it cannot be had from any other external source[1]. If validity of cognition be regarded as something dependent upon the verification, there will result a regress *ad infinitum*; for the cognition of each such verification will stand in need of another verification, and so on[2]. Therefore, cognition is to be regarded as valid simply by virtue of its being a means of knowledge, and it is to be set aside as invalid only on the discovery of a discrepancy in its cause[3].

Invalidity (*aprāmāṇyam*) is of three kinds: (1) falsity of cognition (*mithyātva*); (2) non-perception or ignorance (*ajñāna*); and (3) doubt (*saṃśaya*). Of these the falsity of cognition and doubt are positive entities, and hence (*vastutvād*) they are due to some defect in the cause of cognition (*duṣṭa-kāraṇād*); and non-perception or ignorance is simply due to the absence of the cause or conditions of cognition. Invalidity is discovered through the cognition of its contradictory, that is to say of the real object; e. g. the invalidity of the cognition of silver in the mother-o'-pearl is discovered by the cognition of the mother-o'-pearl[4].

The nature of generic character, which is called

1. *Svataḥ sarva-pramāṇānām Prāmāṇyam iti gamyatām, Na, hi svato satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena śakyate*, p. 59, K. 47.
2. pp. 60-61, K. 49-51.
3. p. 61, K. 53.
4. p. 62, K. 57.

jāti, *ākṛti*[1], *sāmānya*, or *śakti* is discussed under direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), *Ākṛti* and *Vanavāda*. The main point emphasised about it is that it is to be found in the individuals, and is perceptible by the senses like other particular qualities. In fact the individual and the generic characters are inseparably related to each other, and the cognition of the one would not be possible without the other[2]. All individual objects are cognised as having a twofold aspect—one that which distinguishes them from other objects—the specific character; and the other that which brings them under a common class—the generic character; and this twofold aspect would not be cognised if it did not belong to those objects- It is argued that if an object be perceived merely as a particular, there would be no idea of the generic character; and, on the other hand, if the generic character alone were perceived, there would be no ground for perceiving the particular[3]. A large number of generic characters beginning with that of being are found in an individual object, and they are different from the specific characters such as the possession of a dewlap, etc. in the case of a cow[4].

1. *Jātim evākṛtim prāhuḥ*; p. 546 also *sāmānyam ākṛtir jātiḥ śaktir va so bhidhīyatām*, p. 550.
2. *Anyo nyāpekṣitā nityam syāt sāmānya viśeṣayoḥ viśeṣāṇām ca sāmānyam te ca tasya bhavanti hi*. 9.p. 547
3. *Sarva-vastuṣu budhiś ca vyāvṛtty-anugamātmikā. Jāyate dvyātmakatvena vinā sā ca na siddhyati*, K. 5. *Viśeṣa-mātra iṣte ca na sāmānya matir bhavet*,

(iii) Epistemology of the Prabhākara School of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā.

No original work of Prabhākara has been published so far. The only first hand source of his philosophy is the *Bṛhatī*, a manuscript of which is to be found in the Library of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, and which has been used by Dr Gaṅgānātha Jhā in his exposition of the Prabhākara School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Next to the *Bṛhatī* is the *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā* of Śālikanātha Miśra, a work which is still the main source of the philosophy of the Prabhākara School.

According to the Prabhākara School, knowledge is of two kinds; valid and invalid. Of these the first is called cognition (*anubhūti*), and the second memory (*smṛti*) which is different from cognition[1] in so far as it is produced entirely by the impressions left by a previous cognition (*pūrva-vijñāna saṃskāra-mātrajam*). Following his predecessors in the Mīmāṃsā School, Prabhākara also held the doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge. 'It is strange, indeed', says he, 'how a cognition can be said to apprehend an object

---

Sāmānya-mātra-bodhe tu nir-nimittaviśeṣadhīh. 6. p. 546.

Piṇḍe sattādi-jatīnam bahvīnām samavetatā

Tābhyo viśiṣyate gotvam sāsnādibhir asaṃśayam, 3,p. 614,

1. '*pramāṇam anubhutiḥ; na ca smṛteḥ prāmāṇyāpattir iti darśayati, sā smṛter anyā*'. *P. Pañcikā*, p. 42.

and yet be invalid'[1].

While discussing the view of *Vijñāna-vāda* that cognitions are directly perceived, and that they are identical with the objects of cognition, Prabhākara also, following Śabara-svāmin, maintains that cognitions are not perceived directly but that they are known through inference. In this connection he draws a distinction between an object of direct cognition (*saṃvedya*) and an object of indirect cognition (*prameya*). The former being an object, the form of which is immediatly apprehended through the sense-organ; and the latter that which is cognised indirectly without its form being immediatly apprenended. For example, fire as perceived by the eye is *saṃvedya*, and as inferred through the perception of smoke is *prameya*[2].

Prabhākara differs from his predecessors with regard to the number of the valid means of knowledge in so far as he rejects 'non-existence' (*abhāva*) as a separate *pramāṇa*. Direct knowledge is defined by Prabhākara as direct apprehension (*sākṣāt-pratītiḥ*), which involves the cognition of three factors: (1) the apprehended object (*meya*); (2) the apprehending subject (*mātṛ*); and (3) the act of apprehension

1. *Bṛhatī*, *MS*, p. 3, quoted in *PPM*. p. 21; also *P. Pañcikā*, pp. 32 ff.
2. *Bṛhatī*, *MS*, p. 7 ff; *Ṛjuvimalā* pp. 54-61 (quoted in PPM, p. 26); also cf. *P. Pañcikā*, pp. 63 and 64.

(*pramā*)[1]. This analysis of sense-cognition into three factors has been called '*tripuṭi-pratyakṣa-vāda*; which is regarded as particularly distinctive of the Prabhākara School. A corresponding analysis of cognition is found, as we have already seen, in Vātsyāyana's *Nyāya-bhāṣya* on *NS.* I, 1, 1,—"*arthavati ca prāmāṇe pramātā prameyaṃ pramitir ity arthavanti bhavanti*", but it is not maintained by Vātsyāyana that the apprehending subject is cognised directly in the act of cognition itself.

According to the Prabhākara School, direct knowledge pertains to substance, generic character and qualities[2]. The division of direct knowledge into non-reflective (*nirvikalpaka*) and reflective (*savikalpaka*) in the Prabhākara School is the same as in the Bhaṭṭa School. The difference between the two schools as regards the nature of non-reflective perception is that while according to Kumārila[3], the particular and the generic character, although present implicitly, are not perceived at the first moment; according to Prabhākara, they are perceived, but not as particular and generic characters; for the object cognised is not yet compared with other objects[4].

1, *P. Pañcikā*, p. 52, '*pratyakṣasya viśeṣamāha, meya-mātṛ-pramāsu sā*'.

2. *Dravya-jāti-guṇeṣv indriya-saṃyogotthā sā pratyakṣā pratītiḥ*, *P. Pañcikā*, p. 52.

3. *MSV.* IV, 113.

4. *P. Pañcikā*, pp. 54 and 55.

This view, it will appear, is practically the same as Kumārila's; and that it is not really meant to be different from Kumārila's veiw is evident from the assertion in the *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*: "*nirvikalpakam asāmānya-viśeṣa-viṣayam*"[1] 'non-reflective (*knowledge*) is that which has not the particular and the generic characters as its object', which is just parallel to the text of the *Śloka-vārtika*: "*na viśeṣo na sāmānyam tadānīm anubhūyate*"[2], at that moment neither the particular nor the generic character is apprehended[3]. It

1. *P. Pañcikā*, p. 55.
2. In *ŚV*. IV, 113.
3. The text of *P. Pañcikā* which suggests that there is a difference between Prabhākara and Kumārila on this subject is: '*tasmāt sāmānya-viśeṣau dve vastunī pratipadyamānam pratyakṣam prathamam upapadyate kintu vastvantarānusandhāna-śūnyatayā sāmānya-viśeṣa-rūpatā na pratīyate*'. But here also it is clearly said that the properties are not cognised as specific and generic, and hence the text practically does not mean anything different from what Kumārila has said in *MŚV* IV, 113. G. N. Jhā thinks that there is a real difference between the two schools, when he says (PPM. p. 38) "Here in also lies the chief difference of the Prabhākara from the Bhaṭṭa view etc..."

   Keith appears to favour the view I have expressed here. He says (*K. Mīmāṃsā*, pp. 25, 26). 'There does not appear to be any very real difference between the view of Prabhākara and that of Kumārila, though their verbal expression differs ...'

will appear that later on Rāmānuja[1] has described non-reflective direct knowledge in the same way (Chapter IV, iii) as we find it in the *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*.

All knowledge implies a subject (*mātṛ*) which is cognised directly; for no cognition or remembrance of an object is possible without a subject, which is the self[2]. In all cognitions there is present the consciousness 'I know', not that 'something else knows'[3].

The definition and classification of inference as given by the Prabhākara School are essentially the same as those formulated by Śabarasvāmin and accepted by Kumārila[4]. There is a difference, however, between the Bhaṭṭa and the Prabhākara Schools as regards the nature of the object of inference; for, according to the former, it is something not previously known; while, according to the latter, it is something already known[5]. According to the Bhaṭṭa

1. Rāmanuja's Śrī-bhāṣya.
2. *Yāvatī kācid grahaṇa smaraṇa-rūpā pratītis tatra sākṣād ātmā pratibhāti, na hy ātmany anavabhāsamāne viṣayā bhāsante.* P. Pañcikā, p. 56.
3. *sarvā hi pratītir evam upajāyate 'ham jānāmīti, na punar jānātīti kācid buddhir asti.* P. Pañcikā, p. 56.
4. *Laiṅgikaikadeśa-viṣayam sambandha-niyamam smartaḥ puruṣasya niyata-sambandhaika-deśa-darśanād yā buddhis tad anumānam.* P. Pañcikā, p. 72.
5. *Kecit tu bādhita-viṣayatvam ivāsādhita-viṣayatvam apy anumāna-kāraṇam āhuḥ..., tat prabhākara-matānusāriṇo nānumanyante.* P. Pañcikā, p. 76.

School, although the general concomitance between smoke and fire is known, the particular fire existing at a certain particular spot, e. g. on the mountain, is not previously known, and it is this fire which is the object of inference.

Verbal testimony is called scriptural testimony (*śāstram*) in the Prabhākara School, and is defined as the cognition of an object, which is not in contact with the sense-organs, through the interpretation of words[1]. Only the testimony of the Vedic texts is regarded as reliable; for the words used by a man are always liable to convey erroneous information[2]. In this respect there is a difference between the Bhaṭṭa and the Prabhākara School; for the former classifies verbal testimony as (1) human (*pauruṣeya*) and (2) non-human (*apauruṣeya*), and regards both of them as reliable[3].

The Prabhākara School agrees with the Bhaṭṭa School with regard to the definition and nature of

1. *Śāstram śabda-vijñānād asannikṛṣṭe 'rthe budhiḥ. P. Pañcikā*, p. 87.

2. *Na śāstra-vyatiriktam śābdam asti śabdāddhi yad vijñānam asannikṛṣṭe tac chāstram syāt; na ca veda-vyatirekeṇa tat sambhavati;...laukikam hi vākyam nārthesvyam niścayam āpādayati laukika-vacasām anṛtabhūyiṣṭhatvād artha-vyabhicārasya śaṃkitvāt. P. Pañcikā*, p. 94.

3. *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 51.

knowledge by similarity[1].

Presumption (*arthāpatti*) is defined as that assumption without which a certain known fact cannot be seen to be consistent. According to the Prabhākara School, knowledge by presumption differs from inference in so far as the ground of presumption is doubtful, while that of inference is devoid of doubt. When a certain person, say Devadatta, is not found at home, it is doubtful whether he is alive, and is, therefore out; he may be dead[2]. According to the Bhaṭṭa School, there is no doubt in the ground of knowledge by presumption; for if it be doubtful, it will not be possible to have knowledge by presumption at all. If it be not known for certain that a person, who is not at home, is alive, there cannot be any reason to believe that he is out.

Non-existence (*abhāva*), which is accepted by Kumārila as a means of knowledge, is rejected by the Prabhākara School on the ground that the means of knowledge can be considered only with reference to some object to be cognised—'*sarvam pramāṇam prameyāvinā-bhāvi*'. As there is no object of cognition in the case of cognition by non-existence, it is not to be regarded as a means of knowledge[3].

1. '*Sādṛśya-darśanottham jñānam sādṛśya-viṣayakam upamānam*'. *P. Pañcikā*, p. 110.
2. *P. Pañcikā*, pp, 113–118.
   "*Vinā kalpanayārthena dṛṣṭenānupapannatām.*
   Nayatā dṛṣṭam ārtham yā sārthāpattis tu kalpanā."
3. *P. Pañcikā*, p. 118.

The Prabhākara School agrees with its predecessors in rejecting implication (*sambhava*) and tradition (*aitihya*) as means of knowledge.

That the problem of the nature of generic character (*jāti*) was regarded important by the later Indian philosophers is evident from the discussions concerning it in the works of almost every one of them. We have already seen what Kumārila and some of the Jaina thinkers had to say on the subject. In the *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*[1], we find a classification of the various views held by philosophers about the nature of the generic character. It is said that (1) according to some, the generic character is simply a fiction, (*vikalpa-vi.asita*); (2) according to others, although it is real, it is not different from those things which form its substratum (*āśrayebhyo abhinnām anumanyante*); (3) according to a third class of thinkers, it is different from its substratum, and is cognised by inference (*bhinnām apy anumeyām āhuḥ*); while (4) according to a fourth class of philosophers, it is both different and not different from the things which form its snbstratum (*bhinnābhinnām icchanti*). According to Prabhākara, says the author of the *P. Pañcikā*, the generic character is different from its substratum, and is the object of direct knowledge. It is the product of reflecting over previous forms of

1. Ibid, p. 17 ff. '*Bahudhā jāti-viṣaye vivadante vipaścitaḥ*', etc.

things[1]; that is to say, it is the result of comparison. Prabhākara and Kumārila agree in so far as both regard the generic character as something perceivable by the senses; and they differ from each other in so far as, according to Kumārila, the generic character is not different from the particular things which form its substratum[2]. According to the Prabhākara School, the generic character is found in each individual of a class, and is eternal. It does not appear or disappear with the appearance and disappearance of the individuals. It is only the relation of the generic character with the individual which is established when the individual comes into existence, and ceases when it is destroyed.

The argument that the external world is not real for it is like the world of dreams is refuted by Prabhākara thus: 'We are justified only in assuming from a well-known effect a cause that would make the effect possible, and not one that would destroy it; what we find in a dream is that there is cognition of an external object; this effect can justify us in assuming—not indeed the absolute non-existence of the external object—but the real existence of such an object, as without this the cognition would be an impossibility. As a general law we know it to be true that

1. *Jātir āśrayato bhinnā pratyakṣa-jñāna-gocarā.*
Pūrvākārāvamarśena prabhākara-guror matā.
P. Pañcikā, p. 17.
2. MŚV. *Ākṛti*, 52–62, and *Vana-vāda*, 75–76.

that without which something else is not possible is the *cause* of this latter ; from this it follows that the cause of dream-cognition is some object in the external world'[1]. It is not exactly clear against which particular school this refutation of the doctrine is directed, though we know that the doctrine refuted here is identical with that of Śūnya-vāda of Buddhism.

It is pointed out in the *Prakaraṇa pañcikā* that the term '*pramāṇa*' is ambiguous. It may mean either cognition (*pramiti*) itself, or it may signify the means of cognition (*karaṇa*). In case it is the first, the result (*phala*) of *pramāṇa* is the taking or the rejecting etc. of an external object[2]. If it is the second, it means the contact of the mind, the sense-organs, and the object ; and the result is the cognition itself[3]. This applies both to direct knowledge and inference[4].

1. *Bṛhatī* MS. p. 5 b. (quoted in *PPM.* p. 25).
2. '*Mānatve saṃvido bāhyam hāna-dānādikam phalam*'. P. P. p. 64.
3. *Āpekṣikam ca karaṇam mana indriyam eva vā. Tad-artha-sannikarṣo vā mānam cet pūrvakam phalam.* P. *Pañcikā*, p. 64.
4. *P. Pañcikā*, p. 82.

The Development of Sāṃkhya Epistemology in Gāuḍapāda's Bhāṣya and Vācaspati Miśra's Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā.

The Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge was developed by Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra in their commentaries on the *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, especially by the latter. There is no external evidence to prove or disprove the supposition that the Gauḍapāda, the author of the Bhāṣya on the SK., was the same person as the author of the *Māṇḍūkya—kārikā* bearing that name; but the thought, language and style of the two works suggest that it is very improbable that they were written by the same person. It is a well-known fact now that Gauḍapāda's *Bhāṣya* is mostly based upon an earlier commentary on the *SK.* called the *Māṭhara-vṛtti*, the date of which is believed to be about 500 A. D. The *Bhāṣya* must, however, be earlier than the *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra, for it does not show any knowledge of the comments of Vācaspati Miśra on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikās*, and is decidedly of a primitive style.

(i) Gauḍapāda's Bhāṣya on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā

Under *SK.* 4, Gauḍapāda refers to the Mīmāṃsā list of the six means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*), and states that according to the *Sāṃkhya* presumption

1. See S. K. Belvalkar, *Bhandarkar Commemorative Essays*, 1917, pp. 172, 174.

(*arthāpatti*) is included in inference ; and impication (*sambhava*), non-existence (*abhāva*), guess (*pratibhā*[1]), tradition (*aitihya*) and knowledge by similarity (*upamā*) are included in verbal testimony.

The only point worthy of consideration from the point of view of the theory of knowledge in Gauḍapāda's *Bhaṣya* is his explanation of the three kinds of inference. He says: 'Inference is said to be of three kinds: *śeṣavat*, *pūrvavat*, and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*. That which has a previous (instance) is called *pūrvavat-pūrvam asyāstīti pūrvavat*; for example, rain is inferred from the appearance of clouds, because of the previons experience (*pūrvadṛṣṭitvāt*) ; *śeṣavad*, for example, having found that a drop of water from the sea is salt, (it is inferred) that the rest (of the sea-water) must also be salt. *Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* ;— having observed that they have shifted from one place to another, it is inferred with regard to the moon and the stars that they must be moving like (a person, say) Caitra: Just as having noticed that a person named Caitra has got from one place to another, it is inferred that hê must be moving ; so in the case of the moon and the stars also (that they

1. This is an uncommon term found in Gauḍapāda's commentary. He explains it thus :*pratibhā yathā dakṣiṇena vindhyasya sahyasya ca yad uttaram pṛthivyām āsamudrāyām sa pradeśo manoramaḥ, evam ukte tasmin pradeśe śobhanā guṇāḥ santīti pratibhotpadyate. The Bhāsya*, Colebrooke and Wilson's edition, Bombay, 1897, p. 25.

must be moving). Similarly, having seen that the mango tree is in blossom at one place, it is inferred by means of *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* that mango trees must be in blossom at other places also. This is *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*. What next is meant by saying that inference is based upon a mark (*liṅga*) and that which bears the mark (*liṅgi*)? That (inference) is based upon a mark (*liṅga-pūrvakam*), in which the bearer of the mark (*liṅgi*) is inferred by means of the mark; for instance, a mendicant by means of his staff. That (inference) is based upon the bearer of a mark, in which the mark is inferred by means of that which bears the mark, e. g. having seen a mendicant it is inferred that the triple staff (*tri-daṇḍam*) must belong to him[1]."

It will appear that in his explanation of the three kinds of inference while Gauḍapāda agrees with some of the Nyāya commentators with regard to the meaning of *pūrvavat*, he has his own peculiar interpretations of *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* which very much resemble such explanations of them as are found in *Māṭhara-vṛtti* and *Anuyogadvāra*, both very early works[2]. This is another indication of the fact that the author of the Bhāṣya belonged to an early period.

Gauḍapāda's explanation of '*āpta-śrutiḥ*' as *āptaśca śrutiśca āptaśrutiḥ* is evidently wrong; for

1. *SKGB.* pp. 29, 30.

2. See Dhruva, *Trividham, Anumānam*, *Proceedings of the First Oriental Conference*, Poona, 1919.

the text in *Kārikā* (5) is clearly '*āpta-śrutiḥ*' and I do not see how the compound can be expounded in the way Gauḍapāda has done. He explains 'āpta' as meaning preceptors like Brahman and others '*āptā acāryā brahmādayaḥ*', and '*śruti*' as signifying the Veda-'*śrutir vedaḥ.*' The meaning of '*āpta-śrutiḥ*' is given in the *Kārikā* itself that it signifies the utterance of a reliable person *āpta-śrutir āpta-vacanam tu.*' We shall see that Vācaspati Miśra's explanation of '*āpta-śrutiḥ*' is different from that by Gauḍapāda, although both have tried to include the authority of the Veda as a form of verbal testimony.

The theory of knowledge in the Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra.

The *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī* is VM's commentary on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, and is more important as a work on the Sāṃkhya than even the original work of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Under K. IV. *VM* explains a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) thus: *Pramāṇa* is that by which a thing is measured (known), and hence it is the cause of right cognition (*pramā*)[1]. It is a functioning of the intellect, which is free from doubt and self-contradiction, and has for its object something unknown.[2] This knowledge belongs to some person; the result of it is right cognition; and the means of acquiring

1. *Pramām prati karaṇatvam avagamyate.*
2. *Tac cāsandigdhāviparītānadhigata-viṣayā cittavṛttiḥ.* Dr. G. N. Jhā translates this sentence thus: 'This definite right notion is a mental condition free from the contact of all that is either doubtful, self-contradictory or unknown.' It will appear that '*anadhi-gata-viṣayā*' does not mean 'that free from the contact of all that is unknown' as Dr. Jhā's translation puts it, but 'that which has for its object something not (already) known, which condition, as is well-known was included in the definition of cognition by the later writers on logic in order to exclude memory; and here too the last sentence in the paragraph '*etena saṃśaya-viparyayasmṛti-sādhaneṣv aprasaṅgaḥ*' clearly shows that '*anadhigata-viṣayā*' is meant to exclude memory (*smṛti*).

it is the *pramāṇa*. This description of *pramāṇa* precludes the application of the name to such cognition as is the result of doubt, error and memory.

The various factors in cognition are explained thus: The element of *buddhi* is without consciousness, for it is material; and for the same reason its determinations (*adhyavasāya*) are also devoid of consciousness like a jar, etc. Similarly, pleasures, etc. also, which are the various modifications of *buddhi* are also insentient; while the *puruṣa*, who has no relation to pleasures, etc. is sentient. This *puruṣa* appears to be possessed of cognitions and pleasures, etc. (*jñāna-sukhādimān iva*) on account of these being present in the element of *buddhi* and thus reflecting themselves in the *puruṣa*, while the *buddhi* and its determinations, although insentient in themselves, appear as if they are sentient on account of the reflection of the *puruṣa*[1].

The next point worthy of notice in the *STK.* is the division of inference into '*vīta*' and *avīta*.' *Vīta* is that inference which affirms something on the basis of agreement[2]. This is of two kinds: (i) *pūrvavat*, and (ii) *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*. Of these, the *pūrvavat* is that which has such an object for its inference the characteristics of the species of which are

1. *STK.* (G. N. Jhā's edition), p. 10.

2. '*Anvaya-mukhena pravartamānam vidhāyakam vītam.*'

already known,[1] e. g. the inference of fire on a mountain from the existence of smoke, where the characteristics of fire (as a species) are already known from one's experience of it in the kitchen. The *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* is that which has such an object for its inference the characteristics of the species of which are not known;[2] e. g. the inference of sense-organs from the cognitions of colour, etc., where although one has the idea of general causation from such experiences as the cutting of a tree with an axe, the particular cause of the perception of colour etc. viz. the sense-organs, has never been perceived before.

Avīta is the *śeṣavat* inference which is explained thus: '*śeṣa*' is 'that which remains'; and the inferential knowledge which has this remainder for its object is called '*śeṣavat*.' Then quoting Vātsyāyana it is said that 'the cause in question being eliminated, and the other alternatives being found irrelevant, the idea of the remainder is '*pariśeṣa*'[3]. An example of this kind of inference is given under *SK*. IX, where it is proved that 'the cloth is not different from the threads, since it is a property characteristically inhering in the latter. An object differing in essence from another can never inhere in it; as the cow does not inhere in the horse; but as the cloth is inherent

1. *dṛṣṭa-sva-lakṣaṇa-sāmānya-viṣayaṃ yat tat pūrvavat.*

2. *Adṛṣṭa-sva-lakṣaṇa-sāmānya-viṣayam.*

3. '*prasakta-pratiṣedhe, anyatrāprasaṅgāt śiṣyamāṇe sampratyayaḥ pariśeṣaḥ,*'

in the threads, it is not different from it in essence. It will appear that the essential characteristics of *vīta* and *avīta* inference according to Vācaspati Miśra, as explained here, are the same as those according to Uddyotakara; that is to say, one is based upon agree ment, and the other upon difference.[1]

As regards verbal testimony, after having explained how it comes after inference in order, *VM.* says that it is self-evident (*svataḥ pramāṇam*); for it is free from all discrepancies and doubts on account of its proceeding from the *Veda*, which is not the work of a human being. For the same reason, knowledge which is the result of the texts of the *Smṛtis* and the *Purāṇas* etc., which are based upon the *Veda*, is also true.

It is to be noted that the self-validity which VM. attributes to the knowledge of the *Veda* and its dependent scriptures does not represent the view of the author of the *SK.*, as it is inconsistent with *Kārikā* II where it is said that 'the revealed knowledge is like the obvious, since it is characterised by impurity, decay and excess'[2]. In his comment on this *Kārikā*, VM. has explained this condemnation of the Vedic authority by saying that it refers only to the ritualistic portion of it; but there is nothing in the text of

1. *anvaya-mukhena pravartamānam vidhāyakaṃ vītam; vyatireka-mukhena pravartamānaṃ niṣedhakam avītam.* *STK. on SK.* 5 (p. 12).

2. *dṛṣṭavadānuśravikaḥ sa hy aviśuddhikṣayātiśaya-yuktaḥ.*'

text of the *Kārikā* to suggest that it is so. Further in *Kārikā* V, '*āpta-śrutiḥ*' is explained as '*āpta-vacanam*' the utterance of a reliable person, or as VM. explains it, 'true utterance,' which fact indicates clearly that by '*śrutiḥ*' the author of the *Kārikā* did not mean the *Veda* and the dependent scriptures. VM. himself has explained '*śrutiḥ*' as knowledge of the meaning of a sentence produced by words' *śrutiḥ vākya-janitam vākyārtha-jñānam*.

It is shown that verbal testimony is not a case of inference by pointing out that when the meaning of a sentence is the object of cognition (*prameya*), the sentence or the word does not serve as a mark (*liṅga*); for it is not its property (*na tu tad-dharmaḥ*); nor does a sentence, while signifying something, stand in need of the cognition of a relation such as is needed in the case of inference.

After having explained direct knowledge, inference and verbal testimony VM. proves how the rest of the *pramāṇas* treated by some other schools of thought as separate from these are included in them. Knowledge by similarity, he explains, is a combination of verbal testimony, inference and direct knowledge; for the knowledge produced by the statement: 'The gayal is like a cow' is a case of verbal testimony; the knowledge that the word 'gayal' signifies an animal resembling the cow is a case of inference; and lastly, the cognition of resemblance of the animal called gayal to a cow is a case of direct knowledge.

Presumption (*arthāpatti*) too is not a distinct means of knowledge; for, to take the usual instance, the fact that a person, say Caitra, must have gone out if he is alive and not found at home, is a matter of inference; a particular finite object, when not found in one place, must be found elsewhere.

Non-existence (*abhāva*) is shown to be a case of direct knowledge; for the negation of a jar at a certain spot is merely a particular modification of that spot characterised by the absence of the jar. All forms of existence are changing every moment except the power of consciousness (*citi-śaktiḥ*); and as all of them are perceptible by the senses, there is no object which does not fall within the scope of direct knowledge. Therefore, there is no need of postulating any other form of *pramāṇa*.

Implication (*sambhava*) is a case of inference; for the knowledge, for example, that lesser weights are included in the greater ones, is based upon the general known principle that greater quantities contain smaller ones.

Tradition (*aitihya*) is no mode of knowledge; for it is simply a rumour, the origin of which is not known and hence it is not reliable.

The objectivity of the material world is proved

under SK. XI[1] as against the subjective idealists, who say that there is nothing besides knowledge (*vijñāna*). It is maintained that the manifested world (*vyaktam*) is objective (*viṣayaḥ*), that is to say, perceptible and something external to knowledge. For the same reason it is 'common' (*sāmānyam*), that is to say, it is perceived in common by many persons.[2] If it be accepted that everything is only knowledge, then as knowledge is not common, that is to say, it is not shared by different individuals, material things also would not form the object of common experience. But this is not so ; for, says VM., we find the glances of a dancing girl form the object of attention to many people at a time.

Under *Kārikā* XXVII, while discussing the nature and functions of mind as a sense-organ, VM. explains the distinction between non-reflective (*nirvikalpaka*) and reflective (*savikalpaka*) direct knowledge pointing out that it is mind which supplies defi-

---

1. *Tri-guṇam aviveki viṣayaḥ sāmānyam acetanam prasava-dharmi.*
Vyaktam tathā pradhānaṃ tad-viparītas tathā ca pumān.
It will appear that all that is said in the *Kārikā* is that matter both manifested and unmanifested (*pradhāna*) forms the object of knowledge (*viṣaya*) as opposed to the spirit, which is the subject, and the *Kārikā* by itself does not appear to aim at a refutation of *vijñāna-vāda*. It simply draws a distinction between the characteristics of matter and spirit.

2. *tān praty āha 'viṣaya' iti, viṣayo grāhyaḥ ; vijñānād vahir iti yāvat ; ata eva "sāmānyam" anekaiḥ puruṣair gṛhītam ity arthaḥ.* *STK.* p. 27.

niteness to the object of perception and distinguishes it from other objects. He says : ' First there is only the presentational knowledge which is indeterminate, like that of a child or of those who are deaf, etc. produced by an undefined object (*mugdha-vastujam*). Subsequently, the object is invested with its properties, genus, etc., and this cognition which iutroduces these is also regarded as direct knowledge (*pratyakṣatvena sammatā*). This reflective function which belongs to mind distinguishes an object from others of the same and different species, and forms the characteristic feature of mind.[1] This description of the two kinds of knowledge exactly corresponds to that found in Kumārila's *Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārtika*.

The Vedānta Epistemology according to Gauḍapāda, Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja,

Unlike the other schools of philosophy the epistemology of the Vedānta as found in these important authors is of a divergent nature. In fact, so far as their doctrines of knowledge are concerned they may have as well belonged to three different schools. Gauḍapāda practically adopts the epistemology of the Mādhyamika School in so far as he denies knowledge and reality in the ordinary sense. Śaṃkarācārya makes an attempt to find a middle way between a complete denial of the knowledge and reality of the external

1. *STK.* pp. 46, 47.

world and an unqualified acceptance of its reality by propounding his peculiar doctrine of *māyā* and *avidyā*. Rāmānuja undertakes a trenchent criticism of Śamkara's theory of illusion and maintains that both knowledge and its objects are real. In doing so he gives an analysis of the various means of knowledge, especially of the non-reflective (*nirvikalpaka*) and the reflective (*savikalpaka*) direct knowledge. Both Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja criticise the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism.

(i) The doctrine of illusory existence and illusory knowledge according to Gāuḍapāda.

Gauḍapāda, whose work was the precursor of Śaṃkara's Vedānta, has heen called the first systematic writer on the Vedānta metaphysics. His *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* is in part a commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and in part an original treatise expounding the philosophy of absolute reality. As has already been noticed by the students of the *Kārikā*, both the language and the thought of the author bear ample evidence to the fact that he was greatly influenced by the writings of Buddhist writers, especially of those who belonged to the *Mādhyamika* School.[1] In fact some of his *Kārikās* bear striking resemblance to the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* of Nāgārjuna, and except for the fact that Gauḍapāda has substituted '*Brahman*'

1. Cf. Dasgupta *HIP*. I, pp. 420-429; *Radhakrishnan*, *IP*. pp. 452-453; J. Prasad, *IIP*. p. 128.

for Nāgārjuna's '*Śūnyatā*' there is hardly any difference between the philosophical positions of the two.[1]

The work is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is mainly an interpretation of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, and in this Gauḍapāda explains the four aspects of self. *Firstly*, as the *vaiśvānara ātmān* the self as conscious of the world in the state of waking; *secondly*, as the *taijasa ātman*, the self as conscious in the state of dream; *thirdly*, *suṣupty ātman*, the self as in the state of deep sleep when there is no determinate knowledge, and the self stands in its own pure consciousness and pure bliss; and *fourthly*, the self as beyond all perception, relation, comprehension, definition, expression, etc., that which is characterised by the extinction of phenomenal reality (*prapañcopaśamam*). This last is the true nature of self. In the second chapter, Gauḍapāda explains how the world of experience is unreal. He attributes the perception of all phenomena to illusion (*māyā*). In fact, there is no relation of cause and effect, nor is there any bondage or liberation. The third chapter elaborates the same idea of illusory appearance as due to *māyā*. The fourth chapter is mainly devoted to the discussion of the relation of cause and effect, and it is pointed out by means of a dialectical form of argument, very much like that found in the *Mādhyamika-kārikās*, that there is only the appearance of change and production in things, and that the

1. Cf. *JRAS.* 1910, pp. 136 ff.

ultimate reality is unproduced, unchangeable, non-substantial and completely unmoved.[1] There is no analysis of the various means of knowledge in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, the reason probably being that these are regarded as illusory.

The world of waking experience is shown to be as unreal and illusory as that of dreams–' *svapna-jāgarite sthāne hy ekam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ* ' (II. 5). 'Just as the objects experienced as real in a dream are found to be illusory on waking up, so the objects experienced as real in the state of wakefulness are found to be unreal by those who wake up in the state of absoluteness. Having raised the question as to how the world of experience has come into being, how it appears to be diverse, and how the illusion is to disappear, Gauḍapāda says in quite unmistakable terms that it is *ātman* which conjures up all the diversity by means of its own magical powers, and it is the appearance of true knowledge which dispels this plurality and illusion :

> *Kalpayaty ātmanātmānam ātma-dehaḥ sva-māyayā*
> *Sa eva budhyate bhedān iti vedānta-niścayaḥ*[2]
>
> II. 12.

That one whose self is its body, by itself conjures up its own self by means of its own magical power. It is that again which knows distinctions (among things). Such is the established doctrine of the Vedānta.

---

1. J. Prasad, *IIP*. pp. 128-129.
2. Also cf. II, 13 and ff.

Aniścitā yathā rajjur andhakāre vikalpitā
Sarpa-dhārādibhir bhāvais tadvad ātmā vikalpitaḥ

II. 17.

Niścitāyāṃ yathā rajjvām vikalpo vinivartate,
Rajjur eveti cādvaitaṃ tadvad ātma-viniścayaḥ

II. 18.

Just as a rope, being not distinctly perceived in darkness, is falsely imagined to be such things as a snake, a stream of water, and so on; in the same way is the self imagined to be (different from what it is).

Just as on a rope being definitely perceived as such, the false image disappears, and there appears the single perception that it is a rope only; similarly, on the self being definitely ascertained as such (the plurality of existence disappears).

It will appear that while scholars have prominently noticed the other sections of the *Kārikā* which bear resemblance to Buddhistic philosophy, the particular section from which the above verses have been quoted has received little attention. I regard these verses important in so far as they clearly and conclusively establish the fact that Gauḍapāda, as he appears in the *Kārikā*, is as good a Vedāntist as his successor and well-known champion of the system, Śrī-Śaṃkarācārya. In so far as Gauḍapāda recognises *Brahman* as the universal cosmic principle, he is as distinctly a Hindu philosopher and different from a Buddhist as any one can be. That there is very great resemblance between the monistic Vedānta as found in some of the *Upaniṣads* and as developed,

later on to its fullest extent by Gauḍapāda and Śaṃkarācārya on the one hand, and the Mādhyamika School of Buddhism on the other, no one will deny, but the distinction too between the two systems is unmistakable in so far as the one clearly recognises the existence of self, while the other as clearly denies it. Now Gauḍapāda, in his *Kārikā*, makes use of most of the points common to Mādhyamika Buddhism and the Vedānta in so far as they support the proof of the illusory nature of the mental and the material world; but, at the same time, sticks to the fundamental position of the Vedānta that self is the ultimate reality[1].

The fourth chapter of the *Kārikā*, called the *Alātaśānti* 'Putting out the Fire-brand', proves the illusory nature of the mental and the material world with all its relations of substance and attribute, cause and effect, etc., and in doing so most of the dialectical arguments of the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* of Nāgārjuna have been repeated. The chief points about Gauḍapāda's doctrine of knowledge and reality as found in the *Kārikā* are: (1) That the world of waking experience is as unreal and illusory as that of dreams; (2) That the objects of experience are in no way different from the ideas of the same; (3) That these ideas themselves are illusory. In accepting (1) and

1. The *Kārikā* is full of verses speaking of *Brahman* and *ātman* as the ultimate reality. Besides those quoted above cf. III. 1-12.

(2) Gauḍapāda agrees with the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra Schools respectively; and in maintaining (3) he goes beyond the Yogācāra doctrine. There is a good deal of repetition and ambiguity about Gauḍapāda's arguments, just as we find in those of the *Mādhyamika-kārikā*. It is clear, however, that they are mainly based upon the relation of cause and effect. He starts with the premise that dreams are unreal. They being unreal, their cause which is to be found in the world of waking experience must also be unreal. The world of waking experience being unreal, the ideas of it must also be unreal. Thus all the relations, including that of cause and effect, must also be unreal. The verses like the following are typical of Gauḍapāda's arguments:

> *Asaj jāgarite dṛṣṭvā svapne paśyati tanmayaḥ,*
> *Asat svapne 'pi dṛṣṭvā ca pratibuddho na paśyati*
> IV. 40.
>
> *Nāsty asadd-hetukam asat sad-asadd-hetukam tathā,*
> *Sac ca sadd-hetukam nāsti sadd-hetukam asat kutaḥ.*
> IV. 41.

Having seen unreal objects when awake, one sees the same in dreams being invested with them (*tanmayaḥ*); and having seen unreal objects in dreams also, one does not see them when one wakes up.

The unreal has not for its cause the unreal; likewise the real has not for its cause the unreal; the real has not for its cause that which is real; *and then how can the unreal have for its cause that which is real*?

In the above verse the statement that the real has not for its cause that which is real is evidently based upon the denial of the principle of causation altogether. The last statement, viz. that the unreal cannot have for its cause that which is real, is the main argument employed by Gauḍapāda to prove the unreality of all knowledge and being on the basis of the universally accepted unreal nature of dreams.

(ii) Saṃkara's Theory of Knowledge and Reality.

We do not find a systematic treatment of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) in any of Śaṃkara's works. His theory of knowledge can, however, be deduced from some portions of his works, especially his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras*, II, 2. The background of Śaṃkara's whole philosophy, and so also of his epistemology, is the well-known distinction between the world in the ordinary sense (*vyāvahārika-jagat*), and the world in the highest sense (*pāramārthika-jagat*), corresponding to which there are ignorance (*avidyā*) and knowledge (*vidyā*) respectively. This doctrine of twofold reality is not at all peculiar to Śaṃkara; for, as we have seen already, it is found in such Buddhist works as the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*[1]

1. *LS.* II, 187, where the terms *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha* are used. Dr. E. J. Thomas has drawn my attention to the presence of the same distinction also in *Kathāvatthu-PPakaraṇa-Atthakathā* (JPTS. 1889, p. 10)—"*Sammuti-sacca paramattha saccāni vā ekato katvā pi evam āha*".

and the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* of Nāgārjuna[1]. It is also present in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* of Gauḍapāda[2]. What is peculiar to Śaṃkara is his conception of *māyā* which, according to him, is something positive (*bhāva-rūpa*) and yet inexplicable (*anirvacanīya*). It is the cause of the world in the ordinary sense; and the disappearance of it through enlightenment unveils true reality, which is *Brahman*. It will appear that while Śaṃkara's position with regard to the nature of ultimate and true reality is the same as that of Gauḍapāda, he differs from him and the Mādhyamika School in so far as, while maintaining the illusory character of the phenomenal world, he still holds that it is not unreal in the sense that it is identical with knowledge, or does not exist at all. This rather paradoxical doctrine Śaṃkara is able to hold, although as we shall see presently, inconsistently with his fundamental position, because of his peculiar conception of *māyā*. To him *māyā* is a positive entity, and hence the phenomenal world of which it is the cause has also a positive existence. But as *māyā* is also illusion, therefore, the world of ordinary experience is also illusory.

---

1. *MK*. XXIV, 8 and 9, where the terms '*loka-saṃvṛti-satyam*' and '*paramārtha-satyam*' have been used. (This Thesis p.).

2. IV. 57, *Saṃvṛtyā jāyate sarvaṃ śāśvataṃ nāsti tena vai, Sadbhāvena hy ajam sarvam ucchedas tena nāsti vai.*

Now all the above doctrines are, in the first instance, based, according to Śaṃkara, upon the authority of the revealed scriptures, especially the *upaniṣads*, and this in fact is sufficient to establish their truth. Reasoning by itself is no sure guide to truth, and has to be employed only to prove the truth of that which is already vouchsafed by the revealed testimony. Accordingly, we find that in order to establish his own constructive tenets of philosophy, Śaṃkara constantly and assiduously refers to the scriptural texts for proof, and it is only against his opponents that he uses argumentation.

In the analysis of cognition Śaṃkara holds a position very similar to that of the *Sāmkhya*; for, according to him also, it is the self which knows, and it is the intellect which acts, and the functions of the two are confused because of the reflection of the one on the other. It is because of the self that knowledge is possible. It is known by itself and does not form an object of knowledge like other objects. It is the ego characterised by the sense of I[1]. Cognition results from the conjunction of the self, the internal organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*), the sense-organs and the object. Under *Ved. S.* II, 3, 32 Śaṃkara explains how this internal organ is variously called ***manas***, *buddhi*, *vijñāna* and *citta* according as it functions in one way or another, and how its function being atten-

1. *Ātmabodha*, 25, 27. 28, 33, 34.

tion it is an indispensable factor in all cognition. It is called *manas*, when its function is doubt, etc.—'*saṃśayādi-vṛttikam manā ity ucyate*'; *buddhi* when its function is certainty etc,—'*niścayādikam vṛttir iti*'.

Śaṃkara raises the problem of knowledge and error in the opening lines of his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras* by pointing out that in ordinary experience man fails to distinguish between two such opposite entities as the subject (*viṣayin*) and the object (*viṣaya*); and that this superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of the qualities of the one upon the other is due to ignorance (*avidyā*)[1]. Superimposition he defines as the apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing—'*smṛti-rūpaḥ paratra pūrva-dṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*', or simply, as 'the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing'—'*anyasya anya-dharmāvabhāsatā*'; as for example, 'mother-of-pearl appears like silver'; or 'the moon although one only appears as if she were double'. 'This kind of superimposition', says Śaṃkara, 'learned men consider to be ignorance (*avidyā*), and the ascertainment of the true nature of an object by discrimination they call knowledge (*vidyā*)[2]... 'It is on this mutual superimposition of

1. *Tathāpy anyonyasminn anyonyātmakatām.............. loka-vyavahāraḥ.*
2. '*tad-vivekena ca vastu-svarūpāvadhāraṇaṃ vidyām āhuḥ*'.

self and non-self (*ātmānātmanoḥ*) that all such practical conventions as the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge are based[1], as also all scriptures, whether those concerned with injunctions and prohibitions, or with salvation. But how is it that the means of knowledge such as perception, etc. and the scriptures should treat of that which is dependent upon ignorance ? The answer is that the operation of the means of knowledge is not possible unless there be first a notion of the subject; and this is not possible without the erroneous notion that the sense of 'I' and 'mine' belongs to the body and the senses, etc. For, without the employment of the senses, sense-cognition and the other means of knowledge cannot operate; and without a substratum (*adhiṣṭhānam antareṇa*)[2] the senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act without considering the body as superimposed by the nature of self. Nor can, in the absence of all that (superimposition), self, which, in its own nature, is free from all relations (*asaṅgasyātmanaḥ*), become a knowing subject. And without a knowing subject, there is no scope for the operation of the means of knowledge. Hence, sense-cognition and the other means of knowledge, as also the scrip-

1. *sarva-pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahārā laukikāḥ pravṛttāḥ.*
2. This should be the body, although the *Bhāmatī* takes the word to mean 'superintendence or guidance' and this would be attributed to the soul. See Thibaut's Transl. I. (*SBE*) p. 7 (note).

tures treat of those objects which depend upon ignorance[1]".

The purport of the above paragraph is that the ordinary human knowledge, which is the result of the *pramāṇas*, pertains to the world in the ordinary sense which has only an illusory existence, although within this phenomenal existence also we have distinctions of knowledge and error, e. g. the perception of a rope as a snake. That Śaṃkara regards the world in the ordinary sense as illusory and the result of error just in the same way as a snake, while there is a rope only, and also as something which can be sublated by the appearance of true knowledge, is clear from all his writings here and elsewhere. Hence, his position in this respect is in no way substantially different from that of Gauḍapāda, and he cannot consistently draw a distinction between the world of dreams and that of ordinary experience, in so far as both of them are illusory according to his own admission. His observation while commenting on *Ved. S.* II. 2. 29, that the things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness, while those of which we are conscious in our waking state are *never* negated in any state[2] is not consistent

1. I have adopted Thibaut's translation here and elsewhere with such alterations as appeared to be necessary.

2. '*Naivam jāgaritopalabdham vastu stambhādikam, Kasyāṃcid apy avasthāyām bādhyate*'.

with his well-known view that the world in the ordinary sense is the result of *avidyā* or *adhyāsa*, which can be removed by true knowledge. All that Śaṃkara can say consistently with his position is that the world of waking state is relatively real; and Gauḍapāda was right when he said that the world of dreams is as real or as false as the world of waking experience-real in so far as there is all the appearance of reality, false in so far as it is negated by another experience[1].

Analysis of cognition according to Śaṃkara is to be found in his criticisms of the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism in his commentary on *Ved. S.* II. 2. His refutation of the first of these is based upon his epistemological arguments for the permanence of the knower (*upalabdhṛ*), and that of the second upon the invariable presence of an objective reference in all sense-cognition.

His arguments against the doctrine of momentariness may be summarised as follows:

(i) The philosopher, who maintains that all things are momentary only, would have to extend that doctrine to the knower (*upalabdhṛ*) also. That is, however, not possible on account of the remembrance which is consequent on the original perception—'*upalabdhim anūtpadyamānaṃ smaraṇam eva anusmṛtiḥ*'. That remembrance can take place only if it belongs to the same person who previously made

the perception; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed in the sentences: 'I saw that thing, and now I see this (same) thing', if the seeing person were not in both cases the same? As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and subsequent remembrance, the Vaināśika (the Bauddha) has necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentariness[1].

(ii) Should the Buddhist maintain that the recognition of the subject as one and the same takes place on account of the similarity of *different* self-cognitions, each, however, being momentary only it is to be noted that the cognition of similarity is based upon two things; and that, for this reason, the advocate of universal momentariness, who denies the existence of one permanent subject able mentally to grasp the two similar things, simply talks deceitful nonsense when he asserts that recognition is founded on similarity only.

(iii) Should it be said that the cognition 'this is similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent upon the apprehension of the earlier and

1. This and the following paragraphs are in the main extracts from *Saṃkara's* commentary itself; and the English translation has been mostly adopted from Thibaut's Translation (*SBE*) with slight alterations.

later momentary existences—'*na pūrvottarakṣaṇa-dvaya-grahaṇa-nimittam*', this is to be refuted by the remark that the fact of different terms—viz. 'this' and 'that' being used, points to the existence of different things (which the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to that' would be devoid of meaning; we should, in that case, rather speak of 'similarity' only. Further, the hypothesis of 'mere similarity' being cognised does not explain the ordinary recognition of things, for, in recognising a thing, we are conscious of it being that which we were formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that.

(iv) While it may be admitted that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that, or merely is similar to that, for mistakes may be made concerning what lies outside our minds, with regard to the knower (*upalabdhṛ*) there is never a doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it is rather distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation.

Śaṃkara's refutation of *Vijñāna-vāda* that there are no external objects and that only ideas are real is again based mainly upon epistemological grounds. It is contained in his commentary on *Ved. S.* II. 2. 28-31. The main arguments are as follows:—

(i) The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea, whether it be a post, or a wall, or a piece of cloth, or a jar; and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist. 'Why should we pay attention' says Śaṃkara, 'to the words of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward thing, and that no such thing exists, any more than we listen to a man who while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied?

(ii) If it be said that the subjective idealist does not affirm that he is conscious of no object, but only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of consciousness, the answer is that the existence of a thing as something apart from consciousness has necessarily to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. No body, when perceiving a post or wall is conscious of his perception only, but all men are conscious of posts, and walls, and the like as *objects* of their perception. This is clear from the fact that even those who contest the existence of external things bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an internal object of cognition appears like something external.

(iii) If it be said that the assertion that the idea is like something external does not mean that there is really something external, for external things are impossible, the answer is that the possibility or impossibility of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or non-operation of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*); while, on the other hand, the operation and non-operation of the means of knowledge are not to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities. Possible is whatever is apprehended by direct knowledge, or some other means of knowledge; impossible is that which is not so apprehended. Now, the external things are, according to their nature, apprehended by all the means of knowledge, and are therefore real.

(iv) That the idea is distinct from the thing is further true for the following reasons:

(a) The fact that ideas have the form of objects, which is admitted by the subjective idealists, can be explained only on the assumption that there are objects apart from the idea which are the cause of that form. Similarly, the fact that there is an invariable concomitance of idea and the thing shows that they are related to each other as cause and effect[1].

(b) When there is a perception of two objects,

1. *'asati viṣaye viṣaya-sārūpyānupapatteḥ, bahirupalabdhes' ca viṣayasya; ata eva sahopalambha-niyamopi pratyaya-viṣayayor upāyopeya-bhāva-hetukaḥ.*

e. g. of a white and a black cow; or of two qualities of one and the same object, e. g. the smell and the taste of milk; or again, when we have the perception of a jar and also a remembrance of it, we can see that there are two kinds of ideas involved in these acts, viz. the general ideas of a cow, milk and a jar; and the particular ideas of a white and a black cow; of the smell and the taste of milk and of the jar perceived through the senses. These latter, that is, the particular ideas refer to the existence of things.

(v) If it be said that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike, the objection is that the two sets of ideas cannot be treated on the same footing, for they are different in character. The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness. Similarly, the things of which we are conscious when under the influence of magic or illusion are negated by our normal consciousness. Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like, are never negated in any state. Further the visions of a dream are acts of remembrance, while the presentations (*darśana*) of the waking state are immediate cognition (*upalabdhi*). The distinction between remembrance and immediate cognition is directly known by everybody in so far as the one

is characterised by the absence of the object, while the other by the presence of it[1].

(vi) If it be said, as the Buddhists hold, that the variety of ideas can be explained by the variety of mental impressions (*vāsanā-vaicitryāt*), without any reference to external things, the objection is that the variety of impressions cannot be explained without admitting the existence and perception of external things. How could various impressions originate, if no external things were perceived[2].

In case it be said that the mental impressions do not need an external cause, but that they are caused by one another in a beginningless series, the objection is that such a view would lead to a baseless regress *ad infinitum* and would make life impossible (*vyavahāra-lopinī syāt*).

Besides the existence of external objects of experience, Śaṃkara establishes the existence of self also on the ground that there should be a permanent uniting substratum to the various mental impressions and ideas. He says: 'For unless there exists one continuous principle equally connected with the past, the present, and

1. "*smṛty-upalabdhyoś ca pratyakṣam antaram svayam anubhūyate artha-viprayoga-samprayogātmakam*". Commentary on *Ved. S.* II. 2. 29.

2. *arthopalabdhi-nimittā hi pratyartham nānā-rūpa-vāsanā bhavanti, anupalabhyamāneṣu tv artheṣu kiṃnimitta-vicitrā vāsanā bhaveyuḥ*". Commentary on *Ved. S.* II. 2, 30.

the future, an absolutely unchangeable entity (*kūṭastha*) which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition etc., which are based upon mental impressions dependent on place, time and cause[1].

1. *Na hi kāla-traya-sambandhiny ekasminn anvayiny asati kūṭasthe vā sarvārtha-darśani deśa-kāla-nimittāpekṣa-vāsanādhīna-smṛti-pratisandhānādivyavahāraḥ sambhavati.* Commentary on *Ved. S.* II, 2, 31.

(iii) Analysis of Knowledge in the Śrī-Bhāṣya of Rāmānuja and his Criticism of Śaṃkara's Doctrine of Knowledge and Reality.

The Vedānta as taught by Rāmānuja is known as *Viśiṣṭādvaita*—Modified Monism; and he differs from Śaṃkara on very essential points. While according to Śaṃkara, the ultimate reality called Brahman is a homogeneous impersonal absolute, and the world of experience an illusion; according to Rāmānuja Brahman is a personality which comprehends within itself all the plurality of the world of experience, which, as a manifestation of Brahman, is real and not illusory. Further, Brahman, instead of being attributeless, has all the qualities of perfection. It is both the cause and the content (effect) of the world[1]. As there is no such antithesis as between true reality and false reality in the system of Rāmānuja, there is also, according to him, no corresponding opposition between knowledge and ignorance such as we find in Śaṃkara's philosophy.

In the introduction to his commentary on *Ved. S.* I. 1. 1. Rāmānuja examines Śaṃkara's Vedānta at considerable length; and in the course of doing so deals with some epistemological topics of importance.

As against those who like Śaṃkara maintain that the ultimate and true reality is mere being without

1. Cf. *Vedānta-dīpa*—'*sūkṣma-cid-acid-vastu-śarīraḥ paramātmā kāraṇam, sa eva paramātmā sthūla-cid-acid-vastu-śarīraḥ kāryam iti*', *Śrī B.* pp. 4 and 5.

attributes (*nirviśeṣa vastu*), Rāmānuja maintains that such attributeless reality is inconceivable, and cannot be proved to exist by any of the means of knowledge. His arguments might be analysed as follows:

1. The objects proved by the various means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) are all characterised by attributes; and hence no object devoid of attributes can be proved to exist by means of them[1].

2. If it be said that mere being does not depend upon any means of knowledge for its proof, but that it is immediately intuited by one's consciousness (*svānubhavasiddham*), the answer is that even in such an intuition the notion of attributes is always present both in the case of consciousness itself and the object intuited[2]. It is the nature of consciousness that it is self-illuminating and has the characteristic of illuminating other objects, and hence it is not mere (attributeless) being[3]. Similarly, whatever is intuited by consciousness is characterised by some determination-'This is so', and consequently it also is not devoid of attributes (*viśeṣa*).[4]

1. *saviśeṣa-vastu-viṣayatvāt sarva-pramāṇānām.* *Śrī B.* p. 28.
2. *so 'py-ātma-sākṣika-saviśeṣānubhavād eva nirastaḥ.* *Śrī B.* p. 28.
3. *dhiyo hi dhītvam svayam-prakāśatā ca, jñātur viṣaya prakāśana-svabhāvatayopalabdheḥ'.* *Śrī. B.* p. 28.
4. *Idam aham adarśam iti kenacid viśeṣeṇaviśiṣṭaviṣayatvāt sarveṣām anubhāvānām.*

3. To take the case of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), it will appear that both the reflective (*savikalpaka*) and the non-reflective (*nirvikalpaka*) direct knowledge have for their objects things characterised by attributes. That in cases of reflective direct knowledge things are always cognised as possessed of some attributes is admitted by all. It will appear, however, that even in the case of non-reflective direct knowledge things are cognised as possessed of their individual attributes. 'Non-reflective direct knowledge', says Rāmānuja, 'is the apprehension of an object as devoid of *some* atttibutes, but not as devoid of *all* attributes; for a cognition of that kind is, in the first place, not found ever to take place; and in the second place, it is impossible[1]. All cognition takes place as characterised by some qualification—'This is so' etc., for no object can be cognised apart from such individual cofiguration as e. g. the triangular face, dewlap, etc. (in the case of cows). Thus the non-reflective direct knowledge is the apprehension of the first individual (instance) out of a number of things belonging to the same class—'*eka-jatīya-dravyeṣu prathama-piṇḍa-grahaṇam*'; while the reflective direct knowledge is the apprehension of the second individual (instance), the third and so on—'*dvitīyādi-piṇḍa-graha-*

---

1. *Nirvikalpakaṃ nāma kenacid viśeṣena viyuktasya grahaṇam na sarva-viśeṣa-rahitasya, tathābhūtasya kadācid api grahaṇādarśanāt, anupapatteś ca. Śrī B.* p. 29.

ṇam savikalpakam ity ucyate'. Thus in the cognition of the first instance, there is no apprehension of the pervasivenss of (the generic character of) cowhood etc.; and it is only when the second instance, or the third and so on, is cognised that there is an apprehension of the pervasiveness (of the generic character). The cognition of the second and the subsequent instances has a determinate character, because it is characterised by the pervasiveness of (the generic character) of cowhood, etc. in the configuration of a thing as a result of the connection (of the present cognition) with the first cognition, which (pervasiveness of the generic character) can be ascertained only on the cognition of the second instance[1]. The cogni-

1. *Prathama-pratīty-anusaṃhita-vastu-saṃsthāna-rūpa-gotvāder anuvṛtti-dharma-viśiṣṭatvam dvitīyādi-piṇḍa-grahaṇāvaseyam iti dvitīyādigrahaṇasya savikalpakatvam. Śrī. B.* p. 29.

According to Thibaut (Engl. Transl. *SBE.*) and *Vivṛti* (*BSS*), the word '*piṇḍa*' means 'individual', while according to Raṅgācārya, it means 'outline-perception'. From the use of the phrase '*eka-jātīya-dravyeṣu*'—'from among a number of things belonging to the same class', and the subsequent explanation of the two kinds of direct knowledge it will appear that '*piṇḍa*' should mean 'individual instance' in this context. Raṅgācārya's rendering would have been correct, if by non-reflective direct knowledge the author had meant the apprehension of a thing at the first moment of cognition, as the other philosophers do, but he evidently means by it the apprehension of the first instance.

tion of the first instance is indeterminate, for in that there is no (cognition of) *pervasiveness* of cowhood, etc. in the form of the configuration of the object as characterised by the dewlap, etc.; and not because there is no cognition of the generic character in the form of configuration (of the thing); for the generic character etc. also in the form of configuration is not different (in so far as its cognition goes) from objects cognised by sense. And as without its configuration it is impossible to have the cognition of a thing, even in the cognition of the first instance of it, it is its configuration which is cognised as the thing of such and such a nature[1]. In the case of the cognition of the second and the subsequent instances, it is the configuration, the thing possessing the configuration and the special characteristic of the pervasiveness of (the generic character of) cowhood, etc. which are always cognised, and, therefore, their cognition is

---

The terms '*anuvṛtti*' and '*anuvṛttitvam*' have presented a difficulty to the translators. Thibaut interprets it as 'extension' or 'continuation', while Raṅgācārya renders it as 'continued' persistence' or 'the property of continued persistence'. These renderings, as will appear from the translations of the passage by these authors, do not make an intelligible sense. Vivṛtti's explanation: '*anuvṛttitvam caika-rūpeṇānekatrāvasthitvam*'—'*Anuvṛttitva*' is the pervasiveness of the same form (lit. by means of the same form) in a number of instances—appears to be the best and correct, and the same I have adopted.

1. '*saṃsthānam eva vastu ittham iti gṛhyate*'.

determinate. Hence, sense-cognition has never for its object that which is at attributeless[1].

Like direct knowledge, inference and other means of knowledge also pertain to the cognition of things as characterised by some attribute or attributes. For, inference is based upon what has been already cognised by direct knowledge, and all judgments of knowledge indicate a distinction between the thing denoted by the subject and its character denoted by the predicate. 'In all cases' says Rāmānuja, 'whenever we cognise the notion of an attribute and the substance to which it belongs, the fact that they are entirely distinct from each other is clearly evident from the very act of apprehension"[2].

After having discussed the nature of the *pramāṇas* so as to show that all reality cognised through them appears as possessing some kind of character, Rāmānuja refutes the view that the plurality of things as it

---

1. '*Viśeṣa*' has been translated as 'difference' by Thibaut. The context of the whole passage will show, however, that it is 'attribute' which the term denotes, for the author establishes the '*viśeṣatva*' of things by maintaining that they are always cognised as possessing some *attribute* or other. Raṅgācārya has translated the term as 'attribute' and this rendering is also supported by the Vivṛtti—e. g. '*viśeṣa-rahitasya vastuno rūpādya-bhāvān na tatra pratyakṣaṃ kramate*' p. 33.
2. *Sarvatra viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva-pratipattau tayor atyanta-bhedaḥ pratītyaiva suvyaktaḥ. Śrī. B.* p. 30.

is found in ordinary experience is unreal. He says that this doctrine is based upon a failure to understand correctly the notion of that which is to be sublated (*bādhya*) and that which sublates (*bādhaka*) and the act of sublating the one by means of the other[1]. It is only when there is some contradiction about the existence of things in relation to one another, e. g. one and the same thing cannot both exist and not exist at one and the same place and time, or one and the same thing cannot be both a snake and a rope, that there is room for one thing being sublated by another. But it is not so in the case of such things as a jar, a piece of cloth, etc., and hence all of them are real without any contradiction. For the same reason consciousness and being are also not the same. That the two are distinct from each other is proved by experience; for one stands as subject to the other, which is its object[2].

As against the view held by Śaṃkara's School that sense-cognition itself, which testifies to the existence of things, is false, because it is based upon illusion and is contradicted by scripture, Rāmānuja maintains that sense-cognition cannot be regarded as illusory simply because it is contradicted by scripture. For, in the first place, there is no reason to believe that

1. *Tad-anālocita-bādhya-bādhaka-bhāva-vyāvṛtty-anuvṛtti-viśeṣasya bhrānti-kalpitam.* *Śrī. B.* p. 30.

2. *Anubhūti-siddha-viśeṣayos ca viṣaya-viṣayi-bhāvena bhedasya pratyakṣa-siddhatvāt*, *Śrī B.* p. 33.

knowledge obtained through sense-cognition is necessarily fallacious; and in the second place, if it be said that it is false, because it is contradicted by scripture it is to be noted that, according to Śaṃkara, scripture itself belongs to the phenomenal world of illusion and hence it is no better than sense-cognition as a means of knowledge. Further, if it be said that the knowledge obtained through scripture is not false because it is not contradicted by any other authority the objection is that the mere fact that some knowledge is not contradicted by any other authority can be no guarantee of its truth. This Rāmānuja illustrates by a simile: 'Let us imagine' says he, 'a community of men suffering from defective vision due to darkness, without being aware of this defect, and dwelling in some remote mountain caves inaccessible to all other men possessed of sound vision. As all of them are assumed to be suffering from the same kind of defective vision, all of them will equally perceive, say, a double moon, and there will be no other perception (*pratyaya*) to contradict it. But all the same, however, it is not true that their cognition is not false, or that the double moon is not false[1], Similarly there is no guarantee that the falsity of sense-experience and undifferentiated Brahman as taught by scripture is necessarily true. Following the same line of argument Rāmānuja maintains that Śaṃkara's

1. *Śrī B.* p. 55.

doctrine of *avidyā* is false. He hits at the right point when he says that there is no analogy between self appearing as the phenomenal world and a shell appearing as a piece of silver. For he says 'apprehension (*khyāti*), activity (*pravṛtti*), sublation (*bādha*), illusion (*bhramatva*) are possible only when one thing appears as another, and it is not possible to imagine something which is altogether unperceived and groundless[1]; for such a thing, when imagined, would be inexplicable. Silver, when it is perceived, is not inexplicable[2]; on the other hand, it is perceived as real silver. Were it perceived as something inexplicable, there would be no room for either error or its negation, or again for an effort (to get it)'. The whole difficulty about Śaṃkara's doctrine of *avidyā* is that it is regarded by him as something objective and yet such as can be removed by knowledge, which is by its nature subjective[3].

The essential characteristic of consciousness, according to Rāmānuja, which distinguishes it from other things, is that it is capable of illumining itself to itself on the basis of its own being serving as an object[4]. For in the case of other things such as a jar, etc., although they are objects of consciousness, they

1. As *avidyā* is.
2. "*atyantāparidṛṣṭākāraṇaka-vastu-kalpanā-yogāt, kalpyamānam hīdam anirvacanīyam*", p. 94.
3. Cf. *IIP*. pp. 134 and 135.
4. *anubhūtitvaṃ nāma vartamānatā-daśāyām sva-sattyaiva svāśrayam prati prakāśamānatvam*.

do not illumine themselves to themselves; that is to say, they do not appear as objects to themselves. As against Śaṃkarācārya, Rāmānuja maintains that consciousness can be an object of knowledge; for example, it is so when another person infers about the existence of consciousness in another person on the basis of certain outward signs of speech or action ; or when one's own past states of consciousness become an object of one's cognition.

Having proved that consciousness can appear as an object Rāmānuja proceeds to show that it is not eternal but changing. One consciousness (*anubhūti*) lasts so long as its object is cognised, neither before nor after it; otherwise, if consciousness were eternal, all things would be cognised eternally and all at once. On the ground of this changing nature of consciousness he further maintains that there must be, besides consciousness, another permanent agent to which the different cognitions belong and which could explain the facts of memory and recognition. This he calls self (*ātman*), the existence of which, he says, is directly known to every body in the form of 'I'; for example when one says: 'I know the jar'; 'I understand this matter', etc.[1] Just as consciousness implies the existence of self as the agent or the subject, it also necessarily implies the existence of an object ; for conscious-

1. '*Ghaṭam aham jānāmi, imam artham avagacchāmi ghaṭam aham samvedmīti sarveṣām ātma-sākṣikaḥ prasiddaḥ*'. *Śrī. B.* p. 39.

ness is inconceivable as apart from an object, and it is its very nature that it makes some object known. Further, it is itself known only through an object which is cognised by means of it[1].

Rāmānuja's criticisms of the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism in his Commentary on *Ved. S.* II, 2. 2 are substantially on the same lines as those of Śaṃkarācārya, and hence need not be repeated here.

From what has been said above it will appear that the chief contribution of Rāmānuja to the philosophical thought in India was his criticism of Śaṃkara's theory of false reality and false knowledge. While trying to maintain that there is nothing like mere being Rāmānuja makes a careful analysis of direct knowledge and its two divisions, viz. non-reflective direct knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) and reflective direct knowledge (*savikalpaka*). His explanation of the distinction between the two is different from that given by other writers in so far as he restricts the non reflective direct knowledge to the cognition of the first individual instance out of a number of things belonging to a certain class, and also in so far as he denies that there is no cognition of the attributes con-

1. *Na ca nirviṣayā saṃvit kācid asti, anupalabdheḥ; viṣaya-prakāśana-svabhāvatayaivopalabdher eva hi saṃvidaḥ svayam-prakāśatā samarthitā. Sri B.* P. 36.

stituting the generic character of the object cognised for the first time. According to Rāmānuja, what distinguishes non-reflective direct knowledge from reflective direct knowledge is not the absence in the former of the cognition of the attributes of the object cognised, whether generic or specific, but a failure to see, on account of its being the cognition of the first instance, that the generic qualities cognised in that object are possessed by it in common with other objects of the same class. For instance, to take his own example, even in the cognition of a cow for the first time by a person, the generic features of the animal, e. g. the dewlap and triangular face, etc., will be perceived along with the particular qualities of the individual cow such as colour, size etc., but they will not be known to be the generic qualities of a cow for the simple reason that no other cows have been perceived as yet.

Rāmānuja's criticism of Śaṃkara's doctrine of illusion might be regarded as unfair and off the point, in so far as the claim may be made that Śaṃkara did not deny the phenomenal existence of the world, but on the other hand, maintained the reality and permanence of external things as against the Buddhist doctrines of subjective idealism and momentariness. True, but it is equally true that Śaṃkara's reality, permanence and diversity of the external world are illusory after all, the result of *avidyā*, something to

be sublated by the ultimate and the only reality of Brahman on the arising of *vidyā* or true knowledge; and in so far as Śaṃkara holds this doctrine of illusion Rāmānuja's criticisms of it are not irrelevant at all. In fact, once Śaṃkara holds and admits that the phenomenal world is only an illusion, the only alternative left open to him, and to all those who hold views similar to his, is to keep silent on the nature of reality. Rāmānuja rightly emphasises the point that in so far as we know the world by means of the various means of knowledge, it is real and diverse; and as there is nothing to contradict this experience of ours, there is no reason to believe that it is false. In the case of scriptural testimony too, Rāmānuja maintains that, in the first place, it does not lend support to Śaṃkara's doctrines; and in the second place, even if it did so, the scripture itself, accordiug to Śaṃkara, belongs to the illusory world, and hence its testimony is untrustworthy.

(iV) The Doctrine of mind-dependent existence, and a restatement of Gauḍapāda's position in the Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī of Prakāśānanda.

A consistent exposition of the logical consequences of the illusion-theory of Gauḍapāda is to be found in the *VSM.* of Prakāśānanda. We have seen how Śaṃkarācārya failed to reconcile the reality and perma-

nence of the world of experience with the doctrin of illusion which he had adopted from Gauḍapāda and how consequently he was criticised on this subjec by Rāmānuja. The author of the *VSM.* holds complete and consistent doctrine of mind-dependen existence in so far as he declares without any reser vations that things exist only in so far and so long a they are perceived (*dṛṣṭi-mātra*); that fresh object are cognised in recognition; and that there is n difference whatsoever between the world of dream and that of waking experience. It must be remem bered, however, that this doctrine is typically Vedan tic in so far as all appearance, even such as is presen in cognition, is regarded as illusory and Brahman i considered to be the only reality.

A good summary of the doctrines of the *VSM.* i to be found in verses 18–23[1], which it will not be ou of place here to reproduce with a translation:—

Pratyetavya-pratītyoś ca bhedaḥ prāmāṇikaḥ kutaḥ
Pratīti-mātram evaitad bhāti viśvaṃ carācaram—1

Whence is there a distinction capable of pro between cognition and the cognisable ? This univers moving and non-moving, appears as mere cognition. 1

Jñāna-jñeya-prabhedena yathā svapnaṃ pratīyate,
Vijñāna-mātram evaitat tathā jagac carācaram—1

As a dream is cognised with a distinction betwe

1. *VSM.* pp. 51, 52 (Reprint from the *Pandit*, Benares).

cognition and the cognisable[1], even so is the moving and non-moving world which is mere cognition (cognised with a distinction between cognition and the cognisable)—19.

Tantor bhede paṭo yadvac chūnya eva svarūpataḥ
Âtmanopi tathaivedam bhāna-mātram carācaram–20

Just as a piece of cloth is void in its real nature when there is separation from the threads; so is this world a mere appearance when there is separation from the self—20.

Rajjur yathā bhrānta-dṛṣṭyā sarpa-rūpā prakāśate
Âtmā tathā mūḍha-budhyā jagad-rūpaḥ prakaśate–21.

As through erroneous vision a rope appears to have the form of a snake, so through a deluded intellect the self appears to have the form of the world–21.

Âtmany eva jagat sarvaṃ dṛṣṭi-mātraṃ satattvakam
Udbhūya sthitim āsthāya vinaśyati mukur muhuḥ–22

It is in the self that the whole world with all its elements, which exists only in so far as it is seen, takes its rise, stays and perishes again—22.

Pūrṇānandādvaye śuddhe pāpma-doṣādi-varjite
Pratibimbam ivābhāti dṛṣṭi-mātraṃ jagattrayam–23

In that which is perfect bliss, one without a second, pure, and free from sin and other defects, the threefold world, which exists only in so far as it is seen, appears like a reflection—23.

The doctrine contained in the above verses is seen

---

1. Although there is really no such duality.

more clearly in the discussion in the preceding sections of the work. I shall deal here with only such portions as are concerned with the *dṛṣṭi-mātra-vāda*-the view that the world exists only in so far as it is perceived. That our author does maintain this view is proved beyond doubt by verse 10 which contains an objection of an opponent to the doctrine:—

Ajñāta-sattvaṃ neṣṭam ced vyavahāraḥ katham bhavet,
Na hy adarśana-mātreṇa viṣaṇṇo nāśa-niścayāt—10

If uncognised existence be not accepted, how can one get on in the world? For no one grieves for an object through thinking that it is destroyed, merely because it is not seen.

The discussion on the subject is started as the result of the assertion that in the state of emancipaion there is no unperceived order of duality (*ananubhūyamānaṃ dvaitam*), and in the above verse the first objection to the theory of *dṛṣṭi-mātra* is put forth.

The essential answer to the above objection is contained in the assertion that so long as error lasts or a man remains under the influence of illusion the usual belief in the existence of things continues. A man does not grieve for an object which is not perceived for he continues to believe in its existence, just as a man believes in the existence of things in a dream. 'Nor can it be urged that there is a difference between the states of dreaming and waking, in that the former is destroyed by waking knowledge; for in neither case, while the error lasts, is any negation (of either state)

admitted[1]. Nor is there inconsequence in holding that there is a negation of error on the application of evidence; for none would say that, when the error has been removed, there can be any further dealings with the erroneously surmised object'.

In reply to the further objection that in case the existence of things be admitted only in so far as they are perceived there can be no recognition of things (as identical with those cognised previously), as for example, of the world of waking experience as identical with that cognised before one went to sleep, it is said that all such recognition is due to error, and is similar to the illusory perception of a rope as a snake by a number of persons at the same time. 'When a man passes from waking consciousness into the state of dreamless sleep from which he again awakes, his present consciousness relates to a different series of objects; and as for his recognition it is simply due to error'[2].

The perception of things by means of the sense-organs in the state of wakefulness, which is supposed to differentiate such cognition from that of dreams is

1. p. 28, '*na ca tatra bādho'stīti vaiṣamyam, bhramāvasthāyām kutrāpi bādhasyānaṅgīkārāt*, etc.

2. p. 30, '*evam jāgrad-avasthāyām prapañcam anubhūya suṣuptim gatvā punar utthāya yo' yam prapañcānubhavaḥ, sa prapañcāntaram eva viṣayīkaroti pratyabhijñānam tu avivekād eva.*

maintained to be as illusory as that in the state of dreams[1].

Lengthy dialectical arguments have been given to show that there is no difference between cognition and the objects cognised into which we need not enter here. It is evident that the basic principle of the *VSM* is the illusory nature of the world of experience and the position of the author of this work is much the same as that of Gauḍapāda. It is to be noted further that although such expressions as '*pratīti-mātram*', '*vijñāna-mātram*', '*arṣṭi-mātram*', etc. clearly indicate that the author of the *VSM* held the doctrine that things exist only in so far as they are perceived, this principle is not of much consequence in his system as a whole; and what he ultimately wants to establish is that the essence of things is the absolute Brahman. In other words, it is not so much an idealistic theory of existence which he holds as that of a spiritualistic absolutism, and this can be said of almost all Vedānta philosophers who have been usually regarded as idealists.

1. *Indriyāṇām kāraṇatve bhavec codyam tadā tava Svapna bhrame yathā teṣām anvaya-vyatireka-dhīḥ.* 14.

V. Treatment of Epistemology as a separate subject in the New School of Logic (Navya-nyāya).

The characteristic feature of the New School of Logic is that it confines its treatment to the theory of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) as a subject by itself. This practice of considering the means of knowledge separately from the objects of knowledge (*prameya*) had already its precedent in the works of such Buddhist logicians as Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, or Jaina writers as Māṇikya Nandi and Deva Sūri; and it was in fact due to the influence of these that the Hindu authors departed from their usual custom of dealing with the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge together. This departure in the method of treatment, however, simply means that the theory of knowledge came to be regarded as a distinct subject. It does not signify that the New School held the view that the theory of knowledge could be discussed without assuming the objects of knowledge. Neither the existence of knowledge nor that of the objects of knowledge was ever questioned by these logicians. Hence the change in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatment of the subject, with the advent of the New School, is more of a methodological rather than logical or epistemological nature.

The first Hindu logician who dealt with the theory of knowledge as a subject by itself in his work

was Bhāsarvajña, the author of the *Nyāya sāra*. Next to him was Gaṅgeśa, the author of the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, and the reputed founder of the New School of logic. The main tendency of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians of the later period was: *firstly*, to make such modifications in their theories as were found necessary in the light of the criticisms by the philosophers of the other schools and as could be made consistently with the essential tenets of their own; and *secondly*, to refute such doctrines of their opponents as they found impossible to subscribe to. An instance of the first we have already seen in the case of the modified definitions and classifications of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) in the works of the later writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School. An example of the second is to be found in the refutation of such doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā School as the self-validity of knowledge (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) by logicians like Śrīdhara and Gaṅgeśa, the authors of the *Nyāya-kandalī* and the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* respectively.

From the point of view of epistemology it is unnecessary to enter into a detailed survey of the doctrines of the New School of Logic. There is absolutely nothing new or remarkable in the *Nyāya-sāra* o Bhāsarvajña beyond the fact that in the history o the Nyāya School it was the first work to treat th theory of knowledge as an independent subject, an that he did not accept knowledge by similarit

(*upamāna*) as a separate means of knowledge. The *Nyāya-sāra* is not treated as a work of the New School either, although there is no reason why it should not be regarded as really the first work of that school. As regards the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* it will appear that a good deal of the epistemological matter found in this work, including the refutation of the Mīmāṃsā theory of knowledge, is already present in such previous work as the *Nyāya-kandalī*[1] of Śrīdhara; and so far as I can see the usual claim for the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* that it is an epoch-making work can be substantiated on no other ground than that in the history of Nyāya School it was the first systematic and elaborate work which confined its treatment to the theory of the *pramāṇas* alone. For the sake of completeness of the treatment of the subject I shall give here in outline the main points in the theory of knowledge as expounded by the author of this work.

Gaṅgeśa accepts the usual four means of knowledge of the Nyāya, viz. direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*); inference (*anumāna*); knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*); and verbal testimony (*śabda*), and deals with

1. This work is a commentary on the *Praśasta-pādabhāṣya;* and I have not considered it necessary to devote a separate section to it. Reference to the treatment of certain topics common to the *NK.* and the *TC.* have been given in the footnotes in the following pages.

each of them in the four sections into which the *Tattva cintāmaṇi* is divided[1].

Cognition is classified as right cognition (*pramā*) and wrong cognition (*apramā*), and these are defined in the usual way[2]. In this connection the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the self-validity (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) of knowledge is criticised mainly on two grounds: *firstly*, that the validity of knowledge is conditional in so far as it depends upon the requisite conditions of a correct sense-cognition, inference, etc; as for example, upon the absence of obstruction or defect in the sense-organs in the case of sense-cognition; and the presence of the right premises in the case of inference; and *secondly*, that we are sure of the validity of our knowledge only when our knowledge leads to a successful activity prompted by it[3].

While dealing with the nature of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) Gaṅgeśa criticises the definition of *pratyakṣa* as given in the *NS.*[4] on the ground that *firstly* it is too wide in so far as, because the mind is als

1. *TC.* I, p. 538.
2. *PTC.* I, p. 401 ff. '*yatra yad asti tatra tasyānubhava pramā; tadvati tat-prakārakānubhavo vā. Yatra yo nāsti tatra tasya jñānam tad abhāvavati tat prakārak jñānam vā prama.*
3. *TC.* I, pp. 189 ff.; 401 ff.; Cf.; *NK.* (Viz. *SS.*) pp. 217 ff.
4. *NS.* I, 1, 4—*indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñāna pratyakṣam, avyapadeśyam, avyabhicāri, vyavasāy makam.*

a sense-organ, it includes the inference of soul, and remembrance; and *secondly*, it is too narrow in so far as it excludes cognition by God[1]. According to him direct knowledge is that which is not caused by another cognition—*jñānākaraṇakam jñānam iti tu vayam*[2]. We have seen already that the condition of the contact of the object with the sense-organs (*indriyārtha-sannikarṣa*) had been deleted from the definition of direct knowledge much earlier by the Buddhist and the Jaina logicians and also by Praśastapāda in one of his alternative definitions of *pratyakṣa*. Gaṅgeśa's definition, however, is remarkably expressive of the essential nature of direct knowledge viz. that it is free from every other kind of, and all previous knowledge.

Gaṅgeśa criticises Prabhākara's doctrine of the three-fold direct knowledge—the *Tri-puṭi-pratyakṣa*[3] on the ground that it is not true that we are acquainted with the apprehending subject (*pramātṛ*) in the act of sense-cognition itself. In this connection he draws a distinction between the (first) determination

1. *TC.* I, p. 539 ff. *'ātmānumiti-smṛtyor jñāna-mātre cātivyāpteḥ ātmano 'rthasya manasendriyeṇa saṃyogād utpatteḥ.*

2. *TC.* I, p. 552.

3. *TC.* I, p. 788, *tatrātmā kartṛtvena, jñeyam karmatayā, jñānam kriyātvena bhāsate, to jñātṛ-jñeya-sva-viṣayam jñānam anubhūyata iti tri-puṭi-pratyakṣa-vādinaḥ.*

(*vyavasāya*) and the after-determination (*anu-vyavasāya*) in the act of cognition. The first determination consists of the cognisance of the object as a mere 'this' —'*nanv idam iti vyavasāyaḥ*'; and the after-determination which follows the first consists of the cognition 'I know this'—*tad uttaram idam ahaṃ jānāmīty anuvyavasāyaḥ*[1]. It is shown thus that it is only at the *anu-vyavasāya* stage of cognition that there is consciousness of the self or subject; and this cognition is mental, and not sensuous[2].

Direct knowledge is divided into the non-reflective (*nirvikalpaka*) and the reflective (*savikalpaka*) in the usual way; and the definitions of these two kinds of knowledge are essentially the same as those given by the previous writers[3].

1. *TC.* I, p. 789.
2. Cf. *Nyāya-Kandalī*, pp. 91 and 92 "*apare punar evam āhuḥ, jñāna-saṃsargād viṣaye prakāśamāne prakāśa-sva-bhāvatvāt pradīpavad vijñānam prakāśate prakāśāśrayatvāt pradīpa-vartivad ātmāpi prakāśate iti tri-puṭi-pratyakṣateti; tad apy asat; ghaṭo 'yam ity etasmin pratīyamāne jñātṛ-jñānayor aprati-bhāsanāt yatra tv anayoḥ pratibhāso ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmīti tatrotpanne jñāne jñātṛ-jñāna-viśiṣṭasyārthasya mānasa-pratyakṣatā na tu jñātṛ-jñānayos cākṣuṣa-jñāne pratibhāsaḥ tayor api cākṣuṣatva-prasaṅgāt.*
3. I, *TC.* pp. 809 ff. '*tatra nāma jātyādi-yojanārahitaṃ vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhi niṣprakārakam nirvikalpakam*', p. 806; *savikalpakañ ca viśiṣṭa-jñānam yathā gaur ayam iti*, p. 839.

Inference (*anumāna*) is defined as the instrument of that inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) which is the result of the knowledge of the middle term as being in invariable concomitance with the major term, and as abiding in the minor term[1]. It is maintained that inference is a means of knowledge distinct from sense-cognition[2]. A number of definitions of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) are discussed at length, and the nature of the various parts of a syllogism is explained in detail. The classification of inference into (i) *kevalānvayi*, (ii) *kevala-vyatireki* and (iii) *anvaya-vyatireki*[3]; or again into (i) *svārtha* and (ii) *parārtha*[4] is the same as in the works of the previous writers. *Arthāpatti* is shown to be an act of inference[5].

Knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*) is defined in the same way as by the previous Nyāya logicians, viz. that by means of which through resemblance an object is identified *as bearing a certain name*. It is shown again in the usual way that knowledge by similarity is not a case of sense-cognition or inference. The Mīmāṃsā view on the subject is criticised.

Verbal testimony (*śabda*) is defined as that means of knowledge which is the result of a true knowledge

1. *TC.* II, p. 2 *Tatra vyāpti-viśiṣṭa-pakṣa-dharmatā-jñāna-janyaṃ jñānam anumitis tat-karaṇam anumānam.*
2. *TC.* II, p. 21 ff.
3. Ibid, p. 552 ff.
4. *TC.* II, p. 689.
5. *TC.* II, p. 645.

of the meaning of words according to usage[1]. Gaṅgeśa does not appear to draw any real distinction between verbal *testimony* in the sense of reliable authority and verbal *knowledge* in the sense of meaning conveyed by words. In fact it is the latter which he discusses at length in the chapter on *śabda*, and hence most of the treatment is grammatical rather than epistemological.

1. *TC.* IV. p. 1. *prayoga-hetu-bhūtārtha-tattva-jñāna-janya śabdaḥ pramāṇam.*

APPENDIX

Is there 'Acquaintance' or 'Simple Apprehension' ?[1]

In this paper I propose to take up a discussion on the subject at the point it was left in Dr. Broad's paper published in 'Problems of Science and Philosophy' (Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. II, 1919). In the four papers, which form the symposium on the subject in this volume, the main basis of discussion is the Hon. Bertrand Russell's theory of 'knowledge by acquaintance', which is altogether rejected by Dr. Hicks and Dr. Edgell, and partially supported by Prof. Moore and Dr. Broad. The kind of immediate awareness which is meant to be expressed by the phrase 'knowledge by acquaintance' has, however, been advocated by other writers even before Bertrand Russell, the foremost of whom, I think, is the late lamented L. T. Hobhouse. He discusses this under the title 'Simple Apprehension' in the first two chapters of his 'Theory of Knowledge', and tries to meet such objections to it as were urged, for example, by T. H. Green, or are urged, at present, by Dr. Hicks. Among contemporary British thinkers, besides Prof. Moore and Dr. Broad, another advocate,

1. This paper was originally read by the author at a meeting of the Cambridge University moral Sciences Club during the Easter Term of 1930.

of this kind of immediate experience is Prof. Stout, who also calls it Simple Apprehension. What is also interesting is that this theory of immediate awareness has been advocated by some of the mediaeval Indian philosophers, and we find some very suggestive and parallel notions in the definitions and descriptions of such experience as given by these thinkers of the Orient independently of the philosophers of the West.

It will apear that some of those who have advocated the theory of knowledge by aquaintance or simple apprehension, or the same, or a similar theory under a different name, believe that there is such an experience as consists of a *mere* cognisance on the part of the subject of an object, which is *merely* presented to it. In other words, they believe in the existence of a subject-object relation which consists of *mere* cognisance and *mere* presentation of an object. For example, consider Hobhouse, who, as I have already said, is one of the foremost among the modern thinkers who have discussed and advocated the theory of immediate experience in this sense. He says: 'Thought relations never constitute a content of immediate apprehension. Such contents do stand in manifold relations which are unfolded by judgments about them; but the apprehension of them is not the thought of their relations, nor does it depend for its existence in consciousness upon these relations. The judgments themselves would have no meaning if they did not

refer to the data as apprehended. Apprehension, therefore, does not depend on any hitherto assigned mental activities[1]. And again: 'I conclude, then, that the consciousness in which we are directly or immediately aware of the content present to us, a state which I venture to call apprehension, is a primitive or underived act of knowledge'[2]. Prof. Stout speaks of this immediate experience in similar language. 'Simple apprehension,' says he, 'is the term which seems most suitable for naming this bare presence of an object to consciousness without indicating any more special relation in which the mind may stand to this object'[3]. Bertrand Russell too, inspite of his frequent use of the phrase 'knowledge by acquaintance' means by it the same kind of experience as is meant to be expressed by 'simple apprehension' in the works of Hobhouse and Stout, that is to say, he really means 'acquaintance' and not knowledge based upon acquaintance. He has, in fact, used the very term 'acquaintance' at times to express this. For example, in the following statements: 'We shall say that we have *acquaintance* with any thing of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths'[4];

1. Theory of Knowledge, p. 31.
2. *Ibid*, p. 35.
3. Manual of Psychology, 3rd edition, p. 103.
4. Problems of Philosophy, p. 73. (*italics are mine*)

and again, "All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon *acquaintance* as its foundation"[1]. Among the Indian philosophers Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya school and the author of the Nyāya-Sūtras, defines direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) as that which is the result of the contact of the sense-organs with the object, which is not inferential, not discrepant from its object, and definite. Later on, in the school of Hindu Logic, direct knowledge was divided into two kinds: (1) non-reflective and non-descriptive; (*nirvikalpaka*), corresponding to 'simple apprehension'; and (2) reflective and descriptive (*savikalpaka*), corresponding to ordinary perception. The Buddhist philosophers admit only the first kind of cognition as direct knowledge, for they say that the second kind of cognition is also inferential. That this first kind of cognition corresponds to 'simple apprehension' or 'acquaintance' will be clear from Kumārila's description of it. 'At first', says he, 'there is cognition[2] which is mere apprehension (*ālocana-jñānam*); free from reflection and description (*nirvikalpakam*); that which resembles the cognition of a child or the dumb; and is caused by the mere object (*śuddha-vastujam*[3]). Similarly, Bhāsar-

1. Problems of Philosophy, p. 75 (*italics are mine*)
2. Kumārila, as also most of the other Indian philosophers, regarded such experience as knowledge.
3. *Ślokavārtika*, IV. 112.

vajña describes this kind of direct cognisance as 'that which manifests the mere form of an object (*vastu-svarūpamātrāvabhāsakam*); for example, sucn cognition as produced at the first glance at an object (*prathamākṣasannipātajam*)[1]. Another significant definition of direct knowledge, in the history of Indian philosophy, is that given by *Gaṅgeśa*[2] the founder of the New *S*chool of Indian Logic. He defined it as that direct apprehension which is not the result of (previous) knowledge.

Thus we find a number of European and Indian philosophers agree in holding that there is a kind of direct experience in which the object is *merely* presented to, and taken cognisance of, by the subject. In order to decide whether this view is correct or not I think the crucial point to consider is whether there is, or there can be, a cognisance of the various qualities which constitute the sense-date (called an object), such as a red patch, an extended patch, or a hard patch, etc. without thinking at the same time that it is red, it is extended, or it is hard; or even that we know a red patch, an extended patch, or a hard patch. And if there is, or there can be such a cognisance, when and under what conditions does it take place? It will appear that it is really a satisfactory answer to this latter question which will establish the validity

1. Nyāyasāra, (Calcutta, 1910) p. 4.
2. Tattvacintāmaṇi, Bibl, Indica, p. 552.

of the claim to the existence of such cognisance a is alluded to in the first question; and it will furthe appear that although all the advocates of such direc experience agree in admitting that there is, and ther can be, such a simple cognisance as described abov they differ with regard to its exact status in relatio to cognition. There are, *firstly*, those who seem t think that such direct experience is not to be had i adult life, and that it is simply a factor in the comple cognitive act revealed by analysis. Hobhouse, fo example, says: 'For our purpose it is indifferen whether an act of apprehension ever exists by itsel in the sense of forming the whole state of consciousness for the time being. We are contending merely that such an activity is to be found on *analysis* in many of our mental states; that it is a condition of knowledge; and that by itself it takes us a certain distance and no further'[1]. On this point Bertrand Russell also agrees with Hobhouse. He says: 'Knowledge of things, when it is of the kind we call knowledge by acquaintance, is essentially simpler than any knowledge of truths, and logically independent of knowledge of truths, *though it would be rash to assume that human beings ever, in fact, have acquaintance with things without at the same time knowing some truth about them*'[2]. *Secondly*, there are others

1. Theory of Knowledge, p. 36. (*italics are mine*).
2. Problems of Philosophy, p. 72. (*italics are mine*).

who think that such immediate experience as is expressed by the terms 'acquaintance' or 'simple apprehension', and which consists of simply a subject-object relation, does exist at the first moment of contact of the object with the sense-organs as a condition and substratum of the later cognition which may be called 'knowledge by acquaintance'. This seems to be the view held by Prof. Stout and Dr. Broad, and by most of the Indian philosophers. 'It is a precondition', says Prof. Stout, 'of the cognitive attitude, the feeling attitude, and the conative attitude that there should be something before the mind with which they are concerned', and the 'bare presence' of this 'something' to consciousness he calls simple apprehension[1]. Similar is the view of Dr. Broad, according to whom, if I understand him rightly, there is acquaintance every time a fresh object, or parts of an object, comes into contact with the sense-organs. 'Indeed', says he, 'the following seem to me to be plain facts: (a) That when I suddenly look at a landscape or hear a gun fired, I enter into a special kind of relation with a visual field or a noise; that this relation probably begins to subsist before I begin to judge or discriminate; and that, at any rate, it is present in full force at a time when my acts of discrimination and judgment have hardly begun to enter the field; (b) That when I have discriminated and recog-

1. **Manual of Psychology, p. 103.**

nised various parts of the landscape, one at least the relations which I have to these parts is of precise the same kind as that which I originally had to tl whole. And this relation is what I understand l acquaintance with sense-data'[1]. The same conceptic appears in the works of a number of Indian philosc phers, 'At first', says Kumārila, 'there is cognitio which is mere apprehension (*ālocanajñānam*), whic resembles the cognition of a child or the dumb, an is caused by the mere object (*śuddhavastujam*). Anc according to Bhāsarvajña, this cognition, which mani fests the mere appearance of an object, is such as i produced at the first glance (*prathamākṣasannipāta jam*). Rāmānuja, another well-known Indian teacher seems to think that it is only when a particular sense datum is presented to an individual *for the first time in life* that there is such an immediate experience as we have called 'acquaintance' or 'simple apprehension'; otherwise, in all cognition, there is present the subject-predicate relation of the form 'This is so'.

It is rather difficult to convince another of the truth of what one finds in one's own experience. All that can be done is to appeal to certain facts, which may or may not be seen by others as one sees them. Some facts, however, to which I should appeal in connection with the problem under consideration are as follows :—

1. Problems of Science and Philosophy, p. 211.

(1) Before I know, or can know, an object as 'This is A,' 'This is B,' or even as 'This is something' (which I do not exactly know), there should first be a presentation of the sense-data of A or B, or of the something as mere sense-data, and the mere cognisance of these at the first moment of their presentation is what is meant by acquaintance or simple apprehension. That is why such cognisance was called by Indian philosophers as that caused by the mere object (*śuddhavastujam*). This distinction between the object as it is presented at the first moment and as it is perceived later on should come home more clearly by considering the fact that there is no reason why the object as it is presented at the first moment of the contact of the sense-organs with the object in adult life, should be different from what it would be like to a child at the first moment of its perception, it being granted, of course, that the sense-organs of the child are structurally similar to those of a grown up person, and function in the same way so far as the mere apprehension of the sense-data is concerned. A red patch, *as it is in itself*, should appear as such even to a child the first time it is presented to it, although the child would not be able to perceive it as 'This patch is red'.

(2) All such judgments as 'This is red'; 'This is green', etc. which are symbolical of a descriptive perception involve the identification of a familiar

notion e. g., of redness or greenness with a particular sense-datum 'red' or 'green', which ought to be present, presented and taken cognisance of first as the condition of such identification.

(3) So far as I can see while acquaintance with sense-data is altogether non-inferential, their perception as having a certain character and the descriptive judgment, which follows from it, are inferential. The patch which is presented to my sight is perceived as red *because* I am familiar with other patches having that appearance as red.

From what I have said above with regard to the nature of acquaintance it should be clear that I do not mean by it a vague or primitive kind of knowledge as some have characterised it to be. What is known by acquaintance may represent a *thing* vaguely or distinctly, but so far as the presented sense-datum goes it is bound to be definite. When I hear a voice, I may not be able to make out whose it is, or may not be sure whether it is, or is not, of a particular friend of mine whose it might be, but the voice, whatever it is, is definite *in its own character*. Similarly there is no question of acquaintance being a primitive kind of knowledge. In so far as it is a mere presentation and mere cognisance of sense-data, devoid of all interpretation, it is the same in the case of a child and in that of an adult; in the case of a primitive savage and in that of a civilised man of our modern times.

So far I have considered the nature of acquaintance with sense-data only. A further question is whether there are other kinds of acquaintance also, and if so, what they are. What have we to say to the following observations of Bertrand Russell in this connection ?: 'We have acquaintance in sensation', says he, 'with the data of the outer senses, and in introspection with the data of what may be called the inner sense-thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.; we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either of the outer sense or of the inner sense. Further it is probable, thought not certain, that we have acquaintance with self, as that which is aware of things or has desires towards things. In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things; we also have acquaintance with what we shall call *universals*, that is to say, general ideas such as *whiteness*, *diversity*, *brotherhood*, and so on"[1]. By a happy coincidence an Indian philosopher of about the 7th Century, Dharmakīrti, has also included more than the acquaintance of sense-data in his definition of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), and has classified it into four kinds; (1) Sense-apprehension (*indriyajnānam*), corresponding to acquaintance with sense-data; (2) Mental apprehension (*manovijñānam*), corresponding to Russell's acquintance with the data of the inner sense; (3) Self-consciousness (acquaintance with

1. Problems of Philosophy pp. 80, 81.

self); and (4) Mystic intuition (*yogijñānam*[1]). The essential and common characteristics of all these kinds of direct knowledge are: *firstly*, that they do not admit of description (*kalpanābodḥam*), that is to say, there is no subject-predicate relation in them; and *secondly*, that there is no mistake about them (*abhrāntam*). Now I shall make these two classifications of direct knowledge, which are very similar to each other, the basis of my further discussion of the subject.

After a sense-datum has ceased to be presented I can have an image of it in my mind, and there is as much acquaintance with it as there was with the original sense-datum; and hence memory images may be said to be known by acquaintance. Similarly, that I am acquainted with all my feelings and emotions is also evident from introspection. In the case of memory, I think, we have to draw a distinction between the remembrance of concrete sense-data and that of mere abstract facts. When we remember a mere fact, to me it appears it is not the fact but the remembrance of that fact with which we have acquaintance; and hence, Russell's statement that we have acquaintance in memory with *things* which have been data either of the outer sense or of the inner sense will not be strictly correct. In fact, I think, in memory, we *never* have acquaintance with *things* which have been data either of the outer sense or of

1. Nyāyabindu, Bibl. Indica, p. 1.

the inner sense. What we have acquaintance with is either the image of concrete things, or simply the remembrance of abstract facts. Along with the remembrance of abstract facts it happens, however, that there are also some images of concrete things associated with them, for example, along with the memory of the fact that yesterday I read about the disturbances in Bombay there may also appear, and they usually do appear, the images of the page of the paper in which I read the news, some pictures which appeared on that page, and so on. That besides acquaintance with the external and the internal data, we have also an ever-present immediate consciouness of the existence of a subject or self to which this aquaintance and the other mental processes belong, is also a fact which, I think, may be granted.

A rather more cemplex question than the others is whether we can claim acquaintance with universals; and if we can, with what kind of universals and in what sense ? 'It is obvious, to begin with', says Bertrand Russell, 'that we are acquainted with such universals as white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard etc. i. e. with qualities which are exemplified in sense-data. When we see a white patch, we are acquainted, in the first instance, with the particular patch; but by seeing many white patches, we easily learn to abstract the whiteness which they all have in common, and in learning to do this we are learning to be acquaintep

with whiteness'[1]. Similarly he claims to have acquai tance with what he calls time-relations and spac relations, and also with resemblance. Now tl question is: In what form are we acquainted wi these universals? Are we acquainted with suc universals as whiteness, redness, blackness, etc., sense-presentation, or otherwise? Some philosopher for example, in the history of Indian philosoph Kumārila, Prabhākara and Rāmānuja, seem to thin that they are present as a part of the sense-data; whi others seem to hold that they are simply exemplifie in the sense-data. It will appear, however, that w are acquainted with these universals neither in sens representation nor otherwise as purely abstract notion Whatever we have in sense is a particular sense-datun —a particular red-patch, or a black patch. W simply identify our notion of redness or blacknes with the particular instance of it in sense-represent tion. Redness or blackness as universals cannot b said to be presented in sense, nor are we acquainte with them as sensa. Nor can there be an acquaintanc with them as abstract notions, for, so far as I can see the content of abstract notions remains altogethe unpresented and uncognised until they are analysed and all analysis implies something more than mer acquaintance. In fact, it is questionable whethe there is anything at all like a purely abstract notio

1. Problems of Philosophy, p. 158, 159.

of such simple sensible qualities as redness or blackness. What we have of these by generalisation is a sort of generic image, and it is this with which we are acquainted. Whenever I think of redness independently of a red patch presented in sense it is a sort of generic image of redness which is presented to my mind, and I may be said to be acquainted with this in the same sense as with a particular red patch presented in sense. The same may be said of space and time relations. What is presented in sense is so many particular situations in space. By generalisation we get generic images of 'right' and 'left'; 'above' and 'below', etc., and it is these generic images with which I am acquainted when I think of space relations independently of objects in sense-experience which stand in these relations. Similarly, with regard to time relations, in sense we have only particular sequence, and out of these by generalisation we get generic images of 'before', 'after', etc., and it is these with which I am acquainted when I think of time relations independently of particular sequence presented in sense. As regards more abstract and complex universals, such as brotherhood, virtue, etc., I do not think we even have a generic image of these or an acquaintance with it. All that we can get is a sort of image of an indifferent concrete instance of brotherhood, virtue, etc. All that I say is that we cannot be said to have acquaintance with them as such abstract notions.

The question whether acquaintance is knowledge or not is, as Dr. Broad says, mainly a verbal one. If by knowledge we mean only that which consists of a subject-predicate relation, acquaintance is not knowledge; but if we use the term 'knowledge' in a wider sense so as to include even mere awareness or cognisance of a sensum, acquaintance is knowledge. By most of the Indian philosophers it has been regarded as a mode of knowledge.

All knowledge based upon acquaintance and having acquaintance as one of the factors at the time of cognition may be called knowledge by acquaintance. It is also knowledge by description. It corresponds to the second kind of direct knowledge in Indian philosophy, viz, that which is reflective and descriptive (*savikalpaka*).

I agree with Dr. Broad when he says that acquaintance is incorrigible, or as the Sanskrit term '*avyabhicāri*' literally means: 'that which is not discrepant'. It cannot be different from what it is as presented to an individual at a particular moment. By its very nature it is free from the distinction of truth and error, for it is not of the nature of a judgement.

INDEX.

9. Damaka Prahasana—(An old play in one act). Critic edited with English translation etc. by Mahopadhyaya V. Venk Rama. 0.

10. Shatapatha Brahmana—Of the Kanviya School. Cr cally edited for the first time with an extensive historical intro tion of 120 pages by the famous Western Vedic Scholar Dr. Caland Vol. I. Rs. 10/-, Vol. II. part I. Rs. 5 -, Vol. II. part II complete the book (shortly).

11. Ancient Tribes of India—by Dr. B. C. Law. (Ka Kosalas, Aśokas, Magadhas & Bhojas) with 5 plates. Cloth bou with gold letters. Rs. 3-

12. Principles of Indian Silpa Sastra—together with t text of Mayaśāstra (Architecture, sculpture and painting) by Pr P. N. Bose. Rs. 3-8

13. Ancient Indian Colony of Siam—an uptodate hist of Siam by Prof. P. N. Bose with 6 plates. Cloth bound wi gold letters. Rs. 3-8

14. Philosophy of Vaisnava Religion—with special ref rence to Krishnite and Gaurangite cults by Prof. G. N. Mull M. A. Cloth bound with gold letters. Rs. 8-0

15. Sadukti-karnamrita—of Śrīdhar Dāsa critically edit for the first time by the Late MM. Pt. Ramavatar Sharma M. . together with a Sanskrit intro. by Pt. Padma Singh Sharma an English intro. of 142 pages by Dr. Hara Datta Sharma M.A. A ver beautiful collection of Sanskrit verses on different topics. Complet Cloth bound with gold letters. Rs. 10-0-

16. Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East—Vol. Champa, by Dr. R. C. Majumdar M. A., Ph. D., with 1 map an several plates. In this vol. more than 100 inscriptions written i Sanskrit are also added. It deals with the history and civilisatio of Indian Colony in Annam. Rs. 15-0

17. Silpa Sastra—critically edited for the first time wi an introduction notes and English translation by Prof. P. N. Bo M. A. Cloth bound with gold letters. It deals with the art o House construction. Rs. 2-8-

18. Pratima-Mana-Laksanam—critically edited for the first time with an introduction, Sanskrit and Tibetan texts and English trans. by Prof. Phanindra Nath Bose together with Foreword by Prof. M. Winternitz. Cloth bound. Rs. 4-0-0

19. Vedanta-Syamantaka—of Radhadamodara being a treatise on Bengal Vaiṣṇava Philosophy, edited with introduction, notes, and appendices by Prof. U. C. Bhaṭṭacharya. Rs. 2-8-0

20. Land System in South India—(between C. 800 A.D. and 1200 A.D.) by Dr. K. M. Gupta M. A., Ph. D. together with Foreword by Dr. L. D. Barnett. Rs. 10-0-0

21. Essentials of Advaitism—or a free English translation published for the first time of Suresvara's Naisyakarmyasiddhi by Dr. R. Das. Cloth bound with gold letters. Rs. 5-0-0

22. Studies in Philosophy—by Prof. H. M. Bhaṭṭācārya Rs. 3-8-0

23. Naishadha Charita—of Sri Harsha (or love romance of king Nala) completely translated into English for the first time by Principal K. K. Handiqui M. A. with critical notes and copious extracts from several unpublished comm. older than Mallinatha and Narayana including the material portion of the learned comm. of Candupandita (13th century), with a comprehensive appendix on the Philosophical Allusions and a vocabulary with illustrative extracts chiefly dealing with the rare and obscure words. Cloth bound with gold letters. Rs. 12-0-0

24. Rigveda-Pratishakhya—by Dr. Maṅgala Deva Śāstrī M. A. together with a Foreword by Dr. A. B. Keith, English translation of the text, additional notes, several appendices and indices. Cloth bound with gold letters. Rs. 15-0-0

25. Indian Epistemology—by Dr. Jwala Prashad M. A., Ph. D. being the author's thesis approved for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by the University of Cambridge. Cloth bound with gold letters. Rs. 15-0-0

26. Jaina Iconography—by Prof. B. C. Bhaṭṭācārya M. A. This is the Vol. II. of the author's previous book Indian Images Vol. I. Brahmanical. With several plates. An indispensable book for every historian. Rs. 10-0-0

27. Rigveda Samhita—(or the earliest literary monument of the Aryan race and the most sacred scripture of the Hindus) with the comm. of Veṅkaṭa Mādhava. It is a pre-sāyaṇa commentary and throws almost new light on the Ṛgveda. Critically edited for the first time by Dr. Lakshman Sarup M.A., D. Phil (oxon), Officier d'Academie (France). Not only it contains critical footnotes but also elaborate comparative notes relevant to the exegisis of the Ṛgveda. Parallel passages from the commentaries of Sayaṇācarya, Skanda, Yāska, Brāhmaṇas and others bearing on the interpretation of the Ṛgveda are given. This monumental edition will be completed in 6 big Vols. The first Vol. is ready. Price of the 1st Vol. Rs. 40/- An indispensable book for every Vedic scholar. Other Vols. are in progress.